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Within the last decade, there has been a rapid development in the area of damages in 
English Law. For example, subsales have been considered for the purpose of assessing 
the buyer's damages for breach of warranty of quality (Bence Graphics International 
Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd 1997); the exception to the privity requirement that the promisee 
may, in certain cases, recover damages for losses suffered by a third party has been 
extended to apply to construction cases (St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert 
McAlpine Ltd. 1994); it has been made clear that the recovery of damages for cost of 
cure, which exceeds the diminution in value resulting from defective performance, is 
subject to the reasonableness restriction and the intention to cure is only an evidence of 
the reasonableness (Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth. 
1996). Although this thesis is concerned with sale of goods, the applicability of rules, 
developed in other areas of contract law, to cases of defective goods is examined in this 
thesis. 
In view of such a development, the thesis deals with certain issues that may rise in 
applying the principle of Robinson v. Harman (1848) in cases of breach of warranty of 
quality. The thesis argues against the opinion that subsales should be disregarded in 
calculating the buyer's damages for breach of warranty of quality. Although the buyer's 
damages for breach of warranty of quality are normally calculated on the basis of the 
diminution in value of goods, such a measure should be displaced in certain cases. In 
awarding the buyer damages for diminution in value, the issue becomes whether the 
goods should be valued subjectively or objectively. Calculation of damages in cases of 
profit-making goods requires a consideration of certain factors such as the productive 
capacity, the salvage value and the annual earnings. The thesis develops formulas to 
deal with the quantification of damages in cases of defective profit-making goods. The 
recoverability of damages for certain losses, such as mental distress, is open to debate. 
In examining the recoverability of damages for non-pecuniary losses resulting from 
breach of warranty of quality, the thesis pays special attention to the decision in Malik v. 
BCCI (1998). It should be noted that the thesis starts with examining the recoverability 
of damages for `loss of the right to reject' due to the nature of such a loss as 
distinguished from other losses that may result in cases of defective goods. 
The thesis continues to deal with the manufacturer's liability for defective goods. Save 
in certain cases where a ground for collateral contract can be found, the buyer may not 
be able to sue the remote seller, i. e. the seller who is not in a direct contractual 
relationship with the buyer, for breach of warranty due to the lack of privity. The 
American Uniform Commercial Code is being revised in order to include provisions 
concerning the enforceability of the remote sellers' warranties. Comparing with 
American law seems to be encouraging to argue that the remote seller, at least in certain 
cases, should be contractually liable to the ultimate buyer for defective goods. 
Moreover, cases decided under the American Uniform Commercial Code are considered 
in discussing the issues raised in this thesis. Where different attitudes can be found 
under English and American law regarding certain issues, such a difference is examined 
in order to provide solutions for such issues. The thesis takes a further step to deal with 
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1980. The 
applicability of the Convention to certain cases of defective goods is uncertain. The 
restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages under the Convention are considered in 
order to find out the extent to which the Convention departs from the English and 
American jurisdictions in the area of damages. 
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Compensatory damages can be awarded for several types of loss resulting from breach 
of warranty of quality. After stating the aim and scope of this thesis, this chapter will 
continue to state the terminology adopted in this thesis for the classification of such 
losses. In addition, the last section of this chapter will provide a synopsis of significant 
issues dealt with in this thesis. 
1.1 The Aim of the Thesis 
The purpose of compensatory damages was stated in Robinson v. Harman. ' In this case, 
Parke B said that "[t]he rule of the common law is that where a party sustains a loss by 
reason of breach of contract he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same 
situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. "2 In order to 
attain this purpose, the aggrieved party should be entitled to recover for the actual losses 
he suffered due to the breach. In cases of breach of warranty of quality, the buyer may 
suffer several losses, such as diminution in value of the goods supplied, consequential 
loss of profit, expenses wasted or caused by the breach, etc. 
In applying the principle of Robinson, the court should ensure that the seller is held 
liable for the losses caused by his breach. Here, two main points should not be ignored 
in applying the principle of Robinson. Firstly, the court has to take into account other 
principles concerned with the recoverability and quantification of damages, such as 
remoteness and mitigation. 3 The application of such principles may reduce the buyer's 
damages. Secondly, in certain cases, awarding the buyer for all kinds of damage 
resulting from the breach may overcompensate him. In this thesis, a distinction will be 
drawn between the kinds of damage caused by the breach and the actual loss caused by 
the breach. 4 It will be argued that in order to achieve the objective of damages stated in 
Robinson, one should consider the actual loss suffered by the buyer and not all the 
'(1848) 1 Exch 850. 
2 Ibid, p. 855. 
3 Refer to chapter 7 at p. 277. 
4 Infra, pp. 91-2. 
1 
negative results of the breach. The obvious example, discussed in this thesis on this 
point, is where the defective goods are used as ingredients in manufacturing other 
products. In such a case, the buyer should not be entitled to damages for both of the 
diminution in value of the goods supplied and the diminution in value of the products 
manufactured. 5 In order to avoid overcompensating or undercompensating the buyer, 
this work will develop methods that can be considered in quantifying damages for 
breach of warranty of quality in order to ensure that the objective of compensatory 
damages, stated in Robinson, is achieved. 
In the area of quantification of compensatory damages, the balance for the law is to 
ensure that the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, is achieved whilst at the 
same time the buyer is not overcompensated, taking into account other principles 
concerned with the quantification and recoverability of damages. The purpose of this 
research is to evaluate whether or not the law strikes the right balance in assessing 
damages for breach of warranty of quality and whether the application of the principle 
of Robinson is undermined by applying, or misapplying, other principles developed in 
the area of damages. 
As this work deals with the recoverability as well as the quantification of damages, it 
may make sense to consider, to some extent, the question of whether the ultimate buyer 
can recover damages from the remote seller, i. e. a seller in the distribution chain who is 
not privy to the ultimate purchase contract, for the defective quality of goods. Similarly, 
consideration should be given to the question of whether the third party who is affected 
by the defective quality of the goods can recover damages from the retailer or the remote 
seller. The significance of dealing with such questions is, firstly, to ensure that there are 
no uncompensated losses and, secondly, to ensure that the person responsible for losses 
bears liability for it. 
The objective of compensatory damages under the American Uniform Commercial 
Code (henceforth the UCC) 6 and the United Nations Convention on the International 
5 This point is examined in detail in chapter three, infra at pp. 94-5. 
6 The Sections of the UCC, which will be considered in this thesis, have been adopted under all the 
American jurisdictions except Louisiana. However, in Louisiana, the applicable rules regarding the 
recoverability and quantification of damages in cases of breach of warranty of quality are similar to those 
stated under the UCC. See W. H. Henning and W. H. Lawrence, the Law of Sales under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 1992, para. 1.01. 
2 
Sale of Goods 1980 (henceforth the CISG) is the same objective stated in Robinson. As 
will be discussed in this thesis, the SGA, the UCC and the CISG award the buyer 
damages for the losses resulting from defective goods. By allowing the buyer damages 
for his losses, he may be put in the same position as if the goods had been free from 
defects. However, care must be taken to avoid double recovery for the same loss. The 
large number of cases decided under the UCC make it possible to see whether American 
law strikes the right balance in assessing damages for breach of warranty of quality by 
ensuring that the objective of damages is achieved and at the same time the buyer is not 
overcompensated. In drawing a comparison between the English and American 
jurisdictions, it will be seen that the rules of compensatory damages under both the Sale 
of Goods Act (henceforth the SGA) and the UCC are, to a certain extent, similar. 
The method of comparison adopted in this thesis is as follows. Where there is no 
difference between English and American jurisdictions, it becomes possible to deal with 
English and American cases together. Indeed, it is quite often that the American courts 
refer to English cases. However, this would not happen where there is a difference 
between English and American jurisdictions. As will be seen, damages for certain kinds 
of loss, resulting from breach of warranty of quality, may be recovered under the SGA 
and not under the UCC or vice versa. In such a case, American and English cases will be 
examined separately. In this thesis, where there is a difference between English and 
American law regarding an issue, the difference will be dealt with in order to conclude 
which law deals better with such an issue. Such a comparison may provide help to 
eventually find out whether or not English law strikes the right balance in assessing 
compensatory damages for breach of warranty of quality. 
As regards the CISG, it seems hard to draw a comparison between the SGA and the 
UCC on the one hand and the CISG on the other hand regarding each issue raised in this 
thesis due to two main reasons. Firstly, many questions discussed under the SGA and 
the UCC may not arise under the CISG due to its limited scope. The obvious example 
here is the recoverability of damages for non-pecuniary losses. Secondly, since the CISG 
is relatively recent, the number of cases decided under the CISG is relatively small. 
Therefore, one may not be able to go beyond analysing its own provisions. Nevertheless, 
this work will seek to find out, so far as possible, the extent to which the CISG departs 
from the English and American jurisdictions and whether or not such a difference 
3 
affects the objective of awarding compensatory damages. For example, although the 
SGA, the UCC and the CISG impose, to some extent, similar restrictions on the 
recovery of damages, the thesis will argue that the application of such restrictions may 
vary. It is intended to explain how such a difference in application may affect the 
quantification of damages for breach of warranty of quality. 
1.2 The Scope of the Thesis 
Fuller and Perdue state that contract damages are awarded to protect three interests, i. e. 
expectation, reliance and restitution. 7 Awarding the aggrieved party the value of the 
expectancy under the contract can protect the expectation interest. However, in certain 
cases, as discussed in chapter four, the aggrieved party may seek to recover, as damages, 
the expenses incurred in reliance on the contract. Fuller and Perdue call the interest 
protected here the reliance interest. Lastly, the aggrieved party may be entitled to 
restitution, i. e. to recover what he has paid over to the other party in pursuance of the 
contract. Such a recovery can be in a restitutionary action where the contract is 
rescinded. Ogus adds the indemnity interest to such a classification. 9 Under the 
indemnity interest, the aggrieved party may recover for his liability to a third party. 
In this research, it is intended to examine the recoverability and quantification of 
damages in cases where breach of warranty of quality causes expectation or reliance 
loss. In fact, the classification of Fuller and Perdue has been relied on by respected 
writers, such as Ogus, to conclude that damages should not be recoverable for wasted 
pre-contract expenses. This thesis will argue that such writers, with many respects, 
misapplied the classification of Fuller and Perdue. 
It should be noted that the examination of the concept of `warranty of quality' is not 
within the scope of this thesis. This work presumes that the breach of warranty of 
quality is not in dispute or the buyer has sufficiently proved it. Clearly, this work 
presumes further that the buyer retains the defective goods. In cases where the buyer 
rejects defective goods, he may be entitled to damages for non-delivery, as explained in 
chapter two. Damages for non-delivery are clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Under the UCC the buyer may, in certain cases, revoke his acceptance of goods. As 
7 L. L. Fuller and W. R. Perdue, Jr., `The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages' (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 52. 
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explained in chapter two, where the buyer rightfully revokes his acceptance, he may be 
entitled to damages for non-delivery. 
The term `warranty of quality' is used to mean that the seller warrants the goods to be of 
satisfactory quality. 9 The research will deal with compensatory damages for breach of 
implied and express warranties that are concerned with the quality of goods. The 
arguments developed in this thesis can apply similarly to cases of `fitness for particular 
purpose', 1° `sale by sample"' and `sale by description' 12 where the description is 
concerned with the quality of goods. 
This thesis is concerned with consumer and commercial sales. The distinction between 
consumer and commercial cases will be necessary where different opinions may be 
stated depending on the kind of transaction. In addition, construction cases will be 
considered in order to provide authority where sale of goods cases are unavailable. As 
will be explained, the results reached in discussing certain issues raised in construction 
cases will apply similarly to sale of goods cases. For example, construction cases seem 
to be helpful in discussing the recoverability of cost of cure, as discussed in chapter 
three. 
1.3 Terminology 
This thesis adopts the terminology used by McGregor13 for the purpose of examining the 
remedy of damages. Losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality can be 
classified as normal and consequential. 14 Normal loss, 15 for the purpose of this research, 
is the diminution in value of the goods. Diminution in value occurs usually where the 
goods are not of a satisfactory quality, do not correspond to their description or are not 
fit for specific use agreed on by the parties. The measure of damages for normal loss is 
8 Ogus, The Law of Damages, London, 1973, p. 354. 
9 See Sections 14(2) of the SGA, 2-314 of the UCC and Article 35(2-a) of the CISG. 
10 See Sections 14(3) of the SGA, 2-315 of the UCC and Article 35(2-b) of the CISG. 
" See Sections 15 of the SGA, 2-313(1-c) of the UCC and Article 35(2-c) of the CISG. 
12 See Sections 13 of the SGA, 2-313(1-a) of the UCC and Article 35(1) of the CISG. 
13 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 16th ed., 1997, p. 20. 
14 In drawing the distinction between normal and consequential losses, McGregor relies on the decision in 
Mondel v. Steel (1841) 8 M. & W. 858. In this case, Parke B., at p. 870, made it clear that in an action for 
damages for the defective performance of a contract for goods sold or service, the plaintiff may recover 
"as well the difference between the price contracted for and the real value of the articles or the work done, 
as any consequential damage, might have been recovered... ". Harvey McGregor, ibid at p. 21. 
15 Normal loss may also be referred to as general or primary loss. 
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the difference between the value of the goods as defective and the value they would 
have had if they had been free from defects. The ceiling of recovery for normal loss is 
the value of the goods as warranted. Normal loss is integrally different from 
consequential losses which have nothing to do with the decline in value of the goods 
supplied. Generally, consequential losses do not concern the value of the goods 
themselves. They result from the use or loss of use of the defective goods, such as loss 
of profit, loss of goodwill, extra expenses, liability towards third party, personal injuries 
caused to the buyer, etc. While the amount of normal loss can, to some extent, be 
predictable since it cannot exceed the value of the goods as warranted, consequential 
losses may not be predictable as to their amount and can greatly exceed the value of the 
goods as warranted. 
It should be noted that in the context of contractual exclusions of liability, the 
classification of McGregor seems not to be accepted. This was best explained by the 
decision in Croudace Construction Ltd. v. Cawoods Concrete Products Ltd. 16 where the 
buyers sought to recover damages for late delivery. The sellers relied on an express term 
to the contract, which excluded their liability for consequential losses. The Court of 
Appeal rejected the argument that consequential losses are those losses other than the 
difference in value of the goods "as between the date when the goods should have been 
delivered under the contract and the date when they were in fact delivered"17. Under the 
classification of McGregor, consequential loss can be any loss other than the difference 
in value. Obviously, the Court had a different view. In this case, the Court referred to 
consequential losses as those losses resulting under special circumstances. The Court 
relied on the decision in Millars Machinery Co. Ltd. v. David Way and Son'8 where it 
was held that consequential losses do not include those losses which result directly and 
naturally from breach of contract. 
A similar interpretation of consequential losses in the context of exclusion clauses can 
be found in the decision of the Court of Appeal in British Sugar plc v. NEI Power 
Projects Ltd and Another. 19 In this case, the sellers were in breach of contract by 
supplying defective electrical equipment to the buyers. The buyers sought to recover, as 
16 [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 55. 
17 Ibid, pp. 61-2. 
18 [1934] 40 Com. Cas. 204. 
19 [1997] 87 BLR 42. 
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damages, the increased production costs and loss of profits due to the breakdowns. The 
sellers relied on an express term to the contract which limited their liability for 
consequential losses to the value of the contract that was much less than the claimed 
damages. The sellers relied on the view of McGregor to argue that the increased 
production costs and lost profits were elements of consequential loss. Such an argument 
was rejected by the Court. The Court decided that such losses are not consequential 
losses as they were a natural and direct result of the breach. Obviously, the Court limited 
consequential losses to those losses which were as an indirect result of the breach. 2° 
However, it is still hard to decide whether the loss is a direct or an indirect result of the 
breach. In Saint Line Ltd. v. Richardson, Westgarth & Co. Ltd. , 
21 Atkinson J. said "what 
does one mean by `direct damage'? Direct damage is that which flows naturally from 
the breach without other intervening causes and independently of special circumstances, 
while indirect damage does not so flow. "22 In this view, losses, such as lost profit and 
expenses incurred or wasted by breach of warranty of quality, resulting under normal 
circumstances may not be kinds of consequential loss. The term `consequential losses' 
is confined to those losses resulting under special circumstances. 
This was decided by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Hotel Services Ltd. v. 
Hilton International Hotels (UK) Ltd. 23 In this case, the defendant delivered Robobar to 
the plaintiff (Hilton Hotels) under a hire contract. The purpose of using the Robor was 
to make the guests automatically billed on their account for removal of any of the 
Robobar's contents. The Robobar proved defective. The plaintiff sought to recover, 
among others, the loss of profit resulting from the use of the Robobar and the cost of 
removal and storage of chiller units and cabinets. The defendant argued that such losses 
were excluded from his liability by an express term to the contract which excluded 
liability for consequential losses. Such an argument was rejected by the Court on the 
grounds that consequential losses are those which result under special circumstances. 
The Court was not convinced of McGregor's view that consequential losses may result 
under normal circumstances. 24 
20 Ibid, p. 51. 
21 [1940] 2 KB 99. 
22 Ibid, p. 103. 
23 [2000] BLR 235. 
24 Ibid, p. 239. In this case, the Court, at p. 239, refused to follow the plaintiff's submission that "in Hosier 
& Dickinson Ltd vP&M Kaye Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 146, one sees Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest (at 153), 
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In order to avoid any unexpected interpretation of the term `consequential loss', it seems 
better to state expressly in the exclusion clause the exact nature of the loss, such as loss 
of profit or extra expenses, intended to be excluded from the party's liability. For 
example, the recovery of loss of profit was not allowed in Deepak Fertilisers and 
Petrochemicals Corporation v. ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd. and Others25 due to its 
express exclusion from the defendant's liability. In this case, the plaintiff owned a 
modem methanol plant which was built by the aid of technology and know-how 
deriving from the defendants (ICI plc). The plaintiff contracted with a licensee of that 
technology (Davy) for the supply of the ICI technology and know-how as well as the 
provision of other procurement and supervisory services. The methanol converter 
exploded, due to its defective quality, causing severe damage to the plant and as a result 
all production ceased. The plaintiff sued Davy and ICI. The plaintiff sought to recover 
from Davy, among others, the expenses incurred in reconstructing the plant, wasted 
overhead expenses incurred during the construction and loss of profit. Davy relied on an 
express term to the contract which excluded its liability for consequential losses and loss 
of profit. In this case, the Court of Appeal relied on the decision in Croudace 
Construction Ltd. v. Cawoods Concrete Products Ltd26 to reject the argument that the 
losses of the plaintiff were kinds of consequential loss. 27 However, the Court did not 
allow, as damages, the loss of profit since it was excluded expressly from Davy's 
liability. 
It should be clear now that the classification drawn by McGregor between normal and 
consequential losses is rejected expressly by the Court of Appeal in the context of 
contractual exclusions of liability. Although this thesis adopts the classification of 
McGregor, as it provides a convenient way in examining the quantification and 
recoverability of damages, it must be clear that such a classification does not apply in 
Lord Wilberforce (at 156) and Lord Diplock (at 169) using "consequential" to describe damage in the 
sense espoused by McGregor. " Instead, the Court referred to cases where the term consequential loss was 
interpreted differently in the context of contractual exclusion of liability such as the cases of Croudace 
Construction Ltd. v. Cawoods Concrete Products Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 55, Millars Machinery Co. 
Ltd. v. David Way and Son [ 1934] 40 Com. Cas. 204. 
25 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 387. 
26 [1978] 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 55. See supra, p. 6. 
27 In this case, the Court did not state a definition for consequential losses. It found it enough to rely on the 
decision in Croudace Construction Ltd. v. Cawoods Concrete Products Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd's L. Rep. 55 
to reject the conclusion of the trial judge, at first instance, that loss of profit and overhead expenses are 
related elements to consequential loss. 
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cases of exclusion clause. For the purpose of this thesis, consequential loss can be any 
loss other than the diminution in value. Therefore, losses such as expenses wasted or 
caused by the breach under normal circumstances can be considered as kinds of 
consequential loss. However, in the context of contractual exclusions of liability, such 
losses are unlikely to be considered as consequential losses since the term 
`consequential losses' is confined to those losses resulting under special circumstances. 
This is unlikely to create any confusion in this thesis since exclusion clauses are not 
within the scope of this work. 
As regards the UCC, provisions concerned with damages classify losses as three types, 
i. e. normal, consequential and incidental. 28 Cases decided under the UCC usually refer 
to the diminution in value of the goods supplied as the normal loss. 29 Chapter two of 
this thesis will define incidental loss and hopefully make it clear that such a loss can be 
dealt with as consequential loss under the SGA and the CISG. Regarding the CISG, 
Article 74 awards damages for all losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality as 
long as such damages comply with the restrictions stated in the Convention. The CISG 
does not distinguish expressly between normal and consequential losses. However, it 
can be mentioned here that the distinction between normal and consequential losses, 
adopted in this thesis, seems to be consistent with the Articles of the CISG. In fact, the 
CISG, as mentioned below, does not provide a measure of damages for breach of 
warranty of quality. However, Article 75 which deals with compensatory damages in 
cases of avoidance of contract, awards "the difference between the contract price and the 
price in the substitute transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under 
article 74. " Actually, the term "further damages" may be interpreted as damages for 
consequential losses since the first part of the award is obviously for the normal loss 
resulting from non-delivery or non-acceptance of goods. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the term `consequential loss' will be used, in all cases, to mean losses other than the 
diminution in value of the goods supplied. 
28 See Sections 2-714 & 2-715 of the UCC discussed in chapters 3&4. 
29 Section 2-714(2) of the UCC. 
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1.4 Synopsis of Issues Discussed in the Thesis 
The topic of this thesis has developed from the case of Bence Graphics International 
Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd. 30 In this case, the question was whether the buyer's damages 
should be calculated on the basis of the diminution in value of the goods supplied or on 
the basis of the buyer's liability to his sub-buyers. The Court of Appeal held that in 
cases of resale, the buyer's damages should be assessed on the basis of his liability to 
the sub-buyers. The decision in Bence seems in direct contradiction with the decision of 
the same Court in Slater v. Hoyle & Smith Ltd. 31 where the subsale contracts were not 
taken into consideration for the purpose of calculation of damages. Furthermore, the 
decision in Bence has been criticised on the ground that such a decision may 
undercompensate the buyer. Nevertheless, chapter three of this work will produce an 
argument to support the decision in Bence and show that the Court misdirected itself in 
Slater. 
Where the buyer is entitled to recover for the diminution in value, damages may be 
calculated under a prima facie measure, stated in the SGA and the UCC (henceforth the 
prima facie measure). 32 Such a measure does not exist under the CISG. Therefore, one 
may need to find out how damages for breach of warranty of quality can be quantified 
under the CISG. Under the prima facie measure, the buyer is entitled to recover the 
difference between the value of the goods as defective and the value they would have 
had if they had been as warranted. Normally, the goods are valued objectively. The 
question here is whether the subjective value of the goods can be considered for the 
purpose of calculating the buyer's damages under the prima facie measure. Chapter 
three will argue that the subjective value should be considered, in certain cases, for the 
purpose of calculating damages. Therefore, the issue of whether the buyer is entitled to 
recover for loss of "consumer surplus" cannot be avoided. 
The prima facie measure can be displaced in certain cases. One of these cases is where 
damages are calculated on the basis of the buyer's liability to the sub-buyers, as in the 
case of Bence. Furthermore, the prima facie measure can be displaced in cases where the 
court entitles the buyer to recover the cost of cure of defective goods. Usually, the cost 
of cure equals the diminution in value of the defective goods. Where the cost of cure 
30 [ 1997] 1 All ER 979. 
31 [1920] 2 KB 11. 
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exceeds or is less than the diminution in value, on which basis can the buyer's damages 
be calculated? In answering this question, chapter three will examine the decision of the 
House of Lords in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth. 33 
In this case, the House of Lords considered the restriction of reasonableness which is 
imposed on the recovery of cost of cure. Therefore, the examination of this case is 
significant. 
In awarding the cost of replacement of the defective goods, the court should take into 
account the superiority of the substitute goods. Chapter three will produce a formula to 
deal with the calculation of damages in cases where the substitute goods are superior to 
the defective goods. Furthermore, the commercial life of the substitute goods may be 
longer than the remainder of the potential commercial life of the replaced goods. 
Chapter three will argue that the commercial life of substitute goods should be taken 
into account for the purpose of calculating the buyer's damages. In fact, such a 
commercial life was disregarded in Bacon v. Cooper (Metals) Ltd. 34 However, it will be 
argued that the case of Bacon was decided on its own facts. 
The prima facie measure may also be displaced by means other than the cost of cure. It 
is hoped that chapter three will prove that the prima facie measure should be displaced 
in cases where the defective goods were used to produce goods which, as a result, 
appeared defective. It will be seen that a number of UCC cases, such as Durham v. 
Ciba-Geigy Corp. 35 and Albin Elevator Co. v. Pavlica, 36 were decided wrongly by 
awarding the buyer for both the diminution in value of the defective goods and the loss 
of products made by using the defective goods. In such UCC cases, the buyer was 
overcompensated. Furthermore, it will be seen that the buyer should not be allowed to 
recover for both the diminution in value of a chattel and loss of its potential production. 
One of the crucial cases of calculation of damages is the case of loss of profit. The main 
question is whether damages can be awarded for diminution in value and consequential 
loss of profit. The answer to this question depends on whether the profit is defined as 
gross earnings or net profit. Chapter three will argue that in a number of UCC cases the 
32 Sections 53(3) of the SGA and 2-714(2) of the UCC. 
33 [1996] 1 AC 344. 
34 [ 1982] 1 All ER 397. 
35 1982 S. D. LEXIS 262; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 588 (1982). 
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buyer was overcompensated by recovering damages for the diminution in value and loss 
of gross earnings. However, it is hoped to prove, in chapter four, that the buyer may be 
entitled to recover for the loss of net profit, diminution in value and any expenses 
wasted by the seller's breach of warranty of quality. The chapter will argue that the 
decision in Cullinane v. British "Rema " Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 37 undercompensated 
the buyer. 
Calculation of loss of profit may not be an easy task, especially in cases of profit- 
making goods. In such cases, many factors, such as the productive capacity, the salvage 
value and annual earnings, have to be taken into account. Furthermore, the buyer may 
lose the chance of investing the annual earnings that he would have earned but for the 
seller's breach. Chapter four will develop a formula to deal with the quantification of 
loss of profit in cases of profit-making goods. 
Breach of warranty of quality may cause a delay in the operation of the buyer's business. 
The buyer may be entitled to recover for loss of profit resulting from such a delay. 
Chapter four will deal with the recoverability and quantification of loss of profit in such 
cases. Also, breach of warranty of quality may result in a loss of goodwill which is 
likely to cause loss of profit. Such a loss is too speculative and hard to quantify. Chapter 
four will provide a way to quantify damages for loss of goodwill. 
The main restriction imposed upon the recovery of damages for loss of profit is 
certainty. Chapter four will deal with the degree of certainty required in proving the fact 
and amount of loss of profit. The requirement of certainty has been applied strictly by 
the American courts. The so-called "new business rule" was applied to prevent recovery 
of damages for loss of profit in most cases of new business. The rule has been justified 
on the ground that new businesses have no previous records of profit and, thus, loss of 
profit cannot be proved reasonably certain. The rule is still influential in the American 
courts. Such a rule does not exist under English law. Chapter four will argue that the 
application of such a rule may lead to unfair results in certain cases. 
36 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 358; 34 UCC Rep. Serv. 438 (1982). 
37 [ 1954] 1 QB 292. 
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Where the buyer does not suffer or cannot prove loss of profit, he may sue the seller for 
the reliance expenses wasted by breach. It should be noted that the buyer may not be 
entitled to recover all his capital expenses if the seller proves that the capital expenses 
exceed the buyer's potential gross earning, i. e. where the buyer has made a bad bargain. 
The main question is whether the buyer is entitled to recover, as damages, his lost pre- 
contract expenses. In answering this question, the view of English law seems to be 
different from the view of American law. It seems necessary to look at the justifications 
of both views before deciding whether or not damages for loss of pre-contract expenses 
should be recoverable. 
Breach of warranty of quality may result in physical loss suffered by the buyer. Under 
the English and American law, where physical loss results from breach of a contract, the 
aggrieved party may have the choice to sue in tort, contract or both. However, this may 
not be the case under contracts governed by the CISG. Where physical loss results from 
the breach of such contracts, the question of whether the buyer has a choice to bring a 
contract action under the CISG or a tort action under the applicable domestic law is 
open to debate. Chapter five will participate in such a debate in order to reach a 
conclusion regarding this issue. 
Furthermore, under both English and American law, where physical loss results from 
breach of warranty of quality, the recoverability of damages for such a loss in a contract 
action seems to be beyond question. However, this may not be the case under the CISG. 
The CISG may not apply to cases of certain types of physical loss. In such cases, the 
buyer may bring an action under the applicable domestic law. Chapter five will deal 
with the applicability of the Convention to cases of physical loss resulting from breach 
of warranty of quality. 
The buyer, in making his choice to sue in tort or contract, should take into account the 
remoteness principle. Under English law, the remoteness principle seems to apply in 
contract and in tort differently. It will be argued in chapter five that the difference in the 
application of the principle may lead to unfavourable results. The UCC applies the tort 
test to cases of physical loss resulting from breach of contract. The UCC does not apply 
the remoteness principle to cases of physical loss. Chapter five will examine the 
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approach of the UCC in order to find out whether or not it is favourable in cases of 
physical loss. 
Chapter five is mainly concerned with the recoverability of damages for non-pecuniary 
losses, such as physical inconvenience, disappointment, distress, frustration, anxiety, 
displeasure, vexation and tension, resulting from breach of contract. In certain cases, the 
recoverability of such damages is well settled. However, in most cases, the English and 
American courts do not have a coherent approach regarding the recoverability of such 
damages. The question here is whether such damages should be allowed in cases of 
breach of warranty of quality. In answering this question, chapter five will distinguish 
between consumer and commercial cases. The chapter will pay special attention to the 
view of Lord Steyn in Malik v. BCCI38 which is thought to be of great significance. As 
for the CISG, chapter five will show that the issue is beyond its scope. 
After dealing with the recoverability and quantification of damages for breach of 
warranty of quality in chapters three, four and five, chapter six will deal with one of the 
main defences that can be raised by the seller against the buyer's action. Buyers may be 
unaware of the defective quality of the goods that they sell to sub-buyers. Where the 
sub-buyer suffers physical loss, he may bring an action in tort against the original seller. 
Such an action is not available in cases of economic loss unless such a loss is a 
consequence of physical damage. Where the sub-buyer suffers purely economic loss 
resulting from the defective quality of goods, the question becomes whether the sub- 
buyer can bring a contract action against the original seller. 
Under English law, the ultimate buyer may not be entitled to bring a contract action 
against the remote seller, i. e. the manufacturer, the wholesaler or the distributor, due to 
the requirement of privity. In chain contracts, liability may be shifted up the chain until 
it reaches the remote seller. However, chapter six will argue that the method of passing 
the liability up the chain may be deficient in certain cases. Furthermore, such a method 
may be inapplicable where the chain is broken. Some of the American jurisdictions 
avoid such a method by relaxing the rigour of the requirement of privity. In certain 
cases, such jurisdictions allow the ultimate buyer to file a claim in contract against the 
38 [1998] AC 20. 
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original seller. It is intended to find out whether the remote seller should be liable for 
losses suffered by the ultimate buyer due to breach of warranty. 
Furthermore, chapter six is also concerned with the enforceability of the remote seller's 
express warranty issued to the ultimate buyer. The remote seller may warrant the quality 
of their products through advertisements in order to promote their purchase. The 
manufacturer may also issue a warranty, packaged with or accompanying the goods, to 
the ultimate buyer. In general, such warranties may not be enforceable due to the lack of 
a direct contractual relationship between the remote seller and the ultimate buyer. 
However, as will be discussed, the remote seller's warranty issued to the ultimate buyer 
may furnish a ground for collateral contract between the remote seller and the ultimate 
buyer. Nevertheless, chapter six will argue that the remote seller's warranty should be 
enforceable in all cases regardless of whether or not such a warranty furnishes a ground 
for collateral contract. Although the UCC does not deal with the remote seller's 
warranty issued to the ultimate buyer, chapter six will show that such a warranty is 
enforceable under the American jurisdictions. In fact, the draft39 of the revised Article 2 
of the UCC provides expressly that the remote seller's express warranty issued to the 
ultimate buyer is enforceable. 
Breach of warranty of quality may result in a loss suffered by a beneficiary other than 
the ultimate buyer, such as a hirer of the goods, a member of the buyer's family, an 
employee of the buyer, a visitor, etc. The question here is whether such a beneficiary can 
bring a contract action against the retailer or the remote seller. In answering this 
question, one needs to deal with the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Here, 
can the case of St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. 40 be 
relied on in order to allow the buyer to recover damages for losses suffered by a third 
party beneficiary due to the defective quality of goods? The UCC provides a specific 
section to deal with this question. Chapter six will deal with this section in order to 
conclude whether such a beneficiary should be allowed to bring a contract action against 
the retailer or the remote seller. 
39 The draft of March 2000. 
40 [1994] 1 AC 85. 
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The last chapter of this thesis is concerned with the seller's defences against the buyer's 
claim for damages for losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality. The seller 
may be able to prove that the loss could have reasonably been avoided or it has not 
resulted from the breach of warranty of quality or it is too remote. Furthermore, under 
both the UCC and the CISG, the buyer is required to notify the seller of non-conformity 
of goods within a reasonable time after the discovery of the breach. Such a requirement 
does not exist under English law in cases where the buyer retains the defective goods 
and claims damages. Chapter seven will deal with the significance of such notification 
in order to find out whether or not it is desirable to adopt the requirement of notification 
under English law. 
Some of the seller's defences will be taken into consideration in dealing with issues 
raised in the following chapters. Here, it should be noted that the purpose of chapter 
seven is, firstly, to examine the application of the defences mentioned to cases of breach 
of warranty of quality. The application of such defences to cases other than breach of 
warranty of quality is beyond the scope of this research. The second purpose of chapter 
seven is to state the differences in the application of these defences under the SGA, the 
UCC and the CISG in order to find out how such differences can affect the 
recoverability of damages for breach of warranty of quality. Moreover, the application 
of defences, such as causation and notification, may vary widely among the several legal 
systems. It will be seen how the application of the restrictions imposed on the recovery 
of damages under the CISG can be influenced by the several legal systems. 
The application of restrictions, such as causation, mitigation and remoteness, may raise 
a number of issues. For example, does the buyer's failure to examine the goods break 
the causal link between the seller's breach and the buyer's loss? Is the buyer required, 
under the mitigation principle, to stop using the defective goods after he becomes aware 
of the defect? Does the mitigation principle require the buyer to accept the seller's offer 
to repair or replace defective goods? Does the mitigation principle require the buyer to 
accept the seller's offer to restore the contract price and take the goods back? 
Furthermore, under the remoteness principle, some points are approached differently 
under English law, the UCC and the CISG. Such laws seem to disagree on whether the 
test of remoteness is objective or subjective nor do they agree on whether the principle 




Definition and Classification 
Introduction 
As this work deals with foreign legislation, it seems necessary to state briefly the origin 
and historical drafting of the legislation dealt with in this thesis. Moreover, it may be 
necessary to provide in this chapter an explanation of the concept of compensatory 
damages since it is the subject area of this research. 
The main part of this chapter is concerned with the recoverability and quantification of 
damages for `loss of the right to reject'. Since `loss of the right to reject' is of different 
nature from other losses that may result in cases of defective goods, it seems convenient 
to deal with such a loss at this place. The question regarding cases of this loss is whether 
the court achieved the objective of compensatory damages, as stated in Robinson v. 
Harman, ' by awarding the buyer damages for the actual losses resulting from the 
seller's breach. The main argument in this respect is that in a number of cases of `loss of 
the right to reject', the buyer was overcompensated by receiving damages for his market 
loss which did not result from the seller's breach. Before dealing with this point, this 
chapter will explain what is meant by `loss of the right to reject' in this research and 
how it can result in cases of breach of quality warranty. 
In addition, this chapter deals with other points that seem necessary to be considered at 
the beginning of this research. For example, since some arguments, raised in the 
following chapters, are more concerned with consumer sales than commercial sales, it is 
convenient to explain at this place that the CISG is unlikely to apply to consumer sales. 
Another point to be considered at this place is the classification of losses. As explained 
in the previous chapter, losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality can be 
classified as normal and consequential. The UCC seems to add another kind of loss, i. e. 
incidental loss. It is hoped to explain that such a loss is unlikely to result from breach of 
warranty of quality. 
1 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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2.1 Background to the SGA, the UCC and the CISG 
The SGA was enacted in 1979. The purpose of the SGA was to consolidate the law 
regarding sale of goods by putting in one form the 1893 Sale of Goods Act as it had 
been amended between 1893 and 1979. Generally, the court, in applying the provisions 
of the SGA, should not be affected by cases decided before the 1893 Act. This can be 
understood from the famous statement of Lord Herschell in Bank of England v. 
Vagliano Brothers. 2 He said 
"... the purpose of such a statute was that on any point specifically dealt with by 
it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used instead of, as 
before, by roaming over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what 
the law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior 
decision. "3 
However, in practice, the court may refer to cases, decided before the 1893 Act, where 
the SGA is silent on particular issue. 4 Moreover, where it is generally accepted that a 
provision in the SGA was intended to give effect of a particular decision or view in a 
case, the court may refer to such a case. The obvious example in this thesis is Section 
53(2) of the SGA. It is generally accepted that Section 53(2) of the SGA was enacted to 
give effect for the decision in Hadley v Baxendale. 5 
In the USA, the American Uniform Sales Act was modelled on the Sale of Goods Act 
1893. In 1906, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Law 
approved the Uniform Sales Act. After almost 45 years, the Uniform Sales Act was 
superseded by Article 2 of the UCC. The UCC has been adopted by all the States of the 
USA except Louisiana. It should be noted that Article 2 departs from the SGA in many 
aspects of the law of sale of goods. A number of differences between the UCC and the 
SGA can be found in the area of damages. Some of these differences will be considered 
in this thesis. 
It seems that not every aspect of the law of contract for the sale of goods is codified in 
the UCC. Where the UCC is silent on particular issue, the court may refer to the original 
source of contract law, i. e. the common law. Indeed, Section 1-103 of the UCC makes it 
2[ 1891 ] AC 107. In this case, the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 was applied. 
3 Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107,145. 
4 A. G. Guest, Benjamin 's Sale of Goods, London, 1997, p. 6. 
5 [1854] 9 Exch 341. 
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clear that the UCC is to be supplemented by general principles of law and equity unless 
those principles have been displaced by statutes. Since the UCC has been adopted by all 
the States of the USA, except Louisiana, the court in one State may refer to cases 
decided in other States. The Sections of the UCC examined in this thesis have been 
adopted similarly by all the jurisdictions of the USA. Therefore, such Sections should 
have similar application in all the States of the USA. 
Moreover, where the UCC is silent or unclear on particular issue, the court may refer to 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The original Restatement of Contracts was 
adopted in 1932. It was superseded by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in 1979. 
Although the Restatement is not a controlling source of law, it has a persuasive 
authority. 6 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is usually referred to where the UCC 
is silent or unclear on a particular issue. The obvious example is the recoverability of 
damages for mental distress as discussed in chapter five of the thesis. 7 
As regards international sale of goods, the CISG seems to be a successful step of 
uniformity. It can be noted that the CISG originated from two Hague conventions on the 
international sale of Goods 1964, i. e. Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods 
(ULIS) and Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (ULF). The two Hague sales Conventions were the outcome of the efforts of the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) on the unification 
of the international sales law, which was interrupted by the World War H8 In 1968, the 
United Nations Commission on the International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) started its 
project on the international sale of goods. 9 The Hague Conventions 1964 were the 
starting point in drafting the CISG. In 1980, a diplomatic conference held in Vienna 
established the CISG. The CISG came into force in 1988 after securing the requisite 10 
ratification. The CISG has now been adopted by over 50 countries including the United 
States, China and other several industrialized countries. 
6 W. H. Henning and W. H. Lawrence, the Law of Sales under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1992, 
para. 1.01. 
Infra, p. 178. 
8 The project started in 1930 with the decision of the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (UNIDROIT) to appoint a committee of experts to prepare a uniform international sales law. In 1939 
the first draft of UNIDROIT sales text was prepared. The process was interrupted by the World War II. In 
1950, the UNIDROIT decided to continue its process in unifying the international sales law. This has lead 
to the two Hague Conventions 1964. See Nina M. Galston and Hans Smit, International Sales: The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, New York, 1984, para 1.01. 
9 Michael Bridge, The International Sale of Goods: Law and Practice, Oxford, 1999, p. 41. 
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The UK has not yet ratified the CISG. Although this thesis is not concerned with 
examining the possibility and necessity of implementing the CISG in UK, one may note 
that the UK is becoming isolated in the international trading community as the CISG has 
been implemented in the major part of Europe and most of the industrialized countries. 10 
Any way, Professor Bridge makes it clear that the CISG may apply in UK regardless of 
the fact that it has not been ratified by UK. 11 The CISG may apply where the applicable 
law is a law of a Contracting State. Article 1 of the CISG states 
"(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose 
places of business are in different States: 
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or 
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law 
of a Contracting State. 
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in different States is to 
be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either from the contract or 
from any dealings between, or from information disclosed by, the parties at any 
time before or at the conclusion of the contract. 
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of 
the parties or of the contract is to be taken into consideration in determining the 
application of this Convention. " 
Therefore, if the applicable law is the law of France, due to a choice of law clause in the 
contract or the rules of private international law, the CISG will apply even though the 
case is before a court in England. Furthermore, Arbitration Agreements may lead to the 
application of the CISG where the law of a Contracting State applies under such an 
agreement. 
2.2 The Applicability of the SGA, the UCC and the CISG to Consumer 
Sales 
The SGA and the UCC are applicable to consumer transactions. 12 The provisions of 
both the SGA and the UCC are designed to apply to commercial and consumer sales. 
The Consumer Protection Act 1987 is a tort statute that applies to cases where the buyer 
suffers physical loss resulting from defective goods. As for American law, the 
10 The Law commission seems to support the implementation of the CISG in UK. Law Commission, 
Thirty-Second Annual Report, 1997 Law Com. No. 250. 
11 Michael Bridge, supra n. 9 at p. 39. 
12 Sections 13 and 15 of the SGA apply to all kinds of sale of goods regardless of whether the goods are 
sold by private or commercial seller. However, the requirement of satisfactory quality and fitness for 
purpose under Section 14 of the SGA can only arise in cases where the sale is by a business. See 
Stevenson v. Rogers [1999] 1 All ER 613. It is irrelevant whether the goods are sold to a consumer or a 
commercial buyer. 
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Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is concerned with consumer transactions. As this 
research is concerned with the UCC, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act will be dealt 
with briefly. 
2.2.1 Domestic Statutes Applicable to Consumer Sales 
The consumer can sue in tort under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 in cases of 
physical losses resulting from defective products. 13 As explained in chapter six, where 
the buyer suffers physical loss resulting from breach of warranty of quality, he may have 
the choice to sue in contract, tort or both. The producer's14 liability under the Consumer 
Protection Act is strict in the sense that the buyer does not need to prove negligence. 
Under the Act, lack of privity cannot be used as a defence for the buyer's claim against 
the producer. Such a defence can be used where the buyer claims damages for pure 
economic loss resulting from breach of warranty of quality. Here, where the defendant is 
not the direct seller, lack of privity may be a successful defence as discussed in chapter 
six of this thesis. '5 
In the USA, the law has gone a forward step in consumer transactions to make written 
warranties issued to consumers enforceable. This has been made by a federal statute, i. e. 
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The Act regulates the content of written warranties 
issued to consumers. '6 It regulates mainly the cases where liability can be limited or 
excluded. It should be noted that Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not create any 
cause of action where a written warranty does not exist. 17 Furthermore, it applies only in 
13 See Brian W. Harvey and Deborah L. Parry, The Law of Consumer Protection and Fair Trading, 
London, 5th ed., 1996, at p. 159. "Product" is defined, by Section 1(2) of part one of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987, as "any goods or electricity and (subject to subsection 3 below) includes a product 
which is comprised in another product, whether by virtue of being a component parts or raw material or 
otherwise". Subsection 3 provides that "For the purposes of this Part a person who supplies any product in 
which products are comprised, whether by virtue of being component parts or raw materials or otherwise, 
shall not be treated by reason only of his supply of that product as supplying any of the products so 
comprised". 
14 As for the definition of "producer" Section 1(2) of part one of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 
provides that "Producers, in relation to a product, means (a) the person who manufactured it; (b) in the 
case of a substance which has not been manufactured but has been won or abstracted, the person who won 
or abstracted it; (c) in the case of a product which has not been manufactured, won or abstracted but 
essential characteristics of which are attributable to an industrial or other process having been carried out 
(for example, in relation to agricultural produce), the person who carried out that process". 
15 Infra, p. 198. 
16 Jonathan Sheldon and Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Warranty Law, National Consumer Law Center, 
1997, p. 63. 
17 O. F. Harris, Jr. and A. M. Squillante, Warranty Law in Tort and Contract Actions, Vol. 2, New York, 
1989, p. 237. 
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cases where the goods are consumer products and the plaintiff is a consumer. Under the 
Act, the written warranty can be an affirmation of fact or a written promise relating to 
the nature of the goods or an undertaking to refund, repair, replace, or take other 
remedial action with respect to the product "in the event that such product fails to meet 
the specification set forth in the undertaking". 18 
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not seem a perfect model for enforcing 
warranties. Apart from the fact that the Act does not apply to warranties issued to non- 
consumer buyers, the Act applies only to written warranties. As discussed in chapter six 
of this work, 19 manufacturers tend to advertise their products in order to promote their 
sale. The Act is silent with respect to the enforceability of manufacturers' 
representations made through advertisements. Furthermore, the Act requires such a 
warranty to be part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for 
purposes other than resale of the product. 20 Requiring the warranty to be "part of the 
basis of the bargain" may imply the need for a direct sale contract between the supplier 
and the consumer. In view of this, where the consumer suffers loss resulting from 
breach of warranty issued by a remote seller, the Act does not deal with the defence of 
lack of privity where the consumer sues such a seller for breach of warranty. This 
problem arises also under the UCC as explained in chapter six of this research. 21 
2.2.2 The Applicability of the CISG to Consumer Sales 
Article two of the CISG seems to exclude consumer sales from the sphere of the 
application of the Convention. Article 2 provides 
"This Convention does not apply to sales... of goods bought for personal, family 
or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the 
18 Section 2301(6) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides: 
"The term "written Warranty" means- 
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a 
consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or 
workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period 
of time, or 
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to 
refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that 
such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, 
which written affirmation, promise or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a 
supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product. " 
19 Infra, p. 198. 
20 Section 2301(6) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, supra n. 18. 
21 Infra, p. 248. 
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contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were bought for 
any such use". 
Under this Article, consumer sales are excluded from the sphere of the application of the 
Convention. This is due to the different types of consumer protection among the 
signatory countries. 22 Clearly, in cases of consumer goods, the seller will be expected to 
know that the goods are intended to be put for "personal, family or household use"23. 
Here, it would be hard for the seller to prove that he did not know or it was not 
reasonable for him to know, at the time of making the contract, that the goods were 
purchased for "personal, family or household use". 24 However, where the goods are 
designed to be used by a commercial buyer or the quantity of the goods indicate that the 
goods are purchased for commercial use, 25 the Convention will apply unless the seller 
had a reason to know that the goods were purchased for personal use. 26 Likewise, if the 
buyer is an agent for a company, the seller may not be expected to know that the goods 
are bought for personal use. 
In view of this, the fact that the goods are designed for consumer use does have a direct 
effect on the applicability of the Convention. What matters here is the awareness of the 
seller of the purpose of purchase at the time of making the contract. Importantly, the 
awareness of the seller after the time of making the contract is irrelevant for the purpose 
of determining the applicability of the Convention. Therefore, in cases of goods used for 
commercial use, the Convention will apply regardless of the fact that the seller found 
that the goods were purchased for consumer use after the time of making the contract. 27 
It is unclear whether Article 2 of the Convention applies to the issue of whether the 
buyer or the seller is required to show evidence of the purpose of purchase. The point is 
controversial. Whereas some legal writers support the view that proof is a procedural 
22 Comment 3 to Article 2, prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations. 
23 Family use does not only include blood relatives and those related by marriage. The interpretation of 
"family use" must not be affected by domestic laws. Such an interpretation must be towards sociological 
rather than legal criteria. For example, the family use may include the purchase of a gift for a god-child. 
See here Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG), translated by Geoffrey Thomas, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1998, p. 32. 
24 See John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
2nd ed., 1991, p. 97. 
25 Commercial use includes professional use such as office equipment bought by a doctor. 
26 Comment 4 to Article 2, prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations. 
27 F. Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow, International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, New York, 1992, P. 33. 
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matter which is left to domestic law, 28 others support the view that Article two applies 
to the issue of proof. 29 Professor Ferrari, after supporting the view that Article 2 applies 
to the issue of proof, suggests that the burden of proof is not always placed on the seller 
since the buyer might be interested in the application of the Convention. 30 
Of course, the CISG does not deal with the type of evidence which should be accepted 
by the court. However, where the seller shows a sufficient proof that he was neither 
aware nor ought to be aware, at the time of making the contract, that the goods were 
bought for consumer use, Article 2 should be applied to allow the application of the 
Convention. It should be noted that the buyer may be interested in the application of the 
Convention where the domestic consumer protection law offers less right than the 
Convention. 31 If this becomes the case, the buyer may need to show that the seller could 
not have reasonably been aware, at the time of making the contract, that the goods were 
bought for consumer use. In cases where the buyer is not interested in the application of 
the Convention, he should prove that the seller was or ought to have been aware, at the 
time of making the contract, that the goods were purchased for personal use. 
Nevertheless, determining the applicability of the Convention under Articles 1 and 2 of 
the Convention32 may not be necessary in cases of certain loss. The applicability of the 
Convention is excluded, by its own provisions, in certain cases such as the case of 
personal injury as discussed in chapter five. 33 
2.3 Definition of the Concept of Compensatory Damages 
Generally, damages "are the pecuniary recompense given by process of law to a person 
for the actionable wrong that another has done him. , 34 Damages for breach of contract 
can be defined as an amount of money obtained by success in action for breach of 
contract. 
35 
28 Khoo in Bianca and Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law, Mailand, 1987, p. 39. 
29 Peter Schlechtriem, supra n. 23 at p. 33. See Franco Ferrari, `Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of 
Judicial Application and Scholarly Writing' (1995) 15 1 L. & Com. 1; available at <http: //cisgw3. 
law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/2ferrari. html> text accompanying nn. 496-499. 
30 Franco Ferrari, ibid, text accompanying note 502. 
31 Peter Schlechtriem, supra n. 23 at p. 33. 
32 See Article 1 supra p. 20; Article 2 supra p. 22. 
33 Infra, p. 172. 
34 Haisbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. Reissue, Vol. 12(1), para. 802. 
35 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, London, 16th ed., 1997, p. 3. 
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Compensatory damages are those damages which are awarded to recompense an actual 
loss or injury sustained. 36 In cases of breach of warranty of quality, the term 
"compensatory damages" refers to those damages which are awarded to recompense an 
actual loss or injury resulting from the defective quality of goods. 
Non-compensatory damages such as liquidated damages, nominal damages and 
exemplary damages, are clearly excluded from the aforementioned definition of 
compensatory damages. Liquidated damages are the certain sum of money stipulated by 
the parties to be payable on breach. Such a sum of money may be more or less than the 
compensation for the loss suffered by the buyer. 37 As for nominal damages, the buyer 
may be allowed such damages in cases where he fails to prove that he has suffered 
damage caused by the seller's breach, provided that such a breach is sufficiently proved 
or indisputable. 38 Exemplary damages39 are the award which is intended to punish the 
wrongdoer and not to compensate the aggrieved party. Exemplary damages are not 
available in contract law. Clearly, the examination of non-compensatory damages is not 
within the scope of this work. 
Defective quality may be considered as a breach of condition which entitles the buyer to 
reject the goods and claim damages for nondelivery. 40 Under the SGA, where the buyer 
accepts defective goods, subject to his claim for damages, he will not be able to revoke 
his acceptance. Unlike the SGA, the UCC allows the buyer in certain cases to revoke his 
acceptance and return the defective goods. Where the defect `substantially impairs' the 
value of the goods and the seller could not reasonably discover the defect before 
36 Livingstone v. The Rawyards Coal Company (1880) 5 AC 25,39. 
37 S. M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, Toronto, 1983, p. 521. 
38 In Mediana v. Comet, (The Mediana) [1900] AC 113, Lord Halsbury, L. C., pointed out, at p. 116, that 
"`Nominal damages' is a technical phrase which means that you have negatived anything like real 
damages, but that you are affirming by your nominal damages that there is an infraction of a legal right 
which, though it gives you no right to any real damages at all, yet gives you a right to the verdict or 
judgment because your legal right has been infringed. " 
39 The term "punitive damages" is recommended by the Law Commission to be used instead of 
"exemplary damages". Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, Law Com 
No 247, para. 5.31. 
40 This is subject to Section 15A of the SGA which does not entitle the buyer to reject defective goods in 
cases where the defect is simple. Deciding whether the defect is simple is a matter of fact which depends 
on the circumstances of each case. Furthermore, the seller will not be liable for defects which are drawn to 
the buyer's attention before the conclusion of the contract. Section 14(2C) of the SGA states "The term 
implied by subsection (2) above [satisfactory quality] does not extend to any matter making the quality of 
goods unsatisfactory- (a) which is specifically drawn to the buyer's attention before the contract is made, 
(b) where the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made, which that examination ought to 
reveal, or (c) in the case of a contract for sale by sample, which would have been apparent on a reasonable 
examination of the sample. " 
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acceptance or his acceptance was induced by the seller's assurances, the buyer may 
revoke his acceptance under Section 2-608 of the UCC. Moreover, Section 2-608 allows 
the buyer to revoke his acceptance in cases where the defect `substantially impairs' the 
value of the goods and the buyer accepts the defective goods on the reasonable 
assumption that the defect "would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured". 41 
Nevertheless, where the buyer retains defective goods, he may be entitled to damages 
for breach of warranty of quality. This work is concerned with the buyer's remedy of 
damages where the buyer does not revoke his acceptance of the goods in question. 
As regards the CISG, damages do not seem the primary remedy under the Convention. 
In cases where the seller delivers nonconforming goods, the buyer may have the choice 
to claim damages or specific performance. Under Article 46 of the CISG, the buyer may 
require delivery of substitute goods "if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental 
breach of contract". 42 Where the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may 
require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair. 43 
Where the buyer has made a bad bargain, he may reject the defective goods in order to 
avoid his market loss. A simple hypothetical example may clarify this point. Suppose 
that the contract price is £ 1000. Suppose further that at the time of delivery the market 
price of the goods as warranted is £900 and the market price of the defective goods is 
£600. In this example, the buyer has made a bad bargain. If the buyer rejects the goods, 
al Section 2-608 of the UCC states 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially 
impairs its value to him if he has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably 
cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the 
difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have 
discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not 
caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had 
rejected them. 
42 Article 46 of the CISG states: 
"(1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a 
remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. (2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the 
buyer may require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental 
breach of contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice given under 
article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter. " 
43 Article 46(3) of the CISG states "If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require 
the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances. A request for repair must be made either in conjunction with notice given under Article 39 
or within a reasonable time thereafter. " Furthermore, Article 49 of the CISG allows the buyer to avoid the 
contract in cases where the defect of the goods amounts to a `fundamental breach'. See infra p. 44. 
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he will be entitled to damages for non-delivery i. e. the difference between the market 
price and the contract price. 44 Since the contract price is higher than the market price, 
the buyer will not be entitled to more than nominal damages. However, by rejecting the 
defective goods, the buyer can avoid his obligation to pay the price and can obtain 
substitute goods for £900. By this way, the buyer will save £100 (£1000 [The contract 
price] - £900 [The substitute goods price]). On the other hand, if the buyer chooses to 
accept the goods, he will be entitled to damages for breach of warranty i. e. the 
difference between the value of the goods as defective and the value they would have 
had if they had been free from defects. In this hypothetical example, if the goods are 
valued under the market price, the buyer will be entitled to recover £300 (£900 [The 
market price of the goods as warranted] - £600 [The market price of the goods as 
accepted]). By accepting the goods, the buyer will lose £100 which is the difference 
between the contract price (£ 1000) and what he has obtained (£900 [£600 the value of 
the defective goods + £300 the recovered damages]). In such a case, it is likely that the 
buyer will reject the goods. 45 
However, in cases of latent defect, the buyer may not be able to discover the defect 
before acceptance. Under the UCC, the buyer may be entitled to revoke his acceptance, 
as explained above. 46 Where the buyer cannot, or chooses not to, revoke his acceptance, 
he will be entitled to recover, as damages, the difference between the value of the goods 
as warranted and their value as defective. Moreover, in certain cases, the buyer may 
prefer to accept defective goods. This may be the case where there is no available 
market to obtain substitute or where the goods in question are of subjective value for the 
buyer, as discussed in chapter three. 47 In addition, where the goods are of less 
productive capacity than the capacity specified in the contract, the buyer may accept the 
goods in order to perform subcontracts and keep his commercial reputation. 48 In such a 
case, the buyer may be entitled to damages for loss of profit resulting from the deficient 
capacity of the goods, as explained in chapter four. 49 
as Sections 51 of the SGA, 2-713 of the UCC and Article 76 of the CISG. 
as See Ellen A. Peters, `Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods under the 
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two' (1963) 73 The Yale Law Journal 199,270. 
46 Supra, p. 25. 
47 Infra, p. 55. 
48 This is the case of profit-making goods where the substitute cannot be immediately obtained from the 
open market. 
49 Infra, p. 129. 
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2.4 Types of Loss resulting from Breach of Warranty of Quality 
Losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality can be classified as normal and 
consequential as stated in the previous chapter. 50 The UCC adds another kind of loss, 
i. e. incidental damages51(incidental loss). 52 The term incidental losses neither exists 
under the SGA nor the CISG. Although Professor Treitel53 classifies losses, resulting 
from breach of contract, as normal, consequential and incidental, it is hard to find such a 
classification in any case report. Anyhow, losses that can be classified as incidental can 
only result in cases of non-acceptance. Section 2-715(1) of the UCC states 
"Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses 
reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of 
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or 
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable 
expense incident to the delay or other breach. " 
As consequential losses are incidental of the breach and incidental losses are 
consequential for the breach, one may find it difficult to draw a distinction between the 
two kinds of loss. However, the examples provided in Section 2-715(1) indicate that 
incidental losses are mostly the expenses incurred in obtaining substitute goods and 
handling the rejected goods in cases of non-acceptance. It seems that incidental losses 
are always incurred within the scope of the immediate buyer-seller transaction where 
there is a cover and the buyer rejects the goods or revokes his acceptance. 54 On the other 
hand, consequential losses are those incurred by the buyer, as a result of the breach, in 
his relation with a third party, to his business or to any physical interest such as personal 
injury. 55 In Petroleo Brasileiro, S. A., Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp. 56 it was made 
clear that "[w]hile the distinction between the two [incidental and consequential 
damages] is not an obvious one, the Code [UCC] makes plain that incidental damages 
are normally incurred when a buyer (or seller) repudiates the contract or wrongfully 
50 Supra, p. 5. 
s' The term damage can be used to mean a harm; however, its plural "damages" is normally used to mean 
the money compensation. In this view, the term loss is more desirable to be used to avoid any possible 
confusion. 
52 For the purpose of this work, incidental damages will be referred to as incidental losses. 
53 Sir Guenter Treitel, The Law of Contract, London, 10th ed., 1999, p. 879. 
54 Comment 1 to Section 2-715 of the UCC provides "[Section 2-715(1)] is intended to provide 
reimbursement for the buyer who incurs reasonable expenses in connection with the handling of rightfully 
rejected goods or goods whose acceptance may be justifiably revoked, or in connection with effecting 
cover where the breach of the contract lies in non-conformity or non-delivery of the goods. The incidental 
damages listed are not intended to be exhaustive but are merely illustrative of the typical kinds of the 
incidental damage. " [Emphasis added] See Special Project, `Article Two Warranties in Commercial 
Transactions' (1978) 64 Cornell L. Rev. 30,132. 
ss Sprague v. Sumitomo Forestry Co. 104 Wn. 2d 751,762 (1985). 
56 372 F. Supp. 503 (E. D. N. Y. 1974). 
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rejects the goods, causing the other to incur such expenses as transporting, storing or 
reselling the goods. On the other hand, consequential damages do not arise within the 
scope of the immediate buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses incurred by 
the non-breaching party in its dealings, often with third parties, which were a proximate 
result of the breach, and which were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching part y. "57 
Therefore, losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality, other than the diminution 
in value of the goods supplied, should always be dealt with as consequential. However, 
in two American cases, at least, the extra expenses incurred to run defective machinery 
were considered incidental losses. 58 
Here, it is worth noting that the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages, 
i. e. causation, remoteness, mitigation and certainty, do not apply under the UCC to cases 
of incidental losses. 59 However, it should be clear that incidental losses, by their nature 
comply with such restrictions. 60 As regards exclusion clauses, the question here is what 
would be the case if exclusion clauses of incidental loss were of a contract governed by 
the SGA or the CISG? In the light of the fact that the term incidental loss does not exist 
under the SGA and the CISG, it seems hard to state a clear-cut answer to this question. 
Probably, the court will examine the circumstances of each case in order to find out the 
actual meaning of the term which is intended by the parties. Nonetheless, it should be 
57 Petroleo Brasileiro, S. A., Petrobras v. Ameropan Oil Corp. 372 F. Supp. 503,508 (E. D. N. Y. 1974). 
58 In Lewis v. Mobile Oil Corp. 438 F. 2d 500,8 UCC Rep. Serv. 625 (8th Cir. 1971) where the seller 
supplied oil to the buyer's sawmill system which appeared unsuitable, the buyer was awarded damages for 
the expenses incurred on the excessive quantities of oil used to run the system and the repair and 
replacement of mechanical parts damaged by the failure of the oil to function as warranted. In this case, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the incurred expenses as incidental 
loss. In fact the buyer in this case did not reject the goods nor did he revoke his acceptance and there was 
no cover. Nevertheless, the Court dealt with the loss of expenses as incidental loss. The decision in Lewis 
was followed in General Supply & Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S. W. 2d 913,12 UCC Rep 35 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1972). See J. J. White, R. S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, West Publishing Co., 4th ed., 1995, 
p. 370. 
59 For the restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages, see infra, p. 277. 
60 In relation to the restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages, Section 2-715(1) makes it plain that 
the recoverable incidental losses should be reasonable. The Section does not apply the normal restrictions 
imposed on the recovery of damages, i. e. causation, remoteness, certainty and mitigation. Here, one may 
note that incidental losses, by their nature, comply with the restrictions imposed on the recovery for 
consequential losses. Needless to say that such expenses are normally certain as to their amount. As for 
the remoteness principle, such expenses cannot be remote since parties to a sale of goods contract 
normally contemplate, at the time of making the contract, that such expenses are not unlikely to be 
incurred as a result of the breach. Furthermore, avoidable incidental expenses incurred by the buyer are 
normally unreasonable and, as a result, not recoverable under Section 2-715(1) of the UCC. It seems that 
the object of the drafters of the UCC, in not applying the restrictions mentioned to the recovery for 
incidental losses, is to avoid the unnecessary requirement of proof; the buyer, in ca of incidental loss, 
need not prove the compliance of the loss with the restrictions mentioned. 
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clear that losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality cannot be classified as 
incidental. Such losses should always be dealt with as normal or consequential losses. 61 
2.5 Other Compensatory Damages Claimed in Cases of Retained 
Defective Goods 
Damages for diminution in value and consequential losses may not be the only 
compensatory damages recoverable in cases of defective quality. The following will 
deal with another kind of compensatory damages, i. e. damages for loss of the right to 
reject, which may be claimed in certain cases of international sale of goods. This kind of 
damages has been developed by the English courts and as yet, does not have any 
statutory basis. 
2.5.1 What is "Loss of the Right to Reject"? 
In the field of international sale of goods, the buyer may be required to pay the price 
against conforming documents. One of these documents can be quality certificate which 
deals with certain aspects of the quality of goods. The requirement of quality certificate 
is quite common in certain sales, such as sale of oil. Under certain contracts, if the 
quality certificate is in conformity with the contract, the buyer will be required to pay 
the contract price against the certificate, provided that the rest of the required documents 
are in conformity with the contract. The bill of lading is usually part of the documentary 
bundle against which the buyer pays the price. The bill of lading contains a description 
of the goods as to the quality. 62 The cases discussed below are mostly concerned with 
the date of shipment which is part of the description of the goods. 63 In such cases, the 
discussion is concerned with the conformity as to the actual date of shipment and as to 
the documents which state the date of shipment. Obviously, the same applies to the 
61 Although Article 74 of the CISG does not recognize the distinction between consequential and 
incidental losses, the American court in one case has allowed damages for foreseeable incidental losses. In 
fact, Article 74 of the Convention applies the restriction of remoteness to the recovery for all kinds of loss. 
In the CISG case of Delchi Carrier, SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F. 3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) the United States 
Court of Appeals for Second Circuit made it clear that the buyer's claim for incidental losses can be 
successful where such losses are foreseeable. In this case, the Court applied the restriction of remoteness 
to the recovery for incidental losses although, under the UCC, such a restriction applies only to the 
recovery for consequential losses. See E. C. Schneider, `Consequential Damages in the International Sale 
of Goods: Analysis of Two Decisions' (1995) 16 U. Pa. J Int'l Bus. L. 615,628; E. C. Schneider, 
`Measuring Damages under the CISG: Article 74 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods' 9 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 223, n. 33. 
62 See Clive M. Schmitthoff, Schmitthoff's Export Trade: the Law and Practice of International Trade, 
London, 9th ed., 1990, p. 584; John F Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea, London, 3rd ed., 1998, p. 126. 
63 Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers, Ltd. [1954] 2 QB 459,472. See also Bowes v. Shand 
(1877) 2 AC 455 discussed in A. G. Guest, supra n. 4 at para. 18-207. 
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conformity as to the quality of goods and as to the documents which are concerned with 
such a quality. 
Under the CIF contract64 the seller has two separate obligations, i. e. to deliver 
documents and to ship goods in conformity with the contract. Under this kind of 
contract the buyer must also pay the price against conforming documents. If the buyer 
refuses to pay the price, he may be in breach of contract which allows the seller to 
rescind the contract and claim damages for non-acceptance. However, where such 
documents are not in conformity with the contract, the buyer will have the right to reject 
them. In fact, the CIF contract requires the buyer to pay the price against conforming 
documents even though the goods are not in conformity with the contract. This was 
decided by the House of Lords in Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. 65 In this case, 
Lord Diplock disapproved66 of the view, stated by Robert Goff U at the Court of 
Appeal, 67 that the buyer can reject conforming documents where he can prove that the 
defect of the goods entitles him to reject such goods. In Gill & Duffus, the buyers 
refused to pay the price against conforming documents on the grounds that the goods 
allegedly were not in conformity with the contract. The sellers rescinded the contract 
and claimed damages for non-acceptance. The House of Lords held the buyers liable. 
Lord Diplock's view is that the CIF buyer has to pay against conforming documents 
even though the goods are defective. In Gill & Duffus, the documents that were required 
for paying the price were not concerned with the quality of the goods. In such a case, the 
buyer has to pay against such documents even though the goods are not of the right 
quality. In Gill & Duffus, Lord Diplock stated a number of exceptions to his view. First, 
the buyer will be entitled to reject such documents where the seller is guilty of fraud. 68 
Secondly, the buyer may be entitled to reject conforming documents in cases where the 
69 goods are fundamentally different from those which had been sold. 
64 For the CIF contract, see Schmitthoff, supra n. 62 at p. 33; Michael Bridge, supra n. 9 at p. 156; A. G. 
Guest, supra n. 4 at p. 1247. 
65 [1984] AC 382. 
66 Ibid at p. 396. 
67 [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 622,635. 
68 Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc., [1984] AC 382,390. 
69 It should be clear that where the documents show that the shipped goods are fundamentally different 
from those sold, the buyer may reject such documents on the ground that the documents are not genuine 
since they wrongly describe the goods sold. Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc., [1984] AC 382,390. 
See G. H. Treitel, `Rights of rejection under CIF sales' [1984] LMCLQ 565,576-7. F. M. B. Reynolds, 
`Rejection of Documents' [1984] LMCLQ 191,193. 
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Nevertheless, the seller may deliver apparently conforming documents which, in breach 
of contract, show the goods free from defects although the goods are actually defective. 
Both the CIF seller and buyer may not be aware of the defect of the documents at the 
time when the buyer accepts them and pays the price. In such a case, the market price of 
goods may fall between the time of making the contract and the time of delivery of 
goods. If the documents revealed on their face the defect of the goods, which could 
justify the rejection of such goods, 70 the buyer could have rejected the documents and, 
as a result, avoided his market loss. 7' By rejecting the documents, the buyer would 
throw his market loss back on the seller. 72 However, by accepting the documents, the 
buyer has lost his right to reject them. In such a case, is the buyer entitled to damages for 
his market loss that could have been avoided by rejecting the documents? 
2.5.2 Recoverability of Damages for Loss of the Right to Reject 
In order to achieve the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 73 in 
cases of loss of the right to reject, the buyer should be put in the same financial position 
he would have been in if the buyer had exercised his right to reject the documents. It is 
well settled that the seller must be in double breach, i. e. non-conforming goods and non- 
conforming documents, in order to allow the buyer damages for loss of the right to 
reject. This was made clear in James Finlay & Co. Ltd. v. N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel 
Maatschappij74 where the seller received payment against documents which wrongly 
stated the date of shipment. In this case, the seller delivered defective goods since they 
were not shipped within the shipment period stated in the contract. The seller received 
the price against such documents since they were apparently conforming. In this case, 
there was a sharp fall in the market price of the goods between the time of making the 
contract and the time of delivery of goods. The Court awarded the buyer damages for 
this market loss on the ground that the buyer could have rejected the documents and 
avoided such a loss if it had been clear from the documents that the goods were not in 
conformity with the contract. 
70 A. G. Guest, supra n. 4 at p. 1347. 
71 Vargas Pena Apezteguia Y Cia Saic v. Peter Cremer G. M. B. H. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 394. 
72 G. H. Treitel, `Damages for Breach of a c. i. f. Contract' [1988] LMCLQ 457. 
73 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
74 [1928] 2 KB 604. In this case the sellers shipped the goods in question on the Ist of October even 
though it was agreed that the shipment should be made in September. The sellers tendered bills of lading 
which falsely stated that the goods had been shipped on 30th of September. The buyers discovered this 
breach after two years from the time of delivery. 
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Therefore, where the goods are not in conformity with the contract and the seller 
receives payment against conforming documents, the buyer will not be entitled to 
recover damages for his market loss. This was the case in Taylor v. Bank of Athens, 75 
where goods were shipped after the stipulated period of shipment. However, the seller 
received payment against delivery order which did not contain a false date of shipment. 
The seller, acting in good faith, assured the buyer that the bills of lading were dated 31 st 
of August. The seller did not know that the bills of lading were falsely dated. The Court 
did not allow damages for market loss on the ground that the seller received payment 
against conforming documents. 76 In this case, the seller was entitled under the contract 
to receive payment against delivery order. It has been suggested that the decision in 
Taylor would have been different if the seller had paid the price against the falsely dated 
bills of lading. " 
In addition, the buyer will not be entitled to damages for loss of the right to reject where 
the documents are nonconforming and the goods are in conformity with the contract. 
This has been decided in Procter & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corp. v. Kurt A. 
Becher. 78 In this case, the seller received payment against documents which falsely 
stated the date of shipment. 79 However, the goods were shipped within the stipulated 
75 [1922] 27 Com Cas 142. In this case, the shipment was stipulated to be in August. The seller shipped 
the goods in September. There was a fall in the market price between the time of making the contract and 
the time of delivery of goods. There was no difference in the market price of the goods between 31st of 
August and the actual date of shipment. Therefore, the buyer was not entitled to damages for breach of 
warranty since there was no loss caused by the delay in shipment. Neither was the buyer allowed damages 
for market loss since the Court did not find the delivery order a defective document. Consequently the 
Court held that the buyer is not entitled to more than nominal damages. 
76 If the seller was guilty of fraud, the decision might be different. This can be justified on the grounds that 
the seller should not benefit from the normal rule of loss of the right to reject if he was able to tender 
conforming documents and he was aware at the same time that the goods were not in conformity with the 
contract. See G. H. Treitel, supra n. 69 at p. 576. 
77 A. G. Guest, supra n. 4 at p. 1386. 
78 [ 1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21. In this case, the seller received 98 per cent of the price against a misdated bill 
of lading. Shipment was agreed to be made by the end of January but later the parties agreed to extend the 
period of shipment until the end of February. The bill of lading was dated January 31 although the 
shipment was not made until the end of February. By the time of delivery of goods, the buyer discovered 
that he had paid against defective documents. Due to this, he claimed damages for his market loss. The 
Court held that the buyer was not entitled to such damages. In this case, there was a single breach, i. e. 
defective documents. The goods were shipped within the stipulated period of shipment. 
79 Where the seller tenders defective documents before the end of the stipulated period of delivery, he may 
be entitle to replace such documents with conforming documents within the period of delivery. See A. G. 
Guest, supra n. 4 at p. 1296. Similar rule can be found under the UCC and the CISG. Section 2-508(1) of 
the UCC states "Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-conforming and the 
time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to 
cure and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery. " Article 34 of the CISG states "If 
the seller is bound to hand over documents relating to the goods, he must hand them over at the time and 
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period. The buyer was not allowed damages for his market loss. The decision, in this 
case, can simply be explained on the grounds that the purpose of such damages is to put 
the buyer in the same financial position he would have been in if the documents had not 
been defective. In Procter & Gamble, if the bill of lading had been rightly dated, the 
buyer would not have been able to reject it. Therefore, the market loss, which the buyer 
suffered, is not due to the seller's breach of tendering defective documents. "What the 
buyers lost, in the event, was the opportunity to exercise one of the remedies (rejection) 
afforded by the law in respect of the breach [of tendering conforming documents]. They 
lost the opportunity to exercise that remedy, not because of the breach... but because 
they did not know of the existence of the breach at the time. But... having lost the 
opportunity to exercise the remedy of rejection in respect of the breach, thenceforth the 
buyers' remedy in respect of the breach was confined to recovering the actual financial 
loss, if any, suffered by them by reason of the breach... "80 In this case, the Court found 
that the buyers suffered no loss due to the seller's breach of tendering non-conforming 
documents. 
2.5.3 Issues Concerning the Recoverability of Damages for Loss of the 
Right to Reject 
The first question, which seems to have a straightforward answer under the common 
law, is whether the recovery of damages for market loss is available only in cases where 
the seller is guilty of fraud in delivering the defective documents which appear, on their 
face, in conformity with the contract. The answer to this question is clear-cut under the 
common law. The buyer need not prove the seller's fraudulent behaviour in delivering 
the documents. Neither does he need to show that the seller was aware of the fraudulent 
behaviour of somebody else for whom the seller is responsible. This can be understood 
from the case of James Finlay. 
However, one may ask whether the seller's fraudulent behaviour, or his awareness of the 
fraudulent behaviour of somebody for whom he was responsible, in delivering the 
defective documents should be a prerequisite for the recovery of damages for market 
place and in the form required by the contract. If the seller has handed over documents before that time, he 
may, up to that time, cure any lack of conformity in the documents, if the exercise of this right does not 
cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any 
right to claim damages as provided for in this Convention. " 
80 Procter & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corp. v. Kurt A. Becher, [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21,32 per 
Nicholls U. 
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loss? In fact, legal writers seem to disagree on this matter. Professor Treitel suggests 
that the recovery of damages for loss of the right to reject should be "available only 
where the seller (or someone for whom he was responsible) was to blame for the false 
documents, or at least knew of their falsity at the time of tender of documents. "8' This 
opinion responds to the view of Donaldson J. in The Kastellon. 82 In this case, 
Donaldson J awarded the buyers damages for their loss of the right of rejection "[w]ith 
some regret, because their [was] little merit in the buyers' contention". 83 In this case, the 
goods were shipped out of the stipulated period of shipment. The buyers paid against 
falsely dated bills of lading. It became clear to them after they accepted the goods that 
the bills of lading were defective. It seems that Donaldson J expressed his regret due to 
that fact that the goods arrived in the expected time. There was no delay in their arrival. 
However, as Professor Bridge suggests, 84 the decision in this case is consistent with the 
common law position regarding the rules of termination in normal sale transactions 
where the buyer pays against delivery. The common law position is that the buyer need 
not prove that he has suffered actual loss in order to reject defective goods. The actual 
purpose of the buyer is irrelevant as long as there is a sufficient ground of termination. 
Indeed, the buyer may reject defective goods in cases where his real intention is to avoid 
his market loss. Therefore, in cases where the buyer pays against documents, he may 
reject the documents if they reveal on their face the defect of the goods regardless of his 
actual intention of the rejection. If the buyer finds out after he has accepted the goods 
that he lost his right to reject the documents, it will be fair enough to award him 
damages in order to be put in the same financial position he would have been in had he 
rejected the documents. 
Another significant question here is whether the buyer is entitled to damages for his 
market loss in cases where he became aware of the non-conformity of the documents by 
the time of the delivery of goods? The answer to this question can be found in Kwei Tek 
Chao v. British Traders Ltd. 85 In this case, the goods were shipped after the stipulated 
period of shipment. The buyer paid the price against bills of lading which showed on 
their face that the goods were shipped within the stipulated period. The buyer became 
aware of the actual date of shipment before receiving the goods in question. In other 
81 This was stated by Sir Guenter Treitel in A. G. Guest, supra n. 4 at p. 1393. 
82 Huilerie L'Abeille v. Societe Des Huileries Du Niger (The "Kastellon ") [1978] 2 QB 203. 
83 Ibid at p. 207. 
84 See Michael Bridge, supra n. 9 at p. 369. 
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words, the buyer had the chance to reject the goods and, consequently, avoid his market 
loss. However, the buyer accepted the goods and sued successfully for his market loss. 
However, in Kwei Tek Chao, although the Court achieved the objective of damages, as 
stated in Robinson v. Harman, 86 by putting the buyer in the same position he would 
have been in had the breach never happened, it is doubtful that the market loss was 
caused by the buyer's loss of his right to reject the defective documents. The Court 
should always look at the actual losses caused by the seller's breach before applying the 
principle of Robinson. In fact, the buyer's loss resulted from his acceptance of the 
goods. The buyer had the right to reject the goods and did not exercize it. The buyer 
could have avoided his market loss by rejecting the goods. He could have brought a 
restitutionary action to recover the price had he rejected the goods. Therefore, as 
Professor Bridge suggests, 87 the causal link between the seller's breach and the buyer's 
loss in Kwei Tek Chao seems to be broken. In James Finlay, 88 the seller's act of 
delivering defective documents concealed the buyer's right to reject the goods. Such a 
concealment did not exist in Kwei Tek Chao. It is understandable that, in the normal 
course of circumstances, the rule of Kwei Tek Chao may not operate against the seller. 
Where the buyer rejects the defective goods, the seller may not be in a better financial 
position as compared to the case where the buyer retains the defective goods and 
recovers, as damages, his market loss. 89 However, this cannot be a justification for 
awarding the buyer damages for his market loss in cases where such a loss is caused by 
his choice to accept the goods. It is submitted that the buyer in Kwei Tek Chao was 
overcompensated by entitling him to damages for his market loss which was not caused 
by the seller's breach. 
85 [1954] 2 QB 459. 
86 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
87 Michael Bridge, supra n. 9 at p. 365. 
88 James Finlay & Co. Ltd. v. N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappy [1928] 2 KB 604. 
89 In Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers, Ltd. [1954] 2 QB 459, Devlin J. said, at p. 483, that 
"[i]n fact, if [the buyer] had rejected the goods it would not have been to the advantage of the seller in any 
way nor would it have minimized the damages. The damages would have been just the same except that 
the seller would, no doubt, have had the convenience of handling the goods instead of the buyer. " For 
example, suppose that the contract price is £1000 and the market price at the time of delivery of goods is 
£700. Suppose further that there is no diminution in value of the goods due to there defect. The market 
loss in such a case is £300 (£1000-£700). If the buyer rejects the goods, he will be entitled to recover the 
contract price (£ 1000). The buyer will be in the same financial position if he retains the defective goods 
(£700) and recovers damages for his market loss (£300). 
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The Court in Kwei Tek Chao relied on the ground that the buyer could not, as a matter 
of business, reject the goods. 90 The Court justified its award on the ground that it is 
unreasonable to expect the buyer, after he has paid the price on tender of documents, to 
reject the goods which constitute his only security for his claim against the seller. 91 
However, this ground, i. e. to rely on the business reasons of the buyer for not rejecting 
the goods, seems with many respects to be doubtful. The reasoning of Kwei Tek Chao 
can apply to any transaction where the buyer pays the price by the time of delivery of 
goods. Where the seller delivers defective goods and the buyer paid the price by the time 
of delivery, the latter may rely on the reasoning in Kwei Tek Chao to accept the goods 
and sue for his market loss although there is single breach, i. e. defective goods. Here, it 
should be noted that the case of Kwei Tek Chao was approved by the House of Lords in 
Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. 92 
The rule of Kwei Tek Chao seems to be helpful where the buyer pays against apparently 
conforming documents and cannot as a matter of law reject defective goods. This point 
should be considered in conjunction with the rule of Procter & Gamble Philippine 
Manufacturing Corp. v. Kurt A. Becher. 93 The question under this rule can be whether 
the buyer would have had the right to reject the documents if they had revealed the 
defect of the goods, which did not justify the rejection of such goods. The answer to this 
question depends on whether or not the documents, by revealing the defect of the goods, 
could be rendered defective. In certain cases, the documents which reveal the defect of 
the goods may not be described as defective. 94 This was the case in Vargas Pena 
Apezteguia Y Cia Saic v. Peter Cremer G. M. B. H. 95 In this case, the seller tendered a 
90 Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers, Ltd. [ 1954] 2 QB 459,482. 
91 A. G. Guest, supra n. 4 at p. 1388. 
92 [1984] AC 382,395. 
93 [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21. See supra, p. 33. 
94 Michael Bridge, supra n. 9 at p. 367. 
95 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 394. The case was of FOB contract but most of the authorities mentioned in the 
judgment concern CIF contracts. In this case the sellers sold 1500 tonnes of cottonseed. The contract 
contained a term "Max. 15% fat. If above 15% rejectable at buyers' option... " The sellers tendered 
documents which showed on their face that the percentage of fat exceeded 15%. The buyers resold the 
goods in question in order to mitigate their loss. The Court found that the buyers did not reject the goods. 
The act of resale showed that buyers accepted the goods since such an act was inconsistent with the 
sellers' ownership. In this case, there was a fall in the market between the time of contracting and the time 
of resale. The Court held that the loss suffered by the buyers, i. e. the difference between the contract price 
and the resale price, was not caused by the sellers' breach. It was due to the fall in the market which was 
not avoided by the buyer who could have done so by rejecting the documents. The Court held that the 
buyers were entitled to no more than nominal damages. The buyers could have avoided their loss resulting 
from the fall in the market if they had rejected the documents. It is noteworthy that the documents in this 
case were not defective since they revealed the right quality of the goods. However, the Court held that the 
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pre-analysis certificate which revealed on its face that the goods were not in conformity 
with the contract. The pre-analysis certificate in this case cannot be as described 
defective since it stated correctly the quality of the goods. However, in reliance on the 
discussion in Vargas Pena, one may note that where the documents reveal on their face 
the defect of the goods, which justifies the rejection of such goods, the buyer may reject 
the documents and bring the contract to an end. Therefore, if the buyer, after accepting 
the goods, discovers that he has paid against documents that did not reveal the defect of 
the goods, which justifies the rejection of such goods, he may be entitled to damages for 
his market loss. In such a case, the rule of Procter & Gamble will not restrict the buyer's 
recovery. If the documents had revealed the defect of the goods, which justifies the 
rejection of such goods, the buyer could have rejected the documents and avoided his 
market loss. Therefore, it can be said, in such a case, that the buyer lost his right to 
reject and, thus, he is entitled to damages for his market loss. However, it should be 
noted that if the buyer discovered that the goods are defective after he had accepted the 
documents and before accepting the goods, he should not be entitled to damages for his 
market loss. As the buyer did not lose his right to reject the goods, he can avoid his 
market loss by rejecting the goods. 
Nonetheless, in certain circumstances the defect of the goods may not justify their 
rejection. For example, under Section 15A(1) of the SGA, the buyer is not entitled to 
reject defective goods where the defect is so slight that it would be unreasonable for the 
him to reject such goods. 96 Furthermore, the buyer may not be entitled to reject defective 
goods where the breach is of an intermediate term. Here, if the buyer has paid against 
documents that do not reveal the defect in the goods, which does not justify the rejection 
of such goods, can he be entitled to damages for his market loss? At first sight, one may 
answer this question in the negative under the rule of Procter & Gamble for the reason 
that if the documents had revealed the defect of the goods, which does not justify the 
buyers could have rejected the documents on the grounds that they revealed on their face that the goods 
were defective. 
96 Section 15A(1) of the SGA states: "Where in the case of a contract of sale- (a) the buyer would, apart 
from this subsection, have the right to reject goods by reason of a breach on the part of the seller of a term 
implied by section 13,14 or 15 above, but (b) the breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him 
to reject them, then, if the buyer does not deal as a consumer, the breach is not to be treated as a breach of 
warranty. " However, it is submitted in A. G. Guest, supra n. 4 at pp. 1180-83,1390 that this Section should 
not apply to international sale of goods transactions. The submission is justified by the certainty need in 
international sales. The machinery of excluding this Section was suggested, at p. 1182, to be that parties to 
international sales on typical CIF or FOB terms "must be taken to have impliedly agreed to exclude the 
statutory restriction [Section 15A] on the right to reject. " 
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rejection of such goods, the buyer might not have had the right to reject them. The 
documents in such a case may not be defective and the defect of the goods does not 
justify their rejection. However, in certain cases, the buyer may be entitled to reject 
documents which reveal the defect of the goods even though the defect of the goods 
does not justify their rejection. This can be in cases where such documents, by revealing 
the defect of the goods, become defective. For example, in Cehave N. V. v. Bremer 
Handelsgesellschaft (The Hansa Nord) 97 it was held that the CIF buyer was not entitled 
to reject the goods although they were not shipped in good condition as required by the 
contract. The seller's breach was of intermediate term which did not as a matter of law 
justify rejection. However, it was made clear in that case that the buyer could have 
rejected the bill of lading if it had revealed the defect of the goods. 98 In fact, the seller in 
this case was required under the contract to deliver a clean bill of lading. 99 Had the bill 
of lading revealed the fact that the goods were not shipped in good condition, the bill of 
lading would have been defective and the seller would have been in breach of his duty to 
tender a clean bill of lading. In such a case, the buyer would have the right to reject the 
documents regardless of the fact that the defect of the goods does not justify their 
rejection. 
Therefore, it should be clear that the documents can be considered defective for the 
reason that they reveal the defect of the goods although such a defect does not justify the 
rejection of the goods. The buyer is entitled to reject such documents even though the 
defect of the goods does not as a matter of law justify the rejection of such goods. In 
such cases, if the documents did not reveal the defect of the goods and the buyer paid 
against such documents, his right to reject the documents would be lost. If the buyer 
discovers that he paid against such documents before the time of delivery of goods, will 
he be entitled to damages for loss of the right to reject? In light of the fact that in such 
cases the buyer will not be able as a matter of law to reject the goods, the rule of Kwei 
Tek Chao should be applied to entitle the buyer for his market loss regardless of the fact 
that he became aware of the seller's breach by the time of accepting the goods. In such 
cases, the rule of Kwei Tek Chao is of vital significance. The causal link in such cases is 
97 [1976] QB 44. 
98 Cehave N. V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft (The Hansa Nord) [1976] QB 44,70. See also A. G. Guest, 
supra n. 4 at p. 1347. 
99 The "clean bill of lading is one that does not contain any reservation as to the apparent good order or 
condition of the goods, or packing. " British Imex Industries Ltd. v. Midland Bank Ltd. [1958] 1 QB 542, 
551 per Salmon J. 
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established since the buyer's market loss resulted from his loss of the right to reject the 
documents. The buyer did not have as a matter of law the right to reject the documents. 
Finally, is the buyer entitled to damages for his market loss in cases where he was aware 
of the non-conformity of the documents and, nevertheless, accepted them? The answer 
seems to be in the negative although the decision in Kleinjan & Holst N. V. Rotterdam v. 
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H. 100 answers this question in the positive. In this case, 
the buyers paid the price against documents which revealed the defect of the goods. '°' 
However, the buyers reserved their rights. In this case, the buyers could have rejected 
the documents and avoided their market loss. Therefore, it is odd to say that they lost 
their right to reject the documents or the goods. However, the buyers accepted the goods 
and sued for damages for their market loss. Obviously, their market loss resulted from 
their acceptance of the documents and goods. Nevertheless, the buyers were awarded 
damages for their market loss. Cooke J found, from the exchange of telex messages, that 
the parties agreed with the sellers on reserving their rights. 102 He said that "[b]y that 
agreement the rights of the buyers are reserved. Where a person's rights are reserved 
then prima facie it is all of his rights which are reserved and not merely some of them. I 
think that all of the buyers' rights were reserved in this case including their right to 
recover damages for the seller's breach of contract in failing to tender [conforming] 
"103 shipping documents. 
The statement of Cooke J sounds accurate but its application, with many respects, was 
doubtful. Obviously, in Kleinjan the buyers reserved their rights to claim damages for 
losses resulting from the defective documents. In fact, they did not reserve any right 
other than the rights they had without reservation. 104 The measure of damages here is the 
difference between the value of the documents and the value they would have had if 
they had been as warranted. The view of Cooke J was criticised in Vargas Pena 
100 [1972]2QB 11. 
101 The documents showed that the goods were shipped on a ship other than the one specified in the 
contract. 
102 Kleinjan & Holst N. V. Rotterdam v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H. [1972] 2 QB 11,21. 
103 Ibid, p. 21. 
104 In Vargas Pena Apezteguia Y Cia Saic v. Peter Cremer G. M. B. H. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 394, Saville 
J, at p. 399, said "I should add that to my mind acceptance of the documents together with a reservation of 
all rights would (in the absence of a special agreement made with the sellers) make no difference where 
the buyers know the true position: they can only reserve what rights they have-if they choose to accept 
the documents with knowledge of the breach, then the rights they have are the rights attached to that case, 
and not those that would exist if they had taken a different course of action. " [Emphasis added]. 
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Apezteguia Y Cia Saic v. Peter Cremer G. MB. H. 105 In Vargas Pena, where the buyer 
accepted documents which on their face revealed the defect of the goods, the buyer was 
not entitled to damages for his market loss. 106 The buyers would be rightfully entitled to 
damages for their market loss if there was an agreement to reserve their rights for such 
damages. ' 07 Such an agreement cannot be found in the reported facts of the case. 108 It is 
submitted that the buyers in Kleinfan were overcompensated by entitling them to 
damages for losses which were not caused by the seller's breach. Indeed, the seller 
should not be held liable for losses which did not result from his breach. 
To sum up, damages for loss of the right to reject should be confined to cases where the 
seller is in double breach, as to the documents and goods, provided that the first breach, 
i. e. as to the documents, conceals the defect of the goods and the buyer could not 
reasonably discover such a defect before accepting the goods. The rule of Kwei Tek 
Chao v. British Traders Ltd109 should be confined only to cases where the buyer cannot 
as a matter of law reject the goods and the documents would be defective if they 
revealed the non-conformity of goods. By this way, it is submitted, the law will achieve 
the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, ' lo and avoid holding the 
seller liable for losses which did not result from his breach. 
105 [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 394. 
106 In Vargas Pena Apezteguia Y Cia Saic v. Peter Cremer G. MB. H. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 394, Saville 
J, at p. 399, said "[i]f the buyers know of the breach... there is then no causal connection between the 
breach and the loss of the right to reject. The buyers know that they may reject if they wish to do so-the 
breach does not cause them to accept the documents. In such a case to award damages where the 
documents have been accepted on the basis of the difference between the contract and market prices at the 
date of the breach is to award damages that simply do not flow from the breach. The damages that flow 
from the breach in such circumstances are represented (in the ordinary case at least) by the difference 
between the value of the goods as warranted and their value in fact. " 
107 See Michael Bridge, supra n. 9 at p. 366. 
108 In Kleinjan & Holst N. V. Rotterdam v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H. [1972] 2 QB 11 Cooke J 
carried on to consider the case of James Finlay & Co. Ltd. v. N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij 
[1928] 2 K. B. 604. He said, at p. 22, "In my view, the decision in Finlay's case lays down a general rule 
as to the measure of damages in cases where the sellers have broken a condition of the contract by failing 
to tender proper documents and the buyers, not having rescinded, are entitled to recover damages for the 
breach. The reasons why the buyers have not rescinded are immaterial. Whether they have been misled or 
have elected not to rescind with full knowledge of the facts the position is the same, namely, that if they 
had rescinded, they would not have had to pay a price (viz. the contract price) in excess of the market 
price of the goods at the time of the breach. " This view is satisfactorily criticised in A. G. Guest, supra n. 4 
at p. 1389 on the ground that the reasoning of the award can apply where there is only a single breach as to 
the goods. In this case, if the buyer rescinded, he would not have to pay the price. 
'09 [1954] 2 QB 459. 
110 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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2.5.4 Damages for other Losses 
Damages for loss of the right to reject seems to be calculated on the basis of the 
difference between the contract price and the market price. "' The time of the market 
varies from one case to another depending on the time when the buyer discovers the 
defect or the time when he resells the goods. Therefore, in Kleinjan & Holst N. V. 
Rotterdam v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H., 112 the time of delivering the 
documents was considered since the buyers were aware of the sellers' breach before 
accepting such documents. 113 In Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders Ltd, 114 where the 
buyer became aware of the breach after he had accepted the documents, the market price 
at the time of delivery of goods was considered for calculating the market loss. ' 5 
However, in the leading case of James Finlay & Co. Ltd. v. N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong 
Handel Maatschappij, 116 the market price at the time of resale was considered. This was 
the relevant time as the buyers were not aware of the sellers' breach by that time. As the 
decision in Kleinfan is unlikely, or it is hoped not, to be found in future case reports, one 
may conclude that the time of the market price should be prima facie the time of 
delivery of goods or the time of resale if it was not reasonable for the buyer to discover 
the seller's breach by the time of resale. 
Apart from damages for market loss, the buyer may claim damages for diminution in 
value of the goods and for any consequential loss resulting from the seller's breach such 
as, loss of resale or loss of use of the goods in question. In the cases where damages for 
market loss was awarded, e. g. James Finlay, there was no diminution in value of the 
goods due to their defect. However, where the defect causes diminution in value, he may 
claim damages for his market loss and the diminution in value. Where the buyer is 
entitled to damages for diminution in value and for his market loss, he will recover, as 
damages, the difference between the contract price and value of the goods as defective. 
The buyer may also be entitled to recover, as damages, his market loss and the cost of 
cure where the cost of cure displaces the prima facie measure, as discussed in chapter 
three. "' 
111 The relevant market is normally the market available at the destination port. 
112 [1972]2QB 11. 
113 Kleinjan & Holst N. V. Rotterdam v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H., [1972] 2 QB 11,22. 
114 [1954] 2 QB 459. 
115 Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders Ltd. [1954] 2 QB 459,494. 
116 [1928] 2 K. B. 604. 
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2.5.5 Damages for Loss of the Right to Reject under the UCC and the 
CISG 
The remedy of damages for loss of the right to reject has not been discussed under the 
UCC or the CISG. Under the UCC, the CIF seller must "forward and tender with 
commercial promptness all the documents in due form and with any endorsement 
necessary to perfect the buyer's rights. "118 The CIF buyer, unless otherwise agreed, 
"must make payment against tender of the required documents and the seller may not 
tender nor the buyer demand delivery of the goods in substitution for the documents. "119 
In view of that, where the documents are, on their face, in conformity with the contract, 
the buyer must pay the price against them. The buyer must pay before inspecting the 
goods and "assert his remedy against the seller afterwards unless the non-conformity of 
the goods amounts to a real failure of consideration. " 120 
Under the UCC, the buyer cannot revoke his acceptance of documents even in cases 
where the documents are discovered to be defective after their acceptance. In such cases, 
if there is a fall in the market price, can the buyer recover, as damages, his market loss 
which could have been avoided by rejecting the defective documents? To my knowledge 
the question has not been raised before the American courts. In my meeting with 
Professor White121 at the University of Michigan, 122 he suggested that there is nothing to 
prevent the court from awarding damages for loss of the right to reject under Section 2- 
714 of the UCC. 123 The Section, which allows damages for any non-conformity of 
tender, leaves it open for the court to quantify damages in a manner which is reasonable. 
However, it should be remembered that under Section 2-608 of the UCC the buyer may 
revoke his acceptance of goods in certain cases as discussed above. 124 In such cases, the 
buyer will have the chance to avoid his market loss by revoking his acceptance. If the 
buyer can revoke his acceptance and elects not to do so, it may become hard to establish 
117 Infra, p. 77. 
118 Section 2-320(2-e) of the UCC. 
119 Section 2-320(4) of the UCC. 
120 Comment 12 to Section 2-320 of the UCC. 
121 White, James J. is a Professor in commercial law at the University of Michigan. He has written on 
many aspects of commercial law and has published the most widely recognized treatise on the Unifora 
Commercial Code, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform Commercial Code (with Summers, 1995,4th 
ed. ). 
122 The meeting was at the University of Michigan in September 1999. 
123 Infra, p. 53. 
124 Supra, p. 25. 
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a causal link between the seller's breach and the buyer's market loss. 125 In such a case, 
the buyer's loss is caused by his own choice to retain the defective goods. 126 
As for the CISG, Article 58(2) provides that "[i]f the contract involves carriage of the 
goods, the seller may dispatch the goods on terms whereby the goods, or documents 
controlling their disposition, will not be handed over to the buyer except against 
payment of the price. " One of the obligations of the CIF seller is to procure a contract of 
affreightment to deliver the goods to the destination mentioned in the contract. 127 Under 
Article 49 of the Convention the buyer will be entitled to avoid the contract if the 
nonconformity of the documents amounts to a "fundamental breach" of the contract. 128 
As regards the definition of the term "fundamental breach", Article 25 provides that "[a] 
breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such 
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to 
expect under the contract.... " Obviously, under such a definition it seems hard to predict 
what may amount to fundamental breach. As for defective documents, Professor 
Schlechtriem129 makes it clear that where payment is agreed to be made against 
documents, the documents must be regarded as fundamental within the meaning of 
Article 25. 
Therefore, under the CISG, where the documents are defective, the buyer can reject 
them. Where the buyer loses his right to reject defective documents, since they appear 
on their face to be in conformity with the contract, can the buyer recover his market loss 
which could have been avoided by rejecting the documents? Article 74 of the CISG130 
seems wide enough to allow the buyer such damages. The point has not been discussed 
under the CISG but there is nothing to prevent the court from awarding such damages 
under Article 74 of the CISG as long as such damages comply with the normal 
125 This does not apply to cases where the buyer discovers the breach after reselling the goods to a third 
party. In such cases, the buyer cannot revoke his acceptance since he cannot make the goods in question 
available to the seller. 
126 See the argument regarding the case of Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers, Ltd. [1954] 2 
QB 459. Supra, pp. 35-40. 
127 See J. D. Feltham, 'C. I. F. and F. O. B. Contracts and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods' [1991] JBL 413,418-9. 
128 Article 49 of the Convention provides that "[t]he buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the 
failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a 
fundamental breach of contract... " 
129 Peter Schlechtriem, supra n. 23 at p. 420. 
130 See Article 74 of the CISG, infra, p. 53. 
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restrictions' 31 imposed on their recovery. 132 In fact, Article 74 of the Convention makes 
it clear that the buyer should be entitled to recover for the losses caused by the seller'd 
breach. In order to achieve such an objective, the buyer should be entitled to damages 
for `loss of the right to reject' under the Convention. 
Conclusions 
`Incidental loss' stated in the UCC is unlikely to result in cases of defective goods. This 
can be understood from the nature of such a loss as it is concerned with expenses 
incurred in cases where the buyer rejects the goods. Therefore, the following chapters 
will deal with two kinds of loss, i. e. normal and consequential losses. As regards the 
applicability of the CISG to consumer sales, this chapter hopefully explained that the 
CISG is unlikely to apply to consumer sales due to the strict limitations imposed, by its 
own provisions, on its application to consumer sales. Therefore, where an argument, 
raised in the following chapters, distinguishes between consumer and commercial cases, 
it has to be remembered that conclusions reached regarding consumer cases may not 
apply under the CISG. 
`Loss of the right to reject' may result in cases of defective quality of goods where the 
seller is entitled to receive the price against documents which include a quality 
certificate. This is quite common in certain sales, such as sale of oil. In applying the 
principle of Robinson v. Harman, 133 one should consider the losses caused by the 
seller's breach. It is submitted that in two cases, i. e. Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders 
Ltd. 134 and Kleinfan & Holst N. V. Rotterdam v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H., 135 
the buyer was overcompensated by entitling him to damages for losses which did not 
result from the seller's breach. Professor Bridge satisfactorily criticises the decision in 
Kwei Tek Chao on the grounds that the causal link between the seller's breach and the 
buyer's loss did not exist. 
Damages for loss of the right to reject, it is submitted, should be awarded only where the 
seller is in double breach, as to the documents and goods, provided that the first breach, 
i. e. as to the documents, concealed the defect in the goods and the buyer could not 
131 Infra, p. 277. 
132 J 
. 
D. Feltham, supra n. 127 at p. 422. 
133 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. l. 
134 [1954] 2 QB 459. 
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reasonably discover such a defect before accepting the goods. An exception to the last 
condition, i. e. the buyer could not reasonably discover the defect of the goods by the 
time of their acceptance, is the case where the buyer cannot as a matter of law reject the 
goods and the documents would be defective if they revealed the non-conformity of 
goods. In such a case, the buyer would not be able to reject the goods and avoid his 
market loss even if he discovered their defect before accepting them. Therefore, in such 
a case, the rule of Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders Ltd136 may apply to allow the buyer 
damages for his market loss. By this way the court will achieve the objective of 
compensatory damages, as stated in Robinson, and at the same time avoid 
overcompensating the buyer. 
Finally, it does not seem possible to compare English law with the UCC and the CISG 
regarding the recoverability and quantification of damages for `loss of the right to reject' 
due to the fact that this point has never been raised under the UCC or the CISG. 
However, as mentioned above, in my meeting with Professor White at the University of 
Michigan, he suggested that there is nothing to prevent the American courts from 
awarding such damages under the UCC as long as the loss complies with the normal 
restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. In fact, it is too hard to tell whether or 
not the American courts would award damages for `loss of the right to reject', if such 
damages were claimed. However, as this chapter argues that the buyer should not be 
entitled to such damages where he could reject the goods, it can also be argued that the 
American court should not allow such damages where the buyer can reject or revoke his 
acceptance of the goods. Indeed, deciding otherwise may result in overcompensating the 
buyer by holding the seller liable for losses which did not result from his breach. As 
explained above, in certain circumstances, Section 2-608 of the UCC allows the buyer 
to revoke his acceptance. 
As regards the CISG, there is nothing to prevent the court from awarding such damages 
under Article 74. In fact, this Article allows the buyer damages for all losses caused by 
seller's breach as long as such losses comply with the normal restrictions imposed on 
the recovery of damages. Therefore, the arguments produced in this chapter regarding 
135 [1972] 2 QB 11. 
136 [1954] 2 QB 459. 
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damages for `loss of the right to reject' should apply under the CISG in order to avoid 




Recoverability of Damages for Diminution in Value: 
Displacement of the Prima Facie Measure 
Introduction 
Chapter one of this thesis stated that the balance for the law, in awarding compensatory 
damages, is to ensure that the objective of compensatory damages, as stated in Robinson 
v. Harman, ' is achieved and the buyer at the same time is not overcompensated. The 
issue of this chapter is whether or not the law strikes the right balance in cases of normal 
loss, i. e. diminution in value. Commonly, damages for diminution in value are 
quantified under a prima facie measure stated in the SGA and the UCC. The CISG does 
not provide a measure of damages in cases of breach of warranty of quality. Therefore, 
one may need to find out how damages can be quantified in such cases under the 
Convention. 
As the prima facie measure applies under both of the SGA and the UCC, it is intended 
to find out whether such a measure has similar application in English and American 
cases. Where it is thought that the application of the prima facie measure by American 
courts is improper or different from the application of such a measure by English courts, 
it becomes necessary to deal with the American cases separately. The obvious example 
is the UCC cases mentioned below where the buyer obtained double recovery for the 
same loss. Such cases will be examined in order to be relied on in concluding, at the end 
of this chapter, which law deals better with the application of the prima facie measure. 
A significant question under the prima facie measure is whether the objective or the 
subjective value of goods should be considered in order to achieve the purpose of 
compensatory damages stated in Robinson. In most cases, goods have one value whether 
they are valued subjectively or objectively. However, in certain cases, the subjective 
value may exceed or be less than the objective value. Therefore, in such cases, valuing 
the goods subjectively may increase or reduce the buyer's damages. In this chapter, it is 
'(1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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intended to find out the circumstances under which the subjective value should be 
considered in order to achieve the purpose of compensatory damages. Moreover, it is 
necessary to specify the time and place at which the goods should be valued and to deal 
with the question of whether such a time and place vary depending on the circumstances 
of each case. 
Damages for diminution in value may not be allowed in cases where their award would 
overcompensate the buyer. This would be the case where the actual loss of the buyer is 
not the diminution in value. The recent case of Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. 
Fasson UK Ltd2 demonstrates how subsales can be considered to disallow the buyer 
damages for diminution in value. The decision in Bence has been criticised by respected 
writers, such as Treitel. 3 However, it will be argued that the decision in Bence allowed 
the buyers damages for their actual loss. Furthermore, it seems possible to argue that 
reaching a different conclusion in a case such as Bence will clash with the objective of 
compensatory damages stated in Robinson. This work will produce an argument to 
support the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bence which is in contradiction to the 
decision of the same Court in Slater v. Hoyle & Smith Ltd. 4 
The objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, cannot be achieved by awarding the 
difference in market value where the actual loss of the buyer is the cost of cure. The cost 
of cure may exceed or be less than the diminution in value. The question is essentially 
whether the objective of damages can be achieved by allowing the buyer damages for 
diminution in value or cost of cure. The decision of the House of Lords in the recent 
case of Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth5 considered the 
restriction of reasonableness which is imposed on the recovery of damages calculated on 
the basis of cost of cure. 
Where the buyer suffers normal loss and consequential loss of profit, can he recover 
damages for both losses? The answer to this question depends on whether the buyer 
claims damages for loss of gross earnings or net profit. This chapter will distinguish 
between gross earnings and net profit and deal with the case where the buyer seeks to 
2[ 1997] 1 All ER 979. 
3 G. H. Treitel, `Damages for Breach of Warranty of Quality' (1997) 113 LQR 189. 
4 [1920] 2 KB 11. 
5[ 1996] 1 AC 344. 
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recover for loss of gross earnings and diminution in value and/or expenses incurred in 
reliance on the contract. It will be argued that allowing the buyer damages for all these 
losses will overcompensate him. The following chapter will examine the case where the 
buyer seeks to recover for his loss of net profit and for the diminution in value of the 
defective goods and/or for wasted expenses incurred in reliance on the contract. 
3.1 The Basic Rule of Damages for Breach of Warranty of Quality 
Section 53(2) of the SGA provides 
"The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated loss directly 
and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of 
warranty. " 
Section 53(2) lays down the basic rule of damages in terms of Hadley v. Baxendale. 6 
The Section seems to state the first part of the rule of Hadley which allows damages for 
losses "arising naturally, i. e. according to the usual course of things"7 from the breach of 
contract. 8 This part of the rule allows damages for losses resulting under normal 
circumstances. However, the Section adds the world `directly'. This word was not used 
in the rule of Hadley. It is unclear whether the word `directly' is intended to make any 
difference from the rule of Hadley. In the context of contractual exclusions from 
liability, Atkinson J, in Saint Line Ltd. v. Richardson, Westgarth & Co. Ltd., 9 said 
"[d]irect damage is that which flows naturally from the breach without other intervening 
causes and independently of special circumstances, while indirect damage does not so 
flow. "10 Under such an interpretation, there seems to be no need to use both the words 
`directly' and `naturally' in Section 53(2) jointly. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of Atkinson J may be suitable for the application of 
Section 53(2) in the light of the fact that the SGA provides another Section which 
allows `special damages'. Section 54 provides 
"Nothing in this Act affects the right of the buyer or the seller to recover interest 
or special damages in any case where by law interest or special damages may be 
recoverable... ". 
6[ 1854] 9 Exch 341. See A. G. Guest, Benjamin's Sale of Goods, London, 5th ed., 1997, p. 931. 
7 Hadley v. Baxendale, ibid, p. 354. 
8 The rule of Hadley is discussed in chapter seven at p. 284. 
9 [1940] 2 KB 99. 
10 Ibid at p. 103. 
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In this view, Section 53(2) may apply to all losses resulting from breach of warranty 
under normal circumstances. Damages for losses resulting under special circumstances 
can be claimed under Section 54. Therefore, in this thesis, damages for consequential 
losses resulting under normal circumstances may be awarded under Section 53(2). 
However, it should be noted that specifying what losses can be awarded under each 
Section is not significant in practice. The amount of damages is determined according to 
principles founded by the common law. Probably, this is why Section 53(2) is always 
dealt with as part of the rule of Hadley without considering whether or not the word 
`directly' makes any difference. 
In all cases, Section 53(2) should be the starting point in quantifying damages for 
breach of warranty. Therefore, the court should not start by considering Section 53(3) 
which allows the buyer damages for diminution in value. In fact, as discussed below, in 
many cases the buyer may not be entitled to damages for diminution in value calculated 
under the prima facie measure. This is why Auld U, in Bence Graphics International 
Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd, ' l made it clear that the starting point in determining damages for 
breach of warranty should be the rule of Hadley and not the prima facie measure stated 
under Section 53(3). 12 
The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale13 is the origin of the provisions of the UCC and the 
CISG regarding damages for breach of contract. Section 2-714(1) of the UCC is similar 
to Section 53(2) of the SGA. 14 Section 2-714(1) of the UCC states the basic rule of 
damages for breach of warranty. Therefore, the Section is applicable to all cases of 
breach of warranty. This may be quite obvious in cases where the buyer claims damages 
for losses other than the diminution in value or where the prima facie measure is not 
applicable. As will be explained in the next section, under the UCC, damages for 
diminution in value are quantified under the prima facie measure. As regards the CISG, 
Article 74 states the basic rule of damages which applies to all cases of defective goods. 
Article 74 of the CISG provides 
t' [ 1997] 1 All ER 979. 
12 Ibid at p. 991. 
13 [ 1854] 9 Exch 341. 
14 Section 2-714(1) of the UCC provides "Where the buyer has accepted the goods and given notification 
(subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss 
resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is 
reasonable. " 
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"Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the 
breach. Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw 
or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the 
light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as 
a possible consequence of the breach of contract. "15 
Under all the mentioned provisions, the buyer is entitled to recover for his actual loss 
caused by the seller's breach. Allowing the buyer for his actual loss may put him in the 
same position as if the goods had been delivered as warranted. In this sense, one may 
state that by applying these provisions the objective of compensatory damages, as stated 
in Robinson v. Harman, 16 can be achieved. However, it should be noted that the buyer 
may not be entitled to all types of damage caused by the breach. As will discussed 
below, 17 in certain cases, awarding the buyer for all types of damage may 
overcompensate him. 
3.2 The Prima Facie Measure of Damages 
Compensatory damages for the normal loss resulting from breach of warranty of quality 
can be awarded under prima facie measure18 stated in the SGA and the UCC. The prima 
facie measure is designed to achieve the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. 
Harman, 19 by awarding the buyer the "difference between the value of the goods as 
received and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted"'. 20 Where the 
diminution in value is the only loss caused by the seller's breach, the difference in value 
damages may place the buyer in the same position as if the goods had been in 
conformity with the contract. 
15 Article 74 of the CISG corresponds to Article 82 of the Uniform Law in the International Sale of Goods 
(ULIS) which provides "Where the contract is not avoided, damages for a breach of contract by one party 
shall consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party. Such damages 
shall not exceed the loss which the party in breach ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, in the light of the facts and matters which then were known or ought to have been known to 
him, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. " 
16 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
" Infra, p. 91. 
18 The prima facie measure can be referred to as "the difference in value measure" or the normal measure. 
It is also known as a "capital value" assessment; see Paul Dobson, Sale of Goods and Consumer Credit, 
London, 5th ed., 1996, p. 211. 
19 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
20 Section 53(3) of the SGA and 2-714 of the UCC. 
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Although the application of the prima facie measure achieves the objective of damages, 
as stated in Robinson, in normal circumstances, it may not be the best measure in cases 
of special circumstances, as discussed below. It should be noted here that the prima 
facie measure is concerned with breach of warranty of quality; but the measure seems to 
be the normal measure of damages where the goods do not correspond to their 
description or are not fit for specific purpose agreed on by the parties. 21 In case of 
delivery by instalments, the prima facie measure of damages applies separately to each 
delivery. 22 
Section 53(3) of the SGA states: 
"In the case of breach of warranty of quality such loss is prima facie the 
difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and 
the value they would have had if they had fulfilled the warranty. " 
Section 2-714(2) of the UCC states: 
"The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and 
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they 
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount. " 
3.3 The Application of the Prima Facie Measure 
The application of the prima facie measure is straightforward in most cases of breach of 
warranty of quality. Two elements should be determined for the application of the prima 
facie measure, i. e. the value of the goods and the time and place at which goods are 
valued. As for the former element, the application of the prima facie measure can be 
relatively difficult where the actual value of the goods is in dispute. As for the latter 
element, there seems to be a difference between the SGA and the UCC regarding the 
time at which damages should be quantified. 
These elements obviously affect the amount of the recoverable damages and, as a result, 
their consideration is necessary to achieve the objective of compensatory damages stated 
in Robinson v. Harman. 23 The misapplication of such elements may result in 
overcompensating or undercompensating the buyer. The following will consider how 
such elements have been, or should have been, applied in order to strike the right 
21 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, London, 16th ed., 1997, p. 587. 
22 A. G. Guest, Benjamin 's Sale of Goods, London, 5th. ed., 1997, p. 936. 
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balance in awarding compensatory damages by achieving the objective of such damages 
and avoiding overcompensating or undercompensating the buyer. 
3.3.1 The Concept of Value 
The concept of the value of goods is not identified by the SGA, the UCC nor the CISG. 
A great deal is left to the court to consider the suitable ways of valuing the goods. 24 In 
the UCC case of Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Fruehauf Corporation, 25 the Court said that 
"[v]alue is described as the highest price in terms of money for which a product would 
have been sold on the open market... "26. Basically, this description indicates one of the 
ways of valuing the goods, i. e. where there is an available market (the market price). 
This description of the value seems to be concerned only with the selling price of goods. 
However, the selling price might be different from the buying price. If this is the case, 
under which price should the value of the goods be determined? The answer to this 
question varies from one case to another depending on the intended use of the goods. 27 
Where the goods were bought for the purpose of resale, such a value might be decided 
under the reselling price; 28 on the other hand, if the goods were bought to be used by the 
buyer, such a value would probably be decided under the buying price. This is 
understandable on the grounds that the value of the goods should be decided from the 
buyer's view. This is due to the purpose of awarding compensatory damages in cases of 
breach of warranty of quality. Damages here are awarded in order to put the buyer, so 
far as money can do it, in the position he would have been in had the goods been free 
from defects. 
23 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
24 Section 1-201(44) of the UCC which deals with the concept of value, is not helpful here. In Carlson v. 
Rysavy, 1978 S. D. LEXIS 296; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 353 (1978) the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated 
that "There is no code definition of value applicable to [Section 2-714(2)]. The general definition of 
value in [Section 1-201(44)] obviously has no relevance here since it looks to the characteristics of an 
entirely different transaction. "24 Section 1-201(44) of the UCC states "(Value). Except as otherwise 
provided with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections... a person gives value to a right if he 
acquires them 
(a) in return for a binding commitment to extend credit or for extension of immediately available credit 
whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back is provided for in the event of difficulties in 
collection; or 
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim; or 
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for purchase; 
(d) in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. 
25 547 F. 2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977). 
26 Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Fruehauf Corporation, 547 F. 2d 1365 at p. 1379 (8th Cir. 1977). 
27 S. M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, Toronto, 1983, p. 9. 
28 Considering the resale price is subject to the remoteness principle. Under this principle, the resale 
should be in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. 
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In the light of the above discussion, one may state that the goods themselves may have 
more than one value. The value of the goods for a business buyer, who buys a quantity 
of goods for the purpose of resale, may be different from the value of the same goods for 
a consumer buyer. As for the former, such a value might be determined in relation to the 
wholesale price since this is the price that the business buyer would pay if he obtained 
the goods from the market. Therefore, in the case of a consumer buyer, the value should 
be decided in relation to the retail price. 29 Clearly, the price under the wholesale market 
is normally less than the retail market price since the retailer is expected to gain profit. 
Therefore, it is plain that in most cases the value of the goods in question from the 
buyer's view is more than the value of the same goods from the seller's view. 
Furthermore, the use of the goods plays a substantial role in their valuation. Some goods 
can be put to several kinds of use and, thereupon, their value is variable depending on 
the kind of use they are put to. For example, the value of a car intended to be used in a 
car race is different from the value of a normal car. In this instance, such kinds of goods 
should be valued in relation to their use which was known to the parties at the time of 
making the contract. Here, where there is a dispute on whether the actual use of the 
goods was known to the parties at the time of making the contract, the court may, unless 
the intended use is proved, value the goods in relation to the most profitable use to 
which the buyer could reasonably have put such goods. 30 
The last point, to be considered in this respect, is that the goods may have special value 
to the buyer which is more or less than their objective value. Here, can such a value be 
considered for the purpose of applying the prima facie measure of damages? This is, 
once again, left to the courts to determine whether to value the goods subjectively or 
objectively. The following section is concerned with this point. 
3.3.2 Can Damages be Recovered for Loss of `Consumer Surplus' under 
the Principle of Robinson? Objective or Subjective Valuation of Goods? 
Determining the value of goods is the main element in applying the prima facie 
measure. Therefore, the question here is whether the court should consider the 
29 J. D. Calamari and J. M. Perillo, Contracts, West Publishing Co., 2nd ed. 1977, p. 537. 
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subjective value of goods in order to achieve the objective of damages stated in 
Robinson v. Harman. 31 This may be understood from the fact that determining the right 
value of the goods is necessary to know the potential position of the buyer if the goods 
had been in conformity with the contract. This requires the court to decide whether or 
not the subjective value can be considered. 
The objective test (the market value), recognized by the measures of damages for non- 
acceptance and non-delivery, is not adopted expressly by the prima facie measure of 
damages for breach of warranty of quality. It seems that the use of the word `value' 
instead of the `market value' makes the prima facie measure unique in the SGA and the 
UCC. The concept of the market value, in the case of non-delivery, is recognized in 
order to award the buyer the amount which allows him to obtain substitute goods from 
the market. However, in cases of breach of warranty of quality, the buyer may retain the 
defective goods. In this respect, the buyer needs an amount to add to the value of the 
defective goods in order to be put in the same position he would have been in had the 
goods been free from defects, i. e. in order to achieve the objective of damages stated in 
Robinson v. Harman. 32 Therefore, valuing what the buyer has and what he should have 
had is left to the court in order to be achieved according to the circumstances of each 
case. In other words, the court will decide to apply the subjective or the objective test 
according to the circumstances of each case. 
Businessmen are normally expected to be concerned with the market value of the goods 
and not to have any emotional attachment to the goods. 33 Therefore, in most cases, 
goods have the same value whether they are valued subjectively or objectively. 
However, in cases of consumer contracts, the goods might be of special value to the 
buyer. In such contracts, the excess utility or subjective value obtained from goods over 
and above the utility associated with their objective value is called, by economists, 
"consumer surplus". 34 It has been said that "the consumer surplus expected by a person 
30 Ibid at p. 538. See also the pre-UCC cases of Campbell v. Iowa Central Ry., 124 Iowa 248,99 N. W. 
1061 (1904); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Krause, 92 S. W. 431 (1906). 
31 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
32 Ibid, p. 855. 
33 R. R. Anderson, `Incidental And Consequential Damages', (1987) 7 J. L. & Com. 327,331. 
34 D. Harris, A. Ogus and J. Phillips, `Contract Remedies and Consumer Surplus' (1979) 95 LQR 582. 
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who intends to use a good is an equivalent to the profit which a businessman expects to 
make from a contract. "35 
In this view, one may note that the objective of compensatory damages, as stated in 
Robinson, cannot be achieved without compensating the buyer for his loss of `consumer 
surplus'. Of course, the recovery of damages for loss of `consumer surplus' is subject to 
the application of the remoteness principle. The `consumer surplus' should be in the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. This may be 
quite obvious in certain cases such as sales of unique goods which do not have a 
substitute in the open market. However, where substitute goods are obtainable, the buyer 
should make it clear to the seller, at the time of making the contract, that the goods are 
of special value for him in order to be entitled to recover damages for loss of consumer 
surplus. 36 Furthermore, damages for loss of consumer surplus may be irrecoverable 
where the defect of the goods can be cured. Here, where the cost of cure is more than the 
difference in the objective value of the goods as warranted and as defective, the value of 
consumer surplus is included in such a cost. This point, certainly, needs further 
examination which can be found below. 37 
One of the difficulties in awarding damages for loss of `consumer surplus' is its 
assessment. Due to its nature, `consumer surplus' is hard to assess. However, 
economists tend to measure the utility in terms of the maximum amount a consumer 
would pay for a particular purchase. Under such a measurement, if the objective value of 
specific goods is £ 100 but the consumer is willing to pay £ 150 for it, the surplus will be 
£50 (£15O [the subjective value] - £100 [the objective value]). 38 Nonetheless, the measurement 
of the consumer surplus is not as easy as it seems. In most cases, valuing the goods 
subjectively is an intractable task since the buyer may have the tendency to exaggerate 
35 Ibid at pp. 582-3. 
36 Here, one may suggest that the seller may raise the price if he knows, at the time of making the contract, 
that the goods are of more value to the buyer than their objective value. However, due to the market 
competition, the seller may not be able to do so. Most likely, the buyer will obtain the goods from the 
seller's competitors if the seller tries to raise the price of the goods. See Timothy J. Muris, `Cost of 
Completion or Diminution in Market Value: the Relevance of Subjective Value' (1983) 12 J. Legal Stud. 
379,386. 
37 Infra, p. 78. 
38 D. Harris, A. Ogus and J. Phillips, supra n. 34. 
57 
such a value. 39 Where it is reasonable for the buyer to cure the defective goods, there 
will be no need, as discussed below, 40 to measure the consumer surplus. 
Where the parties do not present any evidence of the subjective value, the court will 
probably value the goods objectively. Therefore, it is the buyer's responsibility to 
present sufficient evidence of the subjective value of the goods where such goods are 
more valuable to him than their objective value. 41 Where the buyer proves that the 
goods in question mean to him more than their objective value, the issue will be left to 
the court to decide whether to apply the subjective or objective test depending upon the 
circumstances of each case. For example, where the buyer shows evidence that the seller 
was aware, at the time of making the contract, that the goods have a special value to the 
buyer, the goods will be more likely to be valued subjectively as compared to where the 
seller was not aware of such a special value at the time of making the contract. 
Moreover, the objective of compensatory damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 42 
will not be achieved without considering the subjective value of the defective goods in 
calculating the buyer's damages. The subjective value of the defective goods may 
exceed or be less than their objective value. Where the defective goods are of more 
value to the buyer than their market value, the buyer may not be presumed to resell the 
defective goods at their market price. If this becomes the case, should the court consider 
their subjective value in applying the prima facie measure? Probably the answer would 
be in the positive. This is understandable on the ground that damages are generally 
intended to compensate the buyer for the loss he suffered in fact. In this instance, the 
difference between the value of the goods as warranted and their objective value as 
received might overcompensate the buyer. 43 For example, suppose that the market price 
of the goods as warranted is £500 and the market price of the defective goods is £200. 
Suppose further that the defective goods are worth £250 to the buyer. In this case, 
valuing the defective goods objectively will entitle the buyer to recover £300 (the 
difference between the value of the goods as warranted and as received). However, the 
actual loss, that the buyer suffered, is £250 which is the difference between the value of 
39 See Alexander FH Loke, `Cost of Cure or Difference in Market Value? Toward a Sound Choice in the 
Basis for Quantifying Expectation Damages' (1996) 10 JCL 189,193. 
40 Infra, p. 78. 
43 Ellen A. Peters, `Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods under the Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two' (1963) 73 Yale L. J. 199,269. 
42 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
58 
the goods as warranted (£500) and the subjective value of the goods as received (£250). 
Possibly, this is the case where the consumer is emotionally attached to the goods. In 
such a case, it is the seller's burden to prove that the defective goods are of more value 
to the buyer than their objective value. Here, it should be clear that where the subjective 
value of the goods as defective is more than their objective value, the goods as 
warranted are expected to be of a higher subjective value than their objective value. 
Nevertheless, retaining the defective goods does not indicate that such goods are of a 
higher value than their market price. The buyer is not required to resell the defective 
goods in order to obtain damages for breach of warranty of quality. Therefore, one may 
conclude that the consideration of the subjective value in this case faces the obstacle of 
proof. 
On the other hand, the defective goods might be of less value to the buyer than their 
objective value. In such a case, should the court consider the subjective value for the 
application of the prima facie measure? The answer is likely to be in the negative. One 
may suggest that, in this case, by applying the objective value of the defective goods, the 
buyer would be undercompensated. This suggestion may not be accepted on the ground 
that the buyer in such a case is not presumed to keep the defective goods. Apparently, 
the buyer does not have any emotional attachment to the goods since their subjective 
value is less than their objective one. In such a case, the buyer will be most likely to 
resell the defective goods at their market value or cure them. 
Finally, it can be noted that the subjective value must in principle be considered in order 
to achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson v. Harman. 44 However, one finds 
it difficult to provide certain rules under which the court can choose to apply the 
objective or the subjective value of the goods. The obvious case is that the buyer maybe 
entitled to damages for loss of `consumer surplus' where such a `consumer surplus' was 
in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. Furthermore, 
where there is an available substitute, it seems difficult to allow damages for loss of 
`consumer surplus'. This can be understood on the grounds that the buyer can resell the 
defective goods and obtain a substitute which is up to the specifications of the contract. 
In such a case, the buyer may be allowed to recover for the expenses incurred to resell 
43 1.1. White & R. S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, West Publishing Co., 4th ed., 1995, p. 368. 
44 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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the defective goods and obtain substitute. Even where the remoteness principle does not 
arise and substitute goods are unobtainable, the buyer may not be entitled to more than 
the cost of cure provided that it is reasonable for the buyer to cure the defect as 
explained below. 45 To sum up, the court will elect the subjective or objective test in 
order to measure the actual diminution in value of the goods from the buyer's view, 
taking into account the knowledge available to the seller at the time of making the 
contract. 
3.3.3 Burden of Proof as to the Value of the Goods 
It is the buyer's burden to present evidence of the difference in value of the goods as 
received and as warranted. Where the buyer does not present sufficient proof of the 
difference in value, the court may not award him more than nominal damages. In Aryeh 
v. Lawrence Kostories & Sons, Ltd, 46 where damages were claimed for breach of 
warranty of quality, it was held that "... there was no evidence as to difference in value of 
goods delivered and contract goods... therefore, plaintiff was entitled to nominal 
damages only ...... 
47 
There is nothing to prevent the buyer from depending on his own experience to value 
the goods as long as he convinces the court of the actual value of the goods. This has 
been held in a UCC case where the buyer was allowed to depend on his own experience 
to show the value of the goods. 48 Actually, this matter was best explained in the UCC 
case of Vreeman v. Davis49 where the Court made it clear that "[a]n owner is competent 
to express an opinion on the market value of his or her property, and ordinarily any 
weakness in the foundation for that opinion goes to its weight, not its admissibility. , 50 
Here, it should be noted that such a valuation should be produced by a person who has 
as Infra, p. 83. 
46 [ 1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 63. 
47 Aryeh v. Lawrence Kostories & Sons, Ltd, [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 63,72. In Aryeh's case, there was an 
international sale contract between a British seller and an Iranian buyer. Part of the buyer's claim was for 
breach of warranty of quality of the goods delivered. The buyer could not show a sufficient evidence of 
the difference between the actual value of the goods and the value of the goods they would have had if 
they had been as warranted. As a result, the buyer was not entitled to more than nominal damages in 
respect to this claim. 
48 In Royal Furniture Co. v. City of Morgantown 1980 W. Va. LEXIS 455; 164 W Va. 400 (1980), it was 
held that since the plaintiffs were prominent merchants for many years, they were certainly qualified to 
give competent testimony as to the value of their merchandise. Cited in C. A. Cicconi, `Nelson v. Logan 
Motor Sales, Inc.: Providing damages for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability' (1990) 92 W. 
Va. L. Rev. 427,431. 
49 1984 Minn. LEXIS 1356; 348 N. W. 2d 756 (1984). 
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enough experience in the type of the goods in question. In another UCC case, Spencer v. 
Steinbrecher, 51 it was held that "[t]here is no reason why an owner cannot testify as to 
value of his own personal property, but he must, in order to avoid speculation, have 
enough experience to know values and be able to tell why, so the more frequent method 
of proof is to have the value testimony produced by persons experienced with the type of 
property involved... ". 52 In this view, goods should be valued with certainty in order to 
enable the court to assess damages with reasonable certainty as well. 53 In other words, 
the value of the goods should not be speculative. 54 
3.3.4 Ways of Ascertaining the value 
Ways of valuing goods cannot be put in an exhaustive list since they are ever increasing 
in response to the rapid development of manufacturing new goods. Furthermore, the 
value of the goods is changeable, as previously mentioned, depending on many factors, 
e. g. the use of the goods and the nature of the buyer, goods for wholesale or retail sale, 
etc. The following is intended to state the common ways of determining the value of the 
goods. 
3.3.4.1 Ways of Ascertaining the Value of the Goods as Warranted 
Although the prima facie measure does not adopt the concept of market value, the 
market price55 seems to be the primary evidence of the value of the goods in practice. 56 
For example, in the UCC case of Intervale Steel v. Borg Warner, 57 the Court held that 
"[t]he value of goods "as warranted" has been interpreted to encompass two different 
standards. The primary standard is the fair market value of the goods at the time of 
so Vreeman v. Davis, 1984 Minn. LEXIS 1356; 348 N. W. 2d 756 (1984). 
51 152 W. Va. 490 (1968). 
52 Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490 at p. 497 (1968). 
53 For the restriction of certainty, see infra p. 142. 
sa In the pre-UCC case of Rodgers v. Bailey, 1910 W. Va. LEXIS 105; 68 W. Va. 186 (1910), it was held 
that "In proving compensatory damages, the standard or measure by which the amount may be ascertained 
must be fixed with reasonable certainty, otherwise a verdict is not supported and must be set aside. " 
55 See the following UCC cases where the court considered the market price as an evidence of the value of 
the goods as warranted: Brooks Shoe Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Chesapeake Shoe Co., 1982 Bankr. 
LEXIS 3753; 34 UCC Rep. Serv. 539 (1982); Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp. 
1980 U. S. App. LEXIS 11901; 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 416 (3d Cir. 1980). 
56 See Jones v. Just (1868) 3 QB 197 where the buyers contracted with the seller to purchase a quantity of 
Manilla hemp which did not correspond to the specifications of the contract. The buyers were entitled, as 
damages, to the difference between what the hemp was worth when it arrived and what the same hemp 
would have realised had it been shipped in a state in which it ought to have been shipped. 
57 578 F. Supp. 1081 (1984). 
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acceptance. In using the fair market value, the courts ensure that the buyer is only 
recovering his actual damages and does not gain a windfall from a fluctuating market. 
When the fair market value cannot be easily determined, or the parties do not raise it as 
a measure of `value', courts have generally relied on the contract's purchase price as 
strong evidence of the value of the non-conforming goods as warranted. "58 [Emphasis 
added]. 
The second way of determining the value of the goods as warranted is the contract price. 
The contract price59 is common evidence of the value of the goods as warranted. 60 It 
becomes strong evidence where the market price of the goods is not available. This 
presumably happens where the goods in question are unique, used or especially 
manufactured. Such goods are not normally obtainable in the open market. 61 To sum up, 
it can be noted that in the absence of the market for the goods in question, the court may 
consider the contract price as the primary evidence of the value of the goods as 
warranted. 
In the UCC case of Intervale Steel v. Borg Warner, 62 where the buyer had accepted non- 
conforming steel, the Court found that the proper evidence of the value of the goods as 
warranted is the contract price for the following reasons: (a) the parties did not present 
any evidence of the fair market value of the steel had it been tendered as warranted by 
the seller; (b) it did not appear that the buyer would gain windfall damages if the 
purchase price was used as the value of the goods as warranted; (c) there was no 
evidence showed that the contract price was unreasonable for this type of steel. 
58 Intervale Steel v. Borg Warner, 578 F. Supp. 1081 at p. 1090 (1984). 
59 Since the buyer, in cases of breach of warranty of quality, does not reject the goods, the contract price 
cannot be a fixed measure of determining the value of the goods. The basic aim of damages in this case is 
to entitle the buyer to damages to be added to the value of the goods he received and eventually to be put 
in the economic position he would have been in if the goods had been free from defects. Comment 7 to 
Article 70 of the 1978 draft [currently Article 74] of the CISG provides that "... Since this formula [the 
prima facie measure] is intended to restore him to the economic position he would have been in if the 
contract had been performed properly, the contract price of the goods is not an element in the calculation 
of the damages... ". In the following UCC cases the contract price was accepted as an evidence of the value 
of the goods as warranted: Puritan Mfg., Inc. v. L Klayman & Co., 1974 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 7901; 15 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 1055 (1974); Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, 1976 Ind. App. LEXIS 978; 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 336 
(1976); Long v. Quality Mobile home brokers, Inc., 1978 S. C. LEXIS 356; 25 UCC Rep. Serv. 470 
(1978). 
60 The "Credit price" which includes finance charges is not suitable as an evidence for the value of the 
goods as warranted. The contract price should be the cash price that the parties contracted on. Considering 
the "Credit price" as an evidence of the value of the goods as warranted may award the buyer a windfall 
damages which equal the finance charges. 
61 The contract price will be of little assistance if it can be shown that the market has fallen before the time 
of performance. See D. W. Greig, Sale of Goods, London, 1974, at p. 284. 
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It seems necessary to apply the mentioned conditions stated in Intervale case where the 
court chooses to apply the contract price. The purpose of such conditions is to avoid 
overcompensating or undercompensating the buyer in considering the contract price as 
the value of the goods as warranted. 63 The first condition gives the chance to show 
evidence that the value of the goods is more than the contract price. The second 
condition states that the buyer should not be overcompensated by applying the contract 
price. The contract price may be more than the value of the goods as warranted where 
the market has fallen before the time of performance or where the buyer has made a bad 
bargain. 64 If this becomes the case, the difference between the contract price and the 
value of the goods as defective is more than the actual diminution in value resulting 
from the breach of warranty of quality. In view of that, it seems fair enough to offer the 
seller a chance to prove that the contract price is more than the actual value of the 
goods. This is also the purpose of the third condition which can be fulfilled where the 
court has not been provided by any evidence which shows that the contract price is not 
65 the suitable evidence of the value of the goods as warranted. 
Another way of ascertaining the value of the goods as warranted is the resale price. 
Where the buyer had contracted to resell the "goods as warranted" to a sub-buyer, the 
resale price might be considered as evidence of the value of the goods as warranted. 66 
Clearly, the court may not accept the resale price as evidence of the value of the goods 
as warranted where the seller shows evidence that the resale price is higher than the 
reasonable price of the goods. However, the resale price may be considered where the 
buyer is entitled to damages for his loss of profit on resale. Here, the buyer's damages 
would be the difference between the resale price and the value of the goods as defective. 
In such a case, the court will make sure that the recovery for loss of profit complies with 
the restrictions imposed on the recovery damages. For example, the resale price will not 
be accepted as evidence of the value of the goods as warranted where the lost profit on 
62 1984 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 20620; 38 UCC Rep. Serv. 805 (1984). 
63 In the old case of Loder v. Kekule (1857) 3 C. B. (N. S. ) 128, the market price of the goods in question, 
between the time of contracting and the time of delivery, fell. The Court held that the contract price is not 
a suitable evidence of the value of the goods as warranted. 
64 See D. W. Greig, supra n. 61 at p. 284. 
65 See the UCC case of Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 1983 Kan. LEXIS 228; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 448 
(1983). [A case of a sale of mobile home]. In this case the Court decided that the value of the home as 
warranted, for section 2-714(2) purposes, is the purchase price of the home, absent evidence that the 
purchase price differs from the warranty value. 
66 Roy Goode, Commercial Law, 2nd. ed., 1995, p. 406. 
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resale is too remote. Furthermore, the resale price may not be considered where 
consequential losses are contractually excluded, expressly or impliedly, from the seller's 
liability. Loss on resale is a kind of consequential loss as it results from loss of use of 
the goods in question. 
3.3.4.2 Ways of Ascertaining the Value of the Goods as Received 
Once again, the market value is the primary evidence here. Where there is an available 
market for the defective goods, their value will be, prima facie, the market price. 
However, the market price, in this respect, is not common evidence since the market for 
the defective goods is not normally available. 
In some cases, the received goods are worthless due to their defective quality. Where the 
goods are proved to be without value, such as diseased animals and dangerous 
chemicals, the application of the prima facie measure will allow the buyer damages 
calculated on the basis of the value of the goods that they would have had if they had 
been free from defects. 67 However, in normal circumstances, the defective goods are of 
some value. In the case of second hand goods, it might be sensible to value such goods 
by looking at the price of new goods and deduct an amount equivalent to the 
depreciation. 68 
Where the buyer managed to resell the defective goods, the resale price might be, in 
normal circumstances, a satisfactory evidence of their value. 69 This follows the old 
saying, "the worth of a thing is the price it will bring". In Biggin & Co. Ltd. v. 
Permanite Ltd. and others, 70 Devlin J. said "[i]f the actual damaged goods are sold with 
all faults, good evidence can be obtained of the difference in value, but such a sale is not 
always possible, and a claim for substantial damages cannot be limited to goods which 
have been sold. "71 
67 See W&W Livestock Enter. Inc. v. Gerald H. Dennler 1970 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 896; 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 
169 (1970), (court noted "dead pigs have no value"); Swenson v. Chevron Chemical Co., 1975 S. D. 
LEXIS 170; 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 67 (1975) (a farmer who paid $717 for defective pesticide is entitled to 
recover that amount). 
68 M. G. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, Oxford, 1997,592. 
69 S. M. Waddams, supra n. 27 at p. 152. 
70 [195111 KB 422. 
71 Ibid at p. 438. 
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The sub-buyers should be aware of the defect of the goods in order to consider the resale 
price as evidence of the value of the goods as defective. Here, it should be the buyer's 
responsibility to inform the sub-buyer's of the defective quality of the goods. 72 This may 
be of a vital significance for the purpose of the application of the mitigation principle. 
Under the mitigation principle, the buyer may not be entitled to recover for his liability 
to a sub-buyer for losses resulted after the buyer became aware of the defective 
quality. 73 Furthermore, the court may not accept the resale price as evidence of the value 
of the goods as defective where it is unreasonable. The price is normally reasonable 
where the defective goods are sold in a competitive market within a reasonable time 
after delivery. 74 As the prima facie measure applies at the time of delivery, or 
acceptance under the UCC, the resale should be within a reasonable time after delivery. 
This may be necessary in cases of perishable goods which depreciate rapidly. In such a 
case, the price of the goods may decrease rapidly after the time of delivery. 75 However, 
the resale price may be considered as evidence of the value of the goods even in cases of 
late resale where such a resale is delayed by the seller's negotiation with the buyer. 76 
3.3.5 Time and Place at which Goods are Valued 
The time at which goods are valued is of vital significant for assessing compensatory 
damages in order to comply with the principle of Robinson v. Harman. 77 Clearly, in 
cases where the market price fluctuates, the value of the goods may vary depending on 
the time at which the goods are valued. Therefore, the amount of damages may be 
highly affected by the time of valuing the goods. 
Under the SGA, the prima facie measure applies at the time of delivery while it applies 
at the time of acceptance under the UCC. 78 In normal circumstances, delivery and 
acceptance are made at the same time. Anyhow, the time of measuring the difference in 
value should be the time when the buyer has a reasonable opportunity to discover the 
defects. So, the court may depart from the prima facie measure to measure the 
72 R. R. Anderson, `Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods' (1987) 57 Miss. L. J. 317, 
347. 
73 Infra, p. 298. 
74 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 72 at p. 347. 
75 Special Project, `Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions' (1978) 64 Cornell L. Rev. 30, 
115. 
76 Infra, p. 73. 
7' (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
78 Sections 53(3) of the SGA and 2-714(2) of the UCC. 
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difference in value at the time of discovering the defect where such a time is different 
from the time of delivery or acceptance. 
In international sales, the time of delivery can be the time when the seller delivers the 
goods to the first carrier. This may also apply to domestic distance sales. Under such 
sales, the time of delivery can be the time when the seller delivers the goods to the 
carrier. However, it is unlikely that the goods will be valued at that time. 79 In such sales, 
the buyer may not have the opportunity to examine the goods until the time of their 
arrival. Here, it should be clear that the buyer is not deemed to have accepted the goods 
"until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them for the purpose... of 
ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract ...... 
80 In this case, the court 
may apply the prima facie measure at the time when the buyer takes possession of the 
goods on the ground that this is the time when the buyer may have a reasonable chance 
to discover the defects of the goods. 81 In normal circumstances, this would be the time 
of acceptance. International sales are just one case where the difference in value is 
measured at other than the time of delivery or acceptance. Further cases are examined 
below. 82 
As for the place of determining the value, under the UCC, the prima facie measure 
applies at the place of acceptance83 while under the SGA such a place is not provided. 84 
However, determining the place of valuing the goods is not of vital significance since it 
79 See Christian Twigg-Flesner and Robert Bradgate, `The E. C. Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale 
of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees-All Talks and No Do? ' (2000) Web JCLI section 4(a); 
available at <http: //webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/flesner2. html>. 
80 Section 35(2) of the SGA provides: 
"Where goods are delivered to the buyer, and he has not previously examined them, he is not deemed to 
have accepted them under subsection (1) above until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining 
them for the purpose- (a) of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract, and... ". 
Section 2-606 of the UCC states: 
"Acceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer (a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods 
signifies to the seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their non- 
conformity... ". 
81 A. G. Guest, supra n. 22 at pp. 936,1385; see also Marimpex Mineralöl Handelsgesellschaft m. b. H v. 
Louis Dreyfus et Cie Mineralöl G. m. b. H., [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 167. In this case, the buyer purchased 
Russian gasoil under c. i. f. contract. The contract was governed by English law. The buyer was awarded 
the difference in value damages calculated at the time and place of their arrival at the destination port. 
82 Infra, p. 70. 
83 Section 2-714(2) of the UCC provides that "[t]he measure of damages for breach of warranty is the 
difference at the time and place of acceptance... ". 
84 See Section 53(3) of the SGA. 
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is normally the place of the available market for the goods. 85 Deciding the relevant 
market depends on the circumstances of each case. 
To sum up, it can be noted that it is more appropriate to consider the time of acceptance, 
rather than the time of delivery, in calculating the buyer's damages. As discussed above, 
in certain cases the buyer may not be able to discover the defect of the goods at the time 
of delivery. However, the difference between the SGA and the UCC in this respect is 
not practically significant since the measure of damages is prima facie. Normally, the 
court values the goods at the time when the buyer has a reasonable chance to discover 
the defect of the goods. This can be the time when the buyer decides to resell the 
defective goods and obtain substitute. Therefore, this seems the right practice in order to 
ensure that the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 86 is achieved by 
placing the buyer in the same position he would have been in if the goods had been free 
from defects. 
3.3.6 The Application of the Prima Facie Measure under the CISG 
As stated in chapter one of this research, the objective of damages under Article 74 of 
the CISG is to compensate the buyer for his actual loss resulting from the seller's 
breach. Allowing the buyer damages for his actual losses may put him, so far as money 
can do it, in the same position he would have been in if the goods had been delivered as 
warranted. In other words, awarding the buyer damages for his actual losses may 
achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson v. Harman. 97 
The CISG does not provide a specific measure for quantifying damages in cases of 
breach of warranty of quality. Therefore, the court must calculate such damages in the 
manner which is best suited to the circumstances. 88 Here, the prima facie measure is not 
the basic method of assessing damages under the CISG. Nevertheless, where the goods 
have a recognized value which fluctuates, the prima facie measure would probably 
apply to award the buyer damages for diminution in value. 89 In normal circumstances, 
85 For ways of ascertaining the value of goods, see supra p. 61. 
86 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
87 Ibid, p. 855. 
88 Albert H. Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the United Nations Convention on Contract for 
the International Sale of Goods, 1989, p. 475. 
89 Comment 7 of the Secretariat Commentary to Article 70 of the 1978 draft [currently Article 74] of the 
CISG provides "If the goods delivered had a recognized value which fluctuated, the loss to the buyer 
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the buyer may be entitled to recover the difference in value of the goods as warranted 
and as received. Since by doing so, the buyer may be put in the same position he would 
have been in if the goods had been defect free. However, the time and place at which 
goods are valued are not specified by the Convention. Specifying the time at which 
damages are measured may be of vital significance in cases where the goods fluctuate 
substantially in value. 90 A footnote to the 1978 commentary on Article 70 of the 1978 
draft [currently Article 74] of the CISG states that the CISG gives no indication of the 
time and place at which "the loss should be measured. Presumably it should be at the 
place the seller delivered the goods and at an appropriate point of time, such as the 
moment the goods were delivered, the moment the buyer learned of the non-conformity 
of the goods or the moment that it became clear that the non-conformity would not be 
remedied by the seller under article 35,42,43 or 44, as the case may be. "91 As 
previously mentioned, the place at which goods are valued may not be the place of 
delivery where the available market for the goods is elsewhere. As for the time of 
calculating damages, there seems to be no clear-cut time provided for the assessment of 
damages under the CISG. 92 Therefore, where the court applies the prima facie measure, 
valuing the goods in question can be at the time which is most appropriate in the light of 
the circumstances of each case. 
The appropriate time is not necessarily the time of delivery or acceptance. It is the time 
when the buyer has a reasonable opportunity to discover the defect of the goods. This 
may be the time when the buyer has physical possession of the goods. Moreover, the 
goods may be valued at a point of time after putting them to their use. For example, 
suppose that an American buyer has purchased machinery from a French seller in order 
to use it in his factory. Suppose further that the machinery appears defective within a 
reasonable time after the buyer installs it in his factory. In this example, if American law 
is applicable under private international law, the CISG will be applied since it has been 
ratified by the USA. The buyer may claim damages for breach of warranty of quality. 
would be equal to the difference between the value of the goods as they exist and the value the goods 
would have had if they had been as stipulated in the contract... ". See also H. M. Flechtner, `Remedies 
under the New International Sales Convention: The Perspective from Article 2 of the U. C. C. ' (1988) 8 
J. L. & Com. 53,107. 
90 H. Gabriel, Practitioner's Guide to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), New York, 1994, p. 231. 
91 Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by 
the Secretariat, Commentary on Article 70 [Article 74 of the current CISG], n. 2. 
92 See J. S. Sutton, `Measuring Damages under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods' (1989) 50 Ohio St. L. J. 737,743; Albert H. Kritzer, supra n. 88 at p. 476. 
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The prima facie measure of damages may be applied in order to award the buyer for the 
diminution in value of the machinery. The diminution in value of the machinery may 
vary depending on the time at which the machinery is valued especially where the 
market price of the machinery fluctuates. In this hypothetical example, it seems unfair to 
measure the diminution in value at the time of delivery or acceptance since the defect of 
the goods was not discernible by the time of putting the machinery to its stipulated use. 
In such a case, the court will be likely to measure the diminution in value at the time of 
discovery of the defect. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the prima facie measure might not apply under the 
CISG in certain circumstances. For example, the court may find that the suitable 
measure of damages is the cost of cure of the defective goods. Comment 6 to Article 70 
of the 1978 draft [currently Article 74] of the CISG states that "[w]here the seller 
delivers and the buyer retains defective goods, the loss suffered by the buyer might be 
measured in a number of different ways. If the buyer is able to cure the defect, his loss 
would often equal the cost of the repairs... "93. The comment plainly deals with the 
obvious case where the cost of cure equals the diminution in value. The comment does 
not deal with cases where the cost of cure exceeds or is less than the diminution in 
value. Nevertheless, the words of Article 74 of the Convention are broad enough to 
allow the court to award damages for the actual loss under the normal restrictions94 
imposed on the recovery of damages. Therefore, if the court finds that the buyer's actual 
loss is the cost of cure and not the diminution in value, it is likely to allow the recovery 
of the cost of cure under Article 74 of the CISG. As discussed below, certain 
circumstances may indicate that the cost of cure is the actual loss of the buyer. 95 
3.4 Modification or Displacement of the Prima Facie Measure 
"[I]t's for the court to determine the correct measure of damage, not the aggrieved 
Part Y""96 Although the prima facie measure applies in the majority of cases of breach of 
warranty of quality, the measure seems to be not exclusive. 97 There are certain cases 
93 Document A/CONF. 9715. 
94 Infra, p. 277. 
95 Infra, p. 77. 
96 Bence v. Fasson [1997] 1 All ER 979,989. 
97 M. J. Staff, `the Consequences of Consequential Damages: A Survey of Buyer's Damages under Chapter 
2' (1982) 45 Tex. B. J 1211,1213. The Texas Business and Commerce Code is the Texas' version of the 
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where special circumstances98 lead to the displacement or modification of the prima 
facie measure in order to achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson or to 
avoid overcompensating the buyer. Special circumstances exist where the prima facie 
measure fails to place the buyer in the position he would have occupied had the goods 
been in conformity with the contract. 99 In other words, the prima facie measure should 
be displaced where its application does not comply with the principle of Robinson v. 
Harman. 100 This may be the case where the application of the prima facie measure 
overcompensates or undercompensates the buyer. 101 Here, special circumstances restore 
the assessment of damages to the basic rules under Sections 53(2) of the SGA and 2- 
714(1) of the UCC. 102 Under these rules, the court is to elect the most appropriate 
measure of damages. The following will deal with cases where the prima facie measure 
is modified or displaced under special circumstances. 
3.4.1 Modification of the Prima Facie Measure in order to achieve the 
objective of Damages as stated in Robinson 
As the measure of damages stated in the SGA and the UCC is prima facie, the court 
may modify its application by applying it at other than the time of delivery or 
acceptance. 103 Cases, where the prima facie measure should be modified in order to 
comply with the principle of Robinson v. Harman, 104 seem hard to be put in an 
exhaustive list. In answering the following questions, one may deal with some of these 
circumstances. Where the defect cannot be discovered, or become certain, 105 before 
using the goods, can the diminution in value of the defective goods be measured at the 
time of discovery of the defect? Further, in cases where the buyer has passed the goods 
to a sub-buyer without examining them and the seller was aware of the subsale at the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The reference mentioned is concerned with chapter two of the Texas Business 
and Commerce Code which corresponds to Article two of the official Uniform Commercial Code. 
98 Special circumstances in this context are different from those stated in the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale 
[1854] 9 Exch. 341. The former is the circumstances which displace or modify the prima facie measure for 
the purpose of quantifying damages for diminution in value while the latter is the circumstances which 
should be known to both parties in order to award consequential damages for loss caused by the breach 
under such circumstances. 
99 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 72 at p. 322; Uniform Commercial Code Permanent Editorial Board, 1 PEB 
Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 2: Preliminary Report, American Law Institute, 1990, 
36. 
100 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
'0' See Chad A. Cicconi, supra n. 48. 
102 Supra, p. 50. 
103 The time at which damages are calculated under the prima facie measure is the time of delivery under 
the SGA and the time of acceptance under the UCC. 
104 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
105 See Vreeman v. Davis, 1984 Minn. LEXIS 1356; 348 N. W. 2d 756 (1984). 
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time of making the contract, can the diminution in value be measured at the time of 
arrival of the goods to their destination? Finally, where the seller causes a delay in the 
resale of the defective goods, can the diminution in value be measured at the time of 
resale? 
The application of the prima facie measure assumes that the buyer could immediately 
resell the defective goods in the market if the goods are valued at the market price. 106 
The buyer will not have the chance to do so before discovering the defect of the goods. 
Therefore, where the defect is of a nature which cannot be discovered before using the 
goods, it seems reasonable to measure the difference in value at the time of discovery of 
the defect. Furthermore, in order to consider the actual position that the buyer is placed 
in due to the breach, the defective goods should be valued at the time when the defect is 
discovered. In other words, the goods should be valued at the time of discovery of their 
defect in order to achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson. 
The UCC case of Adam Metal Supply, Inc. v. Electrode, Inc., 107 seems a good example. 
In this case, the buyer bought aluminium sheeting of a specific kind. After it had been 
sheared, it appeared to be of a different kind from that contracted for. It was decided that 
this case was one of special circumstances since it was necessary to shear the aluminium 
in order to determine that it was not as warranted. Due to that, the court decided that the 
value of the aluminium accepted should be ascertained after it was sheared. 108 
It is worth noting that the warranty might relate to the future, e. g. the sale of seeds. In 
this example the buyer will not be able to discover the defect until the crops appear 
defective. In cases of defective seeds, the buyer would normally be entitled to the 
difference between the actual value of crops and the value they would have had but for 
the defective seeds. 109 In such a case, the diminution in value of the crops is a kind of 
consequential loss since it results from the use of the defective goods purchased. Here, 
the normal loss is the diminution in value of the defective seeds themselves at the time 
106 A. G. Guest, supra n. 22 at p. 936. 
107 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17088; 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 178 (1980). 
108 Adam Metal Supply, Inc. v. Electrode, Inc. 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17088; 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 178 
(1980). In this case the Court held that "the `special circumstances' of this case, namely the fact that it was 
necessary to shear the aluminum in order to determine that it was Coilzak [as warranted], mandates that 
[the value of the aluminum accepted be ascertained after it was sheared] and makes it perfectly proper 
under section [2-714]. " 
109 S M. Waddams, supra n. 27 at p. 158. 
71 
of delivery. However, by awarding the buyer damages for the diminution in value of the 
crops, the buyer would be put, so far as money can do it, in the same position he would 
have been in had the seeds been defect free. The buyer in such a case should not be 
entitled to recover for the diminution in value of the seeds jointly with damages for the 
diminution in value of the crops. By awarding the buyer damages for the diminution in 
value of the seeds, the buyer would be overcompensated. This is one of the cases, 
discussed below, 110 where damages cannot be awarded for both normal and 
consequential losses. 
Where goods are bought for resale, they may be valued at the time of their delivery to 
the sub-buyer. In applying the principle of Robinson, one should consider the economic 
end-result of delivering conforming goods. If the goods are discovered to be defective at 
the time they were delivered to sub-buyer, the buyer's liability to the sub-buyer may be 
for the diminution in value of the goods measured at that time. Therefore, it is more 
realistic to apply the prima facie measure at the time when the goods are delivered to the 
sub-buyer provided that the seller was, or should have been, aware at the time of making 
the contract of the fact that the goods would be resold. The case of Van Den Hurk v. R. 
Martens & Co. Ltd., 111 seems to be helpful. In this case, the buyer purchased a quantity 
of sodium sulphide. The sellers admitted that they had been informed by the buyer that 
the goods were required for export and were not for home trade. ' 12 The sub-buyers 
rejected the goods on the ground that they were of an inferior quality of caustic soda. In 
this case, the Court held that the damages were to be assessed "according to the prices 
ruling at the date when they arrived to their ultimate destination". 113 This case states an 
important rule in cases of resale transactions. Where the seller is aware, at the time of 
making the contract, that the buyer will deliver the goods to a third party without 
examining them, damages will be measured according to the value of the goods at the 
time of their arrival to the ultimate buyer. Nevertheless, damages may be calculated at a 
later date where the defect of the goods cannot be known by the time of their use as 
discussed in the previous paragraph. 
10 Infra, p. 91.. 
1" [1920] 1 KB 850. 
112 Ibid at p. 851. 
113 Ibid at p. 853. 
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Since the prima facie measure presumes that the buyer may resell the defective goods 
and obtain a substitute, the time of determining the value may be decided to be the time 
of resale. This may be quite obvious in cases where the resale is delayed due to the 
seller's negotiations with the buyer. In Loder v. Kekule, 114 the price of the resale of the 
defective goods was considered as the value of the defective goods since the seller had 
delayed the resale by his negotiations with the buyer. In this view, it can be noted that 
where, due to the seller's negotiations with the buyer, the resale of the defective goods is 
delayed, the court may consider the resale price as the value of the defective goods for 
the purpose of the application of the prima facie measure. 115 
In any case, where the buyer has mitigated his normal loss, i. e. the diminution in value, 
the court may be reluctant to award the buyer more than his actual loss. In such a case, 
the court will be likely to displace the prima facie measure in order to award the buyer 
damages for his loss as mitigated. '' 6 The buyer may mitigate his loss by reselling the 
defective goods at a price higher than the market price. However, whether such a resale 
price can be considered for calculating the buyer's damages is a controversial point as 
discussed below. ' 17 
3.4.2 Displacement of the Prima Facie Measure where it does not Comply 
with the Principle of Robinson 
In certain cases, the application of the prima facie measure may not be appropriate to 
achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson v. Harman. 118 However, in other 
cases, applying the principle of Robinson may undercompensate the buyer. This can be 
the case of "betterment", as explained below. Therefore, alternative measures should be 
considered in order to avoid overcompensating or undercompensating the buyer. The 
commonest example of such measures is the cost of cure as discussed below. 
119 
Displacement of the prima facie measure occurs normally where such a measure fails to 
apply or where it awards the buyer more or less than his actual loss. 
114 (1857) 3 C. B. 128,140. 
115A. G. Guest, supra n. 22 at p. 936. 
116 See Vorthman v. Keith E. Myers Enterprises, 
(1980). 
117 Infra, p. 95. 
118 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
119 Infra, p. 77. 
1980 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 923; 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 924 
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The buyer may suffer normal loss, i. e. diminution in value of the goods supplied, and 
consequential losses resulting from the breach of warranty of quality. Where it is 
possible to calculate the buyer's loss without the need to distinguish between normal 
and consequential losses, should the court draw such a distinction? As damages are a 
question of fact, the court may not need to draw a distinction between normal and 
consequential losses in cases where there is no exclusion or limitation of the seller's 
liability. This may be helpful in cases where it is hard to draw such a distinction. Here, 
the UCC case of Holm v. Hansen120 seems to be illustrative. In this case the buyer 
purchased a herd of cattle. Within a period after acceptance, the buyer discovered that 
some of the cows were diseased. The disease was contagious. Consequently, all the 
cows were infected. The court found that it is impossible to ascertain which of the 
purchased cattle have been carrying the disease at the time of purchase. Upon that, the 
court decided that "this is a proper case for application of the exception in [Section 2- 
714(1)], which is to be used when special circumstances show proximate damages of a 
different amount. "121 Consequently, it was held that the buyer "is entitled to fair and 
reasonable compensation for the loss he sustained to his entire herd as the proximate 
result of defendant's breaches of warranty. i, 5122 In this case it is obvious that part of the 
buyer's loss was consequential since it was unlikely that all the cows were infected at 
the time of acceptance. It was hard, however, to identify the borderline between normal 
and consequential losses. Therefore, displacing the prima facie measure was necessary 
to award the buyer damages for his actual loss. 123 Nevertheless, in such a case, if the 
seller had limited or excluded his liability for consequential losses, the court might have 
found it necessary to find a way to estimate the consequential loss of the buyer in order 
to exclude it from the seller's liability. As mentioned in chapter one, the classification of 
normal and consequential losses adopted in this thesis does not apply in the context of 
contractual exclusions from liability. 124 
120 1976 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1065; 248 N. W. 2d 503 (1976). 
121 Ibid, p. 19, p. 510 respectively. 
122 Ibid, p. 20, p. 510 respectively. 
123 The case of Smith v. Green (1875) 1 C. P. D. 92, provides a fu ther illustration of the point. In this case, 
the plaintiff bought a cow from the defendant with a warranty that the cow was free from foot and mouth 
disease. The plaintiff who was a farmer placed the cow with other cows. The cow appeared to be diseased 
and some of the other cows were infected by the disease and died. In this case the court found that the 
seller knew, at the time of making the contract, that the buyer is a farmer and he would probably place the 
cow with other cows. On this ground, the court held that the defendant [seller] is liable in damages for the 
entire loss. In this case, the normal loss was the diminution in value of the purchased cow while the 
consequential loss was the diminution in value of the other diseased cows. However, there was no need to 
draw the distinction between these two losses. 
124 Supra, p. 6. 
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3.4.2.1 Cost of Cure 
The concept `cost of cure' plays several roles in assessing damages for defective quality. 
Cost of cure of the defective goods can be evidence of the difference in value damages. 
It can also be a separate measure of damages, which displaces the prima facie measure 
in order to allow damages that comply with the principle of Robinson v. Harman. 125 
Furthermore, cost of cure can be claimed, jointly with damages for diminution in value, 
as a kind of consequential loss in cases where the defective goods cause damage to other 
property. The following will deal with each role separately. 
A) Cost of Cure as an Evidence of the Diminution in Value 
Where the buyer's damages can be measured by the prima facie measure, cost of cure 
may be considered as evidence of the diminution in value. In such cases, the application 
of the prima facie measure complies with the principle of Robinson. Cases show that 
cost of cure can be strong evidence of the difference between the value of the goods as 
warranted and their value as accepted. 
For example, in Minister Trust, Ltd. v. Traps Tractors, Ltd., and Others, 126 the Court 
awarded damages for breach of warranty. The Court held that "the measure of damages 
was the difference between the value of the machines [the subject of the contract] fully 
re-conditioned in accordance with the contract and their value as delivered, and, as the 
market value could not be determined, the amount of the damages should be assessed by 
reference to the time... and cost of putting the machines into the contractual 
condition. , 127 Likewise, in the UCC case of Nelson v. Logan Motor Sales, Inc., 128 the 
Court held that the cost of repair could be used as evidence for the difference in 
125 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
'26[1954]3AllER136. 
127 Ibid at p. 154-6. See also Jackson v Chrysler Acceptances Ltd [1978] RTR 474 where damages were 
claimed for breach of warranty of quality of a car. The court awarded the difference in value of the car at 
the time of delivery and took full account of the fact that various serious defective parts of the car had 
been replaced by the dealers. 
128 1988 W. Va. LEXIS 84; 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 116 (1988). In Winchester v. McCulloch Bros. Garage, 
1980 Ala. LEXIS 3225; 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 212 (1980) it was held that where the goods are repairable, 
cost to repair is a useful measure of the difference in value. See also Custom Automated Machinery v. 
Penda Corporation, 1982 U. S. Dis. LEXIS 10875; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 856 (1982) where the Court 
decided that the difference in value can be computed by reference to the costs of repairing the goods. 
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value. 129 These cases made it clear that the cost of cure may represent the difference in 
value. 
The cost of cure can provide strong evidence of the difference in value if it restores the 
defective goods to the position they would have been in if they had been free from 
defects. In Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Fruehauf, 130 the Court held that "[i]f you find that 
the repair of the cars restored the cars to substantially the same conditions as they would 
have been in if properly manufactured, the difference or diminution in value is the same 
as the reasonable cost of repairing the cars ...... 
131 
In considering the cost of cure as evidence of the diminution in value, the court should 
avoid overcompensating the buyer. Clearly, where the cost of cure is evidence of the 
diminution of the value of the goods, the buyer should not be entitled to both the cost of 
cure and the diminution in value. Although this point seems to be clear, in one UCC 
case the court did award damages for both the diminution in value and cost of cure of 
the same goods and, consequently, the buyer was overcompensated. This was the case of 
R. Clinton Construction Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 132 where the Court awarded the 
buyer damages consisting of the reasonable cost of repair of the defective machinery and 
of the loss of income to the buyer during the down-time occasioned by the period of 
repairs. The Court also awarded the buyer damages for the difference between the value 
of the machinery as warranted and its value as received. It seems that the buyer in this 
case was overcompensated. Whereas the loss of income represents the consequential 
loss, the cost of repair represents the normal loss of the buyer, i. e. the diminution in 
value. In other words, the difference between the values of the machinery as warranted 
and as received was measured by the cost of repair which was recovered under the first 
head of the award. By allowing the buyer the difference in value and the cost of cure, the 
buyer received double recovery for the same loss, i. e. the diminution in value. 
129 See the UCC cases of Holden Mach. v. Sundance Tractor & Mower (In re Fried Group) 1998 Bankr. 
LEXIS 193; 36 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 709 (1998); Winchester v. McCulloch Bros. Garage, Inc., [1980] Ala. 
LEXIS 3225; 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 212 (1998). 
130 547 F. 2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977). 
131 Ibid, p. 1378. 
132 1977 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 12222; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 310 (1977). Cited in M. T. Gibson, `Reliance 
Damages in the Law of Sales under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code' (1997) 29 Ariz. St. L. J., 
909, n. 432. 
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B) Cost of Cure as a Measure of Damages: Does it Comply with the 
Principle of Robinson? 
The buyer should not be entitled to damages for more than his actual loss. Where the 
cost of cure exceeds or is less than the diminution in value, on which basis can the 
buyer's damages be quantified? In answering this question, one needs to determine the 
actual loss of the buyer. The cost of cure may exceed the diminution in value in certain 
cases, such as the case where the goods in question are "secondhand". In this case, 
repairing such goods might put them in a better position than they would have been in if 
they had been as warranted. 133 The question here is whether the buyer is entitled to the 
cost of cure regardless of the "betterment". 
Before considering this question, one may need to deal with the issue of whether the 
cost of cure can be generally recovered. The question has to be answered in view of the 
principle of Robinson v. Harman. 134 Under the principle of Robinson, one may answer 
the question in the positive as the recovery of the cost of cure would put the buyer in the 
position he would have been in if the goods had been delivered as warranted. However, 
under the mitigation principle, the buyer should not be entitled to recover for losses 
which he could have reasonably avoided. Therefore, where substitute goods are 
obtainable, the buyer will be expected to resell the defective goods and purchase goods 
of the right quality. If this becomes the case, the buyer's loss is the difference in the 
market value of the goods as warranted and as defective. Therefore, in such a case, the 
buyer may not be entitled to recover the cost of cure that exceeds the difference in value. 
Under the UCC, this has been decided in the leading case of Line Railroad Co. v. 
Fruehauf. 135 In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit made 
it clear that 
"... if you find that the repairs of the cars placed the cars in a better condition 
than they would have been at the time of acceptance if they had been properly 
manufactured, then the difference or diminution in value recoverable by 
plaintiffs is the difference between the fair market value of the covered hopper 
cars as accepted by [the buyer] and the fair market value they would have had if 
133 Neuman v. Spector Wrecking & Salvage Company, Inc., 1973 Tex. App. LEXIS 2367; 12 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 254 (1973). This was a case of breach of warranty of quality of used goods. It was held eventually 
that awarding the buyer the cost of repair would put him in a better position than he would have occupied 
if the goods had been in conformity with the contract. 
134 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
135 547 F. 2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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[the seller] had manufactured them properly. So [the buyer] in this situation 
would not be able to recover the full amount spent for repairs. "136 
Exceptionally, the buyer may be entitled to recover, as damages, the cost of cure which 
exceeds the difference in value. 137 This may be the case where the breach of warranty of 
quality gives rise to a loss of `consumer surplus'. 138 Under the remoteness principle, 139 
such a loss should be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at the time of 
making the contract, as not unlikely to result from the breach. Where substitute goods 
are unobtainable, 140 such as unique goods, the seller is expected to know, at the time of 
making the contract, that the buyer will have no choice other than repairing the defective 
goods. 141 
136 Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Fruehauf, 547 F. 2d 1365, p. 1378 (8th Cir. 1977). It was decided that "the 
total figure cannot exceed the difference between the fair market value as accepted, and the fair market 
value in the defective condition you find". 
137 Under the UCC, this has been decided in City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 1981 U. S. App. LEXIS 
10957; 31 UCC Rep. Serv. 1375 (1981), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held that "where special circumstances justify the use of a measure of damages other than that expressly 
provided by the statute, plaintiff may recover for its direct damages in any manner that is reasonable". An 
appropriate measure of damages under that provision is the "actual cost" of a remedy that meets the 
ultimate requirements of the contract by converting non-conforming goods into goods which will perform 
as warranted... ". See also the UCC case of Black v. Don Schmid Motor, Inc., 1983 Kan. LEXIS 228; 35 
UCC Rep. Serv. 448 (1983) where it was held that the cost of repairs, necessary to bring the mobile home 
to conformity with the warranties of sale, is a sufficient measure of damages under section 2-714 (2) of the 
UCC. 
138 In Watts v. Morrow [1991] 4 All ER 937, where there was a breach of a contract for survey, the Court 
of Appeal held that cost of cure could be awarded where there is a breach of warranty of the condition of 
the house. In this case, the buyer was not allowed for more than the diminution in value since such a 
warranty did not exist. The surveyor was in breach of his duty to use proper care and skill in reporting 
upon the condition of the house. See also O'Grady v. Westminster Scaffolding, Ltd. [1962] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
238 where the plaintiff was allowed damages calculated on the basis of cost of cure although such a cost 
exceeded the difference in value. In this case, the plaintiff brought a suit in tort to recover for damage 
caused to the car by the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff has acted reasonably in repairing the car on 
the ground that the car was considered as unique and the plaintiff was emotionally attached to the car. 
139 Infra, p. 284. 
140 As concerns secondhand goods, Professor Anderson states that it is generally understood that the 
measure of damages is the cost of repair when repair is possible. Ronald A. Anderson, Anderson on the 
Uniform Commercial Code, New York, 3rd ed., 1997, p. 444. However, in cases where a substitute car is 
available, the buyer should mitigate his loss by obtaining a substitute car. For example, in Darbishire v. 
Warren [1963] 1 WLR 1067 where the plaintiff purchased a secondhand car, which appeared defective, 
the Court of Appeal made it clear that the measure of damages in the case of a replaceable chattel such as 
a secondhand car is the difference in market value. The Court held that the plaintiff, who was under a duty 
to mitigate the loss, had had the car repaired at a cost exceeding its market value instead of trying to 
replace it with a comparable car at the market price. The plaintiff had not acted reasonably vis-a-vis the 
defendant and was not therefore entitled to recover the cost of the repairs. 
141 See the UCC case of Gem Jewelers, Inc., v. Dykman 1990 N. Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3817; 12 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 2d 721 (1990) where the plaintiff contracted with defendant for the construction and installation of 
new, custom-designed jewellery cabinets, cases and fixtures for plaintiff's retail jewellery store. The 
goods installed were defective. The Supreme Court of New York held that "as this case can be found to 
involve goods not bought and sold on the open market, it can reasonably be concluded that the standard 
breach of warranty measure of damages under Section 2-714(2) [the prima facie measure] was inadequate. 
The plaintiff was allowed the cost of cure which exceeded the diminution in value. 
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In this sense, the buyer may be entitled to recover the cost of cure in such cases if the 
cure is the only way to deal with the breach of contract. 142 Indeed, whether in 
commercial or consumer contracts, if the only way to deal with defect is by cure, 
allowing the buyer the cost of cure will achieve the objective of damages stated in 
Robinson v. Harman. 143 The buyer will not be overcompensated since he will be 
awarded for his actual loss which could not reasonably be avoided. This may be the case 
where substitute goods are unobtainable. In fact, it is possible to envisage cases where 
the buyer may mitigate his loss by curing the defective goods even though such a cure 
costs more than the diminution in value. For example, suppose that the buyer bought 
machines specially manufactured to be used in his factory. In such a case, substitute 
goods are hard to be found. If the machine appears defective, the buyer may suffer loss 
of profit resulting from the loss of using the machine. The buyer may mitigate his loss of 
profit by curing the machine. In such a case, the mitigation principle144 may apply to 
allow the buyer the cost of cure even though such a cost exceeds the diminution in 
value. 
Where it is unreasonable for the buyer to cure the defective goods, can the cost of cure, 
which exceeds the diminution in value, be recovered? Under the principle of Robinson, 
the buyer may be entitled to recover such a cost of cure since by such a recovery he will 
be placed in the same position as if the goods had been in conformity with the contract. 
However, where it is unreasonable to cure the defective goods, it becomes unfair to 
allow the buyer damages calculated on the basis of cost of cure. English law imposes the 
restriction of reasonableness on the recoverability of the cost of cure. Under such a 
restriction, it should be reasonable for the buyer to cure the defect. The restriction of 
reasonableness was considered by the House of Lords in Ruxley Electronics and 
Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth. 145 The case involved a contract of 
construction of swimming pool. The construction did not conform to the contract. The 
142 Orsborn suggests that under the consumer surplus theory the buyer may not be entitled to recover the 
cost of cure, which exceeds the diminution in value, in cases where the contract is entered into as a means 
of financial gain. Justin Orsborn, `Expectation Damages for Breach of Contract and the Principle of 
Restitutio In Integram' [1993] Auckland U. L. R. 305,329. 
143 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
144 Infra, p. 298. 
145 [1996] 1 AC 344. The case is of construction contract but the principle of reasonableness, considered 
in the case, applies similarly to sale of goods cases. It may be unreasonable for the buyer to repair the 
goods if the cost of repair is more than the diminution in value and substitute goods are available. In such 
a case, the buyer may resell the defective goods and obtain substitute. However, the buyer may be entitled 
to the cost of cure, which exceeds the diminution in value, where substitute goods are not available or 
there is a `consumer surplus'. 
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plaintiffs sued the defendant who was the owner of the pool for the balance of the 
agreed contract sums. The defendant counterclaimed damages for the breach of contract 
on the ground that the depth of the pool was less than the agreed depth stated in the 
contract. At first instance, it was found that there was no sufficient evidence to prove 
that the shortfall in the depth had decreased the value of the pool and the Court of 
Appeal did not find materials to fault that conclusion. The Court of Appeal held that the 
defendant was entitled to the cost of the remedial work. However, this award was 
rejected by the House of Lords146 on the grounds that it would be unreasonable for the 
owner to incur the cost of demolishing the existing pool and the cost of constructing a 
new and deeper one. ' 47 
Arguably, the reasonableness restriction, considered in Ruxley, is not an application of 
the mitigation principle. 148 Under the mitigation principle, the buyer is not entitled to 
recover, as damages, the expenses he incurred on unreasonable steps to mitigate his loss. 
Here, one may argue that where it is unreasonable for the buyer to cure the defect, the 
mitigation principle will apply to prevent the recovery of damages for the cost of such a 
cure which exceeds the diminution in the market value. However, where there is no 
substitute, it is hard to say that cost of cure is an avoidable loss. In a case such as 
Ruxley, the mitigation principle cannot restrict the owner's claim to recover the cost of 
cure since in pursuing reinstatement, the owner is taking the only available step to cure 
the nonconforming construction. 1491t is hard to accept that the buyer fails to mitigate his 
loss by curing the defect where such a cure is the only way to deal with the defect. The 
mitigation principle can apply here to limit the recovery to the reasonable cost of cure in 
the sense that the buyer should not choose to remedy the defect by an expensive way 
where a cheaper way is available. 150 Regardless, it was decided that the cost of cure was 
unrecoverable since it was unreasonable to cure the defective swimming pool. It is 
submitted that the reasonableness restriction, considered in Ruxley, is not an application 
of the principle of mitigation and it is a separate restriction imposed upon the recovery 
of damages calculated on the basis of cost of cure. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
146 [1996] 1 AC 344. 
147 See Roger Halson, `Damages, Diminution in Value and Cost of Cure' [1995] LMCLQ 27. 
148 In contrast, see Jill Poole, `Damages for Breach of Contract - Compensation and Personal Preferences: 
Ruxley Electronics and construction Ltd v Forsyth' (1996) 59 MLR 272,276 where the writer suggests 
that the reasonableness requirement in the case of Ruxley "referred only to the issue of mitigation". See 
Duncan Miller, Damages for Defective Works: Reasonableness and Restitution, [1995] Building and 
Construction Law 379,386-7. 
149 Alexander FH Loke, supra n. 39 at p. 195. 
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issue of whether the reasonableness restriction is an application of the mitigation 
doctrine or a separate restriction is a theoretical matter which should not affect the 
recoverability of damages. This is because the buyer would not be entitled, in any case, 
to recover the cost of cure where it was unreasonable to cure the defect. 
Where the cure is unreasonable, the buyer may not be expected to cure the defect. In this 
sense, the restriction of reasonableness may help to avoid overcompensating the buyer. 
This seems to be a significant point in quantifying the buyer's damages in order to strike 
the right balance by achieving, so far as possible, the objective of damages, as stated in 
Robinson v. Harman, '5' and ensuring that the buyer is not overcompensated. The 
restriction of reasonableness seems to be of vital significance to the recoverability of the 
cost of cure. It is absolutely logical that damages should not be quantified on the basis of 
the cost of cure where the diminution in value is quite trivial. Generally, awarding the 
buyer the cost of cure, where it is unreasonable for him to cure the defective goods, may 
result in the so-called economic waste. ' 52 The restriction of reasonableness should be 
considered with the other restrictions153 imposed on the recovery of damages in cases 
where the buyer claims the cost of cure. 
Deciding what is reasonable is a matter of fact which depends on the circumstances of 
each case. For example, the buyer may not be entitled to recover the cost of cure which 
is highly disproportionate to the difference in value. "In commercial context a plaintiff 
would not recover damages on a "cost of cure" basis if that cost was disproportionate to 
the financial consequences of the deficiency. "154 Under American law, Section 348(2) of 
the Restatement Second of Contracts provides that the plaintiff may recover, as 
damages, the "reasonable cost of completing performance or of remedying the defect if 
that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to him". The 
leading case in this respect is Jacob Youngs v. Kent155 where it was held that the 
150 For the mitigation principle, see infra p. 298. 
151 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
152 Timothy J. Muris, supra n. 36 at p. 391. 
153 See chapter seven at p. 277. 
154 Channel Island Ferries Ltd. v. Cenargo Navigation Ltd (The Rozel) [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 161,168. 
(Charterparty) In this case, the owners of the ship in question were not entitled to recover, as damages, the 
cost of cure on the ground that the cost was grossly disproportionate to the difference in value. The 
charterers were not liable for the diminution in value since there was no ample evidence of the difference 
in value. 
155 [1921] 129 NE 889 cited in Alexander FH Loke, supra n. 39 at p. 194. See the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in R. W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp. 1985 
U. S. App. LEXIS 29814; 40 UCC Rep. Serv. 1283 (8th Cir. 1985). In this case, the buyer bought 
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plaintiff was entitled to recover the cost of cure unless such a cost is grossly and 
unfairly out of proportion to the good to be attained. Nonetheless, the court may take 
into consideration other factors in applying the restriction of reasonableness. For 
example, in consumer contracts, where the seller is aware at the time of making the 
contract that the goods are of more subjective value to the buyer than their market value, 
the court may be inclined to award the buyer the cost of cure although it exceeds the 
diminution in value. Certainly, "contract law should protect a person's subjective 
choices and eccentric tastes. "156 
Moreover, the House of Lords in Ruxley did not ignore the plaintiffs consumer Surplus. 
Damages were awarded for loss of amenity. This seems to be a convenient approach of 
the issue since the aggrieved party, by such an approach, was compensated for his actual 
loss. In Ruxley, the nature of the contract made it clear that loss of amenity was in the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract as not unlikely to result 
from the breach. As explained above, ' 57 in order to be considered in quantifying the 
buyer's damages, the `subjective value' or `consumer surplus' should be in the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. Therefore, in 
principle, damages for loss of `consumer surplus' can be awarded in any case, whether 
consumer or commercial, under the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of 
damages. However, `consumer surplus' is unlikely to arise in commercial cases. In 
normal circumstances, businessmen are normally concerned with their financial loss 
caused by the seller's breach. Therefore, whether or not the commercial buyer can 
recover for loss of `consumer surplus' depends on the purpose of purchasing the goods. 
In other words, the question turns to be whether the buyer can prove that he suffered 
loss of `consumer surplus'. 
reflective glass panels to use them for installation in a four-storey office building in order to fulfil his 
contractual obligation to the owner of the building. The panels proved defective. The buyer and the owner 
of the building (plaintiffs) submitted that the piecemeal replacement of defective glass panels would not 
cure the defect. Their experts testified that complete replacement of all the panels was necessary. The case 
was considered as one of special circumstances where the prima facie measure of damages could be 
displaced. The prima facie measure was displaced in order to award the buyer the cost of replacement 
which exceeded the diminution in value of the panels. The Court stated that "[t]his measure of damages 
[the cost of replacement] was appropriate here, as [the buyer] suffered damages which could only be 
remedied by replacement of the panels. As such, the special circumstances [in this case] show [that the 
buyer] suffered proximate damages of a different amount than that which is ordinarily recoverable for 
breach of warranty. The jury's award of the replacement cost of the panels merely compensated [the 
buyer] for the proximate damages it actually suffered by reason of [the seller's] breach of warranty. " See 
also Western Paper Co. v. Bilby, 1989 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 52; 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 503 (1989). 
156 Gerard McMeel, `Common Sense on Cost of Cure' [1996] LMCLQ 456,458. 
157 Supra, p. 55. 
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It seems unclear whether the restriction of reasonableness, considered in Ruxley, applies 
under the CISG. However, it is unlikely for the court to award damages for the cost of 
cure where it is unreasonable for the buyer to cure the defective goods. Here, there is 
nothing to prevent the court from awarding damages for loss of amenity where the cost 
of cure appears an inappropriate measure. This was, as previously mentioned, the case in 
Ruxley where the House of Lords entitled the buyer to damages for loss of amenity. 158 
However, as explained in the previous paragraph, loss of amenity is unlikely to be 
suffered in commercial contracts. Since the CISG is unlikely to apply to consumer 
cases, damages for loss of amenity may not be claimed under the Convention. 
As the previous discussion dealt with the recoverability of damages based on the cost of 
cure where such a cost exceeds the diminution in value, further discussion should be 
directed to the case where the cost of cure is less than the diminution in value. It is likely 
that the buyer will seek to recover the difference in the value of the goods as warranted 
and as received wherever the cost of cure is less than such a difference in value. The 
question here is whether the difference in value is recoverable in such a case. Certainly, 
the answer to this question depends on whether or not the cure restores the goods to 
their condition as warranted by the contract. 
In answering this question, one should mainly look at the actual loss suffered by the 
buyer. Where the cure does not restore the goods to the same condition they would have 
been in if they had been in conformity with the contract, the buyer may be entitled to the 
cost of cure plus the difference between the value of the goods as warranted and such a 
cost. Such an award seems to achieve the objective of compensatory damages stated in 
Robinson v. Harman. 159 By such an award, the buyer would be put in the position as if 
the goods had been delivered as warranted. 
Under the UCC, this was stated clearly in the aforementioned case of Soo Line 
Railroad, 160 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that 
"... if you find that the repair of the cars did not restore them to substantially the 
same condition as if they would have been if properly manufactured, then the 
difference or diminution in value is the reasonable cost of repair, plus the 
158 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth, [1996] 1 AC 344,373-4. 
159 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
160 Soo Line Railroad Co. v. Fruehauf, 547 F. 2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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difference between the fair market value of the covered hopper cars if they had 
been manufactured without faults or defects, and the fair market value of the 
repairs... "161 [Emphasis added] 
However, the principle of Robinson should be applied jointly with the mitigation 
principle in cases where the cure brings the defective goods to the contract standard and 
costs less than the difference in value. In such a case, the difference between the cost of 
cure and the difference in value may be considered as a mitigated loss. The question of 
whether or not the buyer was required, under the mitigation principle, to mitigate his 
loss by curing the defect is of no relevance. This is because the mitigation principle does 
not allow the buyer damages for losses which have been avoided in fact. '62 By awarding 
the buyer the difference in value in such a case, the court will ignore the application of 
the mitigation principle which is one of the restrictions imposed on the recovery of 
damages. Therefore, the court will be likely to displace the prima facie measure by 
awarding the buyer the cost of cure. For example, in the UCC case of Tarter v. Monark 
Boat Co., 163 the buyer was awarded the cost of cure ($37,000) which was much less than 
the difference between the value of the goods as warranted and as accepted ($100,000). 
Such a displacement of the prima facie measure is necessary in order to compensate the 
buyer for the loss he suffers in fact and to avoid overcompensation. This is one of the 
cases where the cost of cure is considered as a measure of damages and not as evidence 
of the difference in value. 164 Certainly, in such cases, the cost of cure may fix an upper 
limit for recovery. 165 
C) Cost of Cure as Consequential Loss 
The use of defective goods may result in physical damage to property other than the 
goods purchased. In such a case, the buyer may reinstate such property and seek to 
recover the cost from the seller. Where the cost of reinstatement equals the difference 
between the pre-damage value of the property and their value as damaged, the buyer 
may use the cost of cure as evidence of the loss he suffered. However, the issue becomes 
complicated where the cost of cure exceeds or is less than the difference in value. The 
above discussion dealt with this issue in respect of the repair of defective goods 
161 Ibid, p. 137ß. 
162 For the mitigation principle, see infra p. 298.. 
163 1977 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 16015; 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 33 (1977). 
164 This issue has not been discussed by the English court. See MP Furmston `damages- diminution in 
value or cost of repair? - damages for distress' (1993) 6 JCL 64,65. 
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purchased. It is submitted that the same results reached in that respect would apply to 
the case where damage was caused to property other than the goods purchased. 
Now we turn to the question of whether the buyer is entitled to recover the cost of cure 
regardless of the improvement resulting from the cure. Cure may put the goods in a 
better position than they were before the damage. This is commonly called the issue of 
betterment. At first sight, answering this question in the positive seems to be in direct 
contradiction with the objective of damages stated in Robinson v. Harman. 166 By 
allowing the buyer such a cost of cure, he will be put in a better position than he would 
have been in if the goods had been delivered as warranted. But, what would be the case, 
if the only way to deal with the breach is by curing the defect of the goods? In such a 
case, would the buyer be overcompensated if he were awarded the cost of cure? 
The famous case of Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd., 167 
seems to be helpful. In this case, the defendant agreed to design, build and install a 
heated pipeline and tank system for use in the plaintiff's factory. Due to defective 
performance by the defendant, the whole factory was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff lost 
the heated pipeline system and suffered damage to his factory. In this case the Court 
awarded the buyer the cost of reinstatement of his damaged property although the 
difference in value of the factory before and after the fire was less than the award. The 
decision in this case seems to be fair in light of the fact that the reinstatement of the 
factory was the only way to deal with the damage and the plaintiff could not reinstate 
the factory without 'betterment'. Widgery U said: 
"In my opinion each case depends on its own facts, it being remembered, first, 
that the purpose of the award of damages is to restore the plaintiff to his position 
before the loss occurred, and secondly, that the plaintiff must act reasonably to 
mitigate his loss. If the article damaged is a motor car of common make, the 
plaintiff cannot charge the defendant with the cost of repair when it is cheaper to 
buy a similar car on the market. On the other hand, if no substitute for the 
damaged article is available and no reasonable alternative can be provided, the 
plaintiff should be entitled to the cost of repair.... Nor do I accept that the 
plaintiff must give credit under the heading of "betterment" for the fact that their 
new factory is modern in design and materials. To do so would be the equivalent 
of forcing the plaintiffs to invest their money in the modernizing of their plant 
which might be highly inconvenient for them. "' 68 
165 E. Ellan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, (1970) 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1145,1169. 
'66 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. l. 
167 [1970] 1 All ER 225. 
168 Ibid at p. 240. 
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In the light of the above discussion, one may summarize the issue of betterment as 
follows. The buyer cannot, in certain cases, restore the defective goods to their position 
as warranted nor can he restore damaged interests to their pre-loss position without 
improvement (betterment). 169 In such a case, the cost of cure may exceed the damages 
recoverable under the principle of Robinson v. Harman. 170 However, in such a case, the 
buyer does not have any choice other than curing the defect. Moreover, the improvement 
will not increase the buyer's profit. The case should be different where the improvement 
increases the buyer's profit. 171 Therefore, the buyer will not be overcompensated by 
allowing him the cost of cure in cases where the only way to deal with the breach is by 
curing the defect and such a cure does not increase the buyer's profit. Therefore, in such 
cases, disallowing the cost of cure may undercompensate the buyer. In view of that, it 
seems that the case of Harbutt's Plasticine was rightly decided. Although the decision 
did not achieve the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, the plaintiff was not 
overcompensated as he did not have any choice other than reinstating the building. 
Indeed, in this case, the defendant was held liable for the actual loss caused by his 
breach. This can be an exception to the objective of damages stated in Robinson. Here, it 
should be remembered that the recovery of the cost of cure is subject to the 
reasonableness restriction as discussed above. ' 72 In other words, it should be reasonable 
for the buyer to cure the goods. Where the defect is trivial and its cure costs much more 
than the difference in value, the buyer may not be entitled to the cost of cure. Therefore, 
in Harbutt's Plasticine, if it had been unreasonable to reinstate the building, the plaintiff 
would not have been entitled to the cost of cure. 
3.4.2.2 Issues Concerning the Recoverability and Quantification of 
Damages in Cases of Cost of Cure 
At the last point of the discussion regarding cases of cost of cure, one needs to deal with 
further questions that have certain effect on the recoverability and quantification of 
damages in such cases. Where the buyer cured the defect by himself, would he be 
entitled to recover damages for his out-of-pocket expenses plus a profit for his time and 
effort? Where the diminution in value resulted partly from the use of the goods, would 
169 I. N. Duncan Wallace, Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts, London, Vol. 1,11th ed., 1995, 
p. 1050. 
170 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
171 Infra, pp. 88-91. 
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the buyer be entitled to recover, as damages, the cost of cure? Is it necessary to cure the 
goods in order to consider the cost of such a cure as evidence of the difference in value 
or as a separate measure of damages? Where repair or replacement of profit-making 
goods or parts of them improves their productive capacity, should such improvement be 
taken into account in calculating the buyer's damages? 
Where the buyer or his employees cured, or participated in curing, the defects, there 
would be no reason for not allowing him to recover damages for his out-of-pocket 
expense plus a profit for his time and effort. The buyer may recover, as damages, what 
he has reasonably spent for such a cure plus a profit for his time and effort. 173 This 
recovery can be simply understood on the ground that if the defects were cured by other 
contractors, the buyer would be entitled to recover what he had paid to them. Therefore, 
the seller should not benefit from depriving the buyer of a profit on work which was 
required reasonably for curing the defect. 174 By such a recovery, the buyer will be 
compensated for his actual loss and also the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson 
v. Harman, 175 will be achieved. Of course, such a recovery would be subject to the 
application of the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. 176 
The depreciation resulting from using the goods for a period of time should be 
considered in order to avoid overcompensating the buyer under the principle of 
Robinson. It should be remembered that the diminution in value is normally measured at 
the time of delivery. However, it has been mentioned that where the defect of the goods 
cannot be discovered before using the goods, the diminution of value may be measured 
at the time when the defect is or can be reasonably discovered. Probably, part of the 
diminution in value of the goods may result from their use. Therefore, the court may 
take into consideration the depreciation resulting from the use. In such a case, the buyer 
may not be entitled to recover, as damages, the cost of cure which may put the goods in 
the position they would have been in had the contract been properly performed. 177 The 
award here should be the cost of cure less an amount equaling the diminution in value 
172 Supra, p. 79. 
173 Custom Austomated Mach. v. Penda Corporation, 1982 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 10875; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 
856 (1982). 
174 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 72 at p. 340. 
175 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
176 Infra, p. 277. 
177 See Community Television Services, Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 1977 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14804; 22 
UCC Rep. Serv. 686 (1977). See S. M. Waddams, supra n. 27 at pp. 152-3. 
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resulting from the use of the goods that the buyer had enjoyed over the period preceding 
the time of discovering the defect. '78 However, this may not be the case where the cost 
of cure is considered as a separate measure of damages, which displaces the prima facie 
measure. In such a case, the recoverability of the cost of cure would be subject to the 
discussion stated under the previous section. 
The third question was best dealt with in Ruxley. It seems that where costs of cure are 
accepted as evidence of the difference in value, there is no requirement of curing the 
defect in fact. 179 More importantly, where it is reasonable to cure, there is no need for 
the buyer to show his intention that he will use the award for curing the defects. 180 Since 
the buyer will not be allowed the cost of cure where it is unreasonable to cure the goods, 
there seems no point of requiring the buyer to spend the award of damages on curing the 
defective goods. This point was made clear in Ruxley. Lord Jauncey, in Ruxley, made it 
clear that "the court has no concern with the use to which a plaintiff puts an award of 
damages for a loss which has been established. "181 However, Lord Jauncey continued to 
emphasize that "[i]ntention, or lack of it, to reinstate can have relevance only to 
reasonableness and hence to the extent of the loss which has been sustained. "182 In this 
sense, one may note that where the aggrieved party has started curing the defect or has 
already cured it, he may become in a good position to convince the court that it is 
reasonable to cure the defect. 
As regards the last question, which deals with the superiority of substitute or cured 
goods, the following will argue that profits derived from such a superiority should be 
considered to reduce the buyer's damages in order to avoid overcompensating the buyer. 
178 S. M. Waddams, supra n. 27 at p. 158. 
179 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 72 at p. 338. See also Teledyne Indust. v. Patron Aviation, Inc., 1982 Ga. App. 
LEXIS 1951; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 1365 (1982). 
180 See Gerard McMeel, supra n. 156; Jill Poole, supra n. 148. 
181 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth, [1996] 1 AC 344,359; see also the 
similar opinion of Lord Lloyd at p. 364-5. The view was different in the past; "it has been said that the 
plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable cost of having the remedial work done if in all the circumstances it is 
(or was) reasonable for him to insist on having the work done-- and either (a) he has actually has the work 
done, or (b) he undertakes to have it done, or (c) he shows a "sufficient intention" to have the work done if 
he receives damages on this basis. " D. Harris, A. Ogus, J. Phillips, `Contract Remedies and Consumer 
Surplus' (1979) 95 LQR 582,590. 
182 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth, ibid at p. 359. In this case Lord 
Lloyd, at p. 372, said "I fully accept that the courts are not normally concerned with what a plaintiff does 
with his damages. But it does not follow that intention is not relevant to reasonableness, at least in those 
cases where the plaintiff where the plaintiff does not intend to reinstate. " Intention to cure can be evidence 
that the aggrieved party has suffered a loss of `consumer surplus'. See Elizabeth Macdonald, Breach of a 
Contractual Obligation: Cost of Cure or Market Value? (1988) 52 Conv. & Prop. Law. 421,422. 
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Deciding otherwise will allow the buyer more damages than the damages he is entitled 
to recover under the principle of Robinson. In other words, by ignoring the extra profit 
gained by using the superior substitute, the court may fail to achieve the objective of 
damages stated in Robinson by placing the buyer in a better financial position than the 
position he would have been in if the goods had been free from defects. The case of 
British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric 
Railways Co. of London Ltd183 seems to be helpful. In this case, a railway company 
purchased turbines which appeared defective. The buyer used the turbines for several 
years before he decided to replace them with other turbines of a different make and 
design. By the time the turbines were replaced, the buyer had incurred extra expenses on 
the excess of coal consumption. The substituted turbines were more efficient. The 
House of Lords held that "the pecuniary advantage which the railway company [the 
buyer] derived from the superiority of the substituted turbines was relevant matter for 
the consideration of the arbitrator in assessing the damages... "184 Indeed, the court in 
calculating the buyer's damages should take into account the superiority of substitute 
goods. In order to achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson and avoid 
overcompensating the buyer, it is submitted that damages in cases of replacement of 
defective goods can be quantified as follows: 
([cost of replacement' 85 + extra expenses incurred in using defective goods] - [the 
salvage value of the defective goods + extra profit derived from the superiority of the 
substitute goods]) 
In calculating damages in cases of replacement, one needs to take into account the 
commercial life of the substitute goods. Where the commercial life of the substitute 
183 [1912] AC 673. 
184 raid at p. 674. 
ias The cost of replacement includes expenses incurred in removing the defective goods and installing the 
new goods. For example, in the UCC case of Rose v. Helm 1972 Colo. App. LEXIS 885; 11 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 496 (1972) where the buyer of a restaurant business warranted that the equipment, which included a 
canopy, was in good operating condition, and the canopy collapsed approximately one year later because 
of its defective construction, the court held that the buyer could recover the costs incurred in replacing the 
collapsed canopy as consequential damages under Section 2-715. However, expenses incurred in 
installing new machine in connection with its superior design may not be recoverable. For example, in the 
UCC case of Service Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M. A. Bell Co., 1978 Kan. App. LEXIS 219; 26 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 334 (1978) where the buyer of a defective pollution control device who was not permitted to recover 
the price of a more expensive replacement unit on the basis of special circumstances, was not entitled to 
recover the cost incurred in purchasing the more expensive unit, such as acquisition and installation costs 
and consulting engineer's fees in connection with designing the new unit though the buyer may be 
reimbursed for all expenses in installing and testing the faulty device. 
89 
goods is longer than the remaining of the supposed commercial life of the defective 
goods, could the court consider this point to reduce the buyer's damages provided that 
the replacement is reasonable? Likewise, where the cure extends the commercial life of 
the goods, could the court deduct the value of the extension from the recoverable cost of 
cure provided that the cure is reasonable? The question was raised in Bacon v. Cooper 
(Metals) Ltd. 186 The facts of this case can be summarized as follows. The fragmentiser, 
which was used by the buyer to produce fragmentised scrap steel, was fitted with a rotor 
which, if properly used, had an average life of seven years and which, if broken, could 
only be replaced by a completely new rotor. The rotor, which could have been used for a 
further 3 3/4 years, was damaged by the use of defective steel which was purchased 
from the defendants. The buyer purchased a new rotor which had 7 years commercial 
life. In this case, the Court rejected the sellers' submission that they should only be 
liable for the proportion of the total cost of the rotor which the old rotor expected life 
bore to its total life, on the basis that the chattel being replaced was a wasting asset. The 
Court accepted the submission of buyer that he should be entitled to the whole cost of 
replacement since replacement was necessary in order to put the fragmentiser back into 
working order. 
The Court in Bacon did not consider the decision in British Westinghouse Electric and 
Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London, Ltd. 187 
where damages were reduced by an amount equivalent to the profit derived by the use of 
superior substitute machinery. In normal circumstances, the buyer would not replace the 
substitute goods till the end of their commercial life. Therefore, the cost of purchasing a 
new machine will be incurred at the end of the commercial life of the substitute goods. 
The buyer will have the chance to invest the price of a new machine between the time of 
expiry of the supposed commercial life of the replaced machine and the end of the 
commercial life of the substitute machine. Profits derived from investing the price for 
such a period should be deducted from the buyer's damages. What profit did the buyer 
derive from the breach in Bacon? In this case, the commercial life of the substitute rotor 
was 7 years whereas the damaged rotor had an expectation of 3 3/4 years of further 
useful life. Under the above discussion, one may point out that the Court should have 
considered the profit that could be derived from investing the price of a new rotor for an 
186 [1982] 1 All ER 397. 
187 [1912] AC 673. 
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extra 3 1/4, i. e. the period between the end of the supposed life of the rotor and the end 
of commercial life of the substitute rotor. ' 88 
However, it seems that the Court in Bacon was not convinced that the buyer would use 
the substitute rotor for all its commercial life due to the type of the fragmentiser. The 
Court found out that there were new fragmentisers of much better capacity than the 
fragmentiser in question. Due to that, the Court disregarded the commercial life of the 
substitute rotor for the purpose of quantifying damages. In this case, Cantley J said 
"[c]ounsel for the defendants [sellers] says that, if counsel's submission for the plaintiff 
[buyer] is correct, the defendants would be liable for the cost of a new rotor even if the 
damaged one had only a few days of remaining useful life. He says that that would be an 
absurd result. I think it would be. The application of any general principle is 
inappropriate at the point where it would produce an absurdity. Each case should depend 
on its own facts. , 189 In view of the above discussion, it is submitted that the commercial 
life should be taken into account unless the facts of the case lead to a different 
conclusion. The case of Bacon, it is submitted, was decided on its own facts. 
To sum up, in general, extra profits derived from obtaining substitute goods should be 
considered in order to reduce the buyer's damages. By ignoring such profit, the buyer 
may benefit from the breach of contract. Indeed, the objective of damages, as stated in 
Robinson, cannot be achieved by allowing the buyer to benefit from the seller's breach. 
The exception to this rule is the case of "betterment", as discussed above. 
3.5 Can Damages be Awarded for both of the Diminution in Value and 
Loss of Gross Earning? How can Overcompensation be Avoided? 
In general, the objective of compensatory damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 19o 
can be achieved by allowing the buyer damages for his actual losses. However, as stated 
in chapter one, 191 allowing the buyer for all kinds of damage, caused by the breach, may 
188 In such a case, it is difficult to assess the profit. Interest on the money for specific period may be 
considered as equivalent to the profit expected by investing money. 
189 Bacon v. Cooper (Metals) Ltd., [1982] 1 All ER 397,400. The case of Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd. v. 
Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd., [1970] 1 All ER 225 can be distinguished from cases such as Bacon on 
the ground that it was a case of a building and not of a wasting asset. See also Jean Braucher, `An 
Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law' [1985] Wis. L. Rev. 1405,1429 where 
the writer suggests that the extension of commercial life resulting from the cure should be considered to 
reduce the buyer's damages. 
190 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
191 Supra, p. 1. 
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result in overcompensating him. it seems that one must distinguish between the negative 
results of the breach and the buyer's actual loss caused by the breach. For example, as 
discussed below, The seller may deliver goods in order to be manufactured with other 
ingredients to make other products. If the goods appear defective, two kinds of damage 
may result, i. e. diminution in the value of the goods supplied and diminution in value of 
the products manufactured. However, in such a case, the buyer's actual loss would not 
include the diminution in value of the goods supplied. The buyer's expectations under 
the contract are the profits derived from manufacturing the goods and selling the final 
products. Indeed, this point needs further discussion which can be found below. ' 92 At 
this place, it is enough to say that the buyer's loss of expectations does not necessarily 
include, in all cases, every negative result of the breach. Therefore, in applying the 
objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, the court must look at the actual loss of 
expectations rather than looking at every individual damage caused by the breach. In 
other words, in applying the principle of Robinson, the court must look at the potential 
economic end-result of the delivery of conforming goods. In fact, allowing the buyer 
damages for all kinds of damage caused by the breach may put him in a better financial 
position than he would have been in if the goods had been delivered as warranted. The 
court should look at the ultimate financial position that the buyer would have been in if 
the goods had not been defective taking into account the information available to the 
seller at the time of making the contract. Where the goods are bought in order to be 
manufactured or to be used in business, the court should look at the profit that could 
have been gained if the goods had been as warranted. This observation will be relied on 
in the next section to argue issues raised by the decision in Bence Graphics 
International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd. 193 
The concept of "loss of profit" is normally concerned with consequential losses. Loss of 
profits results normally from the use or loss of use of defective goods. One here should 
distinguish between gross earnings and net profit. Gross earnings can be understood as 
the sum of all the receipts earned by the buyer in using the goods. 
'94 Net profit is the 
buyer's gross earnings minus all the capital expenses, including the contract price, 
necessarily incurred by the buyer in order to obtain such gross earnings. 
195 In this view, 
192 Infra, p. 97. 
193 [ 1997] 1 All ER 979. 
194 M. G. Bridge, supra n. 68 at p. 594. 
195 Ibid, p. 595. 
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awarding gross earnings occurs presumably where the defective goods are worthless. In 
such a case the buyer may be entitled to recover his capital expenses plus his lost net 
profit, i. e. the lost gross earnings. However, where the defective goods are still of value, 
the court should deduct this value from the whole gross earning. Such a distinction 
between gross earnings and net profit can help the court to avoid an overlap between the 
recovery of capital losses such as the price and other expenses incurred in reliance on 
the contract on the one hand and the recovery for the loss of net profit that the buyer 
would have had but for the seller's breach on the other. 
In the light of the above discussion, one can state that the buyer may be entitled to 
recover for both his loss of capital expenses and net profit. In the case of Cullinane v. 
British "Rema " Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 196 the Court misdirected itself when it decided 
that the buyer should not be allowed damages for his loss of net profit and capital loss. 
This case will be examined in the next chapter where the quantification of damages for 
loss of profit, in cases of breach of warranty of quality, is dealt with. 
However, the court should not award the buyer for capital loss and loss of gross 
earnings. In fact, gross earnings include the capital cost. Therefore, allowing the buyer 
damages for his capital loss and loss of gross earning will put him in a better position 
than he would have been in had the goods been free from defects. In this sense, the 
buyer will be overcompensated if he recovers for the diminution in value of a chattel 
and the loss of its potential production. 197 For example, suppose that the buyer had 
bought a profit-making machine which appeared defective. Awarding the buyer his loss 
of the production of the machine over its commercial life, will put him, so far as money 
can do it, in the same position he would have been in if the machine had been as 
warranted. By allowing the buyer damages for his normal loss, i. e. the diminution in 
value of the chattel, the buyer will be overcompensated. 
It should be noted that where the defective profit-making goods are valueless, the buyer 
may not be entitled to recover for the whole loss of gross revenue. In order to avoid 
overcompensating the buyer under the principle of Robinson v. Harman, 198 the court 
should deduct from the gross revenue the expenses that the buyer has saved by the 
196 [1954] 1 QB 292. 
197 M. G. Bridge, supra n. 68 at 595; Paul Dobson, supra n. 18 at p. 21 1. 
198 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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reason of the breach. A hypothetical example of a defective quality machine may make 
this point clearer. Suppose that the buyer paid £1000 as a price of a machine for 
producing a specific kind of goods which was supposed to earn £3000 during its 
commercial life. Suppose further that the buyer needed to pay another £1000 for running 
the machine. If the machine appears defective, the buyer will be entitled to £2000 
assessed as follows: 
£3000 [gross revenue] - £1000 [the saved expenses]. 
Here, suppose further that the defective machine was not worthless and the buyer resold 
it for £200 in an open market. Upon this, the actual loss of the buyer will be £1800 
assessed as the following: £3000 [the gross revenue] - £1200 [the saved expenses + the 
value of the defective goods]. 
3.5.1 UCC Cases where the Buyer Obtained Double Recovery 
The court should not award the buyer damages for both the defective goods and 
damaged products made by using the defective goods, such as the case of defective 
herbicide or insecticide. In fact, by allowing the buyer damages for the diminution in the 
value of the crop, the buyer will be put, so far as money can do it, in the same position 
he would have been in had the herbicides been free from defects. What happens to the 
crops as a result of the defective herbicide is different from the diminution in value of 
the herbicide themselves. However, awarding damages for both losses is inappropriate 
since the herbicide would be purchased, in any case, to be used to produce the crop. The 
buyer's actual loss in such cases would be the diminution in value of the crop which 
resulted from the use of defective herbicide. In such cases, the buyer should not be 
allowed damages for the loss of the diminution in value of the herbicide or insecticide 
since such goods would be used to produce the crop. 199 
Surprisingly, one may find a number of UCC cases where the buyer was mistakenly 
overcompensated by allowing him damages for both defective seeds or defective 
199 Similarly, in R. E. B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 1975 U. S. App. LEXIS 12294; 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 
122 (10th Cir. 1975) where the buyer purchased hog feed which appeared to be defective and killed some 
of the hogs, the Court awarded damages for the loss of the gross earning which the buyer would have 
obtained had the hogs been sold. By this award, the buyer has been put in the same position he would have 
been in had the feed been free from defects. However, the court overcompensated him by allowing him 
further damages for the diminution in value calculated as the difference between the value of the feed as 
warranted and their value as received. 
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herbicide and for the diminution in value of the crops. For example, in Durham v. Ciba- 
Geigy Corp., 200 where the purchased herbicide appeared defective and damaged the crop 
of the buyer, the Court allowed damages for the price of the defective herbicide, the 
profit lost as a result of the reduced crop yield and the cost of fertilizers wasted on the 
crop. Similarly, in Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 201 the Court awarded for the 
diminution in value of the crop resulting from a use of defective insecticide plus a full 
refund of the price of defective insecticide. It is submitted that the Court was mistaken 
in the quantification of damages in these two cases. 
In a case involving the sale of defective herbicide, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit made it clear that the measure of damages in a case of defective 
herbicide or seeds is the value that the crop would have had if the goods had conformed 
to the warranty less the value of the crop actually produced, less the expense of 
preparing for market the portion of the probable crop prevented from maturing. 202 
Thereupon, one finds it difficult to understand how the Court in Albin Elevator Co. v. 
Pavlica, 203 allowed the buyer damages for the diminution in the value of the crop 
resulting from defective seeds used plus the price of the seeds. 
In the English case of Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd , 
204 the Court 
of Appeal dealt with the measure of damages in cases where the goods are used as 
ingredients in industry. In principle, this is similar to the case of the sale of herbicide. 
Here, the buyer should not be entitled to recover for both the diminution in value of the 
goods and the diminution in value of the goods manufactured. However, in the case of 
Bence, the buyers managed to sell the defective products to sub-buyers. It is 
controversial whether the buyers in Bence were compensated for their actual loss. 
3.5.2 The Issue of Bence v. Fasson 
In Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd, 205 the sellers supplied cast vinyl 
film to the buyers in order to be used in manufacturing self-adhesive decals. The buyers 
were in a business supplying self-adhesive decals to manufacturers of containers used in 
200 1982 S. D. LEXIS 262; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 588. 
201 1975 S. D. LEXIS 170; 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 67. 
202 Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Co., 1986 U. S. App. LEXIS 22235; 782 F. 2d 1212. 
203 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 358; 34 UCC Rep. Serv. 438 (1982). 
204 [ 1997] 1 All ER 979. 
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the carriage of goods. The decals were affixed to the containers in order to be identified 
by marks printed on the decals by the buyers. It was a term of the contract that the film 
would survive in a good legible condition for at least five years. However, some of the 
decals became illegible within the five years due to an insufficient stabilizer which had 
been used by the defendants in the manufacture of the film. This led to extensive 
complaints from the customers of the sub-buyer; but only one complaint led to a claim 
against the buyers who settled it by the supply of new decals at their own expense and in 
turn received agreed compensation from the defendants. The sellers admitted their 
liability for the defective film retained by the buyers. The buyers claimed damages for 
breach of warranty as to the quality of the goods and the sellers admitted their liability 
for the breach. 
At first instance, the Court applied the prima facie measure and awarded the buyers 
damages for the diminution in value of the goods at the time of delivery. However, the 
Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed this judgment and awarded the buyers damages 
to be assessed on the basis of "the [buyers'] liability to the subsequent or ultimate users 
of the [buyers'] product in which the [sellers'] goods were an integral part and in the 
event, of a breach of the warranty as to quality, the [buyers'] liability to those others 
would be triggered. "206 
The court in applying the principle of Robinson v. Harman, 207 should look at the final 
position that the buyer would have been in if the goods had been free from defects. This 
would be the position that the buyer should be placed in by way of damages in order to 
achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson. Of course, other principles of law 
should be taken into account. For example, the buyer will not be entitled to such 
damages if his expectations were not in the contemplation of the seller at the time of 
making the contract. Where the goods are purchased in order to be used as ingredients 
for producing other goods, one may imagine, at least, three types of damage that may 
result from their defective quality. Firstly, where the buyer discovers the goods defective 
before he uses them, he may claim damages for the diminution in value which can be 
calculated under the prima facie measure. In such a case, if substitute goods are not 
reasonably obtainable, the buyer may also claim damages for his loss of net profit under 
205 [1997] 1 All ER 979. 
206 Ibid at p. 990. 
207 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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sub-buyers and for his liability to sub-buyers. Secondly, where the defective goods are 
used as ingredients of other products, the buyer's loss would be the diminution in value 
of the products. 208 This is the case of the aforementioned example of sale of 
herbicide. 209 In the previous section, it was argued that where the seller's breach caused 
two types of damage, i. e. diminution in value of the goods supplied and diminution in 
value of the products manufactured by using the goods as ingredients, the buyer should 
not be entitled to damages for both types of damage. In such a case, the buyer's damages 
would be the difference between the actual value of the crops and the value they would 
have had if the goods had been defect free. Of course, subject to the application of the 
restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages, the buyer may be entitled to his loss of 
net profit under sub-buyers and for his liability to sub-buyers. Finally, the buyer may 
resell the products. If this becomes the case, the buyer's loss may be his liability to his 
sub-buyers. 
In a case such as Bence, what position would the buyer have been in if the goods had not 
been defective? The buyer's expectation is to use the goods in industry in order to fulfil 
subcontracts and, as a result, gain profit. Therefore, if the goods had not been defective, 
the buyer would have gained profit by performing subcontracts. Therefore, under the 
principle of Robinson v. Harman, 210 damages should be awarded in order to put the 
buyer in such a position. If the products, manufactured by using the goods as 
ingredients, were discovered defective after they had been used by sub-buyers, the buyer 
may be held liable to the sub-buyers. The buyer's profit may be reduced by his liability 
to the sub-buyers. Therefore, damages should be awarded to compensate him for his 
liability to the sub-buyers. Such a liability is the actual detriment suffered by the buyer. 
The buyer should not be entitled to more than his actual loss. 
Such a loss, i. e. liability to sub-buyers, presumes that there was a diminution in value of 
the goods purchased and a diminution in value of the products. However, the buyer did 
not suffer these types of damage. The buyer's actual loss in such a case is his liability to 
the sub-buyer; and this is the loss that he should be compensated for. In such a case, 
208 See Rostock & Co Ltd. v. Nickolson & Sons Ltd [1904] 1 KB 725 where commercial sulphuric acid 
warranted free from arsenic was used by the buyer for making brewers sugar, the seller was found in 
breach of warranty of quality. Thereupon, the buyer was entitled to recover the price paid for the acid and 
the value of other ingredients spoilt by being mixed with the acid. 
209 Supra, p. 94. 
210 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. l. 
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allowing the buyer damages for more than his liability will result in overcompensating 
him. In the case of Bence, the Court of Appeal, by a majority, was reluctant to award 
damages for diminution in value since the facts of the case "point indubitably against a 
loss of value basis... ". 211 In this case, Otton U, said "[i]n my judgment, once the goods 
had been converted in a manner which was contemplated by the parties... the damages 
must be assessed by reference to the sub-sale ...... 
212 The Court made it clear that the 
prima facie measure of damages stated under Section 53(3) is not always applicable. In 
this respect, Auld U said 
"[a]s to s 53(3), there is, in my view, a danger of giving it a primacy in the code 
of s 53 that it does not deserve. The starting point in a claim for breach of a 
warranty of quality is not to determine whether one or other party has displaced 
the prima facie test in that subsection. The starting point is the Hadley v. 
Baxendale principle ((1854) 9 Exch 341, [1843-60] All ER Rep 461) reproduced 
in s53(2) applicable to a breach of any warranty, namely an estimation on the 
evidence, of "the... loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of 
events, from the breach of warranty". The evidence may be such that prima facie 
test in s 53(3) never comes into play at all. "213 
Nonetheless, where part of the goods are manufactured, the buyer may be entitled to 
damages for more than one type of the three aforementioned types of loss. The buyer 
may recover for the diminution in value of the defective goods which have not been 
manufactured. Also, the buyer may recover for the diminution in value of products made 
by manufacturing the defective goods. However, where such products are resold, the 
buyer's liability to the sub-buyers may be considered instead of the diminution in value 
of the products themselves. In such a case, the buyer would be entitled to recover for the 
diminution in value of the goods purchased and for his liability to the sub-buyers. This 
was the case of Bence. The buyers did not manufacture all the defective goods. 
Therefore, their damages were calculated on the basis of the diminution in value of the 
defective goods which were not manufactured and the liability of the buyers to their sub- 
buyers. 
It should be noted that in the case of Bence, it was in the contemplation of the parties at 
the time of making the contract that the goods were purchased in order to be used in 
industry. Auld U said "[i]t was eminently a case in which they would have 
contemplated that, in the event of a breach by the seller discovered only after the decals 
211 Bence v. Fasson, [ 1997] 1 All ER 979,990. 
212 Ibid at p. 989. 
213 Ibid at p. 991. 
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had been in use, the buyer might wish to pass on to it claims for damages from 
dissatisfied customers. "214 In this sense, the recovery of damages for the seller's liability 
to the sub-buyers cannot be denied under the remoteness principle. 215 The remoteness 
principle applies here to allow the buyer damages for losses which are in the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. 216 
In view of the above discussion, the resale contract should be considered, for the 
purpose of calculating damages, where it was in the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties at the time of making the contract. This seems the suitable way to achieve the 
objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 217 and at the same time avoid 
overcompensating or undercompensating the buyer. Taking the resale into account may 
increase or decrease the buyer's damages depending on the circumstances of each case. 
Where the buyer cannot perform the resale contract, he may claim damages for loss of 
profit on resale and for his liability to the subcontractors. This situation will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter. 218 However, where the buyer performs the resale 
contract successfully, his damages may be limited to his liability to the sub-buyer. In 
Biggin & Co. Ltd. v. Permanite Ltd. and others, 219 Devlin J made it clear that the 
remoteness principle "generally operates in favour of a plaintiff rather than against him, 
but I think that it is capable of doing either... It has often been held... that the profit 
actually made on a sub-sale which is outside the contemplation of the parties cannot be 
used to reduce the damages measured by a notional loss in the market value. If however 
214 Ibid at p. 995. 
215 For the remoteness principle, see infra p. 284. 
216 See Hammond & Co. v. Bussey, [1887] 20 QB 79. In this case, the buyers bought a quantity of the coal 
for the purpose of resale. The seller was aware of the resale contracts. The coal was discovered defective 
by the sub-buyers. Thereupon, the buyers paid damages to the sub-buyers. The buyers sued the seller to 
recover the damages paid to the sub-buyers plus the costs incurred on defending the sub-buyers' action. 
The Court of Appeal held the seller liable and awarded the buyers the damages paid to the sub-buyers plus 
the costs of defence. In this case, there was no dispute on whether the measure of damages is the buyers' 
liability to the sub-buyers. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal made it clear that in a case such as 
Hammond the proper measure of damages is the buyer's liability to the sub-buyer. The buyer's liability 
should be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract where the seller 
is aware of the resale. In this case, Bowen, LJ, at p. 94, said "The defendant knew for what purpose the 
plaintiffs were purchasing the coal, viz., to resell it to the owners of steamers, and he must have known as 
a business man what damages might naturally result to the sub-vendees if it was not reasonably fit for the 
purposes of steamships, and therefore could not be used by the sub-vendees for such purposes. He may 
therefore be reasonably supposed to have contemplated, if the warranty were broken, that claims for 
damages would be made against the plaintiffs by the sub-vendees... " 
217 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
218 Infra, p. 127. 
219 [1951] 1 KB 422. 
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a sub-sale is within the contemplation of the parties, I think that the damages must be 
assessed by reference to it, whether the plaintiff likes it or not. , 220 [Emphasis added] 
It is worth mentioning that the remoteness principle applies to the type of loss and not to 
the measure of damages. 221 It is for the court to specify the measure of damages. 
Therefore, it may not be proper to apply a specific measure of damages because such a 
measure was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. 
However, the parties may agree expressly or impliedly on a specific measure of 
damages. In this sense, one may note that in Bence it was not proper to look for the 
measure that was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making 
the contract. Therefore, it is with many respects strange for the dissenting judge (Thorpe 
U) in Bence to rely on the finding of the judge, at first instance, that the parties had not 
reasonably contemplated the displacement of the prima facie measure at the time of 
making the contract. 222 Professor Bridge, in his interesting comment on Bence, asks 
"since when did the application of damages rules have to be contemplated under the rule 
in Hadley v. Baxendale? "223 In this sense, it seems that the words of Devlin J in Biggin 
& Co. Ltd. v. Permanite Ltd. and others, 224 were not too precise when he pointed out 
that "... if it is the plaintiff's liability to the ultimate user that is contemplated as the 
measure of damage and if in fact it is used without injurious results so that no such 
liability arises, the plaintiff could not claim the difference in market value, and say that 
the sub-sale must be disregarded. "225 
Turning back to the consideration of resale contracts, a significant question is what 
damages would the buyer be entitled to if the buyer's liability to the sub-buyers was not 
in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract? In 
220 Biggin & Co. Ltd. v. Permanite Ltd. and others, [1951] 1 KB 422 at 435-436. Cited in Bence v. 
Fasson, [1997] 1 All ER 979,989. The case of Biggin involved a sale of certain goods which were resold 
to the Dutch Government. The original sellers were aware at the time of making the contract that the 
goods would be resold. Therefore, it was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties that the breach of 
warranty of quality might lead to the liability of the buyers to the Dutch Government. These were the facts 
of the case. The buyers were liable to the sub-buyer and they claimed to recover the damages, paid to the 
sub-buyer, from the seller. In this case, the dispute was about whether the amount paid to the sub-buyer 
was reasonable. There was no dispute on whether the measure of damages should be the liability to the 
sub-buyer or the diminution in value. However, the discussion in this case makes it clear that where the 
resale is in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract, the measure of damages 
should be, in normal circumstances, the liability of the buyer to the sub-buyer. 
221 G. H. Treitel, Remedies for breach of contract: A Comparative Account, Oxford, 1988, p. 161. 
222 Bence v. Fasson, [ 1997] 1 All ER 979,997-8. 
223 Michael G. Bridge, Defective Goods and Sub-sales, [1998] JBL 259,261. 
224 [195111 KB 422. 
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other words, what would be the recoverable damages, where the resale was not in the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract? This may be the case 
where the nature of the goods does not indicate that the goods will be resold or 
manufactured. Where the resale is not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
making the contract, the buyer's liability to his sub-buyers will be too remote. As a 
result, the buyer will not be entitled to recover damages from the seller for such a 
liability. The seller's liability, in such a case, will be likely to be limited to the normal 
loss, i. e. the diminution in value of the goods, which should always be in the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. In awarding damages for 
the diminution in value in such a case, the issue of overcompensation will not arise 
since the buyer will not be entitled to recover for his liability to the sub-buyers. 
However, what would be the case if the difference in value is more than the buyer's 
liability to the sub-buyers? Will the buyer be entitled to recover, as damages, the 
difference in value? Compensatory damages should not exceed the buyer's actual loss. 
By entitling the buyer for more than his actual loss, the buyer will be put in a better 
financial position than he would have been in if the goods had been free from defects. In 
other words, the award will clash with the principle of Robinson v. Harman, 226 which 
states the objective of compensatory damages. In such a case, the buyer's loss is less 
than the difference in value. By awarding the buyer the difference in value, the buyer 
will be overcompensated. To sum up, in cases of resale, where such a resale is not in the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract, the buyer should be 
entitled to damages for diminution in value or for his liability to the sub-buyers 
whichever is the least. 
It is clear enough that where the goods are resold as defective, damages may be 
calculated on the basis of the difference between the value of the goods as warranted 
and the resale price. In cases where the buyer manages to perform subcontracts, made by 
the time of discovery of defect, by convincing the sub-buyer to accept delivery of 
defective goods, can the buyer recover damages for diminution in value? In the light of 
the above argument, one may answer this question in the negative. As the buyer did not 
suffer a loss in fact in such a case, he should not be entitled to more than nominal 
damages. Actually, the buyer's action of performing subcontracts may be considered as 
225 Biggin & Co. Ltd. v. Permanite Ltd. and others, [1951] 1 KB 422 at 435-436. 
226 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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an action of mitigation. It is true that under the mitigation principle, the buyer is not 
required to enforce sub-contracts where the goods in question are defective. However, if 
the buyer did mitigate his loss by enforcing such subcontracts, he should not be entitled 
to recover for such a mitigated loss. 227 
This conclusion seems to be in direct contradiction with the decision in Slater v. Hoyle 
& Smith Ltd. 228 In this case, the sellers delivered part of the goods (1625 pieces of 
unbleached cotton cloth) which appeared defective. The buyers accepted the goods and 
paid for them but refused to take any further delivery. Thereupon, the sellers sued them 
for damages for non-acceptance of the remaining part of the goods. The buyers 
counterclaimed for damages for breach of warranty in relation to the accepted goods. In 
this case, the buyers contracted to resell the goods in question. Despite the defect of the 
goods, they received the whole resale price of the goods from the sub-buyers and they 
were not sued for their breach of warranty of quality under the subcontracts. The Court 
of Appeal held that the resale contracts were not to be taken into account in measuring 
the damages. The Court awarded the buyers the difference between the value of the 
goods delivered an the value they would have had if they had been defect free. 229 The 
Court of Appeal disregarded the resale contracts for the purpose of calculation of 
damages. 230 
227 In British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. 
of London, Ltd., [ 1912] AC 673 Viscount Haldane stated, at 673, that "when in the course of business... 
[the plaintiff] has taken action arising out of the transaction, which action has diminished his loss, the 
effect in actual diminution of the loss he has suffered may be taken into account even though there was no 
duty on him to act. " 
228 [1920] 21 B 11. 
229 Ibid at p. 12. 
230 In Slater's case, the quantity of goods purchased should have made it clear for the seller that the buyers 
would resell such goods. Therefore, the resale was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the 
time of making the contract. In Bence v. Fasson, [1997] 1 All ER 979 Otton LJ, at p. 988, distinguished 
the case of Slater v. Hoyle & Smith Ltd., [1920] 2 KB 11 on the ground that the seller "did not know of 
the contemplated sub-sale" unlike Bence's case where both parties "were aware of the precise use to 
which the film was to be put". See Sheila Bone & Leslie Rutherford, `Damages for Defective Goods with 
onward Sales' [1997] S. J. 138,139. The remoteness principle does not require the seller to be actually 
aware of the resale in order to hold him liable in damages for the buyer's liability to the sub-buyers. It 
seems enough, for the purpose of applying the remoteness principle, that such a resale was in the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. Therefore, the issue of whether 
or not the seller was aware in fact of the resale contracts is of no relevance. The second branch of the rule 
of Hadley v. Baxendale [1854] 9 Exch. 341 provides that "if special circumstances under which the 
contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants and thus known to both 
parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably 
contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract 
under these special circumstances so known and communicated. " In applying the words of this rule to 
cases of resale, Lord Esher, M. R., in Hammond & Co. v. Bussey, [1887] 20 QB 79, at p. 89, said "I do not 
think that there is anything in those words to shew that the second branch of the rule must be confined to 
the case of a sub-contract already actually made at the time of the making of the contract, and would not 
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In awarding compensatory damages, one needs to look at the actual loss suffered by the 
aggrieved party. In Slater's case the buyers' actual loss was their liability to the sub- 
buyers. In fact, such a liability did not exist since the sub-buyers did not sue the buyers 
for the defective goods. In Slater's case, it seems that the award did put the buyers in a 
better financial position than they would have been in if the goods had been in 
conformity with the contract. In other words, the award is inconsistent with the principle 
of Robinson v. Harman. 231 The buyers used the goods successfully to perform their 
subcontracts. As they did so, they suffered, in fact, no loss resulting from breach of 
warranty of quality. 232 The decision in this case was criticised by Auld LJ in Bence's 
case on the ground that the court wrongly "overlooked the basic rule in Section 53(2) as 
to what would have been in the ordinary and natural contemplation of the parties in a 
commercial contract such as it was, namely, that the buyer could well be prejudiced in 
his onward dealing with the goods if they were defective... and [was] seemingly content 
to award a buyer more than the evidence clearly showed he had lost. "233 It is submitted 
that the buyers in Slater were overcompensated. 
Professor Bridge, in his comment on Bence, says that "it is hard to quarrel with a case 
that refuses damages where no loss has occurred, or can be shown to have occurred in 
accordance with the normal civil standard of proof. "234 However, he continues to argue 
that the prima facie measure is preferable on the grounds that it is simpler to apply and 
does not require the buyer to prove losses which are, by their nature, hard to prove. 235 I 
do agree with Professor Bridge that the measure of damages applied in Bence may face 
the difficulty of application. Although I am inclined to accept the opinion of Professor 
Bridge as it is satisfactorily justified by the practical difficulties of applying the measure 
apply to the case of a sub-contract not yet actually made, but which will probably be made. " [Emphasis 
added] 
231 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
232 The decision in Slater v. Hoyle & Smith Ltd., [1920] 2 KB I1 seems to be inconsistent with the 
decision in Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co., [1911] AC 301. Wertheim was a case of late delivery. In 
this case, the buyer claimed damages for the difference between the value of the goods that would have 
had if they had been delivered at the right date and their value at the actual date of delivery. The amount 
claimed was not awarded since the buyer managed to resell the goods at higher price than the market price 
at the actual time of delivery. The resale was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the 
contract. In this case, the resale price was considered for the purpose of quantifying the buyer's damages. 
The case was considered in Slater and distinguished unconvincingly on the ground that it was a case of 
late delivery and not of defective quality. 
233 Bence v. Fasson, [ 1997] 1 All ER 979,994. 
234 Michael G. Bridge, supra n. 223 at p. 262. 
235 Ibid, p. 262. 
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applied in Bence, I find it hard to stand up against such a measure, which in principle 
allows the buyer damages for his actual loss. Indeed, as "difficulties of proof cannot 
alter the legal principles", 236 the difficult application of a measure of damages cannot be 
a sufficient ground to abandon such a measure. 
Professor Treitel has submitted that the reasoning of Slater's case is to be preferred to 
that in Bence's case. 237 In cases of subsale, Professor Treitel distinguishes between two 
situations i. e. where the buyer can perform his subsale only by delivery of the goods 
bought under the original contract and the situation where the subsale can be performed 
by delivery of any goods meeting the description stated in the subcontract but the buyer 
chooses to deliver the goods which he has bought under the original contract. In dealing 
with each situation, Professor Treitel says 
"In the first of these situations, the buyer has indeed suffered no loss if the terms 
of the subsale are either such that the goods are in conformity with that contract 
or such as effectively to exclude liability for any non-conformity with it arising 
by reason of the breach of the original contract. The reason why he has suffered 
no loss is that he had (legally) no choice as to the disposal of the goods, so that 
they are, in his hands, worth no less than the "full price"; and this must be so 
whether or not the seller knew of, or ought to have contemplated, the subsale. 
Hence in such cases the rule in Slater 's case does not apply. In the second 
situation, by contrast, the reduction in value of the goods does cause loss to the 
buyer since (as Scrutton L. J. says in Slaters case at p. 22) he would have been 
legally entitled to deliver other goods to the person who might be called his 
"sub-buyer" (but is not really such) and might have wished to do so if the market 
had fallen; he would then be left with the defective (and hence less valuable) 
goods delivered under the original contract. The buyer is initially in the position 
of having received goods worth less than they should have been and if he is 
(skilful) or fortunate enough subsequently to avoid or reduce that loss, there is 
no good reason for passing this benefit on to the seller. , 238 
Under such a classification, Slater falls under the second situation. By applying the 
opinion of Professor Trietel, the buyers in Slater 'S case have suffered loss since it was 
possible for them to fulfil their subcontracts by delivering substitute goods; and, if they 
had done so, they could have retained the defective goods and claimed damages for 
diminution in value. However, such an opinion seems to clash with the purpose of 
awarding compensatory damages in contract law. In contract law, "where a party 
sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract he is, so far as money can do it, to be 
placed in the same situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been 
236 Malik v. BCCI [1998] AC 20,53 per Lord Steyn. 
237 G. H. Treitel, n. 3 at p. 195. 
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performed. "239 In Slater, if the goods had been as warranted, the buyers would not have 
gained more than their profit on resale. In fact, their profit was not reduced by delivering 
the goods in question. The aim of damages is not to compensate the buyer for loss of 
profit that he could have made as a result of the breach. Damages should not be awarded 
for loss of the chance to keep the defective goods and recover damages for diminution in 
value. Therefore, the buyers in Slater should not have been allowed damages calculated 
on the basis of diminution in value since the award has compensated them for loss of 
profit that they could have gained as a result of the breach. It is respectfully submitted 
that the suggestion of Professor Treitel is inconsistent with the purpose of damages in 
contract law as stated in Robinson v. Harman. 240 
It is absolutely true that in certain cases the buyer may retain the defective goods and 
perform subpurchase contracts by obtaining a substitute from the open market. If this 
becomes the case, the buyer's actual loss will be for the diminution in value of the 
contracted goods. The mitigation principle will not arise since the buyer, as previously 
mentioned, 241 is not required to mitigate his loss by enforcing subcontracts where the 
goods are defective. 242 Therefore, in the case of Bence the buyers were entitled to 
recover for the diminution in value of the remaining film. However, this should not 
apply to cases where the buyer does enforce subcontracts by using the goods in question. 
This was the case of Slater. In this case, the buyers did mitigate their loss by enforcing 
subcontracts which were in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of 
making the contract. Under the mitigation principle the buyer would not be entitled to 
damages for losses he avoided in fact even where he was not required under the 
mitigation principle to avoid such losses. 243 Therefore, the buyers in Slater should not 
have been entitled to damages for the diminution in value. 
238 Ibid at p. 192. 
239 Robinson v. Harman (1848) 1 Exch. 850,855 per Parke B. 
240 mid, p. 855. 
241 Supra, p. 102. 
242 Where the buyer retains the defective goods, the mitigation principle requires him to mitigate his loss 
by obtaining substitute goods to perform subcontracts. 
243 A. G. Guest, supra n. 22 at para. 16-050; B. Kercher, M. Noone, Remedies, 2nd ed., 1990, p. 138. See 
Erie County Natural Gas and Fuel Co. Ltd. v. Carroll [1911] AC 105. In this case, the plaintiffs, who 
carried on an extensive business of quarrying stone and burning lime on their property, sold gas leases, 
gas grants and gas wells. There was a clause in the contract providing that "It is understood that the parties 
of the first part [the plaintiffs] reserve gas enough to supply the plant now operated or to be operated by 
them on said property. " The supply of gas, enjoyed by the plaintiffs under the said clause, was cut and the 
plaintiffs were refused any further supply of gas. Thereupon, the plaintiffs procured the gas required for 
their plant by the acquisition from independent sources of other gas leases and by the construction of work 
necessary to obtain the same. In this case, the plaintiffs sold the works used in procuring the substituted 
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Such an overcompensation was avoided in Bence by awarding the buyers for their 
liability to the sub-buyers of the product in which the sellers' goods were an integral 
part. Probably, Professor Treitel's classification does not apply to Bence's case since the 
defect of the goods was undiscernibly before they were manufactured. However, 
suppose that this was not the case and a substitute film was obtainable, one may find 
that Bence falls under the second classification of Professor Treitel. Under such 
classification, the buyer will be entitled to compensation for the diminution in value of 
whole goods regardless of the subcontracts. The above argument shows that 
disregarding the subcontracts in a case such as Bence may lead to unjust result, i. e. 
overcompensation. 
To sum up, it seems that the award of the Court of Appeal in Bence's case did put the 
buyers in the same financial position they would have been in if the goods had been in 
conformity with the contract. In contrast, the decision in Slater's case overcompensated 
the buyers since it put them in a better financial position than the position they would 
have been in if the goods had been in conformity with the contract. Certainly, the award 
in Slater is inconsistent with the objective of damage stated in Robinson v. Harman. 244 
It is submitted that the decision in Bence is to be preferred to that in Slater. 
3.6 Ruxley and Bence: Damages were Rightly Awarded but Defendant was 
paid for `skimped' Performance. Can `Price Reduction' achieve a better 
balance? Can Restitutionary Damages be awarded? 
Neither the SGA nor the UCC provides expressly for the remedy of price reduction. 
However, Section 53(1-a) states that the buyer may "set up against the seller the breach 
of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price". 245 The Section follows the 
decision in Mondel v. Steel246 where it was made clear that the buyer may defend 
himself, as against the seller's action for the price, by showing the difference in value 
caused by the seller's breach of warranty of quality. 247 Therefore, in cases where the 
gas for more than what they cost. Therefore, the House of Lords held that they were entitled only to 
nominal damages. In this case, the sale price was considered in the quantification of damages. In this case, 
the plaintiffs chose to mitigate there loss by obtaining a substitute. The avoided loss was considered to 
reduce the plaintiffs' damages. 
244 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
245 See also Section 2-717 of the UCC. 
246 (1841) 8 M. & W. 858. 
247 See A. G. Guest, Benjamin's Sale of Goods, London, 5th ed., 1997, p. 932. 
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seller delivers defective goods, the buyer is entitled to withhold some or all of the price. 
If the seller sues for the price or the unpaid part of the price, the buyer may set up the 
diminution in value as a defence. 248 However, for two main reasons, one may state that 
Section 53(1-a) does not provide for the price reduction as stated under the CISG and 
the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees. 249 Firstly, under the SGA, the buyer cannot claim price reduction where he 
has already paid the price. Secondly, the quantification of price reduction is not based on 
the buyer's loss. Therefore, price reduction, as provided for under the CISG, may exceed 
or be less than the diminution in value, as discussed below. In this sense, it seems 
necessary to start with explaining the remedy of `price reduction' under the CISG. 
3.6.1 Price Reduction 
Article 50 of the CISG states 
"If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not the price has 
already been paid, the buyer may reduce the price in the same proportion as the 
value that the goods actually delivered had at the time of the delivery bears to the 
value that conforming goods would have had at that time. However, if the seller 
remedies any failure to perform his obligations in accordance with article 37 or 
article 48 or if the buyer refuses to accept performance by the seller in 
accordance with those articles, the buyer may not reduce the price. " 
The origin of the remedy of price reduction is the Roman law which provided for "the 
buyer's right to reduce the price to the degree of the deficiency -- the actio quanti 
minoris. "250 It has been adopted by the civil legal system countries. In order to achieve 
uniformity, the CISG includes such a remedy jointly with the remedy of damages, which 
is the primary remedy under the common legal system. Unlike the common law and the 
CISG, damages under the civil legal system can be awarded where the seller is at fault. 
Under the CISG, the buyer by suing for price reduction will not lose his right to claim 
damages for losses which cannot be recovered by price reduction. 251 
248 Christian Twigg-Flesner and Robert Bradgate, "The E. C. Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees - All Talk and No Do? " [2000] Web JCLI <http: // webjcli. 
ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/flesner2. html>, Section 6-b. 
249 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, Official Journal L 171,07/07/1999. 
250 John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
Boston, 2nd ed., 1991, p. 395. 
251 Article 45(2) of the CISG states "The buyer is not deprived of any right he may have to claim damages 
by exercising his right to other remedy. " 
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The purpose of price reduction is to preserve the bargain and not to compensate the 
buyer for his actual loss. Under such a remedy, the price can be reduced in order to 
prevent the seller receiving payment for performance which has not been tendered. In 
other words, the price is reduced in order to allow the buyer to pay for what he has 
received. The reduced price is what the buyer is expected to pay for the defective goods 
at the time of making the contract. 252 Therefore, it can be noted that such a remedy is 
quasi-restitutionary. 253 
As the goal of price reduction is to preserve the bargain, Article 50 of the CISG does not 
allow such a remedy where the bargain can be preserved by the seller's cure of the 
defect provided that the seller is entitled to cure the defect under the provisions of the 
CISG. 2$4 Where the seller does not cure the defect or does not have the right to cure, the 
price can be reduced whether or not the buyer has paid the price. If the buyer has not 
paid the price, he may pay a reduced price. However, the buyer needs to claim price 
reduction in cases where he has paid the price. Here, it is worth mentioning that an 
interesting essay, which deals with the application of Article 50 of the CISG in USA and 
Mexico, shows that the buyer normally relies on Article 50 in order to defend the 
seller's action for the price. 255 This may be understandable on the grounds that Article 
50 allows the buyer to reduce the price unilaterally in cases where the seller delivers 
non-conforming goods. In other words, the buyer does not need to sue the seller in order 
to reduce the price unless he has already paid the price and seeks to recover part of it. 
However, if the buyer pays a reduced price, the seller may sue him for the balance. This 
is why in most cases Article 50 is used as a defence where the seller sues for the price. 
252 Peter A. Piliounis, "The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price Reduction and Additional Time 
(Nachfrist) under the CISG: Are these Worthwhile Changes or Additions to English Sales Law", 1999 
Pace Essay, <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/piliounis. html>, text accompanying n. 109.. 
253 See Christian Twigg-Flesner and Robert Bradgate, "The E. C. Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale 
of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees - All Talk and No Do? " [2000] Web JCLI <http: // 
webj cli. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/flesner2. html>, Section 6-b. 
254 Article 37 of the CISG states "If the seller has delivered goods before the date for delivery, he may, up 
to that day, deliver any missing part or make up any deficiency in the quantity of the goods delivered, or 
deliver goods in replacement of any non-conforming goods delivered or remedy any lack of conformity in 
the goods delivered, provided that the exercise of this right does not cause the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as 
provided for in this Convention. " 
Article 48(1) of the CISG states "Subject to Article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, 
remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable 
delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the 
seller of expenses advanced by the buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as 
provided for in this Convention. " 
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Under Article 50, price reduction can be claimed regardless of whether the buyer 
suffered loss or not. Therefore, under the facts of Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. 
Fasson UK Ltd, 256 the buyer may still be entitled to price reduction even though he did 
not suffer any loss. Even in cases where the buyer suffers actual loss, he may choose to 
claim damages for diminution in value or price reduction depending on the amount that 
he can recover under each remedy. In all cases, where the buyer did not suffer, or cannot 
prove his, loss, price reduction provides the buyer of a better recovery than damages. 
The reduced price that the buyer can pay due to the seller's breach can be quantified 
under Article 50 as follows: 25' 
Reduced Price Value of the Goods Delivered 
Contract Price Hypothetical value of conforming goods 
In applying this formula, the goods should be valued at the time of delivery. 258 The 
market price can always be considered where the goods can be obtained from an open 
market. Where the market price is not available, the contract price may be considered in 
valuing the goods as warranted. In such a case, the defective goods may be valued by 
estimating the depreciation in value caused by the defect. 
In all cases, the `subjective value' or `consumer surplus' should not be considered in 
quantifying price reduction. This is due to the fact that price reduction is not concerned 
with the buyer's loss. In this sense, the resale price cannot be considered in valuing the 
goods unless such a price is the market price at the time of delivery. Moreover, cost of 
cure cannot be considered in quantifying price reduction. In brief, all the elements which 
are concerned with the buyer's loss cannot be considered for the quantification of price 
reduction. In this sense, the restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages do not 
255 Arnau Muria Tunön, "The Actio Quanti Minoris and Sales of Goods between Mexico and the U. S.: An 
Analysis of the Remedy of Reduction of the Price in the UN Sales Convention, CISG Article 50 and its 
Civil Law Antecedents", 1998 Pace Essay, <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/muria. html>. 
256 [ 1997] 1 All ER 979. 
257 The formula is quoted from Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1998, p. 441. 
258 The 1978 draft of the Convention states that the value of the goods should be measured at the time of 
the conclusion of contract. In order to avoid constructing a theoretical value that might not have existed at 
the time of making the contract, the time of delivery was considered to calculate the price reduction under 
Article 50 of the Convention. See John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 
United Nations Convention, Boston, 2nd ed., 1991, p. 396. See also Eric E. Bergsten & Anthony J. Miller, 
"The Remedy of Reduction of Price" (1997) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 255. 
109 
apply to cases where the buyer claims price reduction. Such restrictions are concerned 
with the buyer's loss. 
It seems that, under the remedy of price reduction, the buyer's recovery may exceed 
damages for normal loss in two cases, i. e. where the buyer's actual loss is less than the 
diminution in value and where the buyer has made a bad bargain. As price reduction 
does not depend on the buyer's loss, the first case is clear. As mentioned above, if the 
buyer's damages are calculated on the basis of his liability to sub-buyers, the buyer may 
claim price reduction where such a liability does rise. A simple example may explain the 
latter case. Suppose that a buyer purchased a quantity of goods at a price of £ 1000. 
Suppose further that the market price of the goods dropped between the time of making 
the contract and the time of delivery. At the time of delivery, the value of the goods as 
warranted was £800. However, due to a defect in the goods, the value of the goods at the 
time of delivery was £700. In this example, if the buyer claims damages for diminution 
in value, he will recover £ 100 (the difference between the value of the goods as 
warranted £800 and their value as defective £700). However, under the remedy of price 
reduction, the buyer may recover more than the diminution in value. The reduced price 








In effect, the buyer will recover £ 125 (the contract price £ 1000 minus the reduced price 
£875). In this sense, it can be noted that where the buyer has made a bad bargain, it may 
be better for him to sue for price reduction than claiming damages. However, where the 
buyer has made a good bargain, it would be better for him to claim damages for 
diminution in value instead of price reduction. In the mentioned hypothetical example, 
suppose that the value of the goods as warranted at the time of delivery was £1200 and 
their value as defective was £900. The buyer's damages for diminution in value would 
be £300 calculated as the difference between the value of the goods as warranted £1200 
and the value of the goods as defective £900. Under the remedy of price reduction, the 
buyer will recover £250 since the reduced price will be £750 calculated as follows: 
Value of the goods as defective (£900) 
Contract price (£ 1000) x 
Hypothetical value of the goods as warranted (£ 1200) 
Reduced price = 
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By claiming price reduction, the buyer will not lose his right to claim damages for losses 
resulting from the breach such as expenses incurred due to the breach, loss of profit, 
etc. 259 However, where the buyer claims price reduction and damages for all his losses 
caused by the breach, damages should be reduced by the amount which the buyer has 
received by way of price reduction. 260 In all cases, the buyer is advised to claim price 
reduction jointly with damages. In a case such as Bence, could the buyer under the CISG 
sue for price reduction and damages for his liability to sub-buyers if he was successfully 
sued by sub-buyers? In Bence, damages were calculated on the basis of the buyers' 
liability to sub-buyers and the buyers were not allowed damages for diminution in value. 
In such a case, the court should take into account the fact that the buyer's actual loss is 
his liability to sub-buyers and not the diminution in value. Therefore, if such a case is 
ever decided under the CISG, it is submitted that the buyer's damages should be reduced 
by the amount that the buyer has received by way of price reduction. However, one may 
argue that in a case such as Bence the buyer should be entitled to claim price reduction 
and damages for his liability to sub-buyers since price reduction can be claimed 
regardless of whether or not the buyer has suffered loss. However, under this argument, 
where the buyer's actual loss is the diminution in value of the goods, the buyer should 
be entitled to both damages for diminution in value and price reduction. This is 
definitely unacceptable result. It is true that the literal reading of Article 45 may allow 
the buyer to claim both damages for diminution in value and price reduction; however, 
there is no sense in doing so since the buyer's damages should be reduced by the amount 
received by way of price reduction. 261 
Nevertheless, in certain cases the buyer may not be allowed to claim damages under the 
CISG and, hence, price reduction becomes his only way to obtain monetary relief. Under 
Article 79 of the CISG, the buyer may not be entitled to recover damages for losses 
resulting under circumstances beyond the seller's control and could not reasonably be 
expected at the time of making the contract. 262 Therefore, in cases of perishable goods, 
the value of the goods may deteriorate due to their late delivery which was caused by 
259 Article 45(1)(b) of the CISG. 
260 Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods, Oxford, 
2nd ed., 1998, p. 444. 
261 Ibid, p. 444. 
262 Article 79(1) states "A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that 
the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to 
have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or 
overcome it or its consequences. " 
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circumstances beyond the seller's control, such as labour strike, war, etc. 263 In such a 
case, if the buyer accepts the goods, he will not be entitled to damages. However, the 
buyer may claim price reduction since the exemption, provided for in Article 79, does 
not apply to claims other than damages. Article 79(5) of the CISG states "Nothing in 
this Article [Article 79] prevents either party from exercising any right other than to 
claim damages under this Convention. " 
3.6.2 Evaluation 
In certain circumstances, price reduction may offer the buyer a better recovery than 
damages. More importantly, in certain cases, price reduction can be the only way 
available for the buyer to obtain monetary relief under the CISG. Nevertheless, although 
price reduction prevents the seller receiving payment for performance which has not 
been made, it may allow the buyer to gain more than he could have gained if the goods 
had been delivered as warranted. 
The purpose of price reduction is not to make the promise economically efficient. In 
fact, the remedy of damages is more concerned with the economic efficiency of the 
promise. Therefore, compensatory damages are awarded to compensate the buyer for his 
loss regardless of whether the seller received payment for performance which he had not 
made. In view of that, there seems to be a difference in the purpose of each remedy. 
Whilst the remedy of damages is intended to secure the economic end-result of proper 
performance, the remedy of price reduction is concerned with the payment for 
performance received. Such a difference seems to be due to moral consideration rather 
than economic one. 264 In fact, the morality of price reduction seems to be similar to the 
morality of specific performance. Both remedies are concerned with the seller's actual 
performance of the contract. Under specific performance, the seller should perform what 
he promised under the contract; under price reduction, the seller is not entitled to keep 
or claim payment for performance which he had not made. 265 
263 See Anette Gärtner, "The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods Contains some Well- 
known Inconsistencies, but there is much in it which worth preserving and which better accords with 
commercial reality than the Sale of Goods Act 1979", 1998 Pace Essay, <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. 
edu/cisg/biblio/gartner. html>. 
264 Arnau Muria Tunön, "The Actio Quanti Minoris and Sales of Goods between Mexico and the U. S.: An 
Analysis of the Remedy of Reduction of the Price in the UN Sales Convention, CISG Article 50 and its 
Civil Law Antecedents", 1998 Pace Essay, <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/muria. html>, text 
accompanying n. 173. 
265 raid, text accompanying n. 173. 
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It might be argued that in cases where price reduction exceeds the diminution in value, 
the buyer may be placed by way of price reduction in a better financial position than the 
position he would have been in if the goods had been delivered as warranted. However, 
in certain cases, the buyer may not be entitled to recover damages for the diminution in 
value, such as the case of Bence. Therefore, disallowing the buyer to claim price 
reduction in such a case may put the seller in a better financial position than the position 
he would have been in if he had delivered conforming goods. This can be 
understandable on the ground that the seller may save expenses by delivering non- 
conforming goods. Therefore, it seems that none of the remedies of price reduction and 
damages put both parties in the same position they would have been in if the contract 
had been properly performed. 
Although the remedy of compensatory damages can be justified in commercial contracts 
as it, so far as possible, secures the economic end-result of proper performance by 
compensating the buyer for his actual loss, both remedies of price reduction and 
damages should be available in consumer cases in order to provide consumers of better 
protection. The remedy of price reduction may be brought into English law from the 
civil legal system after the implementation of the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of 
the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees. 266 Article 3(2) of the Directive 
states 
"In the case of a lack of conformity, the consumer shall be entitled to have the 
goods brought into conformity free of charge by repair or replacement... or to 
have an appropriate reduction made in the price or the contract rescinded with 
regard to those goods... " 
Here, it should be noted that price reduction is not available under the Directive unless 
repair or replacement, which are kinds of specific performance, are impossible or 
disproportionate. 267 The Directive does not provide a way to quantify price reduction. In 
fact, this is a fundamental gap in the Directive since the method of quantification and 
the time of valuation of goods are of vital significance for the application of price 
reduction in order to achieve its objective, i. e. to prevent the seller from receiving 
266 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, Official Journal L 171,07/07/1999. 
267 Article 3(3) of the Directive states "In the first place, the consumer may require the seller to repair the 
goods or he may require the seller to replace them, in either case free of charge, unless this is impossible 
or disproportionate. " 
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payment for performance which he had not made. It is unclear how price reduction will 
be quantify by the English courts. The courts may look at the practice in other European 
countries or at the CISG. 
To sum up, it seems convenient to allow both remedies of price reduction and damages 
in cases of defective goods. Each remedy has its own purpose. However, allowing price 
reduction under English law may raise some issues. For example, if the buyer is entitled 
to claim price reduction in sale of goods cases, why should not the plaintiff in cases of 
construction contracts be entitled to claim payment reduction where the performance is 
defective? This issue may not arise under the civil legal system due to the generosity of 
such a system in granting specific performance. Under such a remedy, the plaintiff is 
entitled to receive what he contracted for. Under English law, specific performance can 
be granted exceptionally where the remedy of damages is inadequate. This may be the 
case where the goods in question are unique and, therefore, substitute goods are not 
available. 
As previously mentioned, in a case such as Bence, price reduction may place the buyer 
in a better financial position than the position he would have been in if he had received 
conforming goods. In Bence, the buyer's actual loss was his liability to the sub-buyers. 
On the other hand, the award in Bence allowed the defendant to gain from his breach by 
saving the expenses that he should have incurred in order to perform the contract 
properly. It seems that non of price reduction or compensatory damages prevents the 
parties to gain more than they have expected to gain under the contract. Can 
restitutionary damages achieve a better balance if they are recoverable in sale of goods 
cases? 
3.6.3 Restitutionary Damages for Defective Performance 
Under the remedy of restitutionary damages, the innocent party is entitled to recover the 
profit gained by the other party from his breach of contract. Here, it is worth noting that 
the House of Lords in the recent case of Attorney-General v. Blake268 seemed to be 
unhappy with the term `restitutionary damages' due to the fact that damages are 
normally concerned with the innocent party's loss and not with the profit gained by the 
268 [2000] 3 WLR 625. 
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party in breach. 269 Nevertheless, Lord Steyn made it clear that the "terminology... is less 
important than the substance". 270 
Restitutionary damages can be awarded under special circumstances. For example, 
restitutionary damages may be awarded in cases of breach of fiduciary duty. 271 
However, such damages are generally unavailable for breach of contract. Exceptionally, 
they may be awarded for a breach of restrictive covenant. 272 Birks suggests that 
restitutionary damages should be awarded in cases where the breach is cynical. 273 This 
suggestion was rejected in Attorney-General v. Blake274 where it was made clear that the 
fact that the breach is cynical and deliberate is not a reason to allow restitutionary 
damages. 
In Tito V. Waddell (No. 2), 275 Sir Robert Megarry V. -C. pointed out that the question of 
damages "is not one of making the defendant disgorge what he has saved by committing 
the wrong, but one of compensating the plaintiff. , 276 Only in exceptional cases, the 
innocent party may be entitled to recover restitutionary damages. In Attorney-General v. 
Blake, 277 where the House of Lords allowed restitutionary damages, Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead stated that 
269 Ibid, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead p. 638, Lord Steyn p. 644. 270 Ibid, p. 644. 
271 Lord Goff of Chieveley and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, London, 1998, p. 713. 
272 Wrotham Park Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd. [1974] 1 WLR 798. In this case, the defendants 
had built houses on their land in breach of a restrictive covenant in favour of the plaintiffs' neighbouring 
land. A mandatory injunction was refused on the ground that it would cause economic waste. The 
plaintiffs were allowed 5% of the profits gained by the defendants. Damages were allowed in this case on 
the basis of the amount that the plaintiffs would have demanded from the defendants for relaxing the 
covenant. 
273 Peter Birks, "Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Snepp and the fusion of law and equity" 
[1987] LMCLQ 421,440. 
274 [2000] 3 WLR 625,640. 
275 [1977] Ch. 106. 
276 Ibid at p. 332. 
277 [2000] 3 WLR 625. In this case, the defendant was a former member of the Secret Intelligence Service 
S. I. S. who in 1944 signed an undertaking not to divulge any official information gained as a result of his 
employment. However, in 1989, he wrote an autobiography, substantial parts of which were based on 
information he had acquired in the course of his duties as an S. I. S. officer. The defendant was held in 
breach of contract. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, at p. 641, pointed out that "[t]he undertaking, if not a 
fiduciary obligation, was closely akin to a fiduciary obligation, where an account of profits is a standard 
remedy in the event of breach. Had the information which Blake [the defendant] has now disclosed still 
been confidential, an account of profits would have been ordered, almost as a matter of course. In the 
special circumstances of the intelligence services, the same conclusion should follow even though the 
information is no longer confidential. That would be a just response to the breach. " The House of Lords 
held that the case is of special circumstances where restitutionary damages can be awarded. In a case of 
similar facts, Snepp v. US (1980) 444 US 507, the United States Supreme Court allowed restitutionary 
damages. 
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"there seems to be no reason, in principle, why the court must in all 
circumstances rule out an account of profits as a remedy for breach of contract. I 
prefer to avoid the unhappy expression "restitutionary damages". Remedies are 
the law's response to a wrong (or, more precisely, to a cause of action). When, 
exceptionally, a just response to a breach of contract so requires, the court should 
be able to grant the discretionary remedy of requiring a defendant to account to 
the plaintiff for the benefits he has received from his breach of contract. "278 
For the purpose of this thesis, the question is whether restitutionary damages can be 
awarded in cases of defective goods. In the Court of Appeal, the question was dealt with 
in Attorney-General by Lord Woolf M. R. where he pointed out that restitutionary 
damages can be allowed in cases of `skimped' performance. 279 In other words, such 
damages can be awarded where the defendant fails to provide the full extent of services 
he has contracted to provide and for which the plaintiff has paid or has to pay under the 
contract. In such a case, restitutionary damages would be quantified on the basis of the 
expenses saved by the defendant in not performing the contract properly. However, in 
the House of Lords, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated that this issue does not fall 
within the scope of an account of profits. He said that "[i]f a shopkeeper supplies 
inferior and cheaper goods than those ordered and paid for, he has to refund the 
difference in price. That would be the outcome of a claim for damages [compensatory 
damages] for breach of contract. ')1280 However, how can this apply in cases where there 
is no diminution in market value, i. e. difference in market value, resulting from 
defective performance, such as the case of Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and 
another v. Forsyth? 281 How can this apply in cases where the difference in market value 
is not the buyer's actual loss, such as the case of Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. 
Fasson UK Ltd? 282 The recovery of the difference in the market price may not be always 
possible. In Ruxley, the House of Lords brought about justice by allowing the plaintiff 
damages for loss of amenity. However, damages for consumer surplus may not be 
always available since they are subject to the normal restrictions imposed on the 
recovery of damages. It seems that they can only be available where enjoyment or 
283 
amenity is one of the main purposes of the contract. 
278 Attorney-General v. Blake [2000] 3 WLR 625,638. 
279 [1998] 1 All ER 833,845. 
280 Attorney-General v. Blake [2000] 3 WLR 625,640. 
281 [1996] 1 AC 344. 
282 [ 1997] 1 All ER 979. 
283 Brian Coote, "Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest" [1997] CLJ 537,565. 
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Restitutionary damages as well as price reduction may allow the buyer to recover more 
than he would have received if the goods had been delivered as warranted. On the other 
hand, compensatory damages may allow the party in breach to receive payment for 
performance which has not been made. Harris, Ogus and Phillips state that prevention of 
the injured party's recovering a windfall may have the result that the windfall accrues to 
the party in breach. Therefore, they suggest that any windfall should be apportioned 
between the parties. 284 Probably, this may be a convenient approach in cases where 
defective performance substantially increases the defendant's profit while not materially 
reduces the plaintiff's expectations. 
As previously mentioned, the remedy of price reduction will be brought into English law 
through the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and 
Associated Guarantees. 285 The purpose of the Directive is to achieve a "minimum 
harmonization" of the several consumer laws among the legal systems of the member 
states. 286 Therefore, the consumer buyer may have a better protection by offering him 
the choice to sue for price reduction, damages or both. However, this does not achieve a 
perfect balance for the law since the plaintiff in other kinds of contract, such as 
construction contract, will not be allowed to claim payment reduction. The remedy of 
restitutionary damage may provide help here. However, such a remedy is unlikely to be 
generally available in the near future since the Law Commission has recommended that 
the recoverability of restitutionary damages is most appropriate to be left for common 
law development. 287 In the light of the above discussion, it is submitted that more 
attention should be paid to the suggestion of Harris, Ogus and Phillips that any windfall 
gained by the defendant as a result of his defective performance should be apportioned 
between the parties. This seems to bring about justice as non of the parties will be 
allowed to gain alone more than he expected under the contract. This requires a 
legislative intervention since the common law is not familiar with such a solution. 
284 D. Harris, A. Ogus and J. Phillips, `Contract Remedies and Consumer Surplus' (1979) 95 LQR 582, 
593-4. 
285 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, Official Journal L 171,07/07/1999. 
286 See Christian Twigg-Flesner and Robert Bradgate, "The E. C. Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale 
of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees - All Talk and No Do? " [20001 Web JCLI <http: // 
webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/flesner2. html>, Section 2. 
287 Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, Law Com. No 247, para. 1.48. 
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Conclusions 
The objective of compensatory damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 288 cannot be 
achieved without considering the subjective value of the goods in calculating damages 
for normal loss. Ignoring the subjective value may result in undercompensating the 
buyer. However, in considering the subjective value for quantifying the buyer's 
damages, other principles should be taken into account. Taking the subjective value into 
consideration should always be subject to the remoteness principle. In general, loss of 
`consumer surplus' is recoverable as long as it complies with the normal restrictions 
imposed on the recovery of damages. For example, where it is reasonable for the buyer 
to avoid such a loss by obtaining substitute goods, the recovery for such a loss may be 
disallowed due to the application of the mitigation principle. 
In order to achieve the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, the prima facie 
measure should be displaced where its application would not put the buyer in the same 
financial position as if the goods had been confirming or where its application 
undercompensates or overcompensates the buyer. Cases, where the prima facie measure 
can be displaced, cannot be put in an exhaustive list. Where the cost of cure exceeds the 
difference in value, the prima facie measure should be displaced in order to allow the 
buyer damages for his actual loss, i. e. cost of cure. However, this should be subject to 
the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. Therefore, in order to allow 
the buyer to recover, as damages, the cost of cure, such a cure should be the only way to 
deal with the seller's breach. In other words, where it is possible for the buyer to resell 
the defective goods and obtain substitute goods, he may not be entitled to more than the 
difference between the price of resale and the cost of substitute. Moreover, the recovery 
of cost of cure is subject to the restriction of reasonableness as stated in Ruxley 
Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another v. Forsyth. 289 The buyer will not be 
entitled to recover the cost of cure where it is unreasonable to cure the defective goods. 
The buyer is not expected to cure the defective goods where the cost of cure is very 
disproportionate to the difference in value. It is true that awarding the cost of cure 
achieves the objective of compensatory damages stated in Robinson. However, the 
balance of the law will not be achieved by such an award where the application of other 
principles of law disallow such an award. Indeed, the restriction of reasonableness is 
288 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
289 [ 1996] 1 AC 344. 
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significant to achieve the balance of the law since such a principle prevents `economic 
waste'. 
The main question regarding the recoverability of the cost of cure, which exceeds the 
diminution in value, is whether the buyer can recover for such a loss where the cure 
makes the goods of a better quality than the quality they would have had if they had 
been as warranted. Obviously, in such a case, allowing the buyer the cost of cure will 
put him in a better financial position than he would have been in had the goods been 
delivered as warranted. Although the award of the cost of cure seems to clash with the 
objective of compensatory damages, as stated in Robinson, it does not overcompensate 
the buyer since the only way to deal with the seller's breach is to cure the defect of the 
goods. Of course, the buyer should not be entitled to such a recovery where substitute 
goods are reasonably obtainable or where the cure is unreasonable. In view of that, one 
may conclude that although the award in Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and 
Pump Co. Ltd., 29° put the plaintiff in a better position than the position he would have 
been in if the breach had not happened, the plaintiff was not overcompensated since he 
had no choice other than reinstating the property. In fact, disallowing the cost of cure 
would undercompensate the plaintiff since the plaintiff was forced to incur such a cost 
in order to deal with the defendant's breach. In view of that, it can be concluded that the 
decision in Harbutt's Plasticine is an exception to the rule of damages stated in 
Robinson. It is submitted that such an exception is necessary in order to hold the seller 
liable for losses caused by his breach and award the buyer for the expenses caused by 
the breach which could not reasonably be avoided. 
However, this should not be the case where cure increases the productive capacity of the 
goods or, in cases of replacement, the substitute goods are of better productive capacity 
than the goods in question. In this case, allowing the buyer the cost of cure or 
replacement will definitely overcompensate him since the buyer will gain profit derived 
from the increased productive capacity. Therefore, the court should reduce the buyer's 
damages by the amount of profit gained from the increased productive capacity in order 
to avoid overcompensating the buyer. By this way, the court may strike the right balance 
in awarding compensatory damages by ensuring that the objective of damages, as stated 
in Robinson, is achieved and the buyer is not overcompensated. Based on the decision in 
290 [1970] 1 All ER 225. 
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British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric 
Railways Co. of London Ltd291 the following formula is submitted to be considered for 
the quantification of damages: 
([cost of replacement + extra expenses incurred in using defective goods] - [the 
salvage value of the defective goods + extra profit derived from the superiority of the 
substituted goods]) 
Furthermore, in cases of replacement, the substitute machine may be of a longer 
commercial life than the remainder of the potential commercial life of the replaced 
machine. Where it is proved that the buyer was supposed to buy new machine at the end 
of the commercial life of the replaced goods, the buyer will gain extra profit by not 
having to buy a new machine until the end of the commercial life of the substitute 
machine. In other words, the buyer will have the chance to invest the price of a new 
machine between the time of expiry of the potential commercial life of the replaced 
machine and the end of the commercial life of the substitute machine. Profits derived 
from investing the price for such a period should be deducted from the buyer's damages. 
Deciding otherwise may result in putting the buyer in a better financial position than he 
would have been in if the goods had not been defective and, consequently, the award 
will be in direct contradiction with the principle of Robinson. Although the commercial 
life was not taken into consideration to reduce the buyer's damages in Bacon v. Cooper 
(Metals) Ltd, 292 this chapter argued that the case was decided on its own facts. In this 
case, the Court was not convinced that the buyer would use the substitute goods for all 
their commercial life. 
The question of whether subsales can be considered for the quantification of damages 
has been answered in the positive. Where the subsale was in the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of making the contract and the buyer resold the goods, damages 
should be calculated on the basis of the buyer's liability to his sub-buyers. Where the 
goods are bought in order to be manufactured, the buyer may be entitled to damages for 
the diminution in value of the products caused by using the defective goods purchased. 
However, where the buyer performed subcontracts by delivering such products, as in 
291 [ 1912] AC 673. 
292 [1982] 1 All ER 397. 
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Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd, 293 his damages should be limited 
to his liability to the sub-buyers. This is due to the fact that the actual loss caused by the 
seller's breach is the buyer's liability to his sub-buyers. The buyer should not be entitled 
to recover more than his actual loss. In fact, one may argue that allowing the buyer to 
recover damages for more than his actual loss clashes with the objective of damages 
stated in Robinson. In applying the principle of Robinson, the court should look at the 
economic end-result of the performance and not at the direct result of performance. If 
the seller is aware that the goods will be resold or manufactured, damages should be 
awarded to secure the economic end-result of performance, i. e. the potential profit. In a 
case such as Bence, if the goods had not been defective, the buyer would have 
manufactured them and successfully sold the products to the sub-buyers. Therefore, in 
such a case, it can be argued that under the principle of Robinson, compensatory 
damages should be awarded in order to put the buyer, so far as money can do it, in the 
position he would have been in had he successfully performed his subcontracts by 
delivering conforming products. This can be achieved by allowing the buyer damages 
for his liability to the sub-buyers. Therefore, contrary to the opinion of respected writers 
such as Treitel, it is submitted that the case of Bence was rightly decided by allowing the 
buyers damages for their actual loss. 
However, where the subcontracts are not in the contemplation of the parties at the time 
of making the contract, it has been submitted that the buyer should be entitled to recover 
for the diminution in value or for his liability to the sub-buyer whichever is the least. 
This is due to the fact that the buyer's actual loss is his liability to the sub-buyer. But the 
seller's liability should not exceed the diminution in value since the subsale was not in 
the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. Therefore, in 
principle, the sub-buyer is entitled to damages for the diminution in value; however, 
where the buyer's liability to the sub-buyer is less than the diminution in value, the 
buyer should not be entitled to damages for more than his liability to the sub-buyer 
which represents his actual loss. Where the buyer managed to perform subcontracts, 
made by the time of discovery of defects, by convincing the sub-buyers to accept 
delivery of defective goods, he should be entitled to no more than nominal damages. In 
such a case, the buyer suffers no actual loss. Here, it is submitted that the buyers in 
293 [1997] 1 All ER 979. 
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Slater v. Hoyle & Smith Ltd. 294 were overcompensated by awarding them damages 
calculated on the basis of the difference in value. 
In Ruxley and Bence, the defendant received payment for performance that he did not 
make. In other words, the defendant gained from his breach. On the other hand, if the 
plaintiff had been allowed restitutionary damages or price reduction he would have been 
overcompensated since his recovery would have exceeded his actual loss. In order to 
deal with this point, an attention should be paid to the suggestion of Harris, Ogus and 
Phillips that any windfall should be apportioned between the parties. 
All in all, it can be noted that in awarding compensatory damages for normal loss, 
English law strikes the right balance by ensuring that the objective of damages, as stated 
in Robinson, is achieved and ensuring that the buyer is not overcompensated. The 
decision in Bence should be understood as a development in English law in the right 
direction. The decision emphasizes that damages are a question of fact and should not 
be awarded for more than the actual losses caused by the seller's breach. 
The UCC is, to some extent, similar to the SGA with respect to the case of normal loss. 
The only difference seems to be the time at which goods are valued for the purpose of 
applying the prima facie measure. Whilst goods are valued at the time of delivery under 
the SGA, they are valued at the time of acceptance under the UCC. In fact, such a 
difference is not significant due to the fact that the court always values the goods at the 
time when the buyer has a reasonable chance to discover the defect. Valuing the goods 
at a different time may not achieve the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, 
since this would be the time when the buyer can decide to resell the defective goods and 
obtain a substitute. In distance sales, the goods may be delivered when the seller hands 
them over to the carrier or sends them by post. At this time, the buyer may not have any 
reasonable chance to discover the defect of the goods. Therefore, it can be noted that the 
time of acceptance is more appropriate to be used in the prima facie measure than the 
time of delivery since this brings the law into line of reality. 
However, it can be noted that although the time of valuing the goods stated under the 
UCC is to be preferred to that stated under the SGA, in practice such a difference is not 
294[1920]2KB 11. 
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significant since the measure is prima facie. As previously noted, the English and 
American courts may depart from the prima facie measure to value the goods at other 
than the time of delivery or acceptance. For example, in at least three cases, the court is 
unlikely to value the goods at the time of delivery. These cases are (a) where the defect 
cannot be discovered, or become certain, before using the goods; (b) where the buyer 
has passed the goods to a sub-buyer without examining them and the seller was aware, 
at the time of making the contract, of the subsale; (c) where the seller caused a delay in 
the resale of the defective goods. 
In comparing English law with American law, one may note that the American courts 
are less concerned with the actual loss suffered by the buyer. In a number of UCC cases, 
such as Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 295 and Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 296 the 
buyer was overcompensated by awarding him damages for the diminution in value of 
the goods supplied and for the diminution in value of the products made by using the 
goods as ingredients. It was argued that the buyer should only be entitled to recover 
damages for the diminution in value of the products manufactured. To sum up, one may 
note that although the rules under the UCC states the objective of damages, which is 
identical to that in England, the practice of the courts does not show a satisfactory 
achievement of such an objective. 
As regards the CISG, due to the lack of cases, this work could not go beyond analysis of 
its provisions. The Convention does not provide a measure for quantifying damages in 
cases of breach of warranty. However, the words of Article 74 of the Convention may 
lead to the application of the prima facie measure. Where there is a fluctuation in the 
market value of the goods, the prima facie will apply under the Convention in order to 
achieve the objective of compensatory damages. The time of valuing the goods is the 
time when the buyer has a reasonable chance to discover the defect of the goods. The 
recoverability of damages calculated on the basis of cost of cure depends on the actual 
loss recognized by the court. Article 74 allows damages for the actual loss caused by the 
seller's breach. 
295 1982 S. D. LEXIS 262; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 588 (1982). 
296 1975 S. D. LEXIS 170; 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 67 (1975). 
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Chapter Four 
Damages for Consequential Economic Losses: 
Recoverability and Quantification of Loss of Profit 
Introduction 
Consequential economic losses can be loss of profit and expenses caused or wasted by 
the seller's delivery of defective goods. The quantification of loss of profit seems to be a 
difficult task as compared to other types of economic loss. The issue of this chapter is 
whether the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, ' was achieved in 
cases where the defective quality of goods caused consequential economic loss. In order 
to ensure that the law strikes the right balance by achieving the objective of 
compensatory damages and avoiding overcompensating the buyer, this chapter will 
develop methods that can be applied in quantifying the buyer's damages. In cases of 
profit-making goods, the quantification of loss of profit depends on many factors such 
as the productive capacity, the annual earnings and the salvage value. The buyer may 
also lose the chance of investment of the annual earnings that he would have made but 
for the breach. Loss of investment should be quantified for the period within which the 
annual earnings could have been invested. The buyer may also lose profit resulting from 
delay in the operation of his factory due to defective machines delivered by the seller. 
Furthermore, the buyer may suffer loss of profit resulting from loss of goodwill caused 
by delivery of defective goods. 
Compensatory damages are quantified under both the SGA and the UCC similarly. 
Therefore, the methods of quantifying loss of profit developed in this chapter should 
apply under English and American jurisdictions similarly. In developing formulas 
concerned with the quantification of damages for such losses, one has to take into 
account the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. The most 
important restriction which needs to be considered in relation to loss of profit is 
certainty. 
'(1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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English law seems to be different from American law regarding the requirement of 
certainty. Therefore, this chapter will deal with such a requirement under each law in 
order to conclude which law is better in applying the requirement of certainty. In fact, 
until recently, the American courts were reluctant to allow the recovery of loss of profits 
in most cases of sale of goods. The so-called "new business rule" was applied to prevent 
recovery of loss of profit in all cases of new business. Under English law, the "new 
business rule" does not exist. The rule was justified by American courts on the ground 
that new businesses have no previous records of profit and, thus, loss of profit cannot be 
proved with reasonable certainty. The rule is still influential in the American courts. 
This work will argue that the "new business rule" should be regarded as evidential rule 
and should not be regarded as a rule of law. In other words, where the buyer shows that 
his new business suffered loss of profit, the "new business rule" should be set aside. 
Here, one needs to find out what degree of certainty is required in proving the fact and 
amount of loss of profit. Indeed, where the buyer can show, by any means, that he has 
suffered loss of profit, it becomes the duty of the court to quantify such a loss. 
A comparison between English law and American law is also necessary in cases where 
the buyer claims his wasted pre-contract expenses. English law seems to be also 
different from American law regarding the question of whether the buyer is entitled to 
recover pre-contract expenses wasted by a breach of contract. Therefore, one needs to 
find out which law deals better with this question. This chapter will argue that such 
expenses should be recovered, as damages, under the normal restrictions imposed on the 
recovery of damages. In general, where the buyer does not suffer loss of profit or cannot 
prove such a loss with reasonable certainty, he may choose to claim the expenses wasted 
by the breach. The buyer's expenses incurred in reliance on the contract may be wasted 
due to the seller's delivery of useless goods. Now, it seems well settled that the buyer 
will not be entitled to recover all his capital expenses where the seller proves that his 
capital expenses exceed his gross earnings, i. e., where the buyer has made a bad bargain. 
4.1 Loss of Profit 
Economists measure profit as the difference between revenue and expenses. ' The 
famous economist Sir John Hicks made it clear that "income [net profit] is that amount 
2 M. L. Katz and H. S. Rosen, Microeconomics, Boston, 3rd'ed., 1998, p. 208. 
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which an individual can consume and still be as well off at the end of the period as he or 
she was at the start of the period. "3 Apparently, this definition is restricted to the net 
profit and cannot apply to the gross earnings. 4 Net profit can simply be identified as the 
total earning diminished by the cost of obtaining it. 
In principle, loss of profits is recoverable under the SGA and the UCC. Historically, the 
American court was reluctant to award damages for loss of profit. 5 As for the CISG, 
Article 74 provides expressly that "damages for breach of contract by one party consist 
of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party.... " The 
reason that the Article made a specific reference to the loss of profit is that the concept 
of loss, in some legal systems, does not include loss of profit unless a specific reference 
is made. 6 While the concept of loss, in such legal systems, is restricted to the reduction 
in the assets caused by the breach (damnum emergens), the concept of profit is 
concerned with any increase in assets which would have been obtained but for the 
breach (lucrum cessans). 7 Some legal systems do not recognize the loss of profit or it 
may allow its recovery subject to special requirements. 8 
None of the SGA, the UCC nor the CISG provides guidelines for the quantification of 
such a loss. The Secretariat's Commentary to the CISG provides some examples for 
such a quantification under Article 74 of the Convention. 9 Unfortunately, the examples 
do not cover many positions of recovery in respect of retained defective goods. 
Consequential loss of profit can be suffered as a result of loss of resale or as a loss of 
using profit-making goods. 
3 1930. Quoted from A. Berry and R. Jarvis, Accounting in a Business Context, London, 3rd ed., 1997, 
p. 25. 
4 For the distinction between "net profit" and "gross earning", see supra p. 92. 
5 Infra, p. 146. 
6 Knapp, Damages in General, in C. M. Bianca and M. J. Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales 
Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, 1987,543. 
7 Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
Oxford, 2nd ed. in translation by Geoffrey Thomas, 1998, p. 563. See also F. Enderlein and D. Maskow, 
International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, New York, 1992, p. 299. 
8 Peter Schlechtriem, ibid at p. 563. 
9 Document A/CONF. 97/5. See comment 5 to Article 70 of the 1978 draft of the CISG [currently Article 
74 of the CISG]. 
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4.1.1 Loss of Profit on Resale 
As previously mentioned, 10 in applying the principle of Robinson v. Harman" the court 
should look at the economic end-result that the buyer could have achieved if the seller 
had delivered conforming goods. Therefore, if it was in the contemplation of the parties 
that the goods will be resold, the resale should be taken into account in quantifying the 
buyer's damages. Taking the resale contracts into account for the purpose of calculating 
damages may increase or reduce the buyer's damages. The previous chapter dealt with 
cases where the buyer can mitigate his loss by performing subcontracts. Commonly, the 
buyer may contract to resell the goods before the time of delivery under the original 
contract. It has been stated that the buyer is not required under the mitigation principle 
to perform such subcontracts by delivering the defective goods. However, the buyer may 
mitigate his loss by reselling the goods as defective. 12 So, where the buyer does not 
perform subcontracts by delivering the defective goods, he may lose profit, as a result of 
loss of resale, and be liable for non-delivery of goods to the subcontractors. In such a 
case, the buyer may recover damages for loss of profit on resale, 13 for his liability to the 
sub-buyers and for diminution in value of the goods in question. However, where 
substitute goods are reasonably obtainable, the mitigation principle may require the 
buyer to perform subcontracts by delivering substitute goods in order to avoid his 
liability to the subcontractors. 
Under both English and American law, the recovery of such lost profit is subject to two 
main restrictions. 14 First, it should be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at 
the time of making the contract, that the goods are bought for resale. 15 Secondly, the 
buyer is required to prove that the goods are no longer suitable for performing 
subcontracts or the sub-buyers rejected them due to their defective quality. 16 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that it is still arguable whether or not resale contracts 
10 Supra, p. 92. 
" (184 8) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
12 For the mitigation principle, see infra p. 298. 
13 See M. G. Bridge, `Expectation damages and uncertain future losses' in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann 
(eds. ), Good faith and fault in contract law, Oxford, 1995,427, at pp. 449-452. Loss of profit on resale 
frequently occurs in cases of non-delivery. See Richard Schiro, `Prospecting for Lost Profits in the 
Uniform Commercial Code: The Buyer's Dilemmas' (1979) 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1727. 
14 See the leading UCC case of Hendricks & Associates, Inc. v. Daewoo Corporation 1991 U. S. App. 
LEXIS 269; 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1099 (1991). 
15 See the opinion of Lord Denning M. R. regarding the parties' contemplation of loss of profit in Parsons 
Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. [19781 1 QB 791,802. See also E. C. Schneider, `Consequential Damages in 
the International Sale of Goods: Analysis of Two Decision' (1995) 16 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 615,636. 
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can be considered for the purpose of calculating damages. In reliance on the argument 
placed in the previous chapter, one may note that the failure of the court to consider 
resale contracts where such resale was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
making the contract, may be in direct contradiction with the principle of Robinson v. 
Harman. 17 Here, the buyer should show that he did not enforce subcontracts by 
delivering the goods in question due to their defective quality. 
Loss of profit on resale can be quantified on the basis of the difference between the 
resale price and the contract price. However, the diminution in value of the goods in 
question should be taken into account. For example, suppose that the buyer had 
contracted to resell at £1000 and the original contract price was £800. If the buyer could 
not perform subcontracts due to the defective quality of goods, he would be entitled to 
recover £200 (the difference between the resale price and the original price). Suppose 
further that the value of the goods as warranted was £700. In such a case, the buyer's 
loss would be £300 (the difference between the resale price and the value of the retained 
goods). 
The recoverability of damages for loss of profit on resale may not be difficult where the 
buyer shows that he contracted to resell the goods by the time the goods were discovered 
defective. However, this may not be the case where the buyer bought the goods to hold 
in inventory for future resale. If these goods appear defective by the time of their resale, 
the buyer should show evidence of the price at which the goods would have been resold 
but for the breach. Here it should be clear that if the buyer saved expenses, which would 
have been incurred on the resale but for the breach, such expenses should be deducted 
from his total recovery. ' 8 
4.1.2 Loss of Use 
Under English and American jurisdictions, the out-of-pocket expenses suffered by the 
buyer as a result of his loss of use of the defective goods are recoverable. Such expenses 
16 W. H. Henning and G. I. Wallach, The Law of Sales under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1981 
including 1995 supplement, p. 10.33. 
" (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
{8 In the UCC case of Wullschleger & Co., Inc., v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 1985 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 15612; 
41 UCC Rep. Serv. 1213 (1985) where the buyer purchased certain kind of fabric which appeared 
defective, he was entitled to recover, as damages, the loss of net profit, resulting from cancellation of 
purchase orders made by customers, minus labour expenses saved as a result of the breach. 
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can be expected to be in one of two forms. First, the buyer may repair the goods in 
question. Here, he may be entitled to the rental value of substitute goods during the 
period of repair plus the cost of repair provided that such a repair is reasonable in the 
circumstances. 19 Secondly, the buyer may recover as damages expenses incurred in 
obtaining substitute goods subject to the reasonableness requirement. However, where 
substitute goods are unobtainable, the buyer may suffer a loss of profit. In the UCC case 
of Maru Shipping Co. v. Burmeister & Wain Am. Corp., 20 the seller was held liable for 
repair cost attributable to defects in the engines purchased plus profits lost during the 
repair. Where the goods are repairable, the buyer may suffer loss of profit during the 
period of repair. 
4.1.2.1 Loss of Use by Manufacturer Buyer 
The buyer, in this context, is the person who purchases goods in order to be used for 
profit-making industry. The loss of profit of such a buyer may result from a shutdown of 
his business or deficiency in the normal production of the business. In order to apply the 
principle of Robinson v. Harman21 in this case, one has to look at the financial position 
that the buyer could have been in if the goods had operated as warranted for their 
commercial life. Furthermore, the principle of Robinson has to be applied in conjunction 
with other principles, especially the principles of mitigation and certainty. 
The remoteness principle is unlikely to prevent the recovery of loss of profit resulting 
from the deficiency of the profit-making goods. The seller, who deals with a commercial 
buyer, normally contemplates, at the time of making the contract, that the buyer will use 
such goods for a profit-making scheme and it is unlikely that such a profit will be gained 
if the goods appear defective. In the UCC case of Lewis v. Mobile Oil Corp., 22 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit made it clear that where a seller 
provides goods to a manufacturing enterprise with knowledge that they are to be used in 
19 In the case of Charterhouse Credit Co. Ltd. v. Tolly, [1963] 2 QB 683 where the buyer refused to pay 
instalments due to a finance company under a hire-purchase agreement, the company terminated the 
contract and claimed damages. The defendant counterclaimed for damages for defective quality of the car, 
i. e. the subject-matter of the contract. In this case, Upjohn LJ, at p. 711, made it clear that in principle the 
buyer can recover as damages the cost of hiring substitute goods for the period of repair plus the cost of 
repair. 
20 1981 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 9944; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 230 (1981). 
21 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
22 1971 U. S. App. LEXIS 12487; 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 625 (8th Cir. 1971). See also the UCC case of Draft 
Systems, Inc. v. Rimar Manufacturing, Inc. 1981 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 16779; 32 UCC Rep. Serv. 1493 
(1981). 
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the manufacturing process, it is reasonable to assume that he should know that defective 
goods will cause a disruption of production, and loss of profits is a natural consequence 
of such disruption. Similarly, comment 6 to Article 70 of the 1978 draft [currently 
Article 74] of the CISG provides expressly that "... If the goods delivered were machine 
tools, the buyer's loss might also include the loss resulting from lowered production 
during the period the tools could not be used. "23 The comment is concerned with losses 
resulting from the delay in operation. Obviously, the comment does not deal with losses 
caused by the deficiency of the productive capacity of the purchased goods themselves. 
However, Article 74 of the Convention is wide enough to award damages for such 
losses. 
4.1.2.1.2 The Failure of the Court to Apply the Principle of Robinson v 
Harman 
Where profit-making goods appear of deficient productive capacity, the buyer needs to 
consider whether or not he can mitigate his loss by continuing to use the goods in 
question. As discussed below, in certain cases, the mitigation principle may require the 
buyer to stop using the goods or obtaining substitute. However, where the mitigation 
principle does not arise, the buyer may be entitled to recover damages for loss of profit 
resulting from the deficiency of the productivity of the goods in question. The objective 
of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 24 can be achieved by the allowing the 
buyer the difference between the actual profit he earned and the profit he could have 
earned if the goods had been delivered as warranted. Of course, if the buyer cannot gain 
profit due to the seller's breach, he may stop using the goods and sue for his lost 
expectations. 
In one English case, Cullinane v. British "Rema " Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 25 the court 
failed to achieve the objective of damages by undercompensating the buyer for his 
actual loss resulting from the deficient productive capacity of the goods supplied. In this 
case the plaintiff purchased a clay pulverising and drying plant from the defendant. The 
plant was supposed to produce dry clay powder at the rate of six tons per hour. 
26 The 
23 Document A/CONF. 97/5. 
24 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
25 [1954] 1 QB 292. The decision in this case was criticized and damages were reassessed in J. K. 
Macleod, Damages: Reliance or Expectancy Interest, [1970] JBL 19. 
26 It seems that the buyer, in this case, was in breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose which 
is the special capacity of production. 
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commercial life of the plant was ten years. The plant, however, was not as productive as 
warranted. It was capable of producing two tons per hour only. The buyer claimed 
damages for expenses incurred in reliance on the contract plus the loss of net profit. 
Surprisingly, the Court of Appeal held that the buyer was entitled to recover either his 
loss of profit or his total expenditures. 27 In Cullinane, Sir Raymond Evershed, M. R. 
pointed out that 
"'[a]s a matter of principle again, it seems to me that a person who has obtained a 
machine such as the plaintiff here obtained, which was mechanically in exact 
accordance with the order given, but was unable to perform a particular function 
which it was warranted to perform, may adopt one of two courses. He may... 
claim to recover the capital cost he has incurred less anything he can obtain by 
disposing the material that he got. A claim of that kind puts the plaintiff in the 
same position as though he had never made the contract at all. He is, in other 
words, back where he started, and, if it were shown that the profit earning 
capacity was, in fact, very small, the plaintiff would probably elect so to base his 
claim. Alternatively, he may, where the warranty in question relates to 
performance, make his claim on the basis of the profit he has lost, because the 
machine as delivered fell short in its performance of that which was warranted to 
do. "28 [Emphases added] 
The statement by Sir Raymond Evershed, M. R. applies accurately to cases where the 
buyer seeks to recover, as damages, loss of gross earnings and the expenses incurred in 
reliance on the contract. The buyer will obtain double recovery if he is allowed his loss 
of gross earnings and expenditure incurred for obtaining such earnings. This is based 
on the fact that such expenditure constitutes part of the gross earnings. In this sense, the 
buyer can recover, as damages, either his gross earnings or expenditure incurred for 
obtaining such earnings. 29 By allowing the buyer damages for both losses, the court will 
not comply with the principle of Robinson. 
However, in Cullinane the buyer claimed his net profit and his total expenditure 
incurred for obtaining the gross earnings. The buyer's net profit is the difference 
between the gross earnings and the capital expenditure including the price. Therefore, 
the buyer will by no means be overcompensated by allowing him damages for his loss of 
27 The decision has been criticized in S Stoljar, `Nominal, Elective and Preparatory Damages in Contract' 
(1975) 91 LQR 68,80. See generally A. G. Guest, Benjamin's sale of goods, London, 5th. ed., 1997, 
p. 949; Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, London, 16th ed., 1997, p. 595. 
28 Cullinane v. British "Rema " Manufacturing Co. Ltd., [1954] 1 QB 292,303. 
29 The buyer may claim the expenditures wasted where loss of profit cannot be proved with reasonable 
certainty. For example, in Wood prods., Inc., v. CMI Corp., 1986 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 19198; 4 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 2d 407 (1986) the buyer was entitled to refund the purchase price plus extra costs by using 
machinery, minus revenue actually generated by machinery, but buyer failed to prove lost profits with 
sufficient certainty. 
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net profit and such expenditure. 30 In general, where the productive capacity of the 
defective goods is less than what is agreed upon, the buyer will not, in normal 
circumstances, be overcompensated by allowing him his net profit plus his total 
3 expenses which were disposed due to the breach .1 
In Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed, 32 Lord Denning MR referred to Cullinane to allow, as 
damages, expenses wasted by the breach where loss of profit was not claimed. He stated 
that the aggrieved party "can either claim for his loss of profit; or for his wasted 
expenditure. But he must elect between them. He cannot claim both. , 33 In this case, it is 
unclear what Lord Denning MR meant by the word `profit'. It is hoped that he meant 
gross earnings and not net profit. 34 Interpreting such a statement differently may lead to 
undercompensation. 
To sum up, the decision in Cullinane, it is submitted, did not comply with the principle 
of Robinson due to its failure to distinguish between gross earnings and net profit. In 
fact, the damages claimed in Cullinane comply with the principle of Robinson. The 
classification of Sir Raymond Evershed, M. R. should apply only where the buyer claims 
his capital expenses and loss of gross earnings. 
4.1.2.1.2 Formula for the Calculation of Damages under the Principle of 
Robinson v Harman 
Where the mitigation principle does not arise and the buyer uses the defective profit- 
making goods for their commercial life, the following points should be considered in 
quantifying the loss of profit in order to achieve the objective of compensatory damages. 
Firstly, the running expenses of the goods at their lower productive capacity might be 
30 In the UCC case of Sweco, Inc., v. Continental Sulfur and Chemical, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 488; 14 
UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1034 (1991) the buyer was allowed damages for the diminution in value of a defective 
mill and for loss of profit. 
31 See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v. Finney Look Seeds Ltd. [1983] 2 AC 803 where the buyer 
purchased specific kind of seeds which appeared defective, the House of Lords awarded the buyer all his 
costs, wasted in cultivating the worthless crop, as well as the net profit he would have made from a 
successful crop. 
32 [ 1972] 1 QB 60. The case was of a contract between a television company and an actor. The company 
incurred expenses before making the contract. The actor, in breach of contract, refused to do the 
contracted film. The Court of Appeal awarded the expenses wasted by the breach of contract. In this case, 
the plaintiff did not claim damages for his lost profit due to the difficulty of proving that the film would 
have been profitable. The case was referred to in Bed Dis a Turk Ticaret v. International Agri Trade Co. 
Ltd. (The "Selda') [1998] 1 Lloyds Rep. 416. 
33 Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed, [197211 QB 60,63-4. 
34 See Hugh Beale, Remedies for Breach of Contract, London, 1980,156. 
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less than they would have been if the goods had operated at the agreed productive 
capacity. Secondly, the residual value of the defective goods at the end of their 
commercial life, i. e. the salvage value, would be lower than the residual value of the 
goods as warranted. In some cases, the salvage value equals zero. The following section 
provides methods that should be considered in quantifying damages for defective profit- 
making goods. 
To make the case clearer, the following will state a method of measurement of the 
buyer's loss of profit in a hypothetical example inspired by the case of Cullinane. 35 
Suppose that a plant was purchased in order to produce widgets at the rate of ten per 
hour. But, due to the defective quality of the plant, its productive capacity decreased to 
eight widgets per hour. Moreover, the gross revenue of the plant as warranted was 
expected to be [£27,000] per annum and the running expenses36 of the operation were 
expected to be [£ 1000]. 
In this case, the annual earning would be [£26,000] calculated as the annual gross 
revenue [£27,000] less the annual running expenses [£1000]. Further, suppose that the 
commercial life of the plant was 10 years. Suppose further that the contract price of the 
plant and expenses incurred in reliance on the contract was [£50,000]. Also the residual 
value37 of the plant at the end of its commercial life was [£1000]. The total net profit of 
the buyer over the commercial life of the plant would be calculated as follows: 
35 One cannot provide certain formulas for the calculation of damages in all cases of lost profits. The court 
may find its own way in the calculation of damages. The example provided is concerned only with goods 
of deficient productive capacity. In Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350, Lord 
Upjohn, at p. 425, said that "[t]he assessment of damages is not an exact science". 
36 In this example, the average running expenses is used. The running expenses do not include the 
overhead expenses which are incurred whether the machine is in operation or not. Economists distinguish 
between a firm's fixed and variable costs. The former are always stable whether or not the firm does 
anything such as the employees' salaries. The latter are those that vary with the firm's activity. This might 
be the costs of certain materials used to manufacture certain product. In the normal course of 
circumstances, fixed costs may not be taken into account for the calculation of damages. However, in 
certain cases fixed expenses may be considered for the purpose of quantifying damages. For example, 
suppose that the buyer has purchased a machine to use it in his factory. Suppose further that all the 
products of the machine appeared to be defective due to the defect of the machine. In such an example, if 
the buyer claimed the wasted expenses only, one might find a ground for considering the employees' 
salaries for the purpose of calculating the buyer's damages. The buyer's employees might have had more 
time to devote to some other profitable work if the buyer did not purchase the goods in question. In such 
an example, the buyer has paid the salaries without receiving any financial benefit in return. Therefore, the 
court might allow the buyer part of the salaries equivalent to the time spent on operating the defective 
machine. This was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Autotrol 
Corporation v. Continental Water Systems Corporation 1990 U. S. App. LEXIS 20376; 918 F. 2d 689 
(1990). 
37 Some writers consider the depreciation for the quantification of damages. Such a consideration has no 
significance where the annual earnings are considered since such earnings are normally reduced by the 
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(the gross earnings in ten years [ 10(26,000)] + the residual value of the plant at 
the end of its commercial life [£1000]) less the contract price of the plant and 
any further expenses incurred in reliance on the contract [£50,000] = £211,000. 
If the plant was of a lower productive capacity than the contracted productive capacity, 
three figures are likely to change, i. e. the running expenses, 38 the annual gross revenue 
and the residual value. Suppose that the figures changed as follows: the running 
expenses [£700], the annual gross revenue [£22,000] and the residual value of the plant 
at the end of its commercial life [£900]. The annual earning would be [£22,000 - £700 = 
£21,300]; the gross earnings at the end of the commercial life of the plant would be [£10 
(21,300)]. The buyer's total net profit would be calculated as 
(the gross earnings at the end of the plant's commercial life [£213,000] plus the 
salvage value of the plant [£900]) less the contract price of the plant and any 
further expenses incurred in reliance on the contract [£50,000] = £163,900 
In this hypothetical example the lost net profit suffered by the buyer due to the 
deficiency in the productive capacity can simply be quantified as f llows: 39 0 
the expected taxed net profit if the plant operated as warranted [£211,000] - the 
actual taxed net profit that the buyer gained [£ 163,900] = £47,100 
Here, it should be noted that where the damages awarded are subject to tax in the 
buyer's hand, the tax should not be taken into account for the quantification of damages. 
However, where the tax rate changes between the time of the buyer's loss and the time 
of the award, the difference in the tax rate should be taken into account. For example, in 
the recent case of Amstrad Plc. v. Seagate Technology Incorporated and Another, 40 
depreciated value. Moreover, the value of the plant normally depreciates during its commercial life to 
reach eventually the salvage value which should be considered in the assessment of damages. See J. K. 
Macleod, supra n. 25. 
38 The deficiency in the productive capacity may increase the productive costs. In this case, damages 
should be allowed for such extra costs. For example, see Hawthorne Industries, Inc. v. Balfour Maclaine 
International Ltd., 1982 U. S. App. LEXIS 18869; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 1339 (11th Cir. 1982) where 
damages were allowed for the increased productive costs. 
39 The provided formula is based on the analysis in N. Biger and A. S. Rosen, `A Framework for the 
Assessment of Business Damages for Breach of Contract' (1980-81) 5 Can. Bus. L. J. 302. 
40 [ 1997] 86 BLR 34 (Unreported). In this case, the plaintiff purchased a quantity of hard disk drives from 
the defendant. The drives appeared defective. The plaintiff showed evidence that the failure of the drives 
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where the tax rate at the time of the award was less than the tax rate at the time when the 
buyer suffered loss of profit, the buyer's damages were reduced in order to take account 
of the difference in the tax rate. 
A significant restriction of the recovery in cases such as the aforementioned example is 
the mitigation principle. In certain cases, the buyer may mitigate his loss by stopping 
using defective goods and obtaining substitute goods. Here, the buyer will not be 
compensated for losses he could have avoided by obtaining such a substitute. In this 
case, he would be entitled to recover as damages the cost of the substitute goods plus his 
loss of net profit over the period preceded the replacement of the defective goods. 
Where substitute goods are unobtainable, the buyer may have no choice other than 
continuing to use the goods and claiming damages for loss of profit. However, obtaining 
substitute goods may not be a mitigating step in all cases. 41 The buyer may mitigate his 
loss by continuing to use the defective goods for their commercial life. This can be the 
case where the deficiency of the productive capacity is trivial. Where substitute goods 
are unobtainable and the buyer's loss can be mitigated by stopping using the defective 
goods, the buyer may be required to stop using defective goods under the mitigation 
principle. 42 In this case, the buyer would recover for his loss of net profit during the 
period of using the machine plus his loss of gross earnings for the remaining period of 
the commercial life of the machine after subtracting the running expenses which were 
supposed to be incurred if the machine operated as warranted. 
4.1.2.1.3 Loss of Chance of Investing the Annual Earnings 
Turning back to the annual earnings, presumably the buyer would put the annual 
earnings to other profit-making businesses. In this sense, where the productive capacity 
of the goods is deficient, the buyer will be deprived from investing the annual earnings 
that he would have gained if the goods had been free of defect. The court may decide to 
award the buyer interest for the loss of such investment. In the USA such rate is subject 
made his computers unmarketable and, consequently, he suffered loss of profit. It was held that the buyer 
was entitled to recover damages for lost and delayed sales of its computers and for wasted costs. 
41 Where the buyer cannot afford to obtain a substitute machine, the mitigation principle will be unlikely 
to require him to obtain such a substitute. 
42 Supra, p. 298. 
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to local law rules which vary widely from one state to another. 43 However, in cases of 
loss of investment, it does not seem wise to fix a rate of interest for the reason that the 
rate of profit that the buyer lost is normally changeable depending on the circumstances 
of each case. 
Therefore, Biger and Rosen, in their interesting article on the calculation of damages, 44 
suggest a method for the quantification of damages for loss of investing the annual 
earnings. Suppose that the annual loss of earnings, in the aforementioned hypothetical 
example, was [X]. In this case, if the buyer had gained [X] in the first year, he would 
have invested it at the end of the year. In this sense, his damages for such a loss should 
be quantified for the remaining nine years of the commercial life of the plant. 45 Suppose 
that the buyer's profit of investment of [X] was [0.2], his expected net profit gained by 
the investment of [X] for one year would be [X (0.2)]. The outcome would probably be 
invested for the second year. If this becomes the case, his expected net profit after the 
second year would be [X(0.2)(0.2) = X(1+0.2)2]. After the ninth year, the expected net 
profit would be [X(1+0.2)9]. As for X of the second year, the expected net profit should 
be quantified for the remaining 8 years of investment. Such damages would be 
[X(1+0.2)8] for the second year; [X(1+0.2)7] for the third year and so on. In this view, 
the total damages for the loss of chance of investing the annual earnings would be 
quantified as follows 
x(0.2)9 + X(O. 2)8 + X(O. 2)7 +... + X(O. 2) 
Here it should be clear that in this example it is supposed that damages are awarded at 
the end of the commercial life of the plant. However, if damages are claimed at a point 
within the commercial life of the machine, damages for the loss of chance of investment 
would be calculated for the period before the time of award. 
4.1.2.1.4 Delay in Operation of Business 
The delay in operation due to a breach of warranty of quality is indisputably a ground 
for the award of damages. In this case, such damages may include expenses that the 
43 R. R. Anderson, `Incidental and Consequential Damages' (1987) 7 J. L. & Com. 327,432. See also H. S. 
Lee, E. Lee and L. Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 1979 U. S. App. LEXIS 17862; 26 Fed. R. 
Serv. 2d 1086 (2nd Cir. 1979). 
44 See N. Biger and A. S. Rosen, supra n. 39 at p. 312. 
45 Ibid. 
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buyer incurred during the delay period. The head (home) office expenses are normally 
not included in such a recovery since they are normally constant and in no way 
attributable to or affected by the seller's breach. However, this may not be the case 
where the buyer is running a small business and the seller's breach affects the whole 
operation of the business. Here, the head office expenses are likely to be recoverable. 
The main issue arising under this title is concerned with profits gained by putting the 
capital for other profitable uses during the period of delay. 
In order to achieve the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 46 the 
buyer's award should be reduced by the amount of expenses saved due to the delay in 
operation. By ignoring such expenses, the buyer will be put in a better financial position 
than the position he would have been in if the operation of business had not delayed. In 
other words, the buyer will be overcompensated. Moreover, the buyer may decide to free 
his capital in order to be put to another profitable use during the period of delay. If this 
becomes the case, can the seller get credit from profit gained by the use of the capital? 
In other words, should the profit gained by using the capital during the delay period, be 
deducted from the total amount of damages? 
By applying the rule that the buyer should be compensated for losses he suffered in fact, 
the answer to the question should be in the positive. 47 It is plain that ignoring profit 
gained by using the capital in the period of delay, will put the buyer in a better financial 
position than he would have been in if the goods had been free of defect. The answer 
can be based on the mitigation principle. 48 Where the buyer took successful steps to 
mitigate his loss, although he was not required to do so under the mitigation principle, 
the outcome of such steps should be considered for the quantification of damages. 49 In 
this sense, where the buyer gained a profit by putting his capital to other profitable uses 
during the period of delay, although he was not required to do so under the mitigation 
principle, any resulting profit should be deducted from the total amount of damages. 
46 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. l. 
47 See A. G. Guest, Chitty on Contracts, London, Vol. 1,28th ed., 1999, para. 27-096 where it is shown that 
release of resources for other uses is considered in cases of termination of contract. The buyer's damages 
may be reduced by the amount of profit, which is gained by release of resources for other uses. 
48 See F. L. Williamson, `Remedies-Lost Profits as Contract Damages for an Unestablished Business: 
The New Business Rule Becomes Outdated' (1978) 56 N. C. L. Rev. 693,730. 
49 For the mitigation principle, see infra p. 298. 
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Hypothetically, let us suppose that the capital of investment is £1000 and the period of 
delay due to the seller's breach is 2 years. Suppose further that the annual percentage of 
the expected profit during the period of delay is 30% and the annual percentage of the 
profit gained by using the capital for other profitable business during the same period is 
10%. Suppose further that the buyer's claim was for his loss of profit only. Williamson, 
in his interesting article on loss of profits, provides helpful analysis regarding the 
quantification of loss of profit in such a case. 50 Based on the analysis of Williamson, the 
formula of quantifying the buyer's loss of profit in such a case would be 
[(total expected percentage on return on capital - the percentage on actual 
return) x (capital investment)] x number of years of recovery period. 
If the buyer put the whole capital, in the mentioned example, for other profitable uses 
during the period of delay, his loss of profit would be 
[(30% - 10%) x (1000)] x2=£ 400 
Here, it should be noted that the formula applies only to the capital which is invested 
during the delay period. If the buyer invested only part of the capital, his loss of profit 
on the other part should be calculated on the expected percentage of profit. 51 For 
example, suppose that the buyer in the mentioned example invested only £500, his loss 
of profit on this amount would be 
[(30% - 10%) x (500)] x2= £200 
His loss of profit on the rest of the capital would be 
(30%x500)x2=£300 
As such, the total amount of his loss of profit would be [200 + 300 = £500]. In this 
example, the buyer will obtain the same amount whether by the profit of investment plus 
the recoverable damages or by the damages alone if he did not invest. However, the 
so F. L. Williamson, supra n. 48 at p. 731. Similar issue arises in cases of construction contract; where the 
owner's breach cause a delay in the performance of the construction contract, the contractor may lose a 
chance to earn elsewhere on contracting with others. If this becomes the case, the contractor may recover 
for the loss of such a profit. See I. N. Duncan Wallace, Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts, 
London, Vol. 1,11th ed., 1995 at p. 1072. 
51 However, if the buyer put the part, which he did not invest, in a bank, the bank interest should be taken 
into account. 
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buyer in some cases may be required, under the mitigation principle, to put his capital 
for other available uses in order to minimize his loss. 52 
4.1.3 Goodwill and Loss of Prospective Profits 
It is quite normal that a successful business is expected to have a continuity of profitable 
operations. Such expectation is what the concept of goodwill represents. Goodwill, in 
the normal course of circumstances, depends on many factors such as the name of the 
business, its history, the location and its commercial reputation. 53 
Where the goods are defective, the commercial reputation of the buyer's business may 
be affected. The commercial reputation can be represented by the average number of 
customers. If such a number decreases noticeably after the buyer's use of the defective 
goods, the buyer can be entitled to damages for the monetary loss he suffered due to the 
decrease in the demand on his products. 
Under both English and American jurisdictions, the recoverability of damages for loss 
of goodwill seems to be well settled. Denying the recovery for loss of goodwill will be 
in a direct contradiction with the principle of Robinson v. Harman. 54 This is why in 
GKN Centrax Gears Ltd v. Matbro Ltd. 55 Lord Denning M. R. made it clear that the 
principle of Hadley v. Baxendale 56 applies to the loss of repeat orders of customers. His 
Lordship relied on the decision in Aerial Advertising v. Batchelor's Peas57 where the 
plaintiff sent up an airplane advertising Batchelor's Peas. It flew on Armistice day, with 
a streamer bearing the words "Eat Batchelor's Peas". Many of the plaintiff's customers 
were very offended because the two minutes silence of the day was thus disturbed. As a 
result , the plaintiff lost repeat orders from the customers. The plaintiff was 
52 For the mitigation principle, see infra p. 298. 
53 The most famous definition of goodwill was stated by the Court of Appeal of Tennessee in Young v. 
Cooper, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 70; 30 Tenn. App. 55 (1947) "The good will of a business is the 
reasonable expectation of its continued profitable operation. Many factors are involved: the name of the 
firm, its reputation for doing business, the location, the number and character of its customers, the former 
success of the business, and many other elements which would be advantageous in the operation of the 
business. Good will is a property right which may be sold. " 
54 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
ss [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 555. 
56 (1854) 9 Exch. 341. 
57 [1938] 2 All ER 788. 
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subsequently allowed damages for his monetary loss which resulted from the boycott to 
his products. 58 
The position under the UCC is quite identical. The leading UCC case on the 
recoverability of damages for loss of goodwill is Hendricks & Associates, Inc. v. 
Daewoo Corporation59. The facts of this case are, in brief, that the buyer (Hendricks & 
Associates, Inc. ) purchased a quantity of "Stripe Collection" from a Korean company 
(Daewoo) in order to perform a subcontract with Champion, a wholesaler of sporting 
apparel. The buyer ordered the goods to be delivered directly to the sub-buyer. The 
goods appeared defective. Due to the buyer's liability to the sub-buyer, the buyer sued 
the seller for its losses resulting from the seller's breach. Our concern in this case is with 
the buyer's claim for damages for loss of prospective profits from anticipated future 
business with his sub-buyer (Champion). On appeal, after a long discussion of the 
restrictions imposed upon the recovery of such damages, 60 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the award of damages for such loss of profit. This 
case confirms that damages for loss of profit resulting from damage to the buyer's 
commercial reputation can be recovered under the normal restrictions imposed upon the 
recovery of damages. 61 The same conclusion can be reached under the CISG for two 
reasons. Firstly, Article 74 of the Convention awards damages for any loss resulting 
from the breach and meets the restrictions imposed by the Convention. Secondly, 
58 In contrast, see the opinion of Lord Justice Scrutton in Simon v. Pawsons and Leafs [1932] 38 Com. 
Cas. 151,157-8. In this case, under a sale contract, the defendant was obligated to deliver certain dress 
materials to the plaintiff in order to be used in making school uniforms. There was no contract between the 
plaintiff and the convent school, which appointed her to make the uniforms. The materials appeared 
defective. The Court of Appeal upheld the award for defective goods but refused to allow damages for 
loss of appointment and repeat orders. It is obvious in this case that the plaintiff suffered loss of 
reputation. It is unclear how the Court held that such a loss is too remote. 
59 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 269; 13 UCC Serv. 2d 1099 (1991). The first American case, where damages 
for loss of goodwill was awarded, was Enoch C. Swain v. W. H. Schieffelin 1892 N. Y. LEXIS 1539; 134 
N. Y. 471 (1892) where the buyer who was a manufacturer of ice cream purchased materials for colouring 
of the ice cream which appeared defective. Many persons who ate cream made by the buyer, in which the 
said colouring matter had been used, were made sick with symptoms of arsenic poison. The Court of 
Appeal of New York allowed the buyer damages for loss of custom. 
60 The Court found that there was ample evidence that the restrictions of remoteness, mitigation, causation 
and certainty were satisfied. 
61 The recoverability of damages for loss of goodwill was traditionally not admitted in Pennsylvania. See 
R. P. Barbarowicz, `Loss of Goodwill and Business Reputation as recoverable elements of Damages under 
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-715- The Pennsylvania experience' 75 Dick. L. Rev. 63,65. 
Pennsylvania was the last State where damages for loss of goodwill was finally allowed. In Franchise 
Assocs. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1990 Pa. LEXIS 221; 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 11 (1990) the claim for 
damages for loss of goodwill was allowed. See W. H. Henning and G. I. Wallach, The law of Sales under 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 1981, Supplement [1995] at p. 10.05. See also Step-Saver Data Systems, 
Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 1990 U. S. App. LEXIS 14839; 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 343 (1990) where the 
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Article 74 made specific reference to loss of profit in general. In this sense, loss of 
future profits can be recoverable. 
The main obstacle facing the recoverability for loss of goodwill is the proof of such a 
loss. The buyer's pecuniary loss, in respect of damage incurred to the goodwill of the 
buyer's business, is constituted of loss of future profits. One should be well aware of the 
difficulty of ascertaining such a loss. 62 Methods of proof of loss of profit, such as an 
economist's or accountant's testimony, might not be enough to prove such a loss with 
reasonable certainty. These methods are more concerned with profits lost in fact. Future 
profits are more speculative which makes it harder for the buyer to prove their amount 
with reasonable certainty. However, "difficulty of proof should not dispense with 
necessity of proof. "63 
Supposing that the buyer presented tangible data to prove his loss of profit, the obstacle 
of determining the period for which damages should be quantified may arise. 
Theoretically, such a period should be wide enough to give the buyer the opportunity to 
remedy the dissatisfaction of his present and potential customers. Practically, such a 
period is too difficult to determine. The buyer, also, can claim damages for expenses he 
incurred or needs to incur in order to remedy such a dissatisfaction. In certain cases, the 
buyer's loss of goodwill may lead to the shutdown of his business. Such a severe 
consequence is very rare and can hardly be compensated due to the remoteness 
principle. Where the seller supplied defective products which appeared defective and as 
a result the buyer lost goodwill, it seems very hard to prove that it was in the reasonable 
contemplation of the seller, at the time of contracting, that loss of goodwill will cause a 
shutdown of business. However, this consequence can be ample evidence that the buyer 
suffered severe loss of goodwill. As a result, the buyer's damages for loss of goodwill 
may be increased due to such a severe consequence of the breach. 64 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit awarded the buyer the costs incurred in attempts to 
maintain its customers' goodwill. 
62 See Agricultural Services Association v. Ferry-Morse Seed Company and Waldo Rohnert Company, 
1977 U. S. App. LEXIS 14129; 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 443 (1977). 
63 Aerial Advertising v. Batchelor's Peas, [1938] 2 All ER 788,796 per Atkinson, J. 
64 In the UCC case of Lewis River Golf, Inc. v. O. M. Scott & Sons, 1993 Wash. LEXIS 48; 22 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 2d 510 (1993) the Supreme Court of Washington awarded damages for loss of goodwill which 
caused a loss of business. The Court considered the shutdown of business for increasing the buyer's 
damages for loss of goodwill. 
141 
4.2 Certainty Requirement in Cases of Lost Profit 
There are certain cases where the amount of economic loss can be proved with certainty 
such as expenses incurred as a result of breach. In such cases, the buyer is expected to 
show sufficient evidence of the amount of loss. The question becomes one of causation 
more than of certainty. 65 However, this may not be the case with lost profit. The amount 
of lost profit is hard to prove sufficiently certain. This is due to the fact that the 
circumstances of the market, such as fluctuation of prices and number of competitors, 
make it difficult to calculate what the buyer would have gained but for the seller's 
breach. 66 In discussing the requirement of certainty for the recovery of damages, we 
should consider two points, i. e. the fact of loss of profits and the amount of the loss. 
While certainty for the former is very significant, it is not for the latter. 67 In order to be 
allowed his loss of profit as damages, the buyer should show that he has suffered loss of 
profit resulting from breach of warranty of quality. 68 However, the court seems to be 
flexible regarding the certainty of lost profit as to its amount. 
English and American courts seems to have similar attitude regarding the requirement of 
certainty in cases of long established businesses. In this case, the buyer may be required 
to present previous records of profit in order to prove his loss. In addition, the buyer 
may present any evidence of his lost profit. However, American courts seems to have 
different application of the certainty principle in cases of new business. They apply the 
"new business rule" which does not exist under English law. The following will start by 
dealing with the requirement of certainty in general and continue to deal with the 
adequacy of the "new business rule". 
65 In Davies v. Taylor [1974] AC 207 Lord Reid, at p. 213, said "[w]hen the question is or is not true- 
whether a certain thing did or did not happen- then the court must decide one way or the other. There is no 
question of chance or probability. Either it did or it did not happen. But the standard of civil proof is a 
balance of probabilities. If the evidence shows a balance in favour of it having happened, then it is proved 
that it did in fact happen. " 
66 F. L. Williamson, supra n. 48 at p. 697. 
67 K. E. Kober, `A Case for Recovery: Damages for Lost Profits of an Unestablished Business' (1979) 12 
Creighton L. Rev. 1081,1100; See Kissel Co. v. Gressley, 1979 U. S. App. LEXIS 17330; 591 F. 2d 47 
(9th Cir. 1979). 
68 In Ratcliffe v. Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 Bowen LJ, at pp. 532-533, pointed out that "[i]n all actions 
accordingly on the case where the damage actually done is the gist of the action, the character of the acts 
themselves which produce the damage, and the circumstances under which these acts are done, must 
regulate the degree of certainty and particularity with which the damage done ought to be stated and 
proved. As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as 
is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by which the 
damage is done. To insist upon less would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist upon more 
would be the vainest pedantry. " 
142 
4.2.1 Certainty as to Amount 
The English court may not require the amount of loss to be proved sufficiently certain in 
order to entitle the aggrieved party to damages for such a loss. This can be the case 
where mathematical quantification is hard to be achieved such as the case of loss of 
goodwill. Where certainty cannot be achieved by mathematical precision, damages are 
still recoverable under both English and American law. In the leading case of Chaplin v. 
Hicks, 69 Vaughan Williams U stated that "the fact that damages cannot be assessed with 
certainty does not relieve the wrongdoer of the necessity of paying damages. , 70 Indeed, 
damages have been allowed for losses which could only be valued impressionistically. 71 
Here, it is worth noting that courts should not require substantially more information 
than the businessmen commonly use. 72 Requiring a high standard of certainty may make 
the recovery of loss of profit almost impossible. 
The proof of loss of profit with reasonable certainty depends on the nature of the 
business. In most cases, the court allows the buyer to present any evidence, however 
minor, in order to prove his lost profit reasonably certain. However, in certain cases, the 
buyer may be required to show certain kinds of evidence. Established businesses mostly 
have previous records of profit which confer on the buyer a high chance of recovery. 
Previous records of profit can prove the amount of loss of profit with reasonable 
certainty. 73 Even where previous records show that the business was not profitable prior 
to the breach, such records may be of a great help to prove the greater loss resulting 
from the breach. 
Where previous records are available, the buyer may recover damages calculated on the 
basis of the difference between his previous records of profit and the profit he gained by 
74 75 using the defective goods. For example, if the average of the previous records of the 
69 [1911]2R. B786. 
70 Ibid at p. 792. 
71 M. G. Bridge, supra. n. 13 at p. 450. Courts may allow damages for losses which cannot be proved with 
any degree of certainty as to its amount. See S. M. Waddams, `Damages: Assessment of Uncertainties' 
(1998) 13 JCL 55,60. In Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 Vaughan Williams LJ pointed out, at p. 792, 
that "I do not agree with the contention that, if certainty is impossible of attainment, the damages for a 
breach of contract are unassessable. " 
72 Comment, `Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Recovery' (1956) 
65 Yale L. J. 992,1018. 
73 Harvey McGregor, Contract Code, London, 1993, p. 122. 
74 Draft Systems, Inc. v. Rimar Manufacturing, Inc. 1981 U. S. Dis. LEXIS 16779; 32 UCC Rep. Serv. 
1493 (1981). 
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buyer's profit is £1000, the buyer's loss of profit will be calculated as follows. First, 
where the profit decreased to £600 due to the breach, the loss of profit would be [£1000- 
£600 = £400]. Second, where the business suffered a shutdown due to the breach, the 
buyer would probably be entitled to recover the whole profit recorded prior to the use of 
the defective goods, i. e. £1000. 
Here, it should be emphasized that the profit in this context is the net profit. In other 
words, expenses wasted by the breach can be recoverable. Furthermore, where the buyer 
suffered expenses due to the breach, such expenses would be added to his lost profit. 76 
In the hypothetical example mentioned, if the buyer incurred £100 as expenses due to 
the breach, he would, in principle, recover £500 in the first situation77 and £1100 in the 
second situation. 78 
Although the previous records of profit seem to be a tangible method of proving the 
amount of loss of profit with reasonable certainty, one should not deny the fact that loss 
of profit is hard to prove. The buyer finds it difficult to prove his loss of profit with 
reasonable certainty especially where the seller alleges that there were multiple causes 
for the buyer's loss of profit and his breach was not the principal one. This is likely to be 
the case where the profit of the business changes depending on various factors such as 
the economic and political situations of the place where the business is based. In this 
case, the seller will be required to show evidence that his breach was not the paramount 
cause of the buyer's loss of profit. 
Under both English and American law, previous records of profit are not an exclusive 
method to satisfy the certainty requirement. Comment 4 on Section 2-715 of the UCC 
states that "... Loss may be determined in any manner which is reasonable under the 
circumstances. " The buyer may seek to prove his loss of profit by other means such as 
75 The average is considered to make the example clear. However, most of the businesses have special 
period of time in the year (the commercial season) when they can gain more than the other period of the 
same year. In this sense, if the buyer suffered loss of profit at this period, he might present the previous 
records of profit of this period of the past years of his work which will be higher than the average of the 
previous records of his profit. 
76 See the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in the UCC case of El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto- 
Flex Oven Company, 1978 Neb. LEXIS 625; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 342 (1978). The buyer may incur such 
expenses in his successful attempts to mitigate his potential loss of profit. 
7' Calculated as loss of profit in the first situation [400] plus the expenses incurred due to the breach 
[ 100]. 
78 Calculated as loss of profit in the first situation [1000] plus the expenses incurred due to the breach 
[ 100]. 
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expert testimony, market survey, evidence of the buyer's subsequent experience, 
evidence of the buyer's profits from similar business in other areas and records of profit 
of other similar business. Moreover, the buyer may seek to prove that the profit which 
he would have earned, but for the breach, exceeds the previous records of profit. This is 
to be expected where the buyer makes some modifications to his business which would 
have made his business more profitable but for the seller's breach. It is well known that 
the new businesses may face a difficult financial situation in the first few years while 
they are building up their commercial reputation. In this sense, the profit grows by the 
increase in the number of customers. If this becomes the case the profit of such 
businesses is likely to be greater than the profit earned by the same businesses in 
previous months or years. 79 Therefore, in such kinds of business, buyers may seek to 
prove their loss of profits by means other than the previous records of profits. 80 
In cases where the operation of a new business is delayed due to the seller's breach, the 
buyer may seek to prove his lost profit by presenting records of profit following the 
period of delay. 8' In principle, where the buyer could not start his business due to 
defective goods delivered by the seller, the buyer should be entitled to recover for his 
loss of profit resulting from the seller's breach. However, the proof of the amount of 
loss of profit with reasonable certainty is difficult. 82 As previously mentioned, 
businesses face difficult financial situations in the first period of their operations. In this 
view, it would be harsh for the buyer to prove that his business would have earned a 
profit but for the seller's breach. Nevertheless, where the buyer manages to show 
evidence that he suffered a loss of profit resulting from breach of warranty, it will 
become the duty of the court to quantify that loss according to the circumstances of the 
case. 
79 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 43 at p. 406 
80 In certain cases, extra expenses caused by the breach can be seen as part of the loss of profit. So the 
court may not award the buyer for such expenses and loss of profit jointly. For example, in the UCC case 
of El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Company 1978 Neb. LEXIS 625; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 342 
(1978) damages for loss of profit were awarded in the form of award for the increase of labour's cost. The 
facts of this case are simply that the seller delivered a defective pizza oven. The labour's expenses 
increased by 7% since the buyer had to hire additional employees to make up for the insufficiency of 
pizzas caused by the defective oven. The Court awarded the buyer such extra expenses. 
81 K. E. Kober, supra n. 67 at p. 1100. 
82 In Robert W. O'Brien et al. v. Floyd Larson et al., 11 Wash. App. 52 at p. 99 it was held that lost profits 
proved with reasonable certainty are recoverable but prospective profits from a future business, whose 
costs are unknown, are too remote and speculative to be recoverable. 
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As for the CISG, Article 74 provides that damages consist of a sum equal to the loss. To 
determine the amount of damages, here, the buyer has to prove his loss of profit with 
reasonable certainty. Although it is well settled that the judge should be convinced by 
evidence that the buyer's lost profit is certain, the required degree of certainty as to the 
amount of lost profit is not stated by the Convention. 83 Theoretically, judges or 
arbitrators are unlikely to adopt a single standard of proof. 84 Practically, the degree of 
certainty as to amount is likely to be that degree required by the court, which has the 
jurisdiction, under the domestic law or that degree required by the domestic law that the 
arbitrator is most familiar with. Furthermore, Article 74 of the Convention may apply 
clearly to those pecuniary losses which can be mathematically measured. The words of 
the Article, however, make it difficult to tell how damages can be quantified in case of 
non-pecuniary losses and whether or not such damages can be recoverable under the 
Convention. 85 
4.2.2 The "New Business Rule" under American Law 
The American courts, historically, used to be strict in the application of the requirement 
of certainty as to amount. This has resulted in the reluctance of the court to award for 
the loss of profit in general on the ground that the amount of loss of profit is hard to 
prove with reasonable certainty since the expected profit is normally too remote, 
speculative and uncertain. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the law in the US 
slightly changed to establish an exception to this rule. In the leading American case of 
Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 86 the United States Federal Court for the Eighth 
Circuit stated that 
"the loss of profit from the destruction or interruption of an established business 
may be recovered where the plaintiff makes it reasonably certain by competent 
proof what the amount of his loss actually was... The interest upon his capital 
and the expenses of his business deducted from its income for a few months or 
years prior to the interruption produced the customary or yearly net profits of the 
business during that time, and form a rational bases from which the jury may 
lawfully infer what these profits would have been during the interruption if it had 
not been inflicted. "87 
83 See Peter Schlechtriem, supra n. 7 at p. 563. 
84 J. M. Lookofsky, `Remedies for Breach of Contract' in L. Knapp, Commercial Damages: A Guide to 
Remedies in Business Litigation, 1986, Chapter 43, p. 49. 
85 Infra, p. 180. 
86 111 F. 96 (8th Cir. 1901). 
87 Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96 at p. 99 (8th Cir. 1901). 
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The development in American law regarding this point resulted in a complete 
abandonment of such a strict requirement of certainty as to the amount of loss of profit. 
The amount of lost profit is not required to be proved with mathematical precision. 88 it 
is sufficient to prove such an amount with reasonable certainty. Comment 4 to Section 
2-715 of the UCC states: 
"The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of consequential 
damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal administration of remedies 
rejects any doctrine of certainty which requires almost mathematical precision in 
the proof of loss... " 
Where the buyer manages to prove his loss of profit with reasonable certainty, it will be 
sufficient for him to prove its amount reasonably certain. 89 In Central Coal & Coke Co. 
the Court stated that ".... He who is prevented from embarking a new business can 
recover no profits, because there are no provable data of past business from which the 
fact that anticipated profits would have been realized can be legally deduced. "90 In this 
case, the Court formulated the so-called "new business rule" under American law. The 
rule was made on the ground that records of profit that the business earns over the first 
period of its actual operation is unlikely to be sufficient enough to prove the amount of 
the loss of profit with reasonable certainty. This is due to the fact that the profit of the 
business in such a starting period of operation is, in the normal course of circumstances, 
changeable. 91 This rule does not apply to established business which has been in actual 
operation long enough to give it permanency and recognition. 92 
It should be clear that the American "new business rule" is an evidential matter. It is not 
a rule of law. 93 The distinction between established and new businesses is a matter of 
evidence only. 94 Therefore, in cases of new businesses where the buyer shows that the 
88 In Lexington Products, Ltd. v. B. D. Communications, Inc., 1982 U. S. App. LEXIS 19828; 677 F. 2d 251 
(1982) the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when it is certain that damages 
have been caused by a breach of contract, and the only uncertainty is as to their amount, there can rarely 
be any good reason for refusing on account of such uncertainty, any damages whatever for the breach. 
89 Denis Tallon, `Damages, Exemption Clauses, and Penalties' (1992) 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 675,678. 
90 Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96 at p. 99 (8th Cir. 1901). See M. D. Weisman and B. T. 
Clements, `Protecting Reasonable Expectations: Proof of Lost Profits for New Businesses' (1991) 17 
Mass. L. Rev. 186,188. 
91 In contrast, see Vogue v. Shopping Centers, Inc., 1978 Mich. LEXIS 398; 402 Mich. 546 (1978) where 
the Michigan Supreme Court considered the history of profit as a sufficient evidence to make the loss of 
profit reasonably proved. 
92 Atomic Fuel Extraction Corp. v. Estate of Slick, 1964 Tex. App. LEXIS 2859; 386 S. W. 2d 180 (1964). 
93 K. E. Kober, supra n. 67 at pp. 1090-1. 
94 See Systems Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1973 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 11732; 60 F. R. D. 692 (1973). 
See also William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 1948 U. S. App. LEXIS 4028; 164 F. 2d 1021 
(1948). 
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business had important orders or it was operating in an area of scarce supply, the "new 
business rule" should not apply. 95 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Alabama made it clear 
that the Court should focus on whether the plaintiff produced ample evidence instead of 
applying artificial categorization of new and old businesses. 96 
However, one may note that the "new business rule" is still strictly applicable by some 
courts. For example, in Mehta v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 97 damages for loss of 
profit were not allowed on the ground that the business was not in operation for a 
sufficient period of time. It seems difficult to understand why previous records are 
required where the buyer can prove his loss of profit by other means. Disallowing 
damages for loss of profit on the grounds that the business is new is in direct contrast 
with the purpose of awarding compensatory damages. In such a case, the buyer will be 
undercompensated by disallowing him damages for losses which he can manage to 
prove with reasonable certainty. 
Furthermore, comment 2 to Section 2-708 of the UCC provides expressly that previous 
records of profit are not the only method of proof of loss of profit. 98 In this sense, where 
the buyer presents a sufficient evidence of his loss of profit, other than previous records 
of profit, such a loss is likely to be recoverable. 99 The seller may also seek to prove that 
there is no connection between the previous records of profit of the seller's business and 
9s See For Children, Inc. v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 1972 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 10507; 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 1176 (1972). 
96 Super Yalu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson, 1987 Ala. LEXIS 4225; 506 So. 2d 317 (1987). In this case, the 
Alabama Supreme Court held that "the weight of modern authority does not predicate recovery of lost 
profits upon the artificial categorization of a business as "unestablished, " "existing, " or "new" particularly 
where the defendant itself has wrongfully prevented the business from coming into existence and 
generating a track record of profits. Instead, the courts focus on whether the plaintiff has adduced 
evidence that provides a basis from which the jury could with "reasonable certainty" calculate the amount 
of lost profits... ". 
97 1991 N. Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7243; 556 N. Y. S. 2d 601 (1991). In this case it was held that "in order to 
recover lost profits, a business must have been established and in operation for a definite period of time 
and calculations based on other similar businesses are too speculative and will not satisfy the reasonable 
means of calculating damages and lost profit. " 
98 Section 2-708 provides "(1)... the measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is 
the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price 
together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in 
consequence of the buyer's breach. (2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate 
to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of damages is the 
profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by the 
buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for 
costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale. " Comment 2 on the Section 
provides that "It is not necessary to a recovery of profit to show a history of earnings, especially if a new 
venture is involved. " 
99 F. L. Williamson, supra n. 48 at pp. 699-700. 
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the loss of profit caused by the breach. 10° For example, where an established business, 
with previous records of profits, moved to a new place or changed its brand name or 
moved into a new products line, the seller might allege that there is no connection 
between the profit of this business in its new place and its previous records of profit. 101 
The place may affect the profit positively or negatively depending on the circumstances 
of each case. The same applies where a well known business expands to have a new 
branch in a new area. 102 The new branch should be considered as a new business. The 
previous records of profit of the business are unlikely to establish sufficient evidence of 
the loss of profit on the new branch. 103 But this should not be the case where the buyer 
adds a new line of production to increase the capacity of his factory. The history of 
profits of the buyer's factory should be a sufficient proof of his loss of profit. 104 
To sum up, although there seems to be a tendency towards relaxing the "new business 
rule", the rule is still influential in the American courts. It seems strange to decide that 
the business has not suffered loss of profit for the reason that it has no previous records 
of profit. The buyer should be allowed to prove his loss of profit by any available 
means. Therefore, it can be noted that English law deals better with the requirement of 
certainty. 
4.3 Recoverability of Expenses Wasted or Caused by the Breach 
In cases of breach of contract, the aggrieved party normally seeks to recover for loss of 
his expectation interest. However, in certain cases, the buyer may not be able to prove 
his loss of profit. In such cases, the buyer may seek to recover expenses incurred in 
reliance on the contract. In cases of retained defective goods, this can be the case where 
the goods appeared worthless due to their defect and the buyer did not suffer or cannot 
prove his loss of profit with reasonable certainty. In such a case, the buyer may seek to 
recover the capital expenses incurred in reliance on the contract. Furthermore, the buyer 
may also seek to recover extra expenses caused by the breach. 
ioo I. Wallach, `the Buyer's Right to Monetary Damages' (1982) 14 UCCL. I 236,265. 
101 E. J. Wittenberg, `the State of Lost Profits Damages and Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in 
Pennsylvania' (1986) 6 J. L. & Com. 531,539. 
102 See K. E. Kober, supra n. 67 at p. 1085. 
103 This is not an absolute rule. The buyer may seek to prove that the new branch has a similar situation to 
the other branch(s). 
104 K. E. Kober, supra n. 67 at p. 1092. 
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4.3.1 Recoverability of Expenses Wasted by the Breach 
Two main points should be considered in a buyer's claim to recover, as damages, 
expenses wasted by the breach of contract. Firstly, where such expenses exceed the 
buyer's loss of gross earnings, will the buyer be entitled to recover such expenses? This 
can be the case where the buyer makes a bad bargain. Secondly, where the buyer incurs 
expenses, for the purpose of performance of the contract, before the time of making the 
contract, can he recover such expenses, as damages, in a contract action? To my 
knowledge, there are no cases of breach of warranty of quality dealing with such 
questions. Therefore, one needs to examine other cases of contract law in order to find 
the answers to such questions. 
4.3.1.1 The Position in English Law 
Under English law, the answer to the first question can be found in C&P Haulage v. 
Middleton, los where the Court of Appeal stated that the aggrieved party cannot be put in 
a better financial position than he would have been in if the contract had been performed 
properly. In this case, the Court decided that the plaintiff had made a bad bargain, as the 
expenses would not have been recoverable had the contract been performed. Haulage 
was referred to in CCC Films (London) Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd. 106 where 
Hutchison J. made it clear that "a claim for wasted expenditure cannot succeed in a case 
where, even had the contract not been broken by the defendant, the returns earned by the 
plaintiff's exploitation of the chattel or the rights the subject matter of the contract 
would not have been sufficient to recoup that expenditure. "107 It is obvious that the onus 
is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff would not have been able to recover the 
expenses even if the contract had been properly performed. 
105 [1983] 3 All ER 94. In this case, the plaintiffs sought to maintain a claim for the cost of work to 
premises from which he was later unlawfully evicted. The evidence established that the plaintiff was 
actually better off as a result of being evicted than he would have been had he been permitted to remain 
until the time when he could lawfully have been required to leave. It was held, at p. 99, that "It is not the 
function of the Courts where there is a breach of contract knowingly, as this would be the case, to put the 
plaintiff in a better financial position that if the contract had been properly performed. " 
106 [1985] 1 QB 16. In this case, the plaintiffs purchased from the defendants for $12,000 a license to 
exploit, distribute and exhibit three motion pictures. The defendants delivered taped recordings of the 
pictures, without which the license could not be used effectively. The tapes were handed back to the 
defendants in order to be sent to Munich. The defendants were required to arrange insurance and to send 
the tapes via recorded mail. The tapes were lost and the defendants were found in breach of the delivery 
contract and other subsequent contracts of delivery of replacements. The defendants did not show 
sufficient evidence that the plaintiffs would not have succeeded to recover their expenses had the tapes 
been delivered to them. The defendants were found in breach of the delivery contract and the other 
subsequent contracts. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover $12,000. 
107 Ibid at p. 32. 
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In the aforementioned case of CCC Films, 108 the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, as 
damages, pre-contract expenses on the grounds that the loss of such expenses was 
foreseeable by the parties at the time of making the contract. 109 This leads to the 
question of whether pre-contract expenses are recoverable. In answering this question, 
English law seems to differ from American law. Under English law, the aggrieved party 
may recover pre-contract expenditure under the normal restrictions imposed upon the 
recovery of damages. This was held in Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed. 11 ° In this case, 
Lord Denning MR said 
"If the plaintiff claims the wasted expenditure, he is not limited to the 
expenditures incurred after the contract was concluded. He can also claim the 
expenditure incurred before the contract, provided that it was such as would 
reasonably be in the contemplation of the parties as likely to be wasted if the 
contract was broken.... This decision is in accord with the correct principle, 
namely, that wasted expenditures can be recovered when it is wasted by reason 
of the defendant's breach of contract. It is true that, if the defendant had never 
entered into the contract, he would not be liable and the expenditure would have 
been incurred by the plaintiff without redress but the defendant, having made his 
contract and broken it, it does not lie in his mouth to say he is not liable, when it 
was because of his breach that the expenditure was wasted. "111 
Prior to the decision in Anglia, the general rule was that pre-contract expenses are not 
recoverable as damages. Exceptionally, conveyancing expenses incurred before the time 
of making the contract were allowed, as damages, before the decision in Anglia. 112 The 
exception was extended in Lloyd v. Stanbury113 to allow the recovery of non- 
conveyancing expenditure which was required by the contract and made in anticipation 
of it. Ogus argues that in case of Lloyd there was no authority for the award of 
expenditure, incurred before the time of contracting, of performing an act required to be 
done by the contract. Anyhow, the exception was not widened enough to cover cases 
other than sale of land till the decision in Anglia. 
108 CCC Films (London) Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd [1985] 1 QB 16. 
109 Ibid at p. 40. 
110 [1972] 1 QB 60. 
111 Ibid at p. 64. The case was referred to in CCC Films (London) Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd 
[1985] 1 QB 16. 
112 See Wallington v. Townsend [1939] 1 Ch. 588. 
113 [1971] 1 WLR. 535. The pre-contract expenditure claimed in this case was for the transportation and 
installation of a caravan on the site of the intended purchase before the time of making the contract. It was 
a term in the contract which required the plaintiff to provide such a caravan. 
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Clearly, pre-contract expenses are not part of the reliance interest. The party incurs such 
expenses in anticipation of making a contract and not in reliance on a contract. In 
Perestrello and Companhia Limitada v. United Paint Co. Ltd. 114 it was held that it is 
possible for the injured party to seek to recover his wasted expenses in order to be put in 
the position he would have been in if the contract had never been made; however, such 
expenses should not include expenses incurred before the time of making the contract. 
Most likely, in this case, pre-contract expenses were disallowed on the ground that they 
were consistent neither with expectation interest nor with reliance interest damages and 
therefore only nominal damages were recovered. 
Ogus, in his comment on Anglia, concluded that "the award in [Anglia] is unsatisfactory 
in that it is consistent neither with reliance interest compensation nor with expectation 
interest compensation but reveals an unhappy confusion between the two. 115 
Furthermore, Grinlinton argues that the award of such expenses represents a confusion 
between reliance interest and expectation interest damages. "116 Here, it should be noted 
that the terms `reliance interest' and `expectation interest' were first introduced by 
Fuller and Perdue in their interesting article on the reliance interest in contract damages, 
as explained at the beginning of this thesis. ' 17 However, there is nothing to suggest that 
a party cannot recover for a loss because such a recovery is inconsistent with the 
reliance interest compensation or the expectation interest compensation. McLauchlan 
makes it clear that "these terms [expectation and reliance interests] are merely aids to 
analysis, useful tools for determining the sorts of losses for which a plaintiff can 
normally recover in an action for breach of contract. There are certainly not overriding 
rules of law. " 118 It is submitted that damages for wasted pre-contract expenses should 
always be recoverable under the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of 
damages. 
114 The Times, 16 April 1969. Cited in D. W. McLauchlan, `Damages for Pre-Contract Expenditure' (1985) 
11 N. Z. U. L. Rev. 346,348. 
115 A. I. Ogus, `Damages for Pre-Contract Expenditure' (1972) 35 MLR 423,426. The decision in Anglia 
Television Ltd. v. Reed, [1972] 1 QB 60 was also criticized in A. G. Keesing, `Pre-Contract Expenses - 
An Equitable Decision? ' (1983) 9 N. Z. Recent L. Rev. 296. 
116 David P. Grinlinton, `Damages for Wasted Expenditure in Contracts for the Sale of Land' (1984) 5 
Auckland U. L. R. 37,51. 
117 L. L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 
52. See supra, p. 4. 
118 DW McLauchlan, supra n. 114 at p. 355. 
152 
In Perestrello and Companhia Limitada v. United Paint Co. Ltd., 119 it was suggested 
that if at the eleventh hour the defendants had refused to conclude a binding contract, 
the plaintiffs would have had to bear the pre-contract expenses themselves. It is 
absolutely true that in cases where the defendant refuses to conclude a binding contract, 
the only action available to the injured party would be in restitution. It is unlikely that 
such an action will be helpful since restitution requires that a benefit is conferred on the 
other party. Certainly, the party who incurs such expenses will carry the risk of wasting 
them in cases where the contract is not concluded. However, this should not be the case 
after the conclusion of the contract. After the conclusion of the contract, the expenses 
may be wasted as a result of the breach of contract. Such expenses may be rendered 
futile if the contract is broken. 
Corbin finds that pre-contract expenses should be irrecoverable on the ground that "they 
are caused neither by the breach of the contract nor by its making. "12D However, one 
may find that such expenses were wasted by the breach. If there was no breach, such 
expenses would not be wasted. Surprisingly, Ogus suggests that there is "no causal 
connection between the loss (the wasted expenses) and either the making of the contract 
and its breach. , 5121 It is clear enough that the pre-contract expenses can be wasted as a 
result of the breach. It seems unclear how Ogus does not see such a causal link. Plus, 
Ogus suggests that pre-contract expenses may be recoverable in cases where they were 
incurred after the parties had reached a substantial agreement, i. e. within the period 
between the substantial agreement and the formal contract. 122 Here, one finds it difficult 
to understand how Ogus can find the causal link between the breach and the loss, i. e. the 
wasted pre-contract expenses, in cases where substantial agreement was reached and 
cannot find such a causal link in other cases. 
Personally, I cannot find a sufficient reason to deal with loss of pre-contract expenses 
differently. Such a loss is a kind of consequential loss. It results from the breach of 
contract. Therefore, if it was in the reasonable contemplation of the defendant, at the 
time of making the contract, that it is not unlikely to be wasted as a result of the breach, 
one may wonder why such expenses should not be recoverable. If such a loss is too 
119 The Times, 16 April 1969. 
120 A. L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 5,1964. 
121 A. I. Ogus, supra n. 115 at p. 425. 
122 Ibid, p. 425. 
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remote, it will not be recovered as damages due to the application of the remoteness 
principle. 
Furthermore, in cases where the plaintiff can prove that he suffered loss of profit, he 
may be allowed his loss of gross earnings [the buyer's expectations] minus the value he 
retains. As previously mentioned, 123 gross earnings are comprised of the net profit and 
the capital expenses. Pre-contract expenses are practically part of the capital expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff. There is no question about the recoverability of such expenses 
where they constitute part of the buyer's expectations. So, why should the recoverability 
be in question where the plaintiff seeks to recover the expenses he incurred? 
4.3.1.2 The Position in American Law 
As regards the first question, which is concerned with the recoverability of expenses that 
exceed the buyer's expectations, American law seems to have the same answer that can 
be found under English law. In L Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co. 124 where the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made it clear that damages should 
be reduced by the amount that the plaintiff would have lost if the contract had been fully 
performed. 
However, American law seems to deal with the second question differently. Under all 
American jurisdictions, the recovery of pre-contract expenses is generally unavailable. 
However, in one American case, pre-contract expenses were exceptionally awarded for 
the reason that the contract was for an extension of a previous contract. This was the 
case of French v. Nabob Silver-Lead Co. 125 The case involved a dispute concerning a 
mining lease contract. The plaintiff had sought to obtain a two-year extension of the 
lease. The defendant informed the plaintiff that he would be unable to continue to 
provide compressed air for use in mining operations on the lease during any extension 
period. The plaintiff made an arrangement with another company for an alternative 
compressed airline. It is clear that the parties had reached a substantial agreement before 
the expenses where incurred in obtaining the alternative compressed airline and before 
concluding the formal contract of the lease extension. Later, the defendant breached the 
123 Supra, p. 92-3. 
124 1949 U. S. App. LEXIS 2500; 178 F 2d 182 (1949). Cited in C&P Haulage v. Middleton, [1983] 3 
All ER 94,98. 
125 350 P. 2d 206 (1960). 
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contract and the defendant sought to recover the wasted expenses including the pre- 
contract expenses. The Idaho Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff all the expenses 
wasted by the breach including his pre-contract expenses. The decision in this case 
seems to support the view of Ogus mentioned above. 
However, the case of French does not represent the general attitude of the American 
courts. In most cases, the courts were reluctant to allow the pre-contract expenses on the 
ground that they were not incurred in reliance on the contract. 126 Most likely, French's 
case was decided differently due to its special facts. The contract was an extension of 
previous contract which had the same subject-matter. In another case, pre-contract 
expenses were not allowed although they were incurred after the general agreement was 
reached and before the final contract was signed. 127 The general rule under American 
law regarding pre-contract expenses is summarized as follows: 
"For expenditures incurred before the actual making of the contract, a defendant 
is not liable unless he is affirmatively shown to have assumed responsibility for 
them. The action is based upon the contract and can include only losses sustained 
as a consequence of it. The rule applies even if the expenditure were incurred 
directly for the purpose for which the plaintiff made the contract ...... 
128 
[Emphasis added] 
A comparison between English law and American law shows that the latter is less 
favourable for the plaintiff. As previously mentioned, pre-contract expenses comprise 
part of the buyer's gross earnings [the buyer's expectations]. As the buyer's lost 
expectations can be recovered under the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of 
damages, there seems no point to prevent the recovery of pre-contract in cases where 
they are claimed alone. The approach of the American courts regarding this issue is in 
direct contradiction with the objective of damages. Under the UCC, damages must be 
awarded for the actual losses suffered by the buyer as a result of the seller's breach. In 
126 See Hough v. Jay-Dee Realty and Investment Inc. 1966 Mo. App. LEXIS 681; 401 S. W. 2d 545 (1966) 
where the defendant breached its contract to construct and then lease to the plaintiff a restaurant building. 
It was held that expenses incurred within the period of negotiations are irrecoverable since they were not 
referable to the contract or its breach. See also Gruber v. S-MNews Co. 1954 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 2498; 126 
F. Supp. 442 (1954); Gordon v. Pfab, 1976 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1247; 246 N. W. 2d 283 (1976); Norton & 
Lamphere Construction Co. v. Blow & Cote, Inc. 1962 Vt. LEXIS 210; 183 A. 2d 230 (1962). In the last 
case, the pre-contract expenses were disallowed on the ground that they were not known to the defendant 
(a buyer of crushed rock) at the time of making the contract. The pre-contract expenses were not 
disallowed on the ground that they do not refer to the contract or its breach. See G. S. Crespi, `Recovering 
Pre-contractual Expenses as an Element of Reliance Damages' (1995) 49 South Methodist University Law 
Review 43,61. 
127 Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey 1932 Ill. App. LEXIS 805; 265 111. App. 542 (1932). 
128 17 A. L. R. 2d at 1314; cited in D. W. McLauchlan, supra n. 114 at n. 25. 
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view of that, it can be noted that English law is better than American law regarding the 
recoverability of pre-contract expenses. 
4.3.2 Expenses Caused by the Breach 
The buyer may incur extra expenses due to the seller's breach of warranty of quality 
such as fines, costs of litigation, costs of examination, extra labour expenses and cost of 
cure. The recoverability of some of these expenses has been previously examined . 
129 
The buyer may also save expenses which would have been incurred if the goods had 
been free of defects. For the latter, it is previously stated that such expenses should be 
deducted from the total recoverable damages where the manufacturer buyer saved 
expenses due to the deficiency of the productive capacity of the delivered goods. '30 
As regards examination costs, under English law, such cost of inspection is likely to be 
considered as cost of litigation. However, under the UCC, the examination costs can be 
recovered as damages. Section 2-513 of the UCC states that inspection expenses "must 
be borne by the buyer but may be recovered from the seller if the goods do not conform 
and are rejected". The word for word reading of this section suggests that the buyer will 
not be able to recover such expenses unless he rejects the goods. It is still debatable 
whether or not the buyer can recover expenses incurred on special inspection required to 
examine the defective goods after the acceptance. 
To avoid this confusion, it is best to distinguish between two types of inspection: first, 
inspection which occurs prior to the rejection or acceptance of the goods. Expenses 
incurred on such an inspection would be considered as incidental loss if the buyer 
rejected the goods. However, if the buyer, despite the fact that the goods are defective, 
decided to accept the goods, he would not be able to recover such expenses since 
awarding such damages contradicts Section 2-513 of the UCC. Second, inspection 
which occurs after the acceptance of the goods. This inspection normally occurs to 
examine goods discovered defective after the acceptance in order to find out what part 
of the goods is defective. The costs of the second type of inspection in cases of breach of 
warranty of quality should be recoverable whereas costs of the first type should not. The 
second type of inspection is not within the words of Section 2-513 of the UCC since the 
129 For the cost of cure, see supra 75. 
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Section is implicitly concerned with inspections occurring prior to the time of 
acceptance or rejection of the goods. In the UCC case of Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L. D. 
Schreiber Cheese Co. ' 31 the Court awarded the expenses incurred on the inspection of 
ten million pounds of cheese. In this case, the buyer inspected the goods in order to find 
out which of the cheese was contaminated. 
In fact, it is better to deal with such costs as litigation costs in order to encourage the 
parties to set for settlement. Under English law, if one party refuses to set for settlement, 
he will not be able to recover the cost of litigation and as a result he will not be able to 
recover the cost of examination. Such cost of examination is incurred after the buyer 
discovers the seller's breach. The examination is carried out for the purpose of the 
buyer's claim against the seller. Therefore, it is more realistic to deal with them as cost 
of litigation. 
Other expenses, such as fines paid due to the defective quality of goods, may be 
recoverable in principle. Where it was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at 
the time of making the contract, that it is unlikely that the buyer will be prosecuted if the 
seller delivers defective quality goods, the buyer could recover, as damages, fines paid 
and expenses incurred in defending prosecution provided that the concept of mens rea 
did not arise. However, where it is shown that there was on the part of the person a 
degree of mens rea, the buyer will not be able to recover the fine paid or expenses 
incurred in defending the prosecution. 132 Where the prosecution failed and the buyer 
was not fined, he may be entitled to recover the expenses incurred in defending the 
prosecution as damages from the seller. '33 
As for cost of litigation, the general rule under English law seems to allow the buyer 
what he spent in successfully suing the seller including the lawyer's fees. However, the 
position under American law is different. The general rule in the USA is that the buyer 
can only recover the attorney's fees, in an action for breach of contract, only if there is 
130 See loss of use, supra p. 128.. 
131 1971 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 13606; 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 407 (1971). 
132 Osman v. J. Ralph Moss, [ 1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 313. The recovery of the fine from the defendant was 
not clear before this case, especially where the concept of mens rea does not come into picture. On this 
point, see the following cases Crage v. Fry [1903] 67 J. P. 240, Cointat v. Myham [1913] 2 KB 220, 
Leslie v. Reliable Advertising Agency [1915] 1 KB 625. 
133 Harvey McGregor, supra n. 27 at p. 599. 
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an express term in the contract or where a statute authorizes such a recovery. 134 
However, several States do not apply this rule and do authorize the recovery of such fees 
as damages for breach of contract. In addition, a number of consumer protection statutes 
authorize such a recovery. 135 It seems that the buyer would be undercompensated by not 
entitling him to recover what he spent as attorney's fees. 
Conclusions 
Due to the failure to distinguish between net profit and gross earnings, the court may fail 
to achieve the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 136 by placing the 
buyer in a better or less favourable financial position than the position he would have 
been in if the goods had been delivered as warranted. In other words, the failure to 
distinguish between net profit and gross earnings may overcompensate or 
undercompensate the buyer. The classification stated in Cullinane v. British "Rema " 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 137 should only apply where the buyer seeks to recover his lost 
gross earnings and the capital expenses wasted by the seller's breach. Indeed, the buyer 
can either claim his lost gross earnings or the capital expenses since the latter is part of 
gross earnings. However, in principle, the buyer may be entitled to recover his lost net 
profit and the capital expenses. In fact, the buyer's expectations are comprised of the 
capital expenses and the net profit. If the goods delivered are valueless, the buyer may 
be entitled to all his expectations. By doing so, the buyer will be put in the same 
position he would have been in had the goods been delivered as warranted. In other 
words, the award will comply with the principle of Robinson. In Cullinane the court 
failed to achieve the objective of damages stated in Robinson. The Court in Cullinane 
held that the buyer may claim either his capital expenses or his loss of profit. It is 
submitted that the rule of Cullinane can only apply where the buyer claims his lost gross 
earnings and capital expenses. 
In cases of profit making goods, the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, can be 
achieved by allowing the buyer damages calculated on the basis of the difference 
between the actual net profit that the buyer has gained and the net profit that the buyer 
134 G. I. Wallach, supra n. 100 at p. 276. 
135 Ibid at n. 120 where examples of such statutes are cited. 
136 (1848) 1 Exch 850. 
137 [1954] 1 QB 292. 
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would have gained if the goods had been delivered as warranted. Net profit in such a 
case can be quantified under the following formula: 
(the total earning of the goods during their commercial life + the residual value 
of the goods at the end of their commercial life) less the contract price of the 
plant and any further expenses incurred in reliance on the contract. 
Moreover, the principle of Robinson cannot be properly applied in cases of profit- 
making goods without considering the buyer's loss of the chance of investing the annual 
earnings that he would have obtained but for the seller's breach. This work provided a 
way of quantifying the buyer's damages for such a loss of chance. Where the defective 
goods cause a delay in operation of the buyer's business and the buyer, as a result, 
releases his capital for other profitable use, the following formula may apply. 
{[(total expected percentage on return on capital - the percentage on actual 
return) x (capital investment)] x number of years of recovery period. } 
Nevertheless, allowing the buyer damages under the principle of Robinson may 
overcompensate him in cases where the buyer has mitigated his loss. Therefore, the 
buyer may not recover damages under the mentioned formula where he has mitigated, or 
could have mitigated, his loss by obtaining substitute goods or repairing the goods. In 
such a case, the buyer's damages will be calculated on the basis of the cost of 
replacement or repair as explained in the previous chapter. The court should ensure that 
the buyer will not be overcompensated by applying the principle of Robinson. Where the 
buyer stopped using such goods in order to mitigate his loss, he would recover for the 
loss of net profit during the period of using the machine. Plus, he would be entitled to 
recover for his loss of gross earnings for the remaining period of the commercial life of 
the machine after subtracting the running expenses which were supposed to be incurred 
if the machine operated as warranted. The application of the mitigation principle 
depends on the circumstances of each case. For example, where the deficiency in the 
productive capacity is trivial, the buyer may mitigate his loss by continuing to use the 
defective goods. 
Loss of profit can generally be suffered through loss on resale, loss of use and loss of 
goodwill. Loss of profit on resale can normally be quantified as the difference between 
the resale price and the contract price. This formula can apply only where it is 
159 
unreasonable to enforce subcontract by delivering the goods in question or where the 
sub-buyer rejects them due to their defect. As regards the buyer's commercial 
reputation, loss of profit resulting from the damaged commercial reputation are 
recoverable under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG. Indeed, the objective of damages 
cannot be achieved if such a loss is ignored. Commercial reputation can be represented 
by the average number of customers. The difficulties of proof and quantification may 
face the buyer's claim for damages for loss of commercial reputation. The period for 
which such damages are assessed should be long enough to give the buyer the 
opportunity to remedy the dissatisfaction of his present and potential customers. The 
buyer may also claim the cost of remedying such dissatisfaction. 
The methods of quantifying damages developed in this chapter should apply similarly 
under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG. The buyer's damages should not exceed his 
actual loss. The methods of quantification of damages developed in this chapter are 
concerned with the principle of Robinson taking into account the normal restrictions 
imposed on the recovery of damages, i. e. causation, remoteness, mitigation and 
certainty. The principle of certainty is mostly concerned with loss of profit. In general, it 
is the duty of the buyer to prove the loss of profit with reasonable certainty. Whereas the 
uncertainty of the fact of loss of profit is fatal, it is not as to the amount of loss of profit. 
Difficulty of quantification of loss should not dispense with its recoverability. 
American law, in comparison with English law, seems to have a strict application of the 
principle of certainty. The "new business rule" is applied in order to disallow damages 
for loss of profit in cases of new business. However, it was argued that such a rule 
should be considered as a rule of evidence which should be displaced where the buyer 
can prove his loss of profit. It has been seen how the strict application of such a rule has 
lead in some cases to unfair results. It is clear that English law seems to have a better 
application of the principle of certainty. The "new business rule" does not exist under 
English law. The certainty of lost profit depends on the evidence presented by the buyer 
regardless of whether the business is new or has long been established. 
English and American courts seem also to disagree regarding the recoverability of pre- 
contract expenses. In certain cases the buyer may prefer to claim only the expenses 
wasted by the breach. Under English law, it seems that such expenses include pre- 
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contract expenditure. In principle, wasted pre-contract expenses are recoverable under 
the normal restrictions imposed upon the recovery of damages. The position is different 
under American law. The general attitude of the American courts is that pre-contract 
expenses are not recoverable on the ground that they are not incurred in reliance on the 
contract. Such an attitude is supported by respected writers such as Ogus. However, it 
has been argued that the reasoning of the American courts is not sufficient to deny the 
recoverability of such expenses. Pre-contract expenses can be wasted by the breach and, 
therefore, the causation requirement is satisfied. Furthermore, it has been explained how 
such pre-contract expenses constitute part of the gross earnings [the buyer's 
expectations]. Therefore, it is unclear why wasted pre-contract expenses should not be 
recoverable while loss of gross earnings as always recoverable under the normal 
restrictions imposed upon the recovery of damages. It is submitted that the attitude of 
English law regarding this matter is to be preferred to the American one. 
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Chapter Five 
Seller's Liability for Physical Damage: 
Recoverability of Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss 
"To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences 
is invariably difficult but it is recognised that no other process 
can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. No 
sort of arithmetical calculation is possible... ". 1 
"Some objects have a special value to their owner, far in excess 
of their commercial worth: pets, heirlooms, photographs, letters, 
souvenirs or works of personal creation. Other objects have no 
great sentimental value, but are vital to a person's enjoyment or 
peace of mind: a motor caravan hired for a family holiday or 
a morning suit ordered for a wedding. "2 
Introduction 
Under the principle of Robinson v. Harman, 3 the buyer is entitled to recover for losses 
caused by the defective goods in order to be placed, so far as money can do it, in the 
same position as if the goods had been delivered as warranted. However, monetary 
award may not remedy the buyer's non-pecuniary damage. The buyer, who suffers 
personal injury or disfigurement due to the defective goods, may not be relieved by 
receiving an amount of money under the principle of Robinson. In fact, the application 
of the principle of Robinson may provide relief in cases of financial loss more than in 
cases of personal injury. However, monetary award seems to be the only available 
remedy for the buyer's damage. Indeed, the statement of Parke B in Robinson indicates 
that monetary award may not always place the aggrieved party in the same position he 
would have been in if the contract had been properly performed. In principle, the buyer 
should be compensated for all losses he suffered due to the seller's breach of warranty 
of quality. 
Nevertheless, English courts seem to disallow damages for certain types of loss resulting 
from the seller's breach. Under English law, damages are generally unavailable for 
I Parry v. Cleaver [1970] AC 1,22 per Lord Morris. 
2 Norman Palmer and Ewan McKendrick, Interests in Goods, London, 2nd ed., 1998, p. 867. 
3 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. 
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disappointment, distress, frustration, anxiety, displeasure, vexation and tension resulting 
from a breach of contract. In certain cases, such types of damage may result from the 
defective quality of goods. It will be argued that the general non-recoverability rule is in 
direct contradiction with the purpose of compensatory damages in contract law, as stated 
in Robinson. The issue will be dealt with in relation to the recent decision of the House 
of Lords in Malik v. BCCI. 4 Furthermore, English courts seem to have no coherent 
attitude regarding the general non-recoverability rule. Nevertheless, there are certain 
cases where the general non-recoverability rule does not apply. Such cases will be 
examined in order to see whether or not cases of defective goods fall within their scope. 
In comparison with American law, one may note that neither English law nor American 
law has gone far enough to allow damages for all non-pecuniary losses under the normal 
restrictions. American courts do not have coherent attitude regarding the recoverability 
of damages for certain types of non-pecuniary loss. The attitude of the courts varies 
among the several States of the USA. In fact, the UCC provides that the buyer is entitled 
to recover for the losses he suffered due to the seller's breach. However, American 
courts seem to rely on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which exceptionally 
allows damages for non-pecuniary losses in certain cases. It will be argued that there 
seems to be no reason to deal with certain types of non-pecuniary losses differently. 
Damages should be available for all types of loss under the normal restrictions imposed 
on the recovery of damages. 
As regards damages for physical loss, 5 the recoverability of such damages is commonly 
a question of tort. However, the buyer may bring a contract action for physical loss 
resulting from a breach of contract. Indeed, ignoring losses resulting from a breach of 
contract can be in contradiction with the objective of damages stated in Robinson. Under 
both English and American law, where physical loss results from a breach of contract, 
the aggrieved party may have the choice to sue in contract, tort or both for the same loss. 
The buyer who brings a tort action under the Consumer Protection Act 1987, need not 
prove negligence. In view of the fact that damages for physical loss can be recoverable 
in a tort action, one may need not go through lengthy examination of the recoverability 
of such damages in contract. Anyhow, where the contract action is available, the buyer 
4 [1998] AC 20. 
5 For the sake of simplicity, the term "physical loss" is used to include both personal injury and damage to 
property other than the goods supplied. 
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should take into account the remoteness restriction in his choice to sue in contract or 
tort. Under English law, the remoteness principle applies in tort and contract differently. 
It is intended to argue that such a difference in application may lead to unfavourable 
results. Under the UCC, the remoteness principle does not restrict the recoverability of 
damages in cases of physical loss. The issue of whether this can be a suitable approach 
cannot be avoided. 
Although this thesis is mainly concerned with the quantification of damages under the 
principle of Robinson, it seems necessary to consider whether damages can be recovered 
for all types of loss under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG. In general, damages for all 
types of physical loss can be claimed under the SGA and the UCC. However, this may 
not be the case under the CISG. Under the CISG, the buyer may be unable to sue for 
certain physical losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality. If this becomes the 
case, the buyer needs to sue under the applicable domestic law. It is intended to examine 
the recoverability of damages for physical loss under the CISG. Furthermore, this 
chapter considers whether the buyer can avoid the application of the CISG by bringing 
an action in tort under the applicable domestic law. 
5.1 Lord Denning's View Regarding the Remoteness Restriction6 
As the buyer may have the choice to sue in contract or tort for physical loss, it seems 
necessary to see whether the remoteness principle applies in tort and contract 
differently.? The difference in the application of the remoteness principle in tort and 
contract may lead to a difference in the outcome. Remoteness principle is one of the 
principles that may restrict the buyer's recovery under the principle of Robinson v. 
Harman. 8 If the application of the remoteness principle substantially reduces the buyer's 
damages under the principle of Robinson, the buyer may prefer to bring an action in tort 
in order to be placed in the same position before the physical loss occurred. In contract 
law, under the remoteness principle, recoverable damages should normally be for 
detriments that are in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at the time of 
contracting, as not unlikely to result from the breach. 9 However, the principle applies in 
6 For the Remoteness restriction, see infra p. 284. 
7 In Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145, the House of Lords made it clear that the 
innocent party may be entitled to sue in tort and contract for the same loss. 
8 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
9 C. Czarnikow Ltd-v. Koufos (Heron II) [1969] AC 350. 
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tort differently. It provides that "the defendant will be liable for any type of damage 
which is reasonably foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case, 
unless the risk is so small that a reasonable man would in the whole circumstances feel 
justified in neglecting it. "10 In principle, where the remoteness principle arises, the buyer 
will have a better chance of recovery in tort than in contract. 
It seems that there is an emerging distinction between economic loss and physical loss 
regarding the application of the remoteness principle. In the famous case of Parsons 
(Livestock) Ltd v. Uttley Ingham & Co., " Lord Denning M. R. suggested that in cases of 
physical loss, the remoteness principle should apply in tort and contract similarly. 12 The 
facts of this case can be summarized as follows. The plaintiff, who was an owner of a 
herd of pigs, bought a hopper to store special pignuts. After using the hopper for a 
period of time, some of the pignuts appeared mouldy. Due to that, a large number of 
pigs died. At first instance, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for his 
loss under Section 53(2) of the SGA and stated that the remoteness principle does not 
restrict the recovery under this section. The Court of Appeal approved the award but on 
different grounds. The Court of Appeal applied the remoteness principle to such a 
recovery. Scarman U, with whom Orr U apparently agreed, 13 found that the loss, i. e. 
the death of the pigs, the plaintiffs' expenses in dealing with the infection and loss of 
sale and turnover, was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the 
contract as a serious possibility to result from the breach. 14 
However, Lord Denning M. R. took a different view regarding the application of the 
remoteness principle. He pointed out that where an action could be brought in tort and 
contract for the same loss, the remoteness principle should apply to contract and tort 
similarly. 15 As the tort action can be available in cases of physical loss, Lord Denning 
M. R. drew a distinction between physical loss on the one hand and economic loss on the 
10 Ibid at p. 387. See also Overseas Tankship (U. K) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co., [1967] AC 617; Horne 
v. Midland Railway Co. [1872] 7 C. P. 583. 
11 [1978] 1 QB 791,801. 
12 Ibid at p. 802. 
13 Ibid at p. 804. 
14 Ibid at pp. 809-813. 
's In this case Scarman LJ, at p. 806, pointed out that "I agree with [Lord Denning M. R. ] in thinking it is 
absurd that the test of remoteness of damage should, in principle, differ according to the legal 
classification of the cause of action, though one must recognize that parties to a contract have the right to 
agree on a measure of damages which may be greater, or less, than the law would offer in the absence of 
agreement. " However, Scarman LJ did not apply this distinction to the case since he found that previous 
cases do not support this opinion. 
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other. Regarding cases of physical loss, he stated that, "the defaulting party is liable for 
any loss or expense which he ought reasonably to have foreseen at the time of the breach 
as a possible consequence, even if it was only a slight possibility. "16 In fact, the 
requirement of "slight possibility" applies normally in tort and not in contract. In other 
words, Lord Denning M. R. applied the remoteness principle to the recovery of damages 
for physical loss resulting from a breach of contract in the same way that it applies in 
tort. 
Lord Denning M. R. went on to provide examples that support his view. The obvious 
example is concerned with "string contracts". 17 "In many of these cases the 
manufacturer is liable in contract to the immediate party for a breach of his duty to use 
reasonable care and is liable in tort to the ultimate consumer for the same want of 
reasonable care. "' 8 In this example, it seems that there is no point of applying the 
remoteness principle in tort and contract differently. The ultimate buyer can claim 
damages from his direct seller in a contract action and pass the liability up the chain to 
reach eventually the manufacturer; alternatively, he may sue the manufacturer directly in 
tort. '9 Here, if the ultimate consumer chose to sue his direct seller in a contract action 
and the loss was in their contemplation, at the time of contracting, as a slight possibility 
to result from the breach, the seller would not be liable and ultimately the manufacturer 
would escape liability. 20 However, if the ultimate consumer sues the manufacturer in 
tort, the manufacturer may be liable . 
21 In fact, one finds it hard to accept that 
16 Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 QB 791,803 
17 In this work, there seems no room to examine other examples which are not concerned with sale of 
goods contracts. For such examples, see J. M. Steiner, `A Question of Remoteness' (1978) 29 N. I. L. Q. 
282,287. 
18 Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v. Uttley Ingham & Co., [1978] 1 QB 791,803. 
19 Where the goods were determined not defective in tort, the plaintiff would not lose the right to sue in 
contract under the warranty theory. Where the claim is in contract, deciding whether the goods are 
defective or not should be held in the light of the express warranty or/and implied warranties stated by the 
contract or the statute. See R. E. Speidel, `Warranties of Quality in Revised Article 2, Sales and the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' (1999) 14 JCL 15. See also J. M. Feinman, 
`Implied Warranty, Product Liability, and the Boundary between Contract and Tort' (1997) 75 Wash. U. 
L. Q. 469,470 (citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N. E. 2d 730 (N. Y. 1995) where the court found the 
seller in breach of warranty of quality although he was not liable under the tort claim of the aggrieved 
party. 
20 The statute limitation period or the warranty period might be longer or shorter than the period during 
which the buyer can sue in tort. In this sense, in the buyer's point of view, there is a competition between 
tort and contract for finding the best outcome. 
21 In string contracts, there is normally no direct contract between the ultimate buyer and the manufacturer. 
Here, the privity restriction may prevent a party who is not privy to the contract to sue for breach of the 
contract. See J. J. White and R. S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 4th ed., West Publishing Co., 
1995,384. However, in certain cases, the privity restriction may not prevent the ultimate buyer's action in 
contract against the manufacturer. See chapter six, infra 198. 
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determining the liability of the manufacturer depends on the action that the ultimate 
consumer brings. 
Lord Reid in Heron II justified the difference in application of the remoteness principle 
in tort and contract on the ground that a party to a contract can protect himself against a 
risk which would appear unusual to the other party by directing the other party's 
attention to it before the contract is made while there is no such an opportunity for the 
injured party in tort to protect himself. 22 In fact, I find it difficult to understand such a 
justification in cases where the buyer has the choice to sue in tort or contract for the 
same loss. Here, one can point out that it does not seem fair, at all events, that the 
availability or the quantum of damages may differ depending on whether the action is 
brought in tort or in contract. 23 Until now, to my knowledge, there are no cases 
supporting the equality of the application of the remoteness principle in tort and contract 
regarding physical losses; but it is hoped that the law will develop in the direction which 
leads to such equality. 
A supportive view can be found in American law. Under American law, the difference 
in action for physical loss does not lead to a difference in the outcome. In cases of 
physical loss, the same restrictions apply in tort and contract. Section 2-715(2-b) of the 
UCC adopts the causation standard of tort. The section provides that "Consequential 
damages resulting from the seller's breach include... injury to person or property 
proximately resulting from any breach of warranty. " In this sense, under the UCC, 
damages for physical loss can be recoverable, regardless of whether or not it was 
foreseeable at the time of contracting, as long as such a loss results from a breach of 
contract. 24 The attitude of the UCC may be understood on the grounds that "public 
policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the 
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. , 25 
22 C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Koufos (Heron II) [1969] AC 350,386. 
23 See Hadjihambis, `Remoteness of Damage in Contract' (1978) 41 MLR 483,485 where the 
commentator suggests that the distinction drawn by Lord Denning involves an emphasis on the difference 
rather than the reconciliation of the remoteness test in contract and tort. 
24 R. R. Anderson, `Incidental and Consequential Damages' (1987) 7 J. L. & Com. 327,461; Eric C. 
Schneider, `Consequential Damages in the International Sale of Goods: Analysis of Two Decisions' 
(1995) 16 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 615,633. See also Kinsman Transit Co. v. Midland S. S. Line, Inc., 1964 
U. S. App. LEXIS 4032; 338 F. 2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). 
25 East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 1986 U. S. LEXIS 57; 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 609 
(1986). See T. A. Diamond and H. Foss, `Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to 
Hadley v. Baxendale' (1994) 63 Fordham L. Rev. 665,679. 
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Although the UCC ignores expressly the application of the remoteness principle to the 
recovery of damages for physical loss, the courts in some cases did apply the remoteness 
principle to such a recovery. In Lidstrand v. Silvercrost Industries, 26 the plaintiff 
suffered the loss of his clothes and belongings as a result of a defective mobile home. 
The Court awarded damages for this consequential loss on the ground that the seller had 
reason to know, at the time of making the contract, that such a loss could result from the 
general use of the defective goods. 27 However, the application of the remoteness 
principle to the recovery of damages for physical loss seldom happens. It can be noted 
that in the USA the remoteness principle does not restrict the recoverability of damages 
for physical loss. 28 
In comparing English law with American law, one may note that the latter is more 
generous in allowing damages for physical loss. It seems that the buyer under American 
law has better chance to recover for physical loss than under English law. This is due to 
the fact that the remoteness principle does not apply to cases of physical loss under the 
UCC. Damages for physical loss, under the UCC, can be recovered as long as such 
damages are approximately caused by the breach and both the mitigation and certainty 
restrictions are satisfied. However, it should be noted that in practice the remoteness 
principle has rarely prevented the recovery for physical loss under the SGA. 29 
Nevertheless, ignoring the application of the remoteness principle to the recovery of 
damages for physical damage may lead to an unlimited liability of the seller in cases of 
physical loss. It is submitted that remoteness principle should apply to all losses 
resulting from breach of contract. However, where the breach causes physical loss, the 
remoteness principle should apply in contract and tort similarly. 
5.2 The Recoverability of Damages for Physical Losses under the SGA 
and the UGC 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there seems to be no point to go through 
lengthy examination of the recoverability of damages for physical losses since such 
26 1981 Wash. App. LEXIS 1999; 31 UCC Rep. Serv. 978 (1981). 
27 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 24 at p. 453. See also Griese v. Cory Pools, Ltd., 1978 111. App. LEXIS 2289; 
23 UCC Rep. Serv. 1195 (1978). 
28 Eric C. Schneider, supra n. 24 at p. 633. G. I. Wallach, `the Buyer's Right to Monetary Damages' (1982) 
14 UCC L. J. 236,280; R. R. Anderson, supra n. 24 at p. 452; Special Project, `Article Two Warranties in 
Commercial Transactions' (1978) 64 Cornell L. Rev. 30,147. 
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damages can also be claimed in tort. Nevertheless, one may need to consider certain 
points that may arise in cases of physical losses. The general rule is that the aggrieved 
party is entitled to recover for his actual losses resulting from a breach of contract. This 
must be decided in accordance with the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of 
damages. Therefore, although the purpose of damages, as stated in Robinson v. 
Harman, 30 may not be achieved due to the nature of the damage, e. g. personal injury and 
disfigurement, damages can still be awarded as it is the only way to compensate the 
aggrieved party. 
The objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, can be achieved in case of property 
damage. Where the defective goods causes damage to other property, the party may be 
awarded the diminution in value of the property damaged. Here, it should be clear that 
the buyer may not be entitled to recover the diminution in value where his actual loss is 
the cost of cure, as discussed in chapter three. Chapter three of this thesis dealt with the 
quantification of damages for property damage caused by the defective goods supplied. 
Where the defective goods are placed or manufactured with other goods, they may cause 
damage to the whole goods. 31 This was the situation in the case of Rostock & Co. Ltd v. 
32 Nicholson & Sons Ltd. In this case, the seller sold sulphuric acid, with a description 
29 See S. M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, Toronto, 1983, p. 155. 
30 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
31 In cases of property damage, as other cases of loss caused by a breach of contract, the restrictions 
imposed upon the recovery of damages should be satisfied. Here, the remoteness principle requires the 
property loss to be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at the time of making the contract, as 
not unlikely to result from the breach. For example, in Vacwell Engineering Co., Ltd. v. B. D. H. 
Chemicals, Ltd., [1971] 1 QB 88 the buyer contracted with the seller for buying chemicals in order to be 
manufactured with other ingredients. The seller did not inform the buyer at the time of contracting that 
mixing the purchased chemicals with water would cause an explosion. The Court found that the nature of 
the parties' respective business made it a reasonable inference that the buyer would, and did, rely on the 
seller to warn him of the danger of mixing such chemicals with water. The Court found also that without 
an express warning there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that the chemical would come into contact 
with water in the ordinary course of any ordinary industrial use to which it might be put by a 
manufacturer. Upon that the buyer was awarded damages for the loss of property caused by an explosion 
resulting from the seller's breach of warranty of fitness for the purpose of the contract under Section 14(3) 
of the SGA. Similarly, in Harbutt's "Plasticine " Ltd v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd, [ 1970] 1 All ER 
225 where a defective heating system installed by the seller caused a fire and damaged the buyer's factory, 
the court awarded the buyer for the whole damage. See also Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & 
Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31; Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd [1978] QB 791; Wilson v. 
Rickett Cockerell & Co. Ltd [1954] 1 QB 598. As for cases decided under the UCC, see R. E. B., Inc. v 
Ralston Purina Co., 1975 U. S. App. LEXIS 12294; 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 122 (10th Cir. 1975); Milbank 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Proksch, 1976 Minn. LEXIS 1507; 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 774 (1976); Crandell v. 
Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 1983 S. D. LEXIS 326; 36 UCC Rep. Serv. 78 (1983); R. Clinton 
Construction Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 1977 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 12222; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 310 
(1977). 
32 [1904] 1 KB 725. Similarly, see Smith v. Green [1875] 1 C. P. D. 92. In this case, the buyer bought a 
cow which appeared diseased. The cow was put with other cows which belonged to the buyer. As a result 
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that such an acid is free from arsenic, in order to be used for making brewing sugar. The 
sulphuric acid did not correspond with the description and the buyer alleged that the 
seller was in breach of an implied term under Section 13 of the SGA. The Court's award 
included the value of the other ingredients wasted by being mixed with the defective 
goods. 33 In such a case, it is worth mentioning that the use of the goods should be 
ordinary or communicated to the seller at the time of making the contract. Where the 
buyer intended to put the goods to an abnormal use, such damages cannot be 
recoverable unless such a use was communicated to the seller at the time of making the 
contract. This is likely to happen where the goods have multiple uses. 34 
Another significant point that may be considered in cases of property damage is the 
depreciation. The deterioration caused by the use of the goods for a period of time 
should be taken into account to reduce the buyer's damages. 35 In the UCC case of 
Community Television Services v. Dresser Industries, 36 a radio and television 
broadcasting tower collapsed by wind pressure. The Court held that the seller was liable 
for the breach of his express warranty as to the ability of the tower to resist wind 
pressure. The Court, in assessing damages for the loss, took into account the reasonable 
depreciation in the value of the goods resulting from the use that the buyer had enjoyed 
prior to the loss. 37 The court deducted from the buyer's gross loss, an amount equivalent 
to the buyer's use of the goods prior to the collapse of the tower. 
The recovery of damages for personal injury in a contract action has been allowed in 
many cases under English and American law. 38 For example, in Andrews v. 
Hopkinson, 39 where the plaintiff was injured due to a technical defect in a car, the 
plaintiff was awarded damages for his personal injury. 40 Likewise, in the UCC case of 
all the cows were infected of the disease and died. The buyer was entitled to damages for the loss of all the 
cows. 
33 Bostock & Co. Ltd v. Nicholson & Sons Ltd., [1904] 1 KB 725,741-2. 
34 See Randall v. Newson, [1877] 2 QB 102. 
35 The depreciation is of no relevance for the assessment of loss of profit if the residual value of the goods 
at the end of their commercial life is considered. See chapter four, supra p. 133, n. 37. 
36 1977 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14804; 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 686 (1977). 
37 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 24 at p. 448. 
38 See Ellen A. Peters, `Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods under the 
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two' (1963) 73 Yale L. J. 199,272. 
39 [195711 QB 229. 
40 See Godley v. Perry, [ 1960] 1 WLR 9 where the buyer had lost his eye by the breaking of a defective 
catapult, the Court awarded the buyer £2,500 for such a loss. See also Geddling v. Marsh [1920] 1 K. B. 
668; Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons [1928] 2 KB 636; Wren v. Holt [1903] 1 KB 610. 
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Klages v. General Ordnance Equipment Corp., 41 the plaintiff was injured while he was 
trying to protect himself during a theft by using mace manufactured by the defendant. 
The mace did not function to incapacitate the robber as it was advertised by the 
defendant and as a result the plaintiff was shot. The Court held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover for his physical injuries resulting from breach of warranty of 
quality. 42 
At this place, it is worth noting that where a member of the buyer's family suffers 
personal injury, resulting from breach of warranty of quality, the buyer may bring a 
contract action for his financial loss resulting from the breach. In Jackson v. Watson & 
Sons, 43 the buyer had bought a salmon for human consumption. Due to the defective 
quality of the salmon, the buyer's wife died. In this case, the seller was in breach of 
warranty of quality. As a result the buyer was under a necessity of hiring someone to 
take care of his house and family. The buyer had successfully claimed damages for such 
a loss and for the expenses of the medicine and funeral of his wife. 44 For recovering 
damages in such a case, it should be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at 
the time of making the contract, that the goods will be used by the members of the 
buyer's family and it is not unlikely that they will be injured if the goods are defective. 45 
The buyer's claim in Jackson was only for pecuniary losses. However, personal injury 
may result in pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. The buyer may recover damages for 
his medical care and loss of his earning capacity. Moreover, he may recover for some 
non-pecuniary losses such as physical inconvenience. The facts of Jackson case indicate 
that the buyer suffered non-pecuniary loss, i. e. his loss of the society of his wife. Loss of 
society of relatives is one of consequential losses which may result from a breach of 
contract. In the UCC case of Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 46 the plaintiff was 
awarded damages for her loss of consortium. However, it should be mentioned here that 
41 1976 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1978; 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 22 (1976). See also Diprospero v. R. Brown & Sons, 
Inc. 1985 N. Y. App. Div. LEXIS 50927; 41 UCC Rep. Serv. 1651 (1985). 
42 See G. I. Wallach, supra n. 28 at p. 281. 
43 [ 1909] 2 KB 193. 
as See also Priest v. Last [1903] 2 KB 148; Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co. Ltd. [1905] 1 KB 608; Square v. 
Model Farm Dairies (Bournemouth) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 365. 
as A. G. Guest, Benjamin's Sale of Goods, London, 1997, para. 17-068. 
46 1976 Md. LEXIS 635; 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 312 (1976). 
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the recoverability of damages for non-pecuniary losses resulting from breach of contract 
is still unsettled in England and America, as discussed below. 47 
5.3 Damages for Physical Loss under the CISG 
Article 74 of the CISG allows damages for all foreseeable losses caused by the seller's 
breach of warranty of quality. In fact, the buyer should be entitled to recover damages 
for all his losses in order to be placed in the same position he would have been in if the 
goods had been delivered as warranted. In other words, the objective of damages under 
the Convention is the same objective stated in Robinson v. Harman, 48 as mentioned in 
chapter one of this thesis. In view of that, one may expect that damages may be claimed 
for all types of loss resulting from the seller's breach of warranty of quality. However, 
the scope of the application of the CISG does not cover all kinds of physical loss. 
Regarding personal injury and death, Article 5 of the Convention states that "This 
Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or personal injury 
caused by the goods to any person. " The impact of Article 5 is to exclude the 
applicability of the Convention to any personal injury or death which may occur to any 
person such as the buyer, sub-buyer, employees of the buyer or others. The 
recoverability of damages for personal injury and death is expressly left to be decided 
under domestic laws. 49 This is probably due to the various levels of development of the 
national laws regulating product liability and the impossibility of specialized 
international solutions to the issue of product liability. 50 This exclusion is more 
important to those systems, such as the French law, which does not apply the tort law 
rules to any dispute arising out of contractual relationship. In such systems the 
47 Infra, p. 178. In England, an action in tort for such a loss seems unavailable. Section 2 of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1982 states: "No person shall be liable in tort under the law of England... to 
a husband on the ground only of his having deprived him of the services or society of his wife... " 
48 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
49 See F. Enderlein and D. Maskow, International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods: Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of 
Goods, London, 1992 at p. 298; Peter Sarcevic and Paul Volken, International Sale of Goods: Dubrovnik 
Lectures, New York, 1992, p. 35; Muna Ndulo, `the Vienna Sales Convention 1980 and the Hague 
Uniform Laws on International Sale of Goods 1964: a Comparative Analysis' (1989) 38 ICLQ 1,5. 
50 Henry Gabriel, Practitioner's Guide to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), London, 1994, p. 21; B. Nicholas, `The Vienna 
Convention on International Sales Law' 105 LQR 201,208. See also Muhsin Shafiq, The United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods-in Arabic, Egypt [Cairo], at p. 84; N. M. Galston and 
Hans Smit, International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, New York, 1984, p. 1-38. 
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contractual remedies may offer more protection in cases of personal injury than those 
remedies provided by the CISG which are more concerned with commercial damage. 5' 
As regards property damage, the CISG does not exclude the applicability of the 
Convention to property damage. 52 Proposals were addressed by some of the 
representatives in the Vienna Conference to exclude the liability for property damage 
from the scope of the application of the Convention. However, the proposals were not 
53 successful. Damages for property loss can be recovered under Article 74 of the 
Convention. In this view, if the buyer suffers property loss as a result of breach of 
warranty of quality, he can claim damages under the Convention. The question whether 
or not he can claim damages in a tort action under the applicable domestic law has been 
discussed below. 54 
The last main issue here is whether Article 5 excludes the applicability of the 
Convention to the buyer's claim to recover an indemnity paid to a third party for 
personal injury caused by the seller's breach. This issue was raised in Oberlandesgericht 
Düsseldorf, $S where a German buyer purchased from an American seller a machine 
which was sold to a Russian sub-purchaser. The machine proved defective and caused 
personal injury to the sub-purchaser who sought damages from the buyer. The buyer 
relied on the Convention to recover from the seller an indemnity payable to the sub- 
purchaser. In this case the Court made it clear that Article 5 does not exclude the 
applicability of the Convention to such a claim. The buyer's claim in this case was not 
51 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (The Vienna Sales 
Convention) a Consultation Document, Department of Trade and Industry, October 1997, p. 13; The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980), Explanatory 
Documentation prepared for Commonwealth Jurisdictions by Muna Ndulo in association with the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, October 1991, p. 11. 
52 See J. Ramberg, `Breach of Contract and Recoverable Losses', in R. Cranston (ed. ), Making 
Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Roy Goode, Oxford, 1997,191,192. See also M. J. Bonell and 
Fabio Liguori, The U. N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A Critical Analysis of Current 
International Case Law, [1997] Revue de droit uniforme/ Uniform Law Review 385-395; available at 
<http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/libo1. html>, text accompanying note 40. See also Handelsgericht 
Zürich, Switzerland 26 April 1995 available at <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 950426s1. html> where 
the Court did not allow the buyer damages due to his failure of notifying the seller of the defect within a 
resonable time after the discovery under Article 39(1) of the CISG; however, the court did not deny the 
applicability of the Convention to claims for property damage. 
53 See C. M. Bianca and M. J. Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales 
Convention, Milan, 1987 at p. 50; F. Enderlein and D. Maskow, supra n. 49 at p. 298; Peter Sarcevic and 
Paul Volken, supra n. 49 at p. 47- 
54 Supra, p. 175, 
55 Germany 2 July 1993 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/930702g1. htrnl>. 
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for personal injury. The claim was for economic loss he suffered as a result of his 
liability to the sub-purchaser who suffered personal injury. 
The words of Article 5 "to any person " imply that the Article is not only concerned 
with the buyer. In fact, as discussed in the following chapter, Article 4 of the CISG 
makes it clear that the Convention is only concerned with the "formation of the contract 
of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a 
contract. " Therefore, the Convention does not apply to a claim brought by other than the 
buyer and the seller. In view of that, one may note that the privity doctrine applies under 
the Convention as discussed in the following chapter. Here, it should be clear that the 
privity requirement may not allow the sub-purchaser to sue the original seller in a 
contract action for the personal injury resulting from breach of warranty of quality. This 
would apply to any person, other than the direct buyer, who suffers personal injury as a 
result of the original seller's breach. In brief, there is no one, other than the buyer, 
expected to bring a successful suit in contract against the seller. In this sense, there is no 
need to exclude the applicability of the Convention to the third party's claim who 
suffered personal injury since such a claim is prohibited already by the privity doctrine. 
So if there is no person other than the buyer who can sue the seller under the Convention 
for his breach of warranty, what do the words of Article 5 "to any person" mean? Does 
this mean that the Article excludes the applicability of the Convention to the buyer's 
claim to recover damages for his liability to a third party who has suffered personal 
injury resulting from the seller's breach? The issue is debatable. Some respected writers, 
such as Schlechtriem, 56 Bianca57 and Honnold58 suggest that the Court was mistaken in 
its decision in Oberlandesggericht Düsseldorf, s9 Referring to such writers, Article 5 
excludes the applicability of the Convention to any claim based on personal injury 
incurred to the buyer or to a third party. However, Lookofsky and Bernstein, 60 see that 
Article 5 is concerned only with personal injury suffered by the buyer; the Convention 
56 Peter Schlechtriem, Commentary on Oberlandesggericht Düsseldorf 2 July 1993, <http: //cisgw3. 
law. pace. edu/cases/930702gl. html>. 
57 C. M. Bianca and M. J. Bonell, supra n. 53 at p. 49. See also Martin Karollus, `Judicial Interpretation and 
Application of the CISG in Germany 1988-1994' (1995) Cornell Review of the Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, 51-94; available at <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/karollus. 
html>. 
58 John O. Honnold, Uniform Law of International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
Boston, 2nd ed., 1991, pp. 119-120. 
59 Germany 2 July 1993 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. eduJcases/930702g1. html>. 
6' H. Bernstein and J. Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG in Europe, London, 1997 at p. 17, n. 45. 
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should apply to the buyer's claim for indemnity paid to a third party for his personal 
injury resulting from the seller's breach. 
Although I am inclined to support the latter opinion since the buyer's loss is economic, 
the words of Article 5 do not allow me to go to such an extent. The words of Article 5 
"to any person" cannot be interpreted to other than excluding the applicability of the 
Convention to any claim based on a personal injury even though the injury is suffered by 
a third party. This is due to the fact that the third party is likely to be disallowed to sue 
the seller directly under the Convention due to the lack of the privity requirement. 
Therefore, the words of Article 5 should be interpreted to exclude the application of the 
Convention to the buyer's claim for his liability to a third party who suffered personal 
injury resulting from the seller's breach. Applying a different opinion may ignore the 
words of Article 5 of the Convention since it seems very difficult, in such a case, to find 
out the purpose of the words of Article 5. It is submitted that the CISG case of 
Oberlandesggericht Düsseldorf I was wrongly decided. 
5.4 The "Choice of Action" in International Sale of Goods 
Where physical loss results from breach of warranty of quality, the buyer may have the 
choice to sue in contract, tort or both under the English and American jurisdictions. The 
question here is whether such a choice is available to an international buyer under the 
CISG. In other words, where the CISG is applicable, can the buyer avoid its application 
by bringing an action in tort under the applicable domestic law? 
The question may be of vital significance in two cases: the first case is where the buyer 
loses his right to sue under the CISG. This might happen where the buyer does not give 
a proper notice under Article 39 of the CISG. 62 If this becomes the case, the buyer may 
seek to bring an action in tort under the applicable domestic law. The second case is 
where the physical loss is too remote, the buyer might not be entitled to damages since 
61 Germany 2 July 1993 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/930702g1. html>. 
62 Article 39 of the CISG states 
(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to the 
seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or 
ought to have discovered it. 
(2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give 
the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were 
actually handed over to the buyer, unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of 
guarantee. 
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Article 74 of the CISG63 applies the remoteness restriction to the recovery for all kinds 
of damage. In such a case, where the buyer finds out that the applicable domestic law 
does not apply the remoteness principle to the recovery in tort, such as the case in the 
USA, he may choose to bring an action in tort under the domestic law rather than in 
contract under the CISG. 
Such cases would not take place where the applicable domestic law does not allow the 
buyer to sue in tort for losses resulting from a breach of contract, such as the case in 
France. the French rule "non-cumul" excludes the application of tort law rules to any 
dispute arising out of a contractual relation between parties. In contrast, the 
aforementioned cases are of more significance where the applicable domestic law is too 
generous to the extent that it protects purely economic losses in tort; as a result the tort 
action for any loss resulting from a breach of contract would be allowed. 64 
A definite answer to the question, whether or not the buyer under the CISG can bring an 
action in tort under the domestic laws for losses resulting from the breach of contract, is 
still unattainable. There are extreme differences between the opinions of legal writers 
regarding this issue. Honnold suggests that the CISG displaces domestic laws with 
regard to the areas regulated by its rules. 65 His opinion is based mainly on the grounds 
that the applicability of domestic laws to areas governed by the Convention will affect 
the international aspect of the Convention. 66 He adds that if the buyer has the choice to 
sue under the CISG or the applicable domestic law, he will have more protection. Such 
protection will affect the balance between the parties that the CISG is devised to 
provide. Of course, the domestic laws can apply to a contract of international sale, 
governed by the Convention, where the provisions of the CISG excludes its application 
63 Article 74 of the CISG states "Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the 
loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages 
may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract. " 
64 Peter Schlechtriem, `The Borderland of Tort and Contract-Opening a New Frontier? ' (1988) 21 
Cornell Int'l L. J. 467,468. 
65 John O. Honnold, supra n. 58. The same opinion can be found in F. Enderlein and D. Maskow, supra 
n. 49 at p. 298; Petar Sarcevic and Paul Volken, supra n. 49 at p. 47; C. M. Bianca and M. J. Bonell, supra 
n. 53 p. 50; J. M. Lookofsky, Consequential Damages in Comparative Context: From Breach of Promise to 
Monetary Remedy in the American, Scandinavian and International Law of Contracts and Sales, 
Denmark, 1989, p. 285, n. 166. 
66 John O. Honnold, supra n. 58 at p. 124. 
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only, such as sales to consumers (Article 2(a)), the validity of contract provisions67 or 
usage (Article 4(a)) or cases of personal injury (Article 5). 68 
In contrast, another opinion suggests that one should distinguish between property and 
economic losses resulting from a breach of international sale contract under the CISG. 
As for the former, the aggrieved party should have the right to sue in tort if the 
applicable domestic law allows such a suit. 69 However, this should not be the case 
regarding the latter loss. Where the breach violates an economic interest of the contract, 
the CISG should displace domestic laws. In other words, according to this view, if the 
violation of economic interest gives rise to a tort action under the applicable domestic 
law, the CISG can displace such a law. 70 This opinion is based on the ground that the 
shape and extent of economic interests depend mostly on the agreement between the 
parties such as the time of delivery, payment and others. 7' 
In the light of the above discussion, it seems that the opinion of Honnold is preferable. 
One should not ignore the fact that parties to an international sale contract come from 
different legal systems which might not be well-known to each others. Matters which 
give rise to a tort action in one country, might not in another. For example, the buyer 
may be allowed to bring a tort action for losses resulting from a breach of contract under 
English law. Such an action is normally disallowed under the French rule "non-cumul". 
In order to avoid such differences among the several legal systems, the CISG was 
founded in order to offer the parties to an international sale contract one law which they 
can safely rely on with regard to their legal relationship. In this sense, the aggrieved 
party should not be permitted to circumvent the applicable rules of the CISG by bringing 
an action in tort under the applicable domestic law which may offer him better 
judgment. 
67 The seller may not be able to exclude his liability for physical losses by implied or express terms 
included in the contract. Under the English and American law, such exclusion clauses are normally 
considered unconscionable. This is more likely in consumer contracts. Clearly, Section 2-719(3) of the 
UCC states that "... limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer 
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not. " 
Section 6(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 provides that "As against a person dealing as 
consumer, liability for breach of the obligations arising from- (a) [section 13,14 or 15 of the [ 1979] Act] 
(seller's implied undertakings as to conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to their quality 
or fitness for a particular purpose)... cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term. , 67 
68 John 0. Honnold, supra n. 58 at p. 124. 
69 See H. Bernstein and J. Lookofsky, supra n. 60 at p. 57; Peter Schlechtriem, supra n. 64 at p. 473. 
70 See H. Bernstein and J. Lookofsky, ibid at p. 57; Peter Schlechtriem, supra n. 64 at p. 473. 
71 Peter Schlechtriem, ibid at p. 473. 
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5.5 The Recoverability of Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses 
In general, damages for losses resulting from breach of warranty of quality should be 
recovered under the normal restrictions. Ignoring losses resulting from the breach may 
be in direct contradiction with the principle of Robinson v. Harman, 72 as discussed 
below. However, English law seems to be reluctant to allow damages for certain non- 
pecuniary losses resulting from a breach of contract. It confines the recovery of damages 
for such loss to certain cases mentioned below. Non-pecuniary losses may include 
physical inconvenience, disappointment, distress, frustration, anxiety, displeasure, 
vexation and tension. Damages for physical inconvenience can be recoverable under the 
normal restrictions. It can be noted that this damage is normally accompanied with 
physical damage. Where physical inconvenience results from a breach of contract 
without being accompanied with physical injury, damages may still be recoverable 
under the normal restrictions. This has been decided in the old case of Hobbs v. London 
and South Western Railway Co., 73 where the plaintiff suffered physical inconvenience as 
a result of the defendant's breach. In this case, the Court awarded damages for physical 
inconvenience. 74 Similarly, in the recent case of Watts and Another v. Morrow, 75 the 
Court of Appeal awarded damages for physical inconvenience suffered as a result of the 
breach of contract. 76 
In comparing English law with American law, one may state that English law deals 
better with the recoverability of damages for physical inconvenience. Although Section 
2-714 of the UCC allows damages for all losses resulting from breach of warranty, it 
seems that the courts do not have a coherent attitude towards the availability of such 
damages. In McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 77 the Court of Appeal of Illinois 
followed the rule, stated by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in William A. Allen v. 
Edwards, that "mere inconvenience, without more, is not a proper element of 78 
72 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
73 (1875) 10 QB 111. In this case, a family were transported by a railway company to the wrong station. 
The Court awarded them damages for physical inconvenience resulting from walking several miles home 
on a wet night. 
74 Ibid at p. 115. 
75 [1991] 4 All ER 937. 
76 See Burton v. Pinkerton, (1867) 2 Exch. 340 where the Court awarded damages for the physical 
inconvenience caused by the defendant's breach of his employment contract. 
77 1977 111. App. LEXIS 2230; 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 532 (1977). 
78 217 So. 2d 284 (1969). 
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damages. "79 Similarly, in Sellinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 80 where the 
plaintiff suffered physical inconvenience as a result of a defective mobile home, the 
Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's refusal to award damages for such a harm. 
However, in Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 81 the Court of Appeal of 
Arizona did award damages for physical inconvenience resulting from the lack of air- 
conditioning and heating caused by a defective mobile home. The Court did not require 
the buyer to show physical injury in order to recover damages for physical 
inconvenience; in other words, the Court awarded such damages without requiring such 
inconvenience to be accompanied with physical injury. The two mentioned cases, 
Sellinger and Brown, seem to have similar facts but they were decided differently. Such 
a difference may be due to the degree of the severity of physical inconvenience in each 
case. 82 
Nonetheless, It is submitted that damages should be awarded for physical inconvenience 
under the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. This seems to be the 
attitude of English law. It seems that the availability of damages for physical 
inconvenience in the USA is not predictable. The courts award such damages depending 
on the circumstances of each case taking into account mainly the severity of such an 
inconvenience. It seems that physical inconvenience is analogous to physical injury. The 
award of damages for the latter is beyond question; therefore, one might find it difficult 
to justify the anxiety of the American courts to award damages for physical 
inconvenience. 
As for other non-pecuniary losses, such as distress, frustration, anxiety, displeasure, 
vexation and tension, it is still unclear whether damages can be recoverable under the 
normal restrictions. There seems to be an inconsistency in the law reports regarding the 
recoverability of damages for non-pecuniary losses in England and America. It is 
intended to examine the recoverability of damages for such non-pecuniary losses in the 
following section. For the sake of simplicity, the term "mental distress" will be used to 
represent disappointment, frustration, anxiety, displeasure, vexation and tension. 
79 William A. Allen v. Edwards, 217 So. 2d 284 at p. 287 (1969). 
80 1973 Ariz. App. LEXIS 690; 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 879 (1973). 
81 1977 Ariz. App. LEXIS 546; 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1040 (1977). 
82 R. R. Anderson, supra n. 24 at p. 467. 
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As regards the CISG, Comment 3 to Article 74 of the Convention provides that "the 
basic philosophy of the action for damages is to place the injured party in the same 
economic position he would have been in if the contract had been performed. " In this 
sense, damages under the Convention are aimed to deal with the financial loss of the 
aggrieved party only. This observation can be supported by Article 5 of the Convention 
which makes the recoverability of damages for personal injury beyond the scope of the 
Convention. Therefore, one can reach the conclusion that the recoverability of damages 
for non-pecuniary losses is left to be decided under the applicable domestic law. 83 
5.5.1 Damages for Mental Distress84 
As discussed below, the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson v. Harman, 85 may 
not be achieved if the court disallows damages for mental distress. In other words, 
damages for mental distress should be recovered under the normal restrictions. Here, 
one may need to distinguish between consumer and commercial cases. In commercial 
cases, breach of warranty of quality is unlikely to result in mental distress. The buyer, in 
such cases, is likely to be relieved by the award of damages which puts him in the same 
financial position he would have been in if the goods had been free of defects. 86 The 
commercial buyer is not expected to have emotional attachment to the goods. Most 
likely, such a buyer will be concerned with the profit which can be gained by using the 
goods in question. In Hutchinson v. Harris, 87 where the defendant was in breach of a 
83 Under the French law, damages can in principle be recovered for mental distress resulting from a breach 
of contract. See Nelson Enonchong, `Breach of Contract and Damages for Mental Distress' (1996) 16 
O. J. L. S. 617,636. The writer refers to Mazeaud, Mazeaud and Chabas, Lecons de droit civil, obligations, 
8th ed., 1991, paras 422-3. See also M. G. Bridge, `Contractual Damages for Intangible Loss: A 
Comparative Analysis' (1984) 62 Can. Bar Rev. 323,352. 
84 Mental distress should be distinguished from mental illness. the latter is a kind of physical injury for 
which damages can be awarded under the normal restrictions. Nervous shock, suffered by the aggrieved 
party, should be distinguished from other harms such as anxiety or indignity. Damages for mental illness 
may be awarded if such an illness was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at the time of 
making the contract, as not unlikely to result from the breach. Hadley v Baxendale [1854] 9 Exch 341; 
Victoria Laundry v Newman Industries Coulson & Co Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528; Koufos v Czarnikow Ltd 
(The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350; Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd [1978] QB 791. The 
remoteness principle applies to the recovery of damages for mental distress as follows: the principle can 
be satisfied where at the time of making the contract the parties reasonably contemplated, as a serious 
possibility, that mental distress would result from the potential breach. However, Lord Denning M. R. 's 
approach, in the last case, is preferable here since mental distress is analogous to physical damage. On this 
point see A. S. Burrows, `Mental Distress Damages in Contract- a Decade of Change' [1984] LMCLQ 119, 
132. 
85 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
86 Iwan Davies, Sale and Supply of Goods, 2nd ed., 1996, p. 333. 
87 [ 1978] 10 Build. L. R. 19. 
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contract of converting a house into flats, the Court of Appeal was reluctant to award 
damages for mental distress since the plaintiff was converting the house to let for profit. 
Furthermore, in Alexander v Alpe Jack, Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd., 88 Beldam U 
pointed out that "[t]he general rule is that damages for distress, inconvenience or loss of 
enjoyment are not recoverable for breach of an ordinary commercial contract... ". 89 In 
Hays and another v. James & Charles Dodd (a firm)90 Staughton U said that 
"I am not convinced that it is enough to ask whether mental distress was 
reasonably foreseeable as a consequence, or even whether it should reasonably 
have been contemplated as not unlikely to result from a breach of contract. It 
seems to me that damages for mental distress in contract are as a matter of 
policy, limited to certain losses of case.... But it should not in my judgment, 
include any case where the object of the contract was not comfort or pleasure, 
or the relief of discomfort, but simply carrying on a commercial activity with a 
view to profit. 5591 [Emphasis added]. 
However, the position may be different in consumer cases. The consumer buyer92 may 
suffer mental distress resulting from breach of warranty of quality. The question here is 
whether damages can be awarded for such a distress. In Bernstein v. Pamson Motors 
Ltd., 93 where a consumer buyer purchased a car, which appeared defective, Rougier J 
awarded the buyer damages for "a total spoilt day comprising nothing but vexation". 
However, the Court in this case did not discuss the recoverability of such damages nor 
did it cite any authority for such an award. Therefore, the case does not seem helpful in 
deciding whether such damages are generally available for defective goods. Moreover, 
in Jackson v. Chrysler Acceptances Ltd., 94 the Court of Appeal allowed the buyer 
damages for spoiled holiday caused by the defective car purchased. This case, as 
discussed below, 95 falls under one of the exceptions where damages for non-pecuniary 
losses can be recoverable. 
Here, one needs to extend the research to deal with other cases of contract law in order 
to find out whether damages for mental distress are generally recoverable. Under the 
American law, as will be seen, there seems to be inconsistency in the recoverability of 
88 The Times, 1995,4 May. In this case the buyer claimed damages for the distress and inconvenience he 
suffered as a result of the breach of service contract of repairing a Rolls-Royce car. The Court of Appeal 
held that damages for distress and inconvenience are not recoverable. 
89 Alexander v Alpe Jack, Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd., The Times, 1995,4 May. 
90 [1990] 2 All ER 815. 
91 Ibid at p. 824. 
92 This argument may not apply where the consumer is not a natural person. 
93 [1987] 2 All ER 220. 
94 [1978] RTR 474. 
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damages for mental distress. The recoverability of such damages varies among the 
several States. Also, one may notice that there is no coherent attitude towards such a 
recoverability in every single State. 96 
5.5.1.1 The Rule of Addis v. Gramophone: Reality or Illusion? 
In Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd. 97 the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant as 
a manager. Under his contract of employment he was entitled to six months' notice of 
dismissal. He was given this notice by the defendant but he left his work before the end 
of the notice period since the defendant had made it impossible for him to do his work. 
The plaintiff was awarded damages for his financial losses resulting from depriving him 
of a proper notice period, i. e. resulting from breach of the employment contract. 
However, the House of Lords did not award damages for the injury to his feeling and 
reputation resulting from the dismissal. 
This vagueness of the decision by the House of Lords in this case was a source of 
confusion in English law, regarding the recoverability of damages for non-pecuniary 
loss in contract, for approximately ninety years. It was commonly thought that Addis 
stated the rule of the general non-recoverability for non-pecuniary losses. It is true that 
in Cox v. Phillips Industries Ltd., 98 the Court provided expressly that damages for 
mental distress are recoverable if it was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, 
at the time of contracting, as a serious possibility that the breach would expose the 
plaintiff to the vexation, frustration and distress. 99 However, the decision in Cox was 
overruled in Bliss v. South East Thames Regional Health Authority'00 where mental 
distress was caused by a breach of employment contract. In this case, Dillon LJ pointed 
95 Infra, p. 187. 
46 Infra, p. 189. 
47 [1909] AC 488. See also the previous cases of Hamlin v. G. N. Ry. (1856) 1 H. & N. 408 where the 
Court of Exchequer ruled that a delayed passenger was not entitled to recover damages for the 
disappointment resulting from the breach of contract. In Hobbs v. London and South Western Railway, 
[1875] 10 QB 111, where the plaintiff and his family were delivered late at night to the wrong station, 
Mellor J said at, p. 122, that "... for the mere inconvenience, such as annoyance and loss of temper, or 
vexation, or for being disappointed in a particular thing which you have set your mind upon, without real 
physical inconvenience resulting, you cannot recover damages. " 
98 [1976] 1 WLR 638. See B. S. Jackson, `Injured Feelings Resulting from Breach of Contract' (1977) 26 
ICLQ 502,505. 
99 Cox v. Phillips Industries Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR 638,644. In this case, Lawson J, at p. 644, said that "I can 
see no reason in principle why, if a situation arises which within the contemplation of the parties would 
have given rise to vexation, distress and general disappointment and frustration, the person who is injured 
by a contractual breach, should not be compensated in damages for that breach. " 
100 [1987] Industrial Cases Reports 700. 
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out that the decision in Cox was wrong since it was inconsistent with the general rule 
stated in Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd. 101 Dillon L3 held that damages for mental 
distress are still generally not available in contract; such damages can only be awarded 
under some exceptions. '°2 
In the recent case of Malik v. BCC, 103 Lord Steyn made it clear that there is a 
misunderstanding of the decision in Addis. His Lordship stated that the plaintiffs in 
Addis were not allowed damages for their non-pecuniary loss on the ground of lack of 
causation. His Lordship said that "Addis's case simply decided that the loss of 
reputation in that particular case could not be compensated because it was not caused by 
a breach of contract. , 104 Now, one may suggest that the vagueness of the decision of 
Addis, has been removed by the thoughtful speech of Lord Steyn. The question here is 
whether the case of Malik was intended to allow, in principle, the recovery for mental 
distress resulting from breach of contract. 
In Malik, the plaintiffs were employees in a bank which collapsed as a result of massive 
fraud perpetrated by those controlling the bank. The plaintiffs were not aware of and had 
no part in the fraud. The plaintiffs found it difficult to find a job in the banking field due 
to their association with the bank. The plaintiffs were entitled to damages for the 
financial loss resulting from the breach of the trust and confidence term of their 
employment contract. 105 In this case, the House of Lords held that the plaintiffs were 
101 [1909] AC 488. 
102 In Bliss v. South East Thames Regional Health Authority [1987] Industrial Cases Reports 700 Dillon 
LJ, at pp. 717-8, said: "where damages fall to be assessed for breach of contract rather than in tort it is not 
permissible to award general damages for frustration, mental distress, injured feelings or annoyance 
occasioned by the breach... There are exceptions now recognized where the contract which has been 
broken was itself a contract to provide peace of mind or freedom from distress... ". 
103 [1998] AC 20. 
104 Ibid at p. 51. Lord Steyn cited Nelson Enonchong, `Contract Damages for Injury to Reputation' (1996) 
59 MLR 592. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Lord Atkinson, in Addis at p. 494, considered the 
award of damages for injured feelings as a kind of punishment which does not meet the compensatory 
nature of damages in contract law. See M. G. Bridge, `Contractual Damages for Intangible Loss: A 
Comparative Analysis' (1984) 62 Can. Bar Rev. 323,343. 
105 The Court of Appeal in Marbe v George Edwards (Daly's Theatre) Ltd, [1928] 1 KB 269 and Withers 
v General Theatre Corp Ltd [1933] 2 KB 536 distinguished between two kinds of social reputation, i. e., 
an existing reputation or a reputation which would have been acquired if the contract had not been 
breached. In the latter case, the Court of Appeal awarded damages for the loss of reputation which would 
have been acquired if the contract had not been breached and refused to award for the damage of an 
existing reputation. The Court of Appeal, in this case, did not follow the decision in Marbe where the 
award was for the loss of both kinds of reputation. In the recent case of Malik v BCCI, [1998] AC 20,41 
the House of Lords rejected expressly the idea that damages can be only awarded for the loss of reputation 
which would have been acquired if the contract had not been breached and not for the damage of an 
existing reputation. Lord Nicholls, in this case, indicated that the decision in Marbe was decided rightly. 
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entitled to damages for the reasonably foreseeable financial loss suffered by the 
plaintiffs. 106 
Obviously, the House of Lords, in Malik, made it clear that damages, in appropriate 
cases, could in principle be awarded for loss of reputation resulting from a breach of 
contract. In fact, these appropriate cases are mostly where the loss of reputation is 
accompanied with financial loss. 107 Indeed, there is no authority provided by the House 
of Lords in Malik for allowing damages for loss of reputation where no financial loss 
results. This discourages me from suggesting that the issue of recoverability of damages 
for mental distress has been brought to an end by the decision in Malik. In this case, 
Lord Nicholls pointed out that "[f]or present purposes I am not concerned with the 
exclusion of damages for injured feeling. The present case is concerned only with 
financial loss. " 108 Therefore, I need to carry on to find out whether damages can be 
recovered for mental distress resulting from breach of warranty of quality. Hopefully, 
examining cases, where the recoverability of damages for mental distress is not 
debatable will help. 
5.5.1.2 Cases where the Recoverability of Damages for Emotional 
Distress is not Debatable 
Damages for mental distress in contract action seems to be well settled in cases where 
the object of the contract is to provide mainly relaxation or pleasurable amenity. 109 In 
fact, in such cases, the court achieved the objective of damages stated in Robinson v. 
Harman. ' 10 For example, in Jarvis v. Swan Tours Ltd., 111 where distress was suffered as 
106 The recovery of damages for loss of or injury to reputation is normally claimed in a tort action under 
the law of defamation. However, the claim for loss of or injury to reputation may succeed in a contract 
action if a financial loss resulting from an injury to reputation. In Foaminol Laboratories Ltd. v British 
Artid Plastics Ltd., [1941] 2 All ER 393 Hallett J, at pp. 399-400 pointed out that".., a claim for mere loss 
of reputation is the proper subject of an action for defamation, and cannot ordinarily be sustained by 
means of any other form of action... However... if pecuniary loss can be established, the mere fact that the 
pecuniary loss is brought about by the loss of reputation caused by a breach of contract is not sufficient to 
preclude the plaintiffs from recovering in respect of that pecuniary loss. " 
107 Marbe v George Edwards (Daly's Theatre) Ltd[1928] 1 KB 269; Dunk v George Waller & Son Ltd, 
[1970] 2 QB 163; Aerial Advertising Co. v Batchelors Peas Ltd (Manchester) [1938] 2 All ER 788; 
Anglo-Continental Holidays Ltd v Typaldos Lines (London) Ltd, [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep 61. See J. Beatson, 
Anson's Law of Contract, Oxford, 27th ed., 1998, p. 563; Nelson Enonchong, `Contract Damages for 
Injury to Reputation' (1996) 59 MLR 592,595. 
108 Malik v. BCCI [1998] AC 20,38. 
109 See Francis Dawson, `General Damages in Contract for Non-Pecuniary Loss' (1983) 10 N. Z. U. L. Rev. 
232. 
110 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
111 [1973] 1 QB 233. 
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a result of breach of contract for a holiday, the Court of Appeal held that damages for 
mental distress can be recovered in proper cases such as where the contract is supposed 
to provide entertainment and enjoyment. ' 12 The award of damages for mental distress, in 
such a case, aims to compensate the aggrieved party for his disappointment at the 
deprivation of a potential mental benefit. 113 Certainly, the aggrieved party should be 
awarded for his loss of the object of the contract; if a party does not fulfil his obligation 
under a contract, he may be liable in damages for the other party. 
Damages can also be awarded in cases of contract intended to provide freedom from 
worry and anxiety. For example, in Heywood v. Wellers, 114 the plaintiff employed the 
solicitors (defendants) to take proceeding at law to protect her from molestation by a 
third party. The solicitors were under a duty by contract to use reasonable care. 
However, the solicitors failed in their duty and as a result the plaintiff suffered more 
upset and distress. The Court awarded the plaintiff damages for mental distress on the 
ground that it should have been in the contemplation of the parties, at the time of 
contracting, that such a failure will lead to more mental distress for the plaintiff. ' 15 
Furthermore, damages for mental distress can be awarded if such a distress is related to 
physical inconvenience. ' 16 For example in McCall v. Abelesz, "7 where a landlord 
harassed a tenant, Lord Denning M. R. pointed out that damages can be awarded for 
distress consequent upon physical inconvenience. "8 In this sense, damages for mental 
distress should normally be recoverable where they are related to physical 
inconvenience. ' 19 In Watts and Another v. Morrow, 120 Bingham U said 
"[w]here the very object of a contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of 
mind or freedom from molestation, damages will be awarded if the fruit of the 
contract is not provided or if the contrary result is procured instead. If the law 
112 Ibid at p. 238. Lord Denning said that "[i]n a proper case damages for mental distress can be recovered 
in contract... One such case is a contract for a holiday or any other contract to provide entertainment and 
enjoyment". 
113 A. S. Burrows, supra n. 84 at p. 124. 
14 [1976] 1 QB 446. 
115 Ibid at p. 459. 
116 See the judgment of Kerr U in Perry v. Sidney Phillips [1982] 1 WLR 1297. 
117 [1976] Q. B. 585. 
"$ McCall v. Abelesz, [1976] QB 585,594. 
19 Summers v. Salford Corporation, [1943] AC 238; Godley v. Perry, [1960] 1 WLR 9. See also 
Elizabeth Macdonald, `Contractual Damages for Mental Distress' (1994) 7 JCL 134, n. 4. Damages for 
mental distress, which is related to physical injury, were awarded under the head "pain and suffering". See 
Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, London, 16th ed., 1997, p. 54; A. S. Burrows, supra n. 84 at 
p. 127. 
120 [1991] 4 All ER 937. 
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did not cater for this exceptional category of case it would be defective.... In 
cases not falling within this exceptional category, damages are... recoverable for 
physical inconvenience and discomfort caused by the breach and mental 
suffering directly related to that inconvenience and discomfort. " 121 
The above discussion shows that damages for mental distress may be allowed in certain 
cases. However, it should be noted that the decisions of the courts regarding the 
recoverability of such damages show no coherent attitude. For example, in Perry v 
Sidney Phillips & Son (a firm) 122 the Court of Appeal awarded damages for distress, 
worry, inconvenience and trouble which the plaintiff had suffered while living in the 
house he bought, owing to the defects which his surveyor had overlooked. In this case 
Lord Denning MR based his decision on the ground that such a distress was not too 
remote. 123 It was held that these losses were reasonably in the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of making the contract as not unlikely to result from this breach. 
However, in Watts and Another v. Morrow, 124 such damages were not awarded. In this 
case, the plaintiffs asked the defendant to provide a full structural survey of a house. The 
defendant's report revealed no more than defects which could be dealt with as a part of 
ordinary ongoing maintenance and repair. 125 In reliance upon this report the plaintiff 
bought the house. In fact there were major defects in the house. At first instance, it was 
found that the defendant had acted negligently since the report had not revealed such 
defects. The trial judge awarded damages for mental distress on the ground that the 
plaintiff asked for a structural survey in order to reassure that he will have peace of mind 
and freedom from distress after he buys the house. However, the Court of Appeal 
awarded the plaintiff for his financial loss' 26 but refused to award for the mental distress 
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence. The Court applied the 
general non-availability rule and found that this case cannot be classified under any of 
the exceptions to the general non-availability rule. The ordinary surveyor's contract does 
not undertake to provide peace of mind and freedom from distress; the distress was not 
121 Watts and Another v. Morrow, ibid at p. 960. 
122 [1982] 1 WLR 1297. 
123 Ibid at p. 1302. In this case, Kerr U based his award on the ground that the mental distress followed 
from the physical inconvenience caused by the breach. Kerr U applied the rule of the general non- 
availability of damages for mental distress. 
124 [1991] 4 All ER 937. 
125 Ibid at p. 941. 
126 In this case, the Court of Appeal refused to award the cost of cure which was awarded at first instance. 
Instead it awarded the diminution in value which was less than the cost of cure. 
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related to physical inconvenience. 127 Instead, the Court of Appeal awarded damages for 
physical inconvenience, which were less than the award for mental distress. 
5.5.1.3 Are Damages for Mental Distress Recoverable in a Breach of 
Warranty Action? 
In light of the above discussion, can the buyer recover damages for mental distress 
resulting from breach for warranty of quality? As discussed below, disallowing damages 
for mental distress may ignore the principle of . 
Robinson v. Harman. 128 In any case, 
where the distress is related to physical injury or inconvenience caused by breach of 
warranty of quality, the buyer may be allowed damages for such distress. Where the 
breach does not result in a physical inconvenience, the buyer may have a chance to 
recover for loss of pleasurable amenity where the main object of the contract is to 
provide pleasurable amenity. This is unlikely to be the case of commercial contract. 
However, in consumer contracts, the buyer may purchase a good, such as a mobile 
house (caravan), for the sake of relaxation and pleasurable amenity. In such a case, the 
buyer may be entitled to recover damages for loss of such pleasurable amenity caused by 
breach of contract. This was the case in Jackson v. Chrysler Acceptances Ltd. 129 where 
the buyer purchased a car which appeared defective and spoiled his holiday. The buyer 
made it clear, at the time of making the contract, that he will use the car in his holiday in 
France. The Court of Appeal allowed the buyer "the difference between [the] holiday as 
it could reasonably have been expected to be with a car in proper condition and with 
[the defective] car as it was...... 130 
In the recent case of Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v. Forsyth, 131 the House 
of Lords approved the award of damages for loss of pleasurable amenity resulting from 
breach of contract. The award of damages for loss of pleasurable amenity may be 
available in cases where such amenity is the predominant object of the contract. 132 
Thereupon, in a contract of purchase of a house, relaxation might be one of the purposes 
of the contract but not the main one. In such a case, if the potential relaxation has not 
127 Watts and Another v. Morrow, [1991] 4 All ER 937, pp. 954-8. 
128 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
129 [1978] RTR 474. 
130 Ibid at p. 481. The Court of Appeal held that the buyer's damages for spoiled holiday should be greater 
than the £75 awarded at first instance. 
131 [199611 AC 344. 
132 Elizabeth Macdonald, supra n. 119 at p. 145. 
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been obtained, by reason of the seller's breach, the purchaser may not recover damages 
for such a loss unless it is related to physical inconvenience. 133 
The award of damages for loss of pleasurable amenity is intended to compensate the 
buyer for the loss of the object of the contract caused by the breach of seller. Therefore, 
it is not an award for mental distress resulting from the breach of contract. Nevertheless, 
in Ruxley, Lord Lloyd stated that Addis "established the general rule that in claims for 
breach of contract, the plaintiff cannot recover damages for his injured feelings. "134 
However, his Lordship disallowed the application of such a rule in cases where the 
object of the contract is to afford a pleasure. However, such a view that Addis 
established the rule of non-availability of damages for non-pecuniary loss was soon 
overruled by Lord Steyn in Malik v. BCCI135 as previously explained. 136 
So, can the buyer recover damages for mental distress resulting from breach of contract 
where the breach does not cause any physical injury or inconvenience provided that the 
contract is not intended to provide pleasurable amenity? For example, suppose that the 
buyer has contracted with a restaurant to provide food for the guests at his wedding 
ceremony. Suppose further that the food appeared to be defective and the guests suffered 
physical injury due to the defective quality of the food. In such a case, the guests might 
be able to sue the restaurant in a tort action. However, our concern here is whether the 
buyer can sue the restaurant in a contract action for mental distress. 137 In fact, in the 
light of the inconsistency in the law reports, one may not be able to provide a clear-cut 
answer to this question. It is difficult to assume that the English Court will allow such 
damages under the normal restrictions imposed upon the recoverability of damages. 
Here, it is convenient to examine the American Authority before I conclude whether or 
not such damages should be generally available under the normal restrictions. 
133 Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd. [1973] QB 233. 
134 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v. Forsyth, [1996] 1 AC 344,374. 
135 [1998] AC 20. 
136 Supra, p. 182. 
137 If the contract in such a case is intended to provide pleasure, the buyer may be entitled to recover 
damages for mental distress suffered by him and his guests. See Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd. [1975] 
1 WLR 1468. 
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5.5.1.4 The Position in American Law 
Although Section 2-714 of the UCC allows damages for all losses resulting from breach 
of warranty, all American jurisdictions adopt the general non-recoverability rule. 
However, it seems well settled that such damages are recoverable, in principle, in cases 
of loss of enjoyment or entertainment. 138 Furthermore, damages for mental distress may 
be awarded in cases where such a distress follows from bodily injury. For example, in 
Wellcraft Marine, Inc. v. Zarzour, 139 it was held that damages for mental distress can be 
awarded exceptionally where the breach is tortious or is attended with personal injury, 
or where the contractual duty is coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude. 
A comparison between English and American law shows that the latter has gone a step 
forward in allowing damages for mental distress. It is clear that damages for mental 
distress are awarded under American law in the cases where the recoverability of such 
damages is not debatable under English law. In addition, damages for mental distress 
can be recovered where such a distress is too severe. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts allows damages for mental distress in two situations, 140 i. e. where mental 
distress follows from physical harm or where the breach is of such a kind that serious 
emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result. For example, in Joyce Ruth Wise 
v. General Motors Corp., 141 it was held that damages for mental distress are generally 
unavailable in a contract action except in cases where there is bodily injury or where 
serious mental distress was likely to result. Here, it should be noted that the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts does not impose the application of the remoteness principle on 
the recovery of damages for mental distress. 142 Therefore, in certain cases, damages for 
mental distress, resulting from a breach of contract, can be awarded regardless of 
whether or not such a distress is too remote. 143 
138 For example, in Martel v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 1968 Mich. App. LEXIS 787; 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 294 
(1968) where the buyer purchased an applesause which appeared inedible, he was awarded damages for 
loss of enjoyment of eating the applesause. See also McManus v. Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc. 1983 La. App. 
LEXIS 8607; 433 So. 2d 854 (1983) where the buyer was allowed damages for mental distress, resulting 
from the defective quality of the goods purchased. The court found that the intellectual enjoyment, which 
was the main object of the contract, was frustrated by the breach. 
139 1990 Ala. LEXIS 1156; 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 109 (1990). 
140 Restatement (Second) of Contracts [1981] §353 provides "Recovery for emotional disturbance will be 
excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind that 
serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result. " 
141 1984 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 15275; 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 900 (1984). 
142 The UCC does not impose the application of the remoteness principle to the recovery of damages for 
physical loss. 
143 In a non-UCC case, B& MHomes, Inc. v. Hogan, 1979 Ala. LEXIS 3570; 376 So. 2d 667 (1979), the 
Supreme Court of Albama awarded damages for mental distress resulting from breach of contract of 
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There seems to be inconsistencies among the American jurisdictions regarding the 
availability of damages for mental distress. The exceptions provided by the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts can widely or strictly be construed. For example, in Volkswagen 
of Am., Inc. v. Dillard, 144 a buyer of a new mobile home was awarded damages for 
mental distress resulting from the seller's breach of an express warranty. In this case the 
buyer had suffered numerous problems with the vehicle over a period of almost two 
years. Probably one can justify such an award under the second exception stated by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 145 However, in Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North 
America, Inc., lab a buyer of a defective automobile was not awarded damages for mental 
distress under Section 2-715 of the UCC on the grounds that this section does not 
include recompense for mental suffering independent from physical injury. 147 
Occasionally, damages for mental distress were awarded exceptionally on the grounds 
of public policy. For example, in Bogner v. General Motors Corp., 148 the buyer was 
awarded damages for her emotional harm resulting from a delay in her vacation caused 
by the failure of the manufacturer to supply a reasonably prompt warranty service. In 
this case the Court indicated that such damages are normally not awarded, in cases of 
breach of contract, without an accompanying tort. However, the Court did award 
damages for emotional harm on the ground that public policy favours the award of such 
damages in that case. Furthermore, in other cases, mental distress was dealt with as a 
purchase of a house which appeared defective. In this case, the Court found that the mental distress was 
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of making the contract. Upon that, the court awarded 
damages for the mental distress. This case was discussed in G. I. Wallach, supra n. 28 at p. 283; R. R. 
Anderson, supra n. 24 at p. 465. Similarly, see Rogowicz v. Taylor & Gray Inc., 1973 Texas App. LEXIS 
2658; 498 S. W. 2d 352 (1973) discussed in M. J. Staff `the Consequences of Consequential Damages: a 
Survey of Buyer's Damages under Chapter 2' (1982) 45 Tex. B. J. 1211,1214. 
144 1991 Ala. LEXIS 214; 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 475 (1991). 
145 The second exception of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is concerned with the severity of 
damage. Damages are unlikely to be recovered for mere embarrassment. See Hobbley v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13366; 450 So. 2d 332 (1984) where the buyer contracted with the seller to 
supply and install furnace in home, the buyer was entitled to recover damages for physical discomfort 
caused by absence of furnace during the winter but not for embarrassment incurred as result of heating 
house with space heaters when guests visited. 
146 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 218; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 99 (1994). See also Burnell v. Morning Star 
Homes, Inc. 1985 N. Y. App. Div. LEXIS 53337; 494 N. Y. S. 2d 237 (1985). 
'a' A. M. Squillante and J. R. Fonseca, Williston on Sales, Vol. 3,4th ed., 1996, pp. 978,1021. See also 
Stratton-Baldwin Co. v. Brown, 1977 La. App. LEXIS 4680; 343 So 2d 292 (1977) where the buyer was 
not entitled to recover damages for mental distress resulting from breach of warranty of quality of 
carpeting and flooring material. 
148 1982 N. Y. Misc. LEXIS 4090; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 466 (1982). See also Deitsch v. Music Co., 1983 
Ohio Misc. LEXIS 379; 6 Ohio Misc. 2d 6 (1983). 
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kind of personal injury. For example, in Hirst v. Elgin Mental Casket Co., 149 the United 
States District Court of Montana allowed damages for mental distress under Section 2- 
715 of the UCC on the ground that mental distress is a kind of personal injury. 
Furthermore, in Liberty Homes, Inc. v. Epperson, 150 where the buyer purchased a mobile 
home which appeared defective, the buyer sought to recover $191,174.70, as damages, 
for mental distress, the cost of the mobile home and the expenses he incurred to move to 
another house. The cost of the mobile home was $25,982.50. Therefore, the claimed 
damages were mostly for the mental distress. The Supreme Court of Alabama allowed 
this claim for damages for mental distress. In this case, the Court made it clear that 
damages for mental distress are recoverable in cases where the parties contemplate that 
the breach will reasonably or necessarily result in such a distress. The Court added that 
this can be the case where the contractual duty is coupled with matters of mental 
concern or with the feelings of the party to whom the obligation is owed. 
Damages for mental distress are awarded exceptionally. In other words, the court 
usually categorizes the case under an exception to the general rule of the non- 
recoverability of damages for mental distress. Such a rule applies under all the 
jurisdictions of the USA. To my knowledge, there has been no reported case where 
damages for mental distress were allowed under the normal restrictions without 
categorizing it under one of the exceptions to the general non-recoverability rule. 
However, such a rule may not apply strictly in all cases, especially in the State of 
Alabama. In the recent case of Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, '5' where a buyer 
of a new car suffered anxiety and depression due to the car being unsafe to drive, the 
Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the award of $8000 for the mental distress caused by 
the defective quality of the car. 152 The Court stated that damages for mental distress are 
generally unavailable. The case was categorized under the exception that the seller's 
149 1977 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 13366; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 47 (1977). The case involved a sale of a casket 
which was warranted to be water tight for three months. The casket appeared defective. It was held that 
the word `person' embraces the mind as well as the body. Therefore, anxiety or depression does a damage 
to the person. 
150 1991 Ala. LEXIS 350; 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1105 (1991). 
151 1991 Ala. LEXIS 214; 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 475 (1991). See R. A. Walker, `Damages Recoverable 
for Mental Anguish arising from Breach of Warranty in the Sale of Automobile' (1992) 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 
417. 
152 However, in Joyce Ruth Wise v. General Motors Corp. 1984 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 15275; 39 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 900 (1984) the plaintiff could not recover damages for mental distress caused by breach of 
warranties in contract for sale of automobile. 
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contractual obligation was coupled with mental concern or solicitude or with the 
feelings of the buyer. In fact, it is very hard to see why the case was categorized under 
such an exception. Most likely, the case was decided exceptionally under its own facts. 
The seller, in this case, admitted his liability for the anxiety suffered by the buyer. 
To sum up, the rule of the general non-recoverability of damages for mental distress 
seems not to have a strict application in the American courts. In other words, the courts 
seem to be flexible in categorizing the cases under the exceptions to the rule where 
justice requires that. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the rule of the general 
non-recoverability of damages for mental distress is still applicable in the American 
courts. The rule seems to be a matter of policy. The following section will argue that 
there seems to be no point in disallowing compensatory damages for mental distress in 
cases where such a damage, i. e. the distress, complies with the normal restrictions 
imposed on the recovery of damages. 
5.5.1.5 Final Note: the General Non-Recoverability Rule does not Comply 
with the Principle of Robinson v Harman 
The restricted approach of awarding compensatory damages for mental distress 
apparently clashes with a basic principle of the common law. In Robinson v. Harman, 153 
Parke B said that "[t]he rule of the common law is that where a party sustains a loss by 
reason of breach of contract he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same 
situation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. " 154 Awarding 
the aggrieved party damages for mental distress seems to be the only available way to 
help him to recover from such a distress. By depriving him from receiving such 
damages, he cannot be put in the same situation that he would have been in if the 
contract had not been breached. Here, it seems that the approach of the courts in this 
respect is one of policy. 155 However, the courts left this policy unclear. 
156 
153 (1848) 1 Exch. 850. 
154 Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 1 Exch. 850,855. 
Iss See the judgment of Staughton in Hayes and another v James & Charles Dodd (a firm) [1990] 2 All 
ER 815 at p. 824. 
156 MP Furmston, `Damages - Diminution in Value or Cost of Repair? - Damages 
for Distress' (1993) 6 
JCL 64,66. See also David Yates, `Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss' (1973) 36 MLR 535,538. 
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It is true that damages for mental distress are hard to quantify. It seems very hard to give 
an accurate way of assessing the money value of non-pecuniary losses in general. 157 But 
this practical difficulty should not prevent the recovery in principle. 158 Damages for 
mental distress can be quantified in the same way of assessing other forms or heads of 
damages for non-pecuniary losses. A party who has broken his contract should not be 
permitted, in principle, to escape liability because of the difficulty of quantifying such 
damages. One may also suggest that mental distress is hard to prove. "But difficulties of 
159 proof cannot alter the legal principles' 
One may also argue that mental distress may always result from breach of contract and, 
hence, the buyer may always claim damages for such a distress. Consequently, the 
seller's cost of insurance may increase due to the increased risk of liability in case of 
breach; and as a result, the prices will rise. Well, it is doubtful that this would be the 
case in commercial contracts especially where the buyer is a company. The company has 
no feelings. In such a case, mental distress cannot be in the reasonable contemplation of 
the parties as not unlikely to result from the breach. Even in other commercial cases, 
allowing the buyer, as damages, his economic loss may relieve him. 160 However, the 
consumer buyer may suffer mental distress due to defective goods. Here it should be 
noted that the awards for mental distress are normally modest. In consumer cases, it is 
likely that parties to a consumer sale contract reasonably contemplate that mental 
distress is not unlikely to result from breach of warranty of quality. However, contrary to 
the opinion of Treitel, 161 the mere contemplation does indicate that the buyer accepts the 
157 In Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786, Fletcher Moulton LJ pointed out, at p. 795, that "where it is clear 
there has been actual loss resulting from the breach of contract, which it is difficult to estimate in money, 
it is for the jury to do their best to estimate; it is not necessary that there should be an absolute measure of 
damages in each case. There are no doubt well-settled rules as to the measure of damages in certain cases, 
but such accepted rules are only applicable where the breach is one that frequently occurs. In such cases 
the Court weighs the pros and cons and gives advice, and I may almost say directions, to the jury as 
regards the measure of damages. This is especially the case in actions relating to the sale of goods for 
which there is an active and ready market. But in most cases it may be said that there is no recognized 
measure of damages, and that the jury must give what they think to be an adequate solatium under all the 
circumstances of the case. " 
i58 Nelson Enonchong , supra n. 
104 at p. 629. 
159 Malik v. BCCI [ 1998] AC 20,53 per Lord Steyn. 
160 D. J. Whaley, `Paying for the Agony: the Recovery of Mental distress Damages in Contract Actions' 
(1992) 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 935,954. 
161 G 
. 
H. Treitel, Law of Contract, 10th ed., 1999,923. See also the American case of Hatfield v. Max 
Rouse & Sons Northwest, 1980 Ida. LEXIS 394; 100 Idaho 840 (1980). In this case, an auctioneer sold 
the plaintiff's property at an amount far less than that agreed upon. The plaintiff, as a result, suffered 
mental distress. It was held that plaintiff is not entitled to damages for his mental distress. The Court said 
"of course, the breach of any contract which the parties consider important predictably will lead to some 
mental distress. Life in the competitive commercial world has at least equal capacity to bestow ruin as 
benefit, and it is presumed that those who enter this world do so willingly, accepting the risk of 
193 
risk of mental distress. Indeed, "the injured party does not accept the risk of anxiety... 
any more than he accepts the risk of other damage. " 162 
It can be argued that this will lead the court to open its door to any claim, however 
trivial, due to the fact that the breach may always cause trivial mental distress. However, 
triviality should not justify the prohibition of recovery in principle. Even if we accept 
such an opinion, one should not ignore cases where severe mental distress results from 
the breach. As previously mentioned, the American Restatement (Second) of contracts 
allows damages for severe mental distress. Strictly, it seems extremely unjust to 
disallow the buyer damages for severe mental distress resulting from breach of warranty 
of quality where such a non-pecuniary loss complies with the normal restrictions 
imposed upon the recovery of damages. The human is not only made of flesh and blood. 
The human is full of emotions and feelings that should be treated as part of the body. 
Indeed, as the United States District Court of Montana put it, "the person" includes 
mental states which may, like physical states, be injured as a consequence of a breach of 
warranty. 163 The recoverability of damages for physical loss is beyond question; 
thereupon, damages for mental distress should be recoverable. In this view, I do not find 
any justification for the anxiety of the courts, whether in England or the United States, 
regarding the recoverability of damages for mental distress resulting from a breach of 
contract. 
Finally, it should be noted that the tendency of the English Court is not to award a large 
sum for such a loss. Damages for non-pecuniary losses "should be on a scale which is 
not excessive but modest. "164 Personally, I think that the buyer should not be entitled to 
excessive damages for mental distress resulting from the breach of warranty of quality. 
Of course, the amount of damages depends on whether the distress is normal or severe. 
However, where the distress does not cause any illness which requires treatment, it is 
encountering the former as part of the cost of achieving the latter. Absent clear evidence to the contrary 
we will not presume that the parties to a contract such as the one before us meant to ensure each other's 
emotional tranquility. " However, with many respects, the question should be whether or not the aggrieved 
party accepted, at the time of making the contract, to suffer mental distress as a result of the breach by the 
other party. The mere fact that the breach may always cause mental distress does not, by itself, justify the 
denial of damages for such a mental distress. 
162 Nelson Enonchong, supra n. 104 at p. 630. 
163 Hirst v. Elgin Mental Casket Co. 1977 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 13366; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 47 (1977). See 
A. M. Squillante and J. R. Fonseca, supra n. 147 at p. 978. 
164 Watts and Another v. Morrow [1991] 4 All ER 937,945 per Ralph Gibson LJ. 
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hard to accept the large awards such as the awards in the aforementioned American 
cases. 
Conclusions 
The English courts seem to be strict in allowing damages for non-pecuniary losses such 
as mental distress. However, the buyer should be entitled to recover for all losses under 
the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. Ignoring certain types of 
non-pecuniary damage caused by the seller's breach means that the buyer will not be 
fully compensated under the principle of Robinson v. Harman. 165 It is submitted that 
damages should be allowed for mental distress under the normal restrictions. It was 
argued that mental distress is unlikely to result in commercial cases. Under English law, 
as it stands at present, damages for mental distress are exceptionally recoverable in cases 
where the contract is intended to provide mainly pleasurable amenity or free from 
distress or where mental distress follows from personal injury or physical inconvenience 
caused by the breach of contract. 
A comparison between English law and American law shows that the latter has gone a 
step forward regarding the recoverability of damages for mental distress. The general 
non-recoverability rule exists in all the jurisdictions of the USA. The exceptions to this 
rule under English law can also be found in all the American jurisdiction. However, the 
American Restatement (Second) of Contracts takes a further step to allow such damages 
where the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance is a particularly 
likely result. 
However, English courts seem to have better attitude than American courts in cases of 
physical inconvenience. Under English law, damages for physical inconvenience can be 
recovered under the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. However, 
there seems to be inconsistency among the several American jurisdictions regarding 
cases where physical inconvenience is not severe or does not follow from bodily injury. 
It is submitted that there is no reason to deal with cases of physical inconvenience 
differently. Under Section 2-714 of the UCC, damages should be allowed for the 
damage caused by the seller's breach of warranty. Therefore, damages for physical 
inconvenience should be allowed under the normal restrictions. 
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American law seems also to be different from English law in relation to the application 
of the remoteness principle. Unlike English law, American law does not apply the 
remoteness principles to cases of physical damage. Under Section 2-715(2-b) of the 
UCC, damages for physical damage can be recovered if such a damage proximately 
results from the breach. However, it was argued that ignoring the remoteness principle 
may lead to unlimited liability. This may increase the cost of production as the seller's 
insurance will be higher. Moreover, the seller will be in an insecure position as he will 
be liable for physical losses resulting under special circumstances, which he was not 
aware of at the time of making the contract. 
Although English law, unlike American law, applies the remoteness principle to all 
types of loss resulting from defective quality, the principle may apply in tort and 
contract differently. Here, Lord Denning's view is to be preferred. It does not seem 
sensible to consider the same loss as not remote in tort and as too remote in contract. 
Indeed, where an action can be brought in contract or tort for the same loss, the 
remoteness principle should apply similarly under both actions. 
As regards the CISG, it can be noted that the recoverability of damages for mental 
distress and physical inconvenience seems to be beyond the scope of its application. 
Comment 3 to Article 74 makes it clear that the purpose of damages is to compensate 
the aggrieved party for his financial loss. Therefore, the issue is left to be decided under 
the applicable domestic law. Furthermore, the recoverability of damages for personal 
injury is beyond the scope of the CISG. This can simply be understood from the words 
of Article 5 of the Convention. This is due to the differences between the different legal 
systems regarding the recoverability of damages for personal injury. Nevertheless, it is 
still debatable whether the buyer can claim damages, under the CISG, for his liability to 
the sub-buyer who suffered personal injury caused by the defective quality of goods. 
Some legal writers argue that such a claim is for money loss and not for personal injury; 
thus, it is within the scope of the Convention. However, it was argued that Article 5 
excludes the applicability of the Convention to cases of personal injury suffered by any 
person. The sub-buyer may not be allowed to sue the seller under the Convention due to 
the application of the privity requirement. Therefore, it was submitted that the words of 
165 (1848) 1 Exch. 850. 
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Article 5 can only be construed in a way to exclude the application of the Convention to 
cases where the buyer claims damages for his personal injury or for his liability to a 
third party who suffered personal injury caused by the defective quality of the goods. 
However, the exclusion of the applicability of the Convention under Article 5 does not 
include cases of property damage. Damages for property loss resulting from breach of 
warranty of quality can be recoverable under the normal restrictions imposed upon the 
recovery of damages. 
Finally, this chapter dealt with the question of whether the buyer can claim damages in 
tort under the applicable domestic law in areas governed by the CISG. It was argued that 
the buyer should not be allowed to resort to the applicable domestic law in order to 
bring an action in tort in areas governed by the CISG. This opinion took into account the 
international aspect of the Convention and the purpose for which the Convention was 
founded. Allowing the buyer to bring a tort action under the applicable domestic law 
seems a direct attack on the uniformity purpose of the CISG. It is submitted that where 
the CISG is applicable, it becomes the only law which governs the dispute between the 




Liability of Remote Seller: 
Recoverability of Damages for Third Party's Loss 
"In the world of modem commerce, where people rely 
on nationally advertised brand names to buy goods that 
the retailer never altered, inspected, or recommended, 
it is realistic to say... that there is a bargain of sorts 
between buyer and manufacturer. "' 
Introduction 
As the previous chapters were concerned with the proper amount of damages that the 
buyer should receive, this chapter takes a further step to ensure that the buyer is not left 
uncompensated for the losses caused by the defective quality of goods. The chapter 
argues that the strict application of the privity doctrine may leave the buyer 
uncompensated and allow the person responsible for the loss to escape liability. The 
privity requirement should be relaxed in order to ensure that the person responsible for 
the loss bears liability for it. 
Buyers may be unaware of the defective quality of the goods that they sell to sub-buyers. 
Where the sub-buyer suffers physical loss, he may bring an action in tort against the 
original seller. This chapter will show that the privity restriction does not apply where 
the action is brought in tort. However, the tort action is not available in cases of purely 
economic loss resulting from defective goods. As will be discussed, damages for 
economic loss, which is not consequent on physical loss, can only be recovered in a 
contract action. There seem to be difficulties in determining what constitutes economic 
loss in cases of `complex items'. Where the sub-buyer suffers economic loss, resulting 
from breach of warranty of quality, the question becomes whether the sub-buyer can 
bring a direct contract action against the seller. (Diagram A) In answering this question, 
it seems necessary to see whether the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
applies to sale of goods cases. 
1 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111.2d 69,99 (1982) per Simon J. 
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Where warranties are issued by parties to string contracts, liability for breach of such 
warranties may pass up the chain until it reaches the original seller. However, in certain 
cases, liability cannot reach the original seller through this method and, as a result, the 
original seller escapes liability. Such a method may lead to unfairness in some cases. 
Some of the American jurisdictions avoid such a method by relaxing the rigour of the 
requirement of privity. In certain cases, such jurisdictions allow the ultimate buyer to 
file a claim in contract against the remote seller. It is intended to find out whether the 
remote seller should be liable for losses suffered by the ultimate buyer due to breach of 
implied or express warranty. 
In modern commerce, ways of marketing products are rapidly increasing. Manufacturers 
may warrant the quality of their products through advertisements in order to promote 
their purchase. Manufacturers may use wide expressions that may be misleading. In 
most cases, the enforceability of the remote seller's representation is uncertain. It is 
intended to prove that the remote seller should be contractually liable for breach of his 
representation regarding the quality of the goods. (Diagram B) The remote seller can be 
a manufacturer, importer, wholesaler, distributor or any seller in chain contracts who is 
not privy to the purchase contract with the ultimate buyer. 
Beneficiaries, other than the ultimate buyer, are not in a direct contractual relationship 
with the retailer. Can the warranty, issued by a retailer, extend to other beneficiaries? 
Can the ultimate buyer recover damages for losses suffered by a third party beneficiary? 
(Diagram C) In answering this question, one needs to consider the decision of the House 
of Lords in St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. 2 Where the 
remote seller's warranty is legally binding, can beneficiaries, other than the ultimate 
buyer, sue the remote seller under the warranty theory? (Diagram D) 
Z [1994] 1 AC 85. 
199 
Seller 
Can the subbuyer sue the 
original seller in contract foii 
losses resulting from breach 
of warranty of quality? If ye, 
in what circumstances? 
Can the ultimate buyer sue the 
remote seller for breach of 
express warranty of quality 
issued by the remote seller 
to him? In other words, is 
the warranty issued by the 
remote seller to the ultimate 
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6.1 Liability of Remote Seller for Losses Suffered by the Ultimate Buyer 
Under the classic rules of contract law, the aggrieved party cannot bring a contract suit 
unless he is a privy to the breached contract. 3 In Winterbottom v. Wright, 4 where an 
injured coachman sued a third party who had contracted to maintain the coach, the Court 
rejected the claim on the ground of lack of privity. In this case, Lord Abinger pointed 
out that unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who 
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no 
limit, would ensue. 5 The privity requirement, stated in this case, was carried by 
American jurists into cases of claims against remote sellers. 6 The doctrine of privity in 
contract law has become firmly established in Tweedle v. Atkinson? where a third party 
could not enforce a contract made for his benefit. 
The privity doctrine does not apply in tort. Therefore, where the ultimate buyer suffers 
physical loss, resulting from breach of warranty of quality, he may sue the remote seller 
in tort. In the landmark case of Donoghue v. Stevenson8 the House of Lords held that the 
manufacturer may be liable for a third party for physical injury caused by his defective 
products. In this case,. Lord Atkin restricted the applicability of Winterbottom v. Wright, 9 
to cases where the aggrieved party brings a claim in contract. In this sense, one may 
state that the impact of Donoghue is to disallow the application of privity doctrine to tort 
cases and insists on its application to contract cases. In distinguishing the case of 
Winterbottom, Lord Atkin pointed out that "[i]t is to be observed that no negligence 
apart from breach of contract was alleged-in other words, no duty was alleged other 
than the duty arising out of the contract.... The argument of the defendant was that... the 
wrong arose merely out of the breach of a contract and that only a party to the contract 
3 However, such privity requirement may not apply in certain States of the USA. See infra p. 253. See, for 
example, Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 548 (D. Conn. 1981); Lang v. General 
Motors Corporation, 1967 N. D. LEXIS 128; 136 N. W. 2d 805 (1967); Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co., 
1977 Nev. LEXIS 476; 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 568 (1977); Kassab v. Central Soya, 1968 Pa. LEXIS 507; 5 
UCC Rep. Serv. 925 (1968). 
4 [1842] 10 M. &W. 110; 152 ER 402. 
5 Winterbottom v. Wright, [1842] 10 M. & W. 110; 152 ER 402,405. 
6 W. K. Lewis, `Towards a Theory of Strict "Claim" Liability: Warranty Relief for Advertising 
Representations' 47 Ohio St. L. J. 671,673. See the UCC case of Hardesty v. Andro Corp. -Webster Div. 
555 P. 2d 1030 (Okla. 1976), where the owner of an apartment building contracted with the a 
subcontractor for installation of an air conditioning system, the owner could not sue the manufacturer 
under the warranty theory due to the application of the privity doctrine. See also Gold 'n Plump Poultry, 
Inc. v. Simmons Engineering Co. 805 F. 2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1986); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc. 548 
P. 2d 279 (Alaska 1976). 
7 (1861) 1B&S 393. 
8 [1932] AC 562. 
9 [1842] 10 M. & W. 110; 152 ER 402. 
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could sue. "10 This rule can be found under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, which allows the ultimate buyer in certain cases to sue the manufacturer for 
physical losses suffered by defective goods. l l 
Where physical damage results from breach of contract, the aggrieved party may have 
the choice to sue in contract, tort or both. 12 The question here is whether there is a 
contractual relationship between the remote seller and the ultimate buyer. As discussed 
below, in most cases, the answer to this question seems to be in the negative. Clearly, in 
the absence of such a contractual relationship, the ultimate buyer may not be left without 
remedy for his physical loss caused by the defective quality of the goods. In such a case, 
he may bring an action in tort against the remote seller. Under the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987 (henceforth CPA) the buyer need not prove negligence. In other words, the 
liability of the remote seller under the CPA is strict. As the CPA is concerned with the 
safety of the goods, it has no application to cases where the buyer suffers purely 
economic loss. 
It seems well settled that where economic loss is consequent on physical loss, the buyer 
may bring a tort action for such an economic loss. 13 However, the buyer is not entitled 
to recover damages in tort for purely economic loss. 14 Therefore, the only way for the 
10 Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932 AC 562,589. 
11 Section 402A(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: "... One who sells any product in a 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the 
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user 
or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold... ". See R. E. Speidel, `Product 
Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC' (1973) 40 Tennessee Law Review 309; R. G. Fehrenbacher, 
`Product Liability: Recovery of Economic Loss in California' (1977) 13 Cal. W. L. Rev. 297,299. 
12 In the recent case of Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd. [1995] 2 AC 145, the House of Lords made 
it clear that the aggrieved party may have the choice to sue in tort and contract for the same loss. 
13 See Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd. and Others, [1986] 1 QB 507. As for the American 
law, see, as an example, Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S. W. 2d 320; 24 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 555 (Tex. 1978) where it was held that damages for economic loss consequent on physical damage, 
resulting from a breach of contract, can be awarded under the strict liability theory. 
14 See Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church 
Commissioners [1989] AC 177. See also D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, `Privity, Transitivity and 
Rationality' (1991) 54 MLR 48,49. Under the American law, this was made clear in the decision in East 
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 752 F. 2d 903 (3d Cir. 1985) where the Court made 
it clear that damages for purely economic loss are not available in tort. See also Arkwright-Boston 
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 844 F. 2d 1174,6 UCC Rep. Serv. 
2d 73 (5th Cir. 1988); Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F. 2d 925,5 UCC 2d 59 (5th 
Cir. 1987); King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F. 2d 1047,6 UCC2d 1424 (3d Cir. 1988); Nobility Homes of 
Texas, Inc. v. Schivers, 557 S. W. 2d 77,22 UCC Rep. Serv. 621 (Tex. 1977); T. A. Diamond and H. Foss, 
`Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale' (1994) 63 
Fordham L. Rev. 665,676; Stephen J. Leacock, `A General Conspectus of American Law on Product 
Liability' in American Business Law, 1989,273 at 278; C. S. D'Angelo, `the Economic Loss Doctrine: 
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buyer to recover for his economic loss is to bring an action in contract. The case may be 
complicated where the buyer suffers physical and economic losses resulting from the 
breach of warranty of quality. Where the goods are defective, the buyer may suffer 
economic loss which consists of the diminution in value of the goods' 5 and any loss of 
profit resulting from the deficiency in the productive capacity of the goods. The buyer 
may also suffer physical loss resulting from the defective quality of the goods and 
financial loss consequent on such a physical loss. The question here is whether the buyer 
can bring a tort action to recover for all such losses. This issue rose in Muirhead v. 
Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd. and Others. 16 In this case, the plaintiff was a wholesale 
fish merchant. He had entered into a contract for the installation of pumps in order to 
use them in his lobster farm. The pumps did not function properly due to their defective 
quality. As a result the plaintiff lost his entire stock of lobsters. The plaintiff brought an 
action in tort against inter alia the manufacturer, who had supplied the electrical motors 
for the pumps, to recover for his physical damage, i. e. the loss of stock, and his 
economic loss. The Court of Appeal awarded the plaintiff damages for his physical loss 
and the financial loss that was consequent on the physical loss, i. e. the loss of the stock 
of lobsters and the loss of profit on the sale of the lost lobsters. However, the plaintiff's 
claim for purely economic loss was not successful. The Court did not allow the plaintiff 
to recover damages for the diminution in value of the pumps and loss of profit that he 
would have made from the installation if the pumps had been free of defects. The Court 
held that damages for purely economic loss are not available in tort. 
It is obvious that the buyer cannot bring an action in tort to recover damages for the 
diminution in value of the goods supplied. 17 This was well explained by Lord Bridge of 
Harwich in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council. 18 In this case, the plaintiff purchased 
a semi-detached house from a construction company. The house was constructed on a 
concrete raft foundation. The plans and calculations for the raft foundations were 
Saving Contract Warranty Law from Drowning in a Sea of Torts' (1995) 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 591,592; 
D. B. Gaebler, `Negligence, Economic Loss, and the UCC' (1986) 61 Ind. L. J. 593,623. 
is Under English law and all the American jurisdictions, damages cannot be recovered in tort for 
diminution in value of the goods supplied. See K. S. French, `Tort and Contract: Pennsylvania Denies a 
Products Liability Claim for Economic Loss resulting from a Product Damaged as a Result of its own 
Defect' (1989) 9 J. L. & Com. 99. 
16 [1986] 1 QB 507. 
17 In cases where the goods deteriorate due to their own defect, the buyer may not recover in tort for such 
a loss. The only loss here is economic which cannot be compensated in tort. See A. G. Guest, Chitty on 
Contracts, London, Vol. 1,28th ed., 1999, para. 19-033. 
18 [1991] 1 AC 398. 
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approved by the local council. The house appeared seriously defective due to serious 
cracks; the house foundation appeared defective and the differential settlement beneath 
it had caused it to distort. The plaintiff brought an action against the council claiming 
that it was liable for the consulting engineers' negligence in recommending approval of 
the plans and alleging that he and his family had suffered an imminent risk to health and 
safety because gas and soil pipes had broken and there was a risk of further breaks. The 
House of Lords held that the plaintiff's loss was purely economic as dangerous defect 
once known became merely a defect in quality, which is purely economic loss. Damages 
for such a loss cannot be recovered in a tort action. In this case, Lord Bridge of Harwich 
said 
"[i]f a manufacturer negligently puts into circulation a chattel containing a latent 
defect which renders it dangerous to persons or property, the manufacturer, on 
the well-known principles established by Donoghue v Stevenson [ 1932] AC 562, 
[1932] All ER 1, will be liable in tort for injury to persons or damage to property 
which the chattel causes. But if a manufacturer produces and sells a chattel 
which is merely defective in quality, even to the extent that it is valueless for the 
purpose for which it is intended, the manufacturer's liability at common law 
arises only under and by reference to the terms of any contract to which he is a 
party in relation to the chattel; the common law does not impose on him any 
liability in tort to persons to whom he owes no duty in contract but who, having 
acquired the chattel, suffer economic loss because the chattel is defective in 
quality. If a dangerous defect in a chattel is discovered before it causes any 
personal injury or damage to property, because the danger is now known and 
the chattel cannot be safely used unless the defect is repaired, the defect 
becomes merely a defect in quality. The chattel is either capable of repair at 
economic cost or it is worthless and must be scrapped. In either case the loss 
sustained by the owner or hirer of the chattel is purely economic. It is 
recoverable against any party who owes the loser a relevant contractual duty. But 
it is not recoverable in tort in the absence of a special relationship of proximity 
imposing on the tortfeasor a duty of care to safeguard the plaintiff from 
economic loss. There is no such special relationship between the manufacturer 
of a chattel and a remote owner or hirer. "19 [Emphasis added] 
Two main questions may be raised by the decision in Murphy. Firstly, What does purely 
economic loss mean in the context of complex structure or complex chattel? Secondly, 
where expenses incurred to avoid risk of property damage, can such expenses be 
recovered in a tort action? 
In complex structure or complex chattel, a defective part of a structure or chattel may 
cause damage to another part of the same structure or chattel. The question here is 
19 Ibid, p. 475. 
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whether such a damage can be regarded as a purely economic loss or as a damage to 
other property for the purpose of application of Donoghue v. Stevenson20 principle. 21 In 
Murphy Lord Bridge of Harwich distinguished between two parts of the structure, i. e. 
the part which can be regarded as part of the structure itself, such as the foundations of 
building and the part which is incorporated in the building such as a boiler or electrical 
installation. 22 Under such a distinction, the damage caused to the whole structure by the 
failure of the first part can be regarded as economic loss whereas the damage caused to 
the structure by the failure of the second part can be regarded as property damage for the 
purpose of application of Donoghue principle. Therefore, where a television explodes 
and causes damage to the buyer's property, the buyer may bring a tort action against the 
manufacturer to recover for the property damage. 
Applying the distinction drawn by Lord Bridge of Harwich to cases of sale of "complex 
items" may not be as easy as in cases of complex structure. For example, suppose that 
due to a defective tyre of a car, the car was damaged. Can the buyer of the car sue the 
manufacturer of the tyre for the damaged car? Under the classification of Lord Bridge of 
Harwich, if the defective foundations of a house caused damage to the whole house, the 
damage will be regarded as purely economic loss which cannot be recovered in a tort 
action. 23 In this sense, the damage caused to the car by the defective tyre may be 
considered as purely economic loss. However, one may argue that in sale of "complex 
20 [1932] AC 562. 
21 Supra, p. 202. 
22 Lord Bridge of Harwich, in Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398,478, said "[a] 
critical distinction must be drawn here between some part of a complex structure which is said to be a 
`danger' only because it does not perform its proper function in sustaining the other parts and some 
distinct item incorporated in the structure which positively malfunctions so as to inflict positive damage 
on the structure in which it is incorporated. Thus, if a defective central heating boiler explodes and 
damages a house or defective electrical installation malfunctions and sets the house on fire, I see no reason 
to doubt that the owner of the house, if he can prove that the damage was due to the negligence of the 
boiler manufacturer in the one case or the electrical contractor in the other, can recover damages in tort on 
Donoghue v Stevenson principles. But the position in law is entirely different where, by reason of the 
inadequacy of the foundations of the building to support the weight of the superstructure, differential 
settlement and consequent cracking occurs. Here, once the first cracks appear, the structure as a whole is 
seen to be defective and the nature of the defect is known. " 
23 However, the innocent party may recover for purely economic loss in a tort action where there is a 
special relationship of proximity between him and the party in breach. In Murphy v. Brentwood District 
Council [1991] 1 AC 398, Lord Bridge of Harwich, at pp. 480-1, said "a building owner can only recover 
the cost of repairing a defective building on the ground of the authority's negligence in performing its 
statutory function of approving plans or inspecting buildings in the course of construction if the scope of 
the authority's duty of care is wide enough to embrace purely economic loss.... There may, of course, be 
situations where, even in the absence of contract, there is a special relationship of proximity between 
builder and building owner which is sufficiantly akin to contract to introduce the element of reliance so 
that the scope of the duty of care owed by the builder to the owner is wide enough to embrace purely 
economic loss. " 
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items" contracts, the court may reach a different conclusion, especially where the items 
were manufactured by several manufacturers. This was the case of Aswan Engineering 
Co. v. Lupdine Ltd. 24 In this case, the plaintiffs bought a consignment of liquid 
waterproofing compound in plastic pails for shipment to Kuwait. The pails were stacked 
in shipping containers. On arrival in Kuwait, the containers were left standing on the 
quayside in full sunshine. The temperature inside the containers became too high and, as 
a result, the pails collapsed. Consequently, the entire consignment was lost. The plaintiff 
brought a tort action against the manufacturer of the pails to recover for the lost 
consignment caused by the collapse of the pails. The question, discussed by the Court of 
Appeal, was whether the loss of the liquid caused by the collapse of the pails was 
damage to other property. 
In answering this question, Lloyd U considered similar cases. He said "[i]f I buy a 
defective tyre for my car and it bursts, I can sue the manufacturer of the tyre for damage 
to the car as well as injury to my person. But what if the tyre was part of the original 
equipment? Presumably the car is other property of the plaintiff, even though the tyre 
was a component part of the car, and property in the tyre and property in the car passed 
simultaneously. Another example, perhaps even closer to the present case, would be if I 
buy a bottle of wine and find that the wine is undrinkable owing to a defect in the cork. 
Is the wine other property, so as to enable me to bring an action against the manufacturer 
of the cork in tort?.... My provisional view is that in all these cases there is damage to 
other property of the plaintiff '25. According to the view of Lloyd U, if the electrical 
motors, in the case of Muirhead discussed above, 26 caused damage to the pumps, the 
buyer could have recovered damages from the manufacturer of the motors for such a 
damage. Lloyd U stated a provisional view as damages claimed were not recoverable, 
anyhow, due to the fact that the loss was too remote. 
The case of Aswan was not referred to in Murphy. However, in the recent case of 
Losinjska Plovidba v. Transco Overseas Ltd. and others (The "Orjula ' )27 the Court 
refused to rely on the view of Lloyd U in Aswan. The facts of Orjula were as follows. 
The plaintiff was a bareboat charterers of the vessel Orjula operating a liner service 
24 [1987] 1 WLR 1. 
25 Ibid, p. 21. 
26 Supra, p. 204. 
27 [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395. 
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between England and Libya. Two containers were delivered to the plaintiff in order to 
be shipped to Libya. The containers were filled with drums of chemicals. The drums 
were not properly stored in the containers. As a result, there was a leakage of chemicals 
which caused damage to the containers and the vessel. The plaintiff sued inter alia the 
shipper (first defendant) and the supplier of the drums of chemicals (second defendant). 
As against the second defendant, the plaintiff alleged that the second defendant failed to 
lash, stow and/or secure the drums of chemicals within the containers in such a manner 
as to enable them to withstand the ordinary risks of transport by sea. The plaintiff relied 
on the view of Lloyd U in Aswan in order to recover damages in a tort action for the 
damage caused to the containers. The plaintiff submitted that the damage to the 
containers should be considered as damage to other property. However, the Court 
rejected this submission on the ground that the decision in Murphy seems to disapprove 
the view of Lloyd LJ. 28 However, the Court distinguished Murphy on the ground that in 
the present case the plaintiff directly or indirectly supplied the containers to the second 
defendant. "The plaintiffs interest in the containers is not therefore a subsequent 
interest deriving from the fact that the second defendant put them into circulation. It is a 
prior interest". 29 Thereupon, the Court held that the damage to the containers was 
considered as damage to other property. The second defendant was held liable for such a 
damage. 
In the light of the decisions in Murphy and The Orjula, one may state that in cases of 
sale of "complex items", where a defective item causes damage to another item of the 
goods, the damage caused is the diminution in value of the whole goods, i. e. purely 
economic loss. Of course, this would not apply where the defective item is bought under 
a separate contract. If this becomes the case, the damage caused by such an item to the 
other items can be regarded as damage to another property. 
28 In Losinjska Plovidba v. Transco Overseas Ltd. and others (The "Orjula') [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395, 
Mance J, at p. 401, said "I was referred on this respect to dicta in opposing directions in the Court of 
Appeal in Aswan Engineering Co Ltd v Lupdine Ltd, [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 347; [1987] 1 WLR 1, per 
Lord Justice Lloyd at p 365, col 1; p 21B-H and per Lord Justice Nicholls at p 365, cols 1 and 2; pp 28H- 
29G. Lord Justice Lloyd expressed the provisional view that a purchaser of a compound in pails might 
claim in tort for loss of the compound due to a defect in the pails. Lord Justice Nicholls doubted this, and 
his view appears to acquire further force in the light of the subsequence decision in Murphy. " 
29 Losinjska Plovidba v. Transco Overseas Ltd. and others (The "Orjula') [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 395, 
401. 
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However, the aforementioned classification 30 of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Murphy 
seems difficult to apply in certain cases. For example, if I buy a computer with extra 
speakers and due to a defect in the speakers the whole computer is damaged. Is the 
damage to the computer property damage or purely economic loss? The answer depends 
on whether such speakers can be considered as part of the computer which sustains the 
other parts or just an item incorporated in the computer to use it for certain purposes. 
Under the classification of Lord Bridge of Harwich, the damaged computer can be 
considered as a diminution in value of the computer, i. e. purely economic loss, where 
the speakers can be considered as part of the computer which sustains the other parts. 
However, such a damage may be considered as property damage if the speakers are 
considered as part which is incorporated in the computer for certain purposes. The same 
confusion appears in a case where the buyer purchases a computer with modem in order 
to connect the computer with the Internet. In view of the decision in The Orjula, the 
court may deal with the computer and other items as one unit and, as a result, any 
damage to the computer caused by such items may be considered as purely economic 
loss. Personally, I prefer the view of Lloyd LJ in Aswan. If I buy the computer and the 
modem under two separate contracts, the damage to the computer due to the defective 
modem can be always considered as property damage for the purpose of application of 
Donoghue principle. So, why should the same damage be considered economic loss 
where the computer and the modem are bought under one contract? In view of that, it is 
submitted, the court should pay more attention to the view of Lloyd LJ in Aswan. 
The second question raised by the decision in Murphy is whether the buyer can recover 
expenses incurred in order to avoid risk of physical damage. In Anns v. Merton London 
Borough, 31 the damages allowed by the House of Lords included expenses to restore the 
building to a condition in which it is no longer an imminent danger to health or safety. 
The House of Lords in Murphy overruled its decision in Anns and the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Dutton v. Bognor Regis United Building Co Ltd and Another. 32 As 
30 Supra, p. 206. 
31 [ 1977] 2 All ER 492. The case involved a claim by the plaintiffs against the council for their breach of 
duty of care to approve the plans for construction of a building. The facts of the case are similar to those 
of Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 in which the House of Lords overruled its 
decision in Anns. In D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church Commissioners [1989] AC 177, Lord Bridge of 
Harwich also criticised the decision in Anns but he preferred not to provide any concluded view since the 
case of D. & F. Estates did not involve a claim against the council. In that case, the claim was against 
inter alia the builder. The damage to the house was held purely economic loss. 
32 [1972] 1 All ER 462. The case of Dutton involved a claim in tort against a builder of a house for the 
defective building and against the local authority (the council) for breach of duty of care in inspecting the 
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discussed above, in Murphy it was held that once the defect is discovered, it becomes 
economic loss. In such a case, the plaintiff will not be able to recover for any physical 
loss caused by the defect after the plaintiffs have discovered such a defect. The expenses 
incurred in avoiding the risk of physical damage were considered in Murphy as purely 
economic loss. 33 As previously mentioned, Lord Bridge of Harwich stated that "[i]f a 
dangerous defect in a chattel is discovered before it causes any personal injury or 
damage to property, because the danger is now known and the chattel cannot be safely 
used unless the defect is repaired, the defect becomes merely a defect in quality. "34 
However, Lord Bridge of Harwich stated one exception to his view. Where a dangerous 
defect of the structure is "a potential source of physical damage to persons or property 
on neighbouring land or on the highway, the building owner ought, in principle, to be 
entitled to recover in tort from the negligent builder the cost of obviating the danger, 
whether by repair or by demolition, so far as that cost is necessarily incurred in order to 
protect himself from potential liability to third parties. , 35 
In all cases, the decision in Murphy should not affect the recoverability of the expenses 
incurred in mitigating a present property damage. In such a case, although the expenses 
incurred are economic loss, the buyer will be entitled to recover such expenses in a tort 
action on the ground that the expenses incurred in order to mitigate a present property 
damage. For example, in the aforementioned case, The Orjula, the plaintiff was 
successful in his tort action to recover, as damages, the cost of preventing the leakage of 
some containers. The plaintiff incurred such expenses in order to mitigate the damage to 
the vessel, which was carrying the defective containers. In this case, it was made clear 
that damages for economic loss can be available in tort where such a loss flows from or 
is incurred in mitigating physical damage. The case of Murphy was distinguished on the 
ground that in Murphy the expenses were incurred to avoid the risk of physical damage. 
Therefore, the buyer may recover in tort the cost of repair of the goods supplied if such a 
repair was made to mitigate present damage to other property. 
building. The claim against the builder was settled as the builder was exempted from liability for 
negligence. The council was held liable for the cost of the repairing the house. The damage to the house 
was considered as physical damage. Obviously, this decision was overruled by the decision in Murphy. 
33 Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398, pp. 479-80. 
34 Ibid, p. 475. 
35 Ibid, p. 475. 
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At the last point of this discussion, one cannot ignore the decision of the House of Lords 
in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co. Ltd. 36 In this case, the plaintiff brought a successful 
action in tort to recover for purely economic loss. The facts of this case are well known. 
B had undertaken to build a factory for C under a contract which entitled C to nominate 
a sub-contractor. C nominated A who, as a result, entered into contract with B. The floor 
appeared defective and, consequently, C brought an action in tort against A for such 
defective performance. The House of Lords awarded C damages for such an economic 
loss, i. e. the cost of replacing the floor and other items of economic loss consequent on 
such replacement. The decision in this case seems to be an exception to the general rule 
that damages are not available in tort for purely economic loss. It has been suggested 
that this case was decided on its own facts. 37 In this case, there was a special relation 
between A and C as the latter nominated A. Indeed, subsequent decisions prove that 
damages for purely economic loss are not available in tort. 38 In fact, one may find a way 
to argue that there was a collateral contract between A and C in Junior Books. The main 
question here is whether the consideration requirement is satisfied. Obviously, C had 
conferred a benefit on A by offering him the opportunity to contract with B. In return, C 
was required to perform his contract with B properly. Therefore, one may argue that C 
could have brought an action in contract against A in order to recover for his economic 
loss. However, the action was brought in tort and exceptionally damages for economic 
loss were awarded. 
In the light of the above discussion, one may need to direct the arguments in this chapter 
to cases where the buyer suffers purely economic loss, i. e. diminution in value and loss 
36 [1983] 1 AC 520. 
37 In Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd. and Others, [1986] 1 QB 507, Robert Goff LJ, at 
p. 528, pointed out that "... it is, I think, safest for this court to treat Junior Books as a case in which, on its 
particular facts, there was considered to be such a very close relationship between the parties that the 
defenders could, if the facts as pleaded were proved, be held liable to the pursuers. I feel fortified in 
adopting that approach by three matters. First, Lord Fraser stressed that he was deciding the appeal before 
him `strictly on its own facts' (see [1982] 3 All ER 201 at 204, [1983] 1 AC 520 at 533). Second, in the 
advice of the Privy Council in Candlewood Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd, The Mineral 
Transporter, The Ibaraki Maru [1985] 2 All ER 935, [1985] 3 WLR 381 Lord Fraser, who delivered the 
advice, appears to have treated Junior Books as a decision of limited application. Third, both Lord Fraser 
and Lord Roskill in Junior Books gave examples which assist us in approaching the present case on a 
pragmatic basis. For Lord Fraser considered that the very close proximity between the parties in his view 
distinguished the case before him from `the case of producers of goods to be offered for sale to the 
public' (see [1982] 3 All ER 201 at 204, [1983] 1 AC 520 at 533) and Lord Roskill contrasted cases in 
which... there was reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant with cases of claims by ultimate purchasers 
against manufacturers in respect of goods purchased under ordinary everyday transactions where `it is 
obvious that in truth the real reliance was on the immediate vendor and not on the manufacturer' (see 
[1982] 3 All ER 201 at 214, [1983] 1 AC 520 at 547). " [Emphasis added] 
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of profit which is not consequent on physical damage. In such cases, the buyer will have 
no choice other than suing the remote seller in contract in order to recover damages for 
such losses. Bringing a contract action against the remote seller may not be always 
possible due to the lack of vertical privity. The expression of "vertical privity" is used in 
this work to describe the relationship between parties in distributive chain contracts. In 
cases of other losses, i. e. physical loss and economic loss consequent on physical loss, 
the buyer may find an alternative way of recovery by bringing an action in tort through 
negligence or under the CPA. 
Where the loss results from breach of express warranty issued by the remote seller to the 
ultimate buyer, the question becomes whether such a warranty is enforceable or not. The 
SGA, the UCC and the CISG do not deal expressly with the enforceability of warranties 
issued by the remote seller to the ultimate buyer. Under the SGA, the issue is clearly left 
to the case law. The applicability of the UCC and the CISG to such warranties is 
uncertain. Anyhow, such a warranty can be enforceable in cases where it furnishes a 
ground for collateral contract between the remote seller and the ultimate buyer. 
However, as discussed below, one of the requirements for making a contract is 
consideration, which does not seem easy to find in cases of collateral relationship. 39 A 
contractual relationship between the remote seller and the ultimate buyer is too hard to 
be found where there is no express warranty issued by the remote seller to the ultimate 
buyer. In such a case, it seems hard to find a legal ground for holding the remote seller 
liable for losses suffered by the ultimate buyer, especially where the loss suffered is 
purely economic. 
To deal with this issue, i. e. the liability of the remote seller to the ultimate buyer, one 
needs to start with the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. At this place the EC 
Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees40 cannot be ignored. 
38 Murphy v. Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398; D. & F. Estates Ltd. v. Church 
Commissioners [1989] AC 177. 
39 R. A. Anderson, I. Fox and D. P. Twomey, Business Law, 1988, p. 251. 
ao Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, Official Journal L 171,07/07/1999 
p. 0012 - 0016. 
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6.1.1 The Applicability of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
to Cases of Defective Goods 
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (henceforth the 1999 Act) was enacted 
in order to ensure that the agreement between the parties is legally enforceable. 41 Before 
the 1999 Act came into force, the contract term which entitles a third party to enforce 
the contract was not legally enforceable. 42 
The significance of the 1999 Act is that it fills an obvious gap in the common law. The 
promisor's breach may cause economic loss to third party. In this case, the person who 
suffers the loss, i. e. the third party, may not have a contract action and the person who 
can bring such an action, i. e. the promisee, does not suffer any loss. Now, under the 
1999 Act, the third party may bring a contract action against the promisor to recover for 
his own loss. Exceptionally, the promisee may be allowed to recover damages for losses 
suffered by a third party. 43 This exception is not dealt with by the 1999 Act. However, 
subject to certain restrictions discussed below, such exception is still available even 
after the 1999 Act came into force. 44 In all cases, such exception will not be available 
where the third party has a cause of action. Therefore, the buyer may not rely on this 
exception to recover damages for losses suffered by his sub-buyer due to defective 
goods. This is due to the fact that the sub-buyer has a contract action against the buyer 
who may recover for his liability to such a sub-buyer from his direct seller. Furthermore, 
in cases where the buyer purchases goods in order to give them to a third party as a gift, 
the application of such an exception is also too limited. Indeed, this point needs further 
examination which can be found below. 45 
41 See Peter Kincaid, `Privity Reform in England' (2000) 116 LQR 43,46. 
42 The severe application of the doctrine of privity was criticized by Steyn LJ in the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Darlington Borough Council v. Wiltshier Northern Ltd. [1995] 1 WLR 68. In this case, 
Steyn LJ said, at p. 76, that "[t]he case for recognising a contract for the benefit of the third party is simple 
and straightforward. The autonomy of the will of the parties should be respected. The law of contract 
should give effect to the reasonable expectations of contracting parties. Principle certainly requires that a 
burden should not be imposed on a third party without his consent. But there is no doctrinal, logical or 
policy reason why the law should deny effectiveness to a contract for the benefit of a third party where 
that is the expressed intention of the parties. Moreover, often the parties, and particularly third parties, 
organise their affairs on the faith of the contract. They rely on the contract. It is therefore unjust to deny 
effectiveness to such a contract. I will not struggle with the point further since nobody seriously asserts the 
contrary. " Cited in Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law 
Com. No. 242, para. 1.1. 
43 Infra, p. 262-7. 
44 Infra, p. 262. 
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Section 1 of the 1999 Act states: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person who is not a party to a contract 
(a "third party") may in his own right enforce a term of the contract if- 
(a) the contract expressly provides that he may, or 
(b) 
... the term purports to confer a benefit on him. (2) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply if on a proper construction of the contract it 
appears that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third 
party. 
(3) The third party must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a 
member of a class or as answering a particular description but need not be in 
existence when the contract is entered into. 
As the 1999 Act came to deal with cases where the third party cannot sue due to the lack 
of privity, its effect may be limited in cases where the third party has an action. 
Therefore, in cases of resale of goods, the sub-buyer may bring a suit against the 
promisee, i. e. the buyer. Therefore, the application of the 1999 Act is very limited. 
However, the Law Commission Report, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of 
Third Parties, 46 provides that "third party consumers stand to gain from our proposals. 
For example, under our proposals a manufacturer and retailer could expressly confer 
legal rights on the purchaser to enforce the contracts as regards the quality of the goods 
purchased, thereby affording a purchaser a remedy if the retailer became insolvent. "47 
However, a close look at Section 1 of the 1999 Act makes it clear that the 1999 Act is 
unlikely to apply to cases of resale. It is true that Subsection 1(1-b) of the 1999 Act 
applies where the sale contract confers a benefit on the sub-buyer, such as the case 
where the seller is aware that the goods are bought in order to perform subcontracts. 
However, Subsection 1(2) of the 1999 Act may not make it possible for the sub-buyer to 
bring a direct action against the original seller. This is due to the fact that the sub-buyer 
may bring an action against his immediate seller, i. e. the original buyer. Therefore, the 
construction of the sale contract shows that the parties to the contract do not intend to 
confer legal rights on the sub-buyer. However, the parties may expressly state in the 
contract that the sub-buyer has a legal right to enforce the contract. Here, the sub-buyer 
may rely on Subsection 1(1-a) of the 1999 Act to enforce the contract. The point is well 
explained in the Law Commission Report itself. The Report provides 
"Without such an express term [a term which expressly confers a legal right on 
the purchaser], the purchaser would normally have no such right [the right to sue 
45 Infra, p. 259. 
46 Law Com. No. 242. 
47 Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242. 
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the manufacturer] because even if expressly identified as a beneficiary of the 
manufacturer's contract with the retailer, the chain of contracts giving the 
purchaser a remedy against the retailer for the manufacturer's breach means 
that on a proper construction of the contract, construed in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances, the manufacturer and retailer do not intend to 
confer a legal right of enforceability on the third party. "48 [Emphasis added]. 
In view of the above discussion, one may state that the 1999 Act allows the sub-buyer to 
recover damages49 from the original seller only where there is an express term which 
provides that sub-buyer has such a right. Such an express agreement is not common. 
Probably, this is due to the fact that a term to the contract, which indicates that a third 
party has the right to enforce the contract, was not enforceable until the 1999 Act came 
into force. 
Nevertheless, Subsection 1(1-b) may provide help in cases where the buyer purchases 
the goods for a third party beneficiary who does not have a cause of action. As will be 
discussed below, 50 if the buyer informs the seller that the goods will be given to a third 
party as a gift and asks him to deliver the goods to the third party who is identified by 
name, the 1999 Act may apply to allow the third party's action against the seller for 
defective goods. The Law Commission Report, mentioned above, provides a clear 
example on this point. The example is 
"On Mr and Mrs C's marriage, their wealthy relative B buys an expensive 3 
piece suite as a wedding gift from A Ltd, a well known Central London 
department store with a reputation for quality. She makes it clear when 
purchasing the 3 piece suite that it is a gift for friends and indeed the delivery 
slip and instructions show that it is to be sent to Mr and Mrs C's home and 
should be left with the house keeper as it is a gift. After 2 weeks of wear the 
fabric on the suite wears thin and frays, and after 3 weeks, two castors collapse. 
Subject to the rebuttal by A Ltd under the proviso to the second limb [currently 
Subsection 1(2) of the 1999 Act], Mr and Mrs C can sue A Ltd for breach of an 
implied term in the contract that the goods be of a satisfactory quality. A Ltd 
have promised to confer a benefit (the suite of satisfactory quality) on Mr and 
Mrs C, who have been expressly identified by name. , 51 [Footnotes omitted]. 
The Law Commission Report adds that the third party may not be able to sue the seller 
if the seller was unaware at the time of making the contract that the goods were 
48 Ibid, para. 7.54, n. 44. 
49 Section 1(5) of the 1999 Act states "For the purpose of exercising his right to enforce a term of the 
contract, there shall be available to the third party any remedy that would have been available to him in an 
action for breach of contract if he had been a party to the contract... ". 
50 This is a case of horizontal privity which is discussed at p. 259. 
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purchased for a third party. 52 The requirement of express identification of the third party 
beneficiary may lead to unfair results. As discussed below, the circumstances of the case 
may indicate that the goods are purchased for a third party beneficiary. In such a case, it 
will be argued that the third party beneficiary should be entitled to sue the seller for 
defective goods. 53 In any case, the seller can argue under Subsection 1(2) of the 1999 
Act that on the proper construction of the contract, he did not intend to confer a legal 
right on the third party. 
It can be stated that the sub-buyer is unlikely to be able to bring a contract action under 
the 1999 Act against the original seller for defective goods. However, if the 1999 Act 
ever applies to sale of goods cases, such as the case where there is an express term 
conferring a legal right on the sub-buyer, the seller can defend the action of the sub- 
buyer by the same defences that are available to him against the buyer. In general, where 
a third party brings an action under the 1999 Act, Section 3 of the Act allows the 
promisor to defend such an action by raising the same defences that he would have if 
such an action were brought by the promisee. 54 Therefore, the original seller may raise 
the normal defences in case of a claim for damages, i. e. causation, remoteness, 
mitigation and certainty. Also, the seller may raise any defence that can be available to 
him under an express term in the contract. 
To sum up, the 1999 Act seems to be concerned with the intention of the contracting 
parties to confer a legal right on a third party. Obviously, under the 1999 Act, the mere 
contemplation of the parties that a benefit will be conferred on a third party is not 
enough for the third party to enforce the contract. However, as discussed below, 55 the 
51 Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, 
example 14, para. 7.41. 
52 Ibid, example 15, para. 7.42. 
53 Infra, p. 260. 
sa Subsections 3(2) of the 1999 Act states "The promisor shall have available to him by way of defence or 
set-off any matter that- (a) arises from or in connection with the contract and is relevant to the term, and 
(b) would have been available to him by way of defence or set-off if the proceedings had been brought by 
the promisee. " 
Subsection 3(3) states "The promisor shall also have available to him by way of defence or set-off any 
matter if- (a) an express term of the contract provides for it to be available to him in proceedings brought 
by the third party, and (b) it would have been available to him by way of defence or set-off if the 
proceedings had been brought by the promisee. 
Subsection 3(4) states "The promisor shall also have available to him- by way of defence or set-off any 
matter, and (b) by way of counterclaim any matter not arising from the contract, that would have been 
available to him by way of defence or set-off or, as the case may be, by way of counterclaim against the 
third party if the third party had been a party to the contract. " 
55 Infra, p. 221. 
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ultimate buyer should be allowed to sue the original seller for defective goods in cases 
where the original seller was aware at the time of making the contract that the goods 
will be resold. This argument will be based on the fact that in chain contracts liability 
may pass up the chain until it reaches eventually the original seller. Therefore, the 
ultimate buyer should be allowed to sue the original seller directly in order to bring the 
law into line of reality. However, the question is whether the court can go beyond the 
1999 Act to allow the ultimate buyer to sue the manufacturer even though the agreement 
between the manufacturer and his immediate buyer does not expressly confer such a 
right on the ultimate buyer. In principle, this question can be answered in the positive 
since the Law Commission Report, on which the 1999 Act is based, makes it clear that 
where the court decides that the 1999 Act does not go far enough, it may offer the third 
party more protection than that he receives under the 1999 Act. The Law Commission 
Report states 
"[w]e should emphasise that we do not wish our proposed legislation - which we 
believe to be a relatively conservative and moderate measure - to hamper the 
judicial development of third party rights. Should the House of Lords decide that 
in a particular sphere our reform does not go far enough and that, for example, 
a measure of imposed consumer protection is required..., we would not wish our 
proposed legislation to be construed as hampering that development. "56 
[Emphasis added]. 
However, the court is unlikely to go beyond the boundary of the 1999 Act in normal 
cases since by doing so, the court will ignore the 1999 Act. The court may go beyond 
the 1999 Act only in cases which require policy consideration. There seems to be a room 
to argue that there should be special treatment for certain cases of consumer sale. It is 
true that the Law Commission has rejected the tests which automatically give consumers 
the right to sue the original seller and preferred to apply the "dual intention"57 test to all 
cases. 58 However, the Law Commission avoided proposing any special test of 
enforceability for consumers in order to avoid any conflict with other law reforms, such 
56 The Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. 
No. 242, para. 5.10. 
57 Under the "dual intention" test, a third party may enforce a contract in which the parties intend that he 
should receive the benefit of the promised performance and also intend to create a legal obligation 
enforceable by him. 
58 These tests are 1) a third party may enforce a contract on which he justifiably and reasonably relies, 
regardless of the intentions of the parties; 2) a third party may enforce a contract which actually confers a 
benefit on him, regardless of the purpose of the contract or the intention of the parties. 
See Law 
Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, 
paras. 7.53,7.54. 
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as the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees. 59 The Law Commission Report states 
"[w]e consider that the automatic conferring of contractual rights on third parties 
who are consumers rests on policy considerations that need to be tackled in 
relation to specific areas. We do not think that they can properly be addressed 
through the kind of general reform with which we are here concerned. Indeed we 
think that it would be dangerous - in terms of producing a potential conflict of 
reform proposals - for us here to embark on specific measures of consumer 
protection when there are other reform initiatives under discussion in specific 
areas, based on protecting consumers. We have in mind particularly consumer 
guarantees.... Rather our strategy is to reform the general law of contract, based 
on effecting contracting parties' intentions, which then leaves the way free for 
more radical consumer protection measures in future in specific areas. , 60 
[Footnotes omitted]. 
It is clear from this statement that the Law Commission did not provide a special test of 
enforceability of contract by consumers since their proposal was based on effecting the 
contracting parties' intention in the general law of contract. However, the Law 
Commission did not reject the idea that there should be special treatment for consumer 
cases and left the way free for more consumer protection measures. Such protection 
measures can be made by legislation. It will be seen that the EC Directive on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees will be reviewed in 
relation to producer's liability. However, any provision for producer's liability under the 
Directive is unlikely to give the consumer the right to claim damages. The Directive's 
remedial scheme, as explained below, does not make the remedy of damages available 
for consumers. Meanwhile, one may also argue that the court still has the discretion to 
go beyond the boundary of the 1999 Act in order to offer consumers more protection in 
certain cases. This argument is based on the ground that the aforementioned statement 
of the Law Commission indicates that the 1999 Act provides a minimum protection for 
consumers and leaves the way free for further protection. As submitted in the next 
section, the court, at least in cases where the consumer cannot sue his immediate seller 
since the latter has disappeared or become insolvent, should allow such a consumer to 
bring a contract action against the original seller regardless of whether or not the 1999 
s9 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, Official Journal L 171 , 07/07/1999. 60 Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, 
para. 7.55. 
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Act allows such an action. 61 The next section argues that the 1999 Act does not go far 
enough to protect the ultimate buyer in cases of `string contracts'. 
One of the difficulties that faced the Law Commission in proposing the 1999 Act is the 
requirement of consideration. Although it seems inadequate for the purpose of this 
research to deal with the issue of whether the requirement of consideration is in need for 
reform, it is worth mentioning that the Law Commission has pointed out that the maxim 
"consideration must move from the promisee" might be interpreted to disallow the third 
party beneficiary who did not provide the consideration to enforce the contract. 62 In 
other words, the maxim might be interpreted to require the consideration to move from 
the plaintiff. 63 In fact, the 1999 Act does not consider the third party as a party to the 
contract. It merely confers the right to enforce the contract on him. Therefore, the rule 
that consideration must move from the promisee should not affect the right of the third 
party to sue under the contract. 64 In this sense, as long as the promisee provides a 
consideration, the third party beneficiary need not provide a consideration in order to 
have the right to sue under the contract. To avoid any confusion, the Law Commission 
has recommended that the law should ensure that the maxim mentioned should not be 
interpreted to disallow the third party to enforce the contract. The Law Commission 65 
Report indicates that giving the third party beneficiary a statutory right to enforce the 
contract should imply a reform of the rule that consideration must move from the 
promisee where such a rule means that consideration must move from the plaintiff. 66 
At the last point of this section, one should not fail to mention that the ultimate buyer 
may have an action against the original seller by several means. For example, where the 
ultimate buyer suffers physical loss, he may sue in tort. Moreover, where the buyer 
assigns the benefit of the contract to the sub-buyer, the sub-buyer may have a cause of 
61 This submission presumes that the seller is reasonably aware at the time of making the contract that the 
goods will be resold. 
62 Law Commission, Privity of Contract. Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Corn. No. 242, 
para. 6.5. 
63 See John Adams, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, "Privity of Contract - the Benefits and 
the Burdens of Law Reform" (1997) 60 MLR 238,247. 
64 See Hugh Beale, "Privity of Contract: Judicial and Legislative Reform" (1995) 9 JCL 103,113; John 
Adams and Roger Brownsword, "Privity and the Concept of a Network Contract" (1990) 10 L. S. 12,22. 
65 Recommendation 6 of the Law Commission states that "the legislation should ensure that the rule that 
consideration must move from the promisee is reformed to the extent necessary to avoid nullifying our 
proposed reform of the doctrine of privity. " Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the 
Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242. 
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action against the original seller. 67 Such an assignment is also possible under the 
American Law. For example, in Dravo Equipment Co. v. German68 it was stated that 
express warranty can be transferred to the transferee, e. g. sub-buyer, of the goods unless 
the warranty indicates otherwise. 69 As a result, the sub-buyer can sue the warrantor for 
breach of such express warranty as long as his use of the goods is not substantially 
different from the buyer's use. 70 Here, it should be noted that the seller may prohibit 
such assignment by an express term of the contract. In cases of express warranties, it is 
common that such a warranty provides that it is available for the first purchaser and for 
specific period of time after the date of purchase. 
Furthermore, the sub-buyer may have a cause of action against the original seller under 
an express warranty issued by such a seller to the ultimate buyer. The issue of whether 
such a warranty is enforceable is the subject matter of the next section. Here, it should 
be clear that this work is not concerned with warranties purchased by the buyer. The 
ultimate buyer may pay extra sum of money to obtain the remote seller's warranty. In 
such cases, the retailer, most likely, acts as an agent for the remote seller since the price 
of such a warranty goes to the remote seller. Hence, under this warranty, the ultimate 
buyer would be in a direct contractual relationship with the remote seller. However, 
such a practice is uncommon. The buyer may pay extra money to insure the goods 
purchased. 7' The insurer may be the retailer or an insurance company to which the 
retailer acts as an agent. 
66 Law Commission, Privity of Contract. Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, 
para. 6.8, n. 8. 
6' See St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. [1994] 1 AC 85. See also 
Darlington Borough Council v. Wiltshier Northern Ltd. [1995] 3 All ER 895; P. S. Atiyah, The Sale of 
Goods, Pitman Publishing, 9th ed., 1995, p. 231. 
68 73 Or. App. 165; 40 UCC Rep. Serv. 1240 (1985). See also Collins Co. v. Carboline Co. N. E. 2d 834 
(1988), where the Illinois Supreme Court held that an assignee of an express warranty aquires privity of 
contract with the warrantor. 
69 Section 2-210(2) of the UCC provides that "Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer 
can be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other party, or 
increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially his chance of 
obtaining return performance. A right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of 
the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise. " 
70 See TD Crandall, MJ Herbert and L. Lawrence, Uniform Commercial Code, Boston, 1993, p. 7.73. See 
also S. Bonanno, `Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties: a Retrospect of and Prospects for 
Illinois Commercial Code §2-318' (1991) 251 Marshall L. Rev. 177,197. 
71 M. P. Furmston, `Defective Goods and Exclusion Clauses' in Buying and Selling law, Croner 
Publication Ltd., p. 3.52. The ultimate buyer may also insure the goods purchased through the retailer who 
acts as an agent for the insurance company. 
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6.1.2 The Privity Requirement should be Relaxed in `String Contracts' 
The previous section hopefully made it clear that the 1999 Act does not provide much 
help in cases of string contracts. The law as it stands at present does not seem to provide 
sufficient protection to the ultimate buyer nor does it prevent the manufacturer escaping 
liability for purely economic losses resulting from the defective quality of his products. 
The manufacturer, who knows that he will not be directly liable to the ultimate buyer for 
defective products, may have no adequate incentive to produce his goods carefully. 
Liability may not pass up the chain in all cases, as explained below. Therefore, Adams 
and Brownsword argue that "if end purchasers do not normally have any option other 
than to sue the immediate contracting party in the chain, we might wish to relax the 
privity restriction where it is not possible to work liability back along the chain. In such 
circumstances, it is arguable that the purchaser should be permitted to leapfrog over the 
first defendant. , 72 The ultimate buyer legitimately expects the manufacturer to produce 
goods of the right quality. The manufacturer should know that the ultimate buyer will 
have such a legitimate expectation. Therefore, the manufacturer, as Adams and 
Brownsword suggest, 73 should be liable for the defective quality of goods. Chris Willett 
seems to have similar view. He argues that the "doctrinal obstacles to recovery for poor 
quality goods from the manufacturer flout what are perfectly reasonable consumer 
expectations. Most consumers probably reasonably imagine that manufacturers (who 
actually make the goods) should be primarily responsible if the goods are qualitatively 
defective. These expectations may be particularly important in circumstances where the 
retailer cannot be sued because he is untraceable or insolvent. "74 
Professor Beale argues that the extent of manufacturer's liability may be uncertain 
because he does not have adequate information about the buyer's or end-user's losses. 
Therefore, "it may be cheaper for the buyer or end-user to bear the uncertain losses 
itself, since it will have better information and can therefore insure more cheaply". 75 
Obviously, Professor Beale bases his arguments on the costs and, as a result, on the 
price of the goods. However, he argues that the manufacturer should have an adequate 
incentive to produce his goods carefully. Thereupon, he suggests that the manufacturer 
should be liable for the cost of repairing or replacing the goods or refunding the price; 
72 John Adams and Roger Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract, London, 1995, p. 152. 
73 Ibid, p. 156. 
74 Chris Willett, "The Quality of Goods and the Rights of Consumers" (1993) 44 NILQ 218,225. 
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but the manufacturer should not be liable for consequential losses suffered by the 
ultimate buyer or end-user. 76 As regards price refund one may ask which price that the 
ultimate buyer should recover. Is it the retail price or the price that the manufacturer 
received from his immediate buyer? It can be argued that the ultimate buyer should 
receive what he has paid for the goods, i. e. the retail price. But this may not be fair in 
cases where the retail price is more than the market or reasonable price. Therefore, the 
consumer should not be entitled to recover from the manufacturer the unreasonable 
price he paid to the retailer. 
Professor Beale does not ignore the liability of the manufacturer for consumer's 
economic consequential losses. He argues that consumers should be entitled to recover 
the cost of hiring a replacement while the defective goods are being repaired or 
replaced. This may, as he suggests, "give the manufacturer an adequate incentive to get 
on and repair or replace. "77 The consumer's usual consequential economic loss is the 
cost of hiring replacement while the goods are being repaired or replaced. If the 
defective goods cause physical damage, the consumer may be able to bring an action 
against the manufacturer under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. By this way, the 
consumer can be totally compensated. However, where the goods are bought to be used 
in business, the consequential economic loss is normally loss of profit. Professor Beale 
argues that the manufacturer should not be directly liable for such a loss as the cost of 
bearing such a loss will be high. 
However, the manufacturer still needs to insure for his liability against his immediate 
buyer. If the extent of the manufacturer's liability to the ultimate buyer is uncertain since 
he does not have adequate information about such a buyer, the extent of his liability to 
his immediate buyer may become uncertain. This is due to that fact that retailer's 
liability for the ultimate buyer may pass up the chain until it reaches the manufacturer. 
In this sense, the manufacturer will bear the loss of the ultimate buyer whether through 
his liability to his immediate buyer or through his liability to the ultimate buyer. In other 
words, the manufacturer's extent of liability may be uncertain whether against his 
immediate buyer or the ultimate buyer. Professor Beale justifies his opinion on the 
75 Hugh Beale, "Customers, Chains and Networks" in Chris Willett, Aspects of Fairness in Contract, 
1996,137,146. 
76 Ibid, p. 146. 
77 Ibid, pp. 146-7. 
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ground that manufacturers normally limit their liability down the chain of contracts. He 
argues that such a practice is "an efficient arrangement knowingly agreed to by the 
parties because of the cost of requiring the manufacturer to bear liability which is 
uncertain in extent. ' 78 In order to leave an incentive for the manufacturer to produce his 
goods carefully, Professor Beale suggests that the manufacturer, as against the ultimate 
buyer's claim, should not be allowed to rely on exclusion clauses included in the 
contract he made with his immediate buyer. However, he suggests that the manufacturer 
should be allowed to rely on such exclusion clauses where the ultimate buyer agreed on 
similar clauses in his contract with the retailer or where the ultimate buyer consented to 
such clauses. 79 
I do believe that the view of Professor Beale is quite appropriate in cases where all the 
contracts in a distribution chain include similar exclusion clauses. However, this is not 
always the case. There may be cases where the manufacturer does not exclude his 
liability to his immediate buyer and one of the parties to the distribution chain has 
disappeared or shelters behind exclusion clauses. In such cases, the liability for the 
ultimate buyer's consequential loss will not reach the manufacturer as the distribution 
chain is broken. Therefore, the manufacturer will escape liability. Furthermore, liability 
will not reach the manufacturer if the retailer has disappeared or become insolvent. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the manufacturer should be liable for all losses suffered 
by the ultimate buyer. If the loss results from unusual use of the goods, the manufacturer 
will not be liable unless he guaranteed the goods to be fit for such an unusual use. In 
addition, the remoteness principle should protect the manufacturer against the ultimate 
buyer's claim for abnormal losses which he could not reasonably have contemplated at 
the time he sold the goods to his immediate buyer. In general, as between `network 
contracts', 80 Adam and Brownsword suggest that the requirement of privity doctrine 
78 Ibid, pp. 145. 
79 Ibid, pp. 150. 
80 John Adams and Roger Brownsword, supra n. 64 at pp. 27-8. They reach their conclusion in the light of 
the exceptions to the privity restriction under the common law. They define a network contract as follows: 
"1. A network contract is a contract forming part of a set of contracts. 2. The set of contracts has the 
following characteristics: (i) there is a principal contract (or, there are a number of principal contracts) 
within the set giving the set an overall objective; (ii) other contracts (secondary and tertiary contracts, and 
so on) are entered into, an object of each of which is -directly or indirectly- to further the attainment of 
this overall objective; and, (iii) the network of contractors expands until a sufficiency of contractors are 
obligated, whether to the parties to the principal contract or to other contractors within the set, to attain the 
overall objective. " 
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should have no application. This should apply similarly in cases of chain contracts. 8' 
They state that "whereas, at present, the privity doctrine operates in relation to strangers 
to particular contracts (irrespective of whether such contracts comprise a network), we 
propose that privity should operate in relation only to strangers to a particular network of 
contracts (but not as between the network contractors themselves). "82 However, as 
previously discussed, the court may not go farther than the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 in cases of normal circumstances. Nevertheless, it is submitted that 
there should be special treatment to cases of chain contracts. If this general submission 
is not accepted, I propose that the court should pay special attention to cases where the 
retailer disappears and the ultimate buyer is left without remedy. In such cases, the 
ultimate buyer should be allowed to bring a direct contract action against the 
manufacturer. As previously discussed, the 1999 Act offers the third party a minimum 
protection and leaves the way free for further protection if the court decides that the Act 
does not go far enough. 83 
In order to bring about justice under this submission, the manufacturer should be 
entitled to rely on the exclusion clauses included in his contract with his immediate 
buyer. In fact, the manufacturer may bear the loss suffered by the ultimate buyer by 
paying damages to his immediate buyer for the latter's liability to the ultimate buyer 
who suffered losses caused by the defective goods. As the manufacturer can rely on the 
exclusion or limitation clauses against his immediate buyer's claim for the latter's 
liability to the ultimate buyer, he should be entitled to rely on such clauses as against the 
direct claim of the ultimate buyer. Adams and Brownsword, after submitting that the 
doctrine of privity should be relaxed in cases of network contracts, argue that a party to 
the contract should be able to rely on the terms of the contract to defend the third party's 
action. 84 It is submitted that the manufacturer should be able to rely on the terms of his 
contract with the immediate buyer in order to defend the ultimate buyer's action. 
81 In John Adams and Roger Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract, London, 1995, p. 152, the authors argue 
that chain of contracts "should be treated as if it were a network. For example, if a dealer is a recognised 
outlet for a particular manufacturer's products (say, the manufacturer's motor cars, or electrical goods), 
with the goods being supplied to the dealer through a distribution system controlled by the manufacturer, 
then it is artificial to treate the chain as so many discreate contracts. Moreover, it is arguable that 
consumer purchasers should be regarded as being in direct contract with any contractors in the chain. " 
82 John Adams and Roger Brownsword, supra n. 64 at p. 13. 
83 Supra, p. 217. 
84 John N. Adams and Roger Brownsword, supra n. 64 at p. 27. 
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Therefore, the seller may take measures of defence against the claim of the sub-buyer. 85 
As it is the case under Subsection 3(6) of the 1999 Act, the parties need not indicate 
expressly that an exclusion term applies to the sub-buyer's action. 86 In fact, this was 
stated in one case where the ultimate buyer brought an action in tort against the 
manufacturer. In Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd. and Others, 87 where the 
ultimate buyer sued the manufacturer in tort, Robert Goff LJ made it clear that the 
manufacturer, as against the ultimate buyer, can rely on the terms of his contract with 
his immediate buyer. 88 
However, two points should be added to this submission. Firstly, in consumer claims, 
the manufacturer should not be able to exclude his liability for breach of any of the 
implied terms 13,14 and 15 of the SGA. The rules of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977 regarding consumer claims should apply in order to disallow excluding liability for 
breach of the implied terms of description and quality provided by the SGA. 89 Secondly, 
the exclusion of liability clauses should be communicated to the ultimate buyer by 
attaching them to the goods or by other appropriate means in order to give such a buyer 
an opportunity to take pre-caution measures, such as insurance. 
In February 1992, the Department of Trade and Industry proposed for a statutory reform 
concerning the manufacturer's liability for defective goods. The proposal contained 
three sections: 
(1) The manufacturer should be civilly liable under statute for the performance 
of his guarantee to the consumer. In cases where the manufacturer is outside the 
UK, the manufacturer's guarantee would be enforceable against the importer. 
(2) The retailer should be jointly and severally liable with the manufacturer for 
the manufacturer's guarantee to a consumer. 
85 See W. K. Jones, `Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract over Tort' 
(1990) 44 U. Miami. L. Rev. 731,791. 
86 Subsection 3(6) of the 1999 Act provides "Where in any proceedings brought against him a third party 
seeks in reliance on section 1 to enforce a term of a contract (including, in particular, a term purporting to 
exclude or limit liability), he may not do so if he could not have done so (whether by reason of any 
particular circumstances relating to him or otherwise) had he been a party to the contract. " See Meryll 
Dean, `Removing a Blot on the Landscape-The Reform of the Doctrine of Privity' [2000] JBL 143,151. 
87 [1986] 1 QB 507. 
88 Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd. and Others, [1986] 1 QB 507,529. 
89 The application of Section 3 (Liability arising in contract) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 seems 
to be limited to the claims of the contracting parties. Section 3(1) states that "This section applies as 
between contracting parties where one of them deals as consumer or on the other's written standard terms 
of business". [Emphasis added]. Section 6(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 states "As against a 
person dealing as consumer, liability for breach of the obligations arising from- (a) [section 13,14 or 15 
of the [1979] Act] (seller's implied undertakings as to conformity of goods with description or sample, or 
as to their quality of fitness for a particular purpose)... cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any 
contract term. " 
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(3) Manufacturers or, in the case of imported goods, importers, should be liable 
with the seller for the satisfactory quality of goods under the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. 
Under the first section of the proposal, there seems to be no need to discuss whether the 
manufacturer's warranty, issued to the consumer, can furnish a legal ground for a 
collateral contractual relationship. However, the section does not provide the kind of 
remedy that the consumer can claim. Section two of the proposal may create some 
practical difficulties. The main problem is that retailers will not be able to participate in 
drafting manufacturer's express warranties and, in most cases, they may. not be aware of 
the content of those warranties which are packaged with or accompanying the goods. 90 
In addition, the retailer may not be able to perform the manufacturer's guarantee. For 
example, suppose that the guarantee is for repair. The retailer may not have the facilities 
that may enable him to repair the goods. The producer's guarantees of repair, 
replacement and refund of price will become legally binding after the implementation of 
the EC Directive, as discussed under the next section. The producer will not be liable to 
the consumer for giving false statements regarding the quality of goods. However, under 
the Directive, such statements are considered in assessing the retailer's liability to the 
consumer. Under the next section, it will be argued that the Directive should be 
reviewed in a way to make the producer liable for his false statements instead of the 
retailer. 
The DTI proposal is concerned with guarantees issued by manufacturers or importers 
only. So, what would be the case if a wholesaler or a distributor, other than the importer, 
issued a warranty to the ultimate buyer? In addition, the proposal does not deal with the 
issue where the goods are expected to be used by beneficiaries other than the ultimate 
buyer. 91 Furthermore, the proposal does not deal with the case where the ultimate buyer 
is a non-consumer. In fact, non-consumer buyers are more likely to suffer economic 
losses than consumers. Since such economic losses cannot be claimed in tort, a statutory 
reform is needed to allow them to sue the remote seller in contract. 
90 G. G. Howells and S. Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law, 1995,163. In cases of manufacturer's 
guarantee which contains a promise for repair, the retailer may find it difficult to perform such guarantee. 
91 Chris Willett, "The Quality of Goods and the Rights of Consumers" (1993) 44 NILQ 218,226. 
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6.1.3 Remote Seller's Liability under the EC Directive on Certain Aspects 
of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees 
The purpose of the EC Directive92 is to provide a minimum protection for consumers. In 
other words, it is intended to be a minimum harmonisation of the measures of consumer 
protection among the Member States. 93 Although the provisions of the Directive are, to 
some extent, similar to the relevant provisions of the SGA, its remedial scheme for 
defective goods is different. The remedy of damages, as the primary remedy under 
English law, is not available under the Directive. The Directive provides four remedies 
for defective goods, i. e. repair, replacement, price reduction and recission. However, the 
buyer does not have the choice of remedy under the Directive. Article 3(3) of the 
Directive states: "In the first place, the consumer may require the seller to repair the 
goods or he may require the seller to replace them, in either case free of charge, unless 
this is impossible or disproportionate. " 
The question here is whether the remedy of damages will be available in consumer cases 
after the implementation of the Directive. Twigg-Flesner and Bradgate argue that under 
existing domestic law consumers can be better protected than under the Directive. 94 
Indeed, under English law the consumer can reject defective goods, even though the 
defect is minor, 95 and repudiate the contract. 96 In such a case, the buyer may recover the 
92 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain 
Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, Official Journal L 171 , 07/07/1999. 93 Article 1(1) of the Directive states "The purpose of this Directive is the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States on certain aspects of the sale of consumer 
goods and associated guarantees in order to ensure a uniform minimum level of consumer protection in 
the context of the internal market. " 
94 Christian Twigg-Flesner and Robert Bradgate, `The E. C. Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees-All Talks and No Do? ' [2000] Web JCLI <http: //webjcli. 
ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/flesner2. html> section 6(c). 
95 Section 15A of the SGA does not allow the buyer to reject the goods for minor defects unless the buyer 
deals as a consumer. 
96 Implied terms provided by Sections 13,14 and 15 of the SGA are conditions. Section 11(3) of the SGA 
allows the buyer to reject the goods and repudiate the contract if the seller is in breach of a condition. The 
Section states "Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach of which may give rise 
to a right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of which may give rise to a claim for 
damages but not to a right to reject the goods and treate the contract as repudiated, depends in each case 
on the construction of the contract... " Obviously, the wording of Section 11(3) of the SGA makes it clear 
that the buyer has two separate rights in cases of breach of condition, i. e. to reject the goods and to 
repudiate the contract. See Bradgate, R and White, F, "Rejection and Termination in Contracts for the 
Sale of Goods" in J. Birds, R. Bradgate and C. Villiers (eds. ) Termination of Contracts, London, 1995, 
53,68. Bradgate and White convincingly argue against the view that the seller may have the right to 
remedy his defective performance if he can deliver substitute goods within the delivery period and his 
initial breach is not repudiatory. In fact, such a view seems to be in contradiction with Section 11(3) of the 
SGA since such a Section provides for the buyer's right to terminate the contract if the seller is in breach 
of a condition. Therefore, it is the buyer's choice to allow the seller to remedy his breach and the seller 
cannot impose specific performance, i. e. replacement, upon the buyer. Where the seller delivers defective 
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contract price by a restitutionary action. 97 He may also claim damages under Sections 51 
and 54 of the SGA. Furthermore, the consumer may choose to accept the defective 
goods and claim damages for breach of warranty of quality. In this case, their damages 
can be quantified as discussed in this research. Under the Directive, the consumer does 
not have such a choice. The remedy of specific performance, i. e. repair or replacement, 
is imposed upon him. He will not be able to rescind the contract unless repair or 
replacement is impossible or disproportionate. 98 Moreover, rescission is not available 
under the Directive where the defects in the goods are minor. 99 Thereupon, Twigg- 
Flesner and Bradgate suggest that the Directive should be implemented by free standing 
regulations operating in parallel with the SGA. IOO If this becomes the case, the consumer 
may be able to rely on the Directive or the SGA as the case may be. It can be noted here 
that consumers may prefer repair of defective goods. The SGA does not offer the 
consumer a legal right to ask for repair or replacement. This can be understandable in 
the light of the restrictive approach of English law to grant specific performance. In 
view of that, the implementation of the Directive is necessary as it provides that the 
consumer has the right to demand repair or replacement of non-conforming goods. 
In certain cases, repair and replacement may be impossible. This can be the case where 
the buyer purchases goods in order to be mixed them with other ingredients. If the goods 
are defective, the ingredients can be spoilt. As repair and replacement are impossible in 
such a case, the buyer will be entitled to price reduction. The buyer's loss will not be 
considered for the purpose of quantifying price reduction, as explained in chapter 
three. 101 Therefore, the remedy of damages will be important in such a case in order to 
allow the buyer to bring a contract action against the seller for the losses caused by the 
goods, the buyer may reject the goods and ask for replacement. In such a case, the buyer rejects the goods 
but does not treat the contract as repudiated. If the seller does not deliver substitute goods, the buyer may 
repudiate the contract and claim damages for non-delivery under Section 51 of the SGA. Nevertheless, 
such a debate may not affect consumer cases where there is no period of delivery. In most consumer 
contracts, the goods are delivered at the time of making the contract. 
9' See Section 54 of the SGA. 
98 Article 3(3) of the Directive states ".... A remedy shall be deemed to be disproportionate if it imposes 
costs on the seller which, in comparison with the alternative remedy, are unreasonable, taking into 
account: 
- the value the goods would have if there were no lack of conformity, 
- the significance of the lack of conformity, and 
- whether the alternative remedy could be completed without significant inconvenience to the consumer. " 99 Article 3(6) of the Directive states "The consumer is not entitled to have the contract rescinded if the 
lack of conformity is minor. " 
100 Christian Twigg-Flesner and Robert Bradgate, `The E. C. Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees-All Talks and No Do? ' [2000] Web JCLI <http: //webjcli. 
ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue2/flesner2. html> section 7. 
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defective goods. Price reduction will not compensate the buyer for his actual loss. This 
is one of the cases where the remedial scheme under the SGA can be more favourable 
for the consumer than the Directive's remedial scheme. Indeed, implementing the 
Directive by free standing regulations operating in parallel with the SGA will offer the 
consumer the choice to bring a claim under the SGA or the Directive, which means 
better consumer protection. 
The CISG provides the same remedies that are available to the buyer under the 
Directive. However, under the CISG, the buyer has the choice of remedy. If the buyer is 
entitled to price reduction under the CISG, he may also claim damages for consequential 
losses as explained in chapter three. 102 The Directive does not adopt the same remedial 
scheme. Therefore, in the aforementioned example of goods purchased in order to be 
mixed with other ingredients, if the buyer claimed price reduction under the CISG, he 
would be able to claim damages for the wasted ingredients. However, this is not the case 
under the Directive. Even where the buyer does not suffer consequential losses, the 
remedy of damages may be more favourable to him in certain cases, as discussed in 
chapter three. As Shears, Zollers and Hurd suggest, the remedies under the Directive are 
designed for disappointment and not for the buyer's injury. 103 Therefore, it is significant 
to keep the remedial scheme of the SGA available to consumers after the 
implementation of the Directive. 
The main question, for the purpose of the argument in this chapter, is whether the 
ultimate buyer can sue the remote seller (producer) 104 for defective goods. Under the 
current text of the Directive, the answer is in the negative. However, the producers' 
statements regarding the quality of goods may be taken into account in determining 
whether or not the goods are defective. In other words, the retailer may be held liable for 
breach of the manufacturer's public statement regarding the quality of the goods. Article 
2(2) of the Directive states 
"Consumer goods are presumed to be in conformity with the contract if they... 
show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the same type 
101 Supra, p. 107. 
102 Supra, p. 111. 
103 Peter Shears, Frances E. Zollers and Sandra N. Hurd, "It will be the biggest change to consumer rights 
for 20 years! " [2000] JBL 262,276. 
104 Article 1 (2-c) of the 1999 EC Directive defines producer as "the manufacturer of the consumer goods, 
the importer of consumer goods into the territory of the Community or any person purporting to be a 
producer by placing his name, trade mark or other distinctive sign on the consumer goods". 
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and which the consumer can reasonably expect, given the nature of the goods 
and taking into account any public statements on the specific characteristics of 
the goods made about them by the seller, the producer or his representative, 
particularly in advertising or on labelling. " [Emphasis added]. 
In fact, it seems strange to hold the retailer bound by public statement issued by the 
manufacturer who is not directly bound by it. This may be extremely unfair in cases 
where the retailer becomes aware of the statement after he purchases the goods from a 
seller in a distribution chain. One here may suggest that the retailer may sue the 
distributor for his liability to the consumer; the distributor may pass the liability up the 
chain until it reaches the manufacturer. However, where the consumer's claim is for 
breach of manufacturer's statement, the distributor will not be liable for the 
consequences of such a breach. Consequently, the retailer will not be able to recover 
damages from the distributor for his liability to the consumer which was caused by the 
manufacturer's breach of his public statement. As a result, under this regime, where the 
retailer did not purchase the goods directly from the manufacturer, the manufacturer will 
escape liability for giving wrong statement about the quality of goods. '05 Although this 
regime may offer better protection for consumer, it seems to be unfair for the retailer. 
More importantly, the consumer may not benefit from the retailer's liability in cases 
where the retailer has disappeared or become insolvent. Furthermore, the retailer may 
not be bound by public statements in certain cases. Article 2(4) of the Directive states 
"The seller shall not be bound by public statements, as referred to in paragraph 
2(d) if he: 
- shows that he was not, and could not reasonably have been, aware of the 
statement in question, 
- shows that by the time of conclusion of the contract the statement had been 
corrected, or 
- shows that the decision to buy the consumer goods could not have been 
influenced by the statement. " 
In view of the above discussion, it can be noted that the producer should be liable for 
breach of his public statement. Furthermore, the producer should be directly liable to the 
consumer for defective goods. This may not create any contradiction with the 1999 Act 
since the Law Commission Report, on which the 1999 Act is based, makes it clear that 
the 1999 Act is not intended to prevent any further protection for consumers. 
106 In fact, 
105 Hugh Beale, supra n. 75 at p. 153. 
106 Supra, p. 217. 
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producer's liability for defective goods may be added to the Directive later. Article 12 of 
the Directive states expressly that the Directive will be reviewed in relation to, inter 
alia, "the case for introducing the producer's direct liability and, if appropriate, shall be 
accompanied by proposals. " Recital 23 provides that in light of "the experience acquired 
in implementing this Directive, it may be necessary to envisage more far-reaching 
harmonization, notably by providing for the producer's direct liability for defects for 
which he is responsible". 
If the review of the Directive produces a new provision for the producer's direct 
liability, the same remedial scheme of the Directive may apply. Therefore, the remedy of 
damages will not be available for consumers against the producer. However, this may 
lead to unfair results where the consumer suffers consequential losses caused by 
defective goods. In cases where the consumer suffers physical losses resulting from 
defective goods, he may sue the producer under the Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
Therefore, the buyer may recover for his actual loss by suing the producer under the 
Directive and the Consumer Protection Act 1987. However, where the consumer incurs 
extra expenses due to the defective quality of goods, he will not be able to recover such 
expenses under the Directive. It is submitted that English law should go farther than the 
Directive to offer consumers the right to sue the remote seller for all foreseeable losses 
resulting from defective goods. By this way, the consumer can be better protected. If this 
submission is ever accepted, double recovery can always be avoided by disallowing the 
consumer to recover damages from the retailer and the producer for the same loss. As 
previously argued, the remote seller should be liable to the ultimate buyer, whether 
commercial or consumer, for foreseeable losses resulting from defective quality. Indeed, 
a reform regarding remote seller's liability, as Professor Beale suggests, 107 is necessary 
in both commercial and consumer cases. 
At the last point, it should be noted that the Directive makes it clear that certain 
manufacturer's guarantees are legally enforceable. 108 As discussed below, the 
enforceability of such guarantees is debatable under English law. Although such 
guarantees are likely enforceable under English law, the Directive removes any doubt 
about their enforceability. Article 6 of the Directive states 
107 Hugh Beale, supra n. 75 at p. 139. 
108 See Robert Bradgate, `Harmonisation of Legal Guarantees: A Common Law Perspective' [1995] 
Consum. L. J. 94,107. 
231 
"1. A guarantee shall be legally binding on the offerer under the conditions laid 
down in the guarantee statement and the associated advertising. 2. The guarantee 
shall : 
- state that the consumer has legal rights under applicable national legislation 
governing the sale of consumer goods and make clear that those rights are not 
affected by the guarantee, 
- set out in plain intelligible language the contents of the guarantee and the 
essential particulars necessary for making claims under the guarantee, notably 
the duration and territorial scope of the guarantee as well as the name and 
address of the guarantor. " 
Article 1 of the Directive defines guarantee as "any undertaking by a seller or producer 
to the consumer, given without extra charge, to reimburse the price paid or to replace, 
repair or handle consumer goods in any way if they do not meet the specifications set 
out in the guarantee statement or in the relevant advertising. " In view of that, the 
Directive does not deal with the enforceability of the remote seller's warranty as to the 
quality of goods. If the remote seller issues a warranty which states that the goods are of 
specific quality, he will not be held liable under the Directive for breach of false 
warranty. Whether such a warranty is enforceable under English law is the subject- 
matter of the next section. Chris Willett suggests that manufacturers tend to honour their 
guarantees of repair, replacement or reimbursement of the price; therefore, a reform is 
needed to hold the producer bound by his warranty as to the quality of goods which he 
issues to the ultimate buyer. 109 
Under Article 6(3) of the Directive, the guarantee should be made available to 
consumers on their request. This may not be possible in cases of packaged warranties 
where the consumer may not have access to by the time he purchases the goods. 110 
However, under Article 6(5) of the Directive, the fact that the guarantee was not made 
available to the consumer does not make the guarantee unenforceable. 
6.1.4 Passing up the Liability in `String Contracts' 
Where the ultimate buyer suffers a loss for breach of warranty of quality, he may, in the 
normal course of circumstances, claim damages from his direct seller. In cases of chain 
contracts if the seller is held liable, he may pass the liability to his seller by claiming the 
109 Chris Willett, "The Quality of Goods and the Rights of Consumers" (1993) 44 NILQ 218,230. 
110 See Peter Shears, Frances E. Zollers and Sandra N. Hurd, "It will be the biggest change to consumer 
rights for 20 years! " [2000] JBL 262,269. 
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compensation that he paid to the ultimate buyer. ' 11 By this method, liability may pass on 
from a seller to another until it reaches eventually the manufacturer. However, this may 
not be always the case. 
6.1.4.1 The Deficiency of the Method 
The method of "passing the liability" may be deficient in two cases, i. e., where it 
increases the remote seller's liability and where the chain of contracts is broken. The 
remote seller may be considerably more liable through this method than where he is 
sued directly by the ultimate buyer. It is quite obvious that such a remote seller may be 
liable for all expenditures incurred reasonably' 12 by the sellers in the chain contracts on 
defending the claims of breach of warranty. 113 One here may suggest that the seller in a 
distribution chain may bring his direct seller into the case. The latter may also bring his 
direct seller and so on till the original seller is brought to defend the action. 114 By this 
way, expenses might be cut down and the original seller's liability would not increase 
materially. On this point, some time ago, Talman has pointed out that if defendants can 
be substituted by other defendants in an action for breach of warranty within the vertical 
distribution chain, why cannot the injured party sue directly the remote seller who is 
originally liable for the deficiency of the goods in question? He suggested that in such 
'I See the UCC case of Mann v. Weyerhaeuser Co. 703 F. 2d 272 (8th Cir. 1983), where the buyer was 
allowed, as damages, the compensation he paid to his customers due to the manufacturer's breach of 
warranty of quality. 
112 Regarding expenditures incurred in defending a sub-buyer's claim, such expenditures are recoverable if 
they were reasonable. Where the original seller was informed of the sub-buyer's claim and he refused to 
contribute in defending it, the expenditures are likely to be held reasonable. On the other hand, where the 
buyer defends the sub-buyer's claim after he knew from the seller that there is no defence, the 
expenditures incurred on such a defence are likely to be unreasonable. See Hammond & Co. v. Bussey 
(1888) 20 QB 79; Bennet v. Kreeger, (1925) 41 TLR 609. 
113 See the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Western Seed Production Corp. v. 
Campbell, 1969 U. S. LEXIS 2552; 393 U. S. 1093 (1969) Where the buyer settles the sub-buyer's claim 
out of the court, the amount paid through such a settlement should be reasonable. See also Kasler and 
Cohen v. Slavouski [1928] 1 KB 78 where A sold dyed rabbit skins to B who resold them to C. There was 
a chain of contracts till the one of the items reached F. F recovered from his directed buyer for the "fur 
dermatitis" he suffered due to the defective quality of the skins. Each buyer in the chain recovered what he 
paid to his sub-buyer from his direct seller. The liability reached finally the original seller A. The Court 
held that B was entitled to recover from A the damages recovered in the original action by F and a sum in 
respect of costs incurred by themselves and C and D respectively in connection with the claims against 
them. 
114 Section 2-607(5)(a) of the UCC states that "Where the buyer is sued for breach of warranty or other 
obligation for which his seller is answerable over... he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If 
the notice states that the seller may come in and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be 
bound in any action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigation, 
then unless the seller after reasonable receipt of the notice does come in and defend he is so bound. " 
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cases, the aggrieved party should be able to proceed against the manufacturer directly. ' 5 
The previous discussion shows that there is a kind of response to such a suggestion 
among the American jurisdictions. It is submitted that the classic rule of privity need not 
be strictly applied in such cases. Abolishing the requirement of privity in such cases 
brings the law into line of reality. 
Passing the liability up chain contracts cannot be successful in at least four cases. 
Firstly, where a seller to an upstream contract has gone out of business or become 
insolvent, the chain will be broken and, hence, the liability cannot be shifted up any 
more. In fact, the buyer may not be able to identify the seller he purchased the goods 
from. This is not unusual case. In fact, the consumer who goes shopping may buy 
several things from different places. It is possible that the consumer may not be able to 
identify the seller of each item he purchased. Actually, this may also happen in cases 
where the buyers are not consumers. The buyer may purchase branded goods in reliance 
on the brand name without paying attention to the place from which he obtained the 
goods. Therefore, the buyer he purchases a quantity of branded goods from different 
places may find it difficult to identify the immediate seller of each item he purchased. 
As a result, the chain of contracts can be broken. For example, in the case of Lambert 
and another v. Lewis and others, 116 the chain was broken because the dealers could not 
identify their immediate seller of the goods. 
Secondly, parties in chain contracts may shelter behind disclaimer clauses. Where one of 
the contracts in the chain includes clauses which exclude the liability of the seller, the 
buyer may not be able to recover for his liability towards his sub-buyer and, hence, 
liability cannot pass up further. The third case is concerned with the limitation period. 
By the time liability is passed up to the original seller, the limitation period of the claim 
may have expired. Therefore, the remote seller may have the chance to escape liability 
by relying on the defence of the limitation period to defend his direct buyer's claim. In 
such a case, there is a risk that the remote seller may escape liability. Such a risk can be 
avoided by allowing the ultimate buyer to sue the remote seller directly. 
' 17 
115 J. E. Talman, `On the Problem of Extension of Warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code' 
(1968) 1 Conn. L. Rev. 369,380. 
116 [1982] AC 225. See infra, p. 245. 
11' See J. N. Adams and R Brownsword, Key Issues in Contract, London, 1995, p. 152. 
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The fourth case of the deficiency of this method is where the remote seller issues 
warranty to the ultimate buyer. In such a case, the ultimate buyer cannot sue his direct 
buyer for breach of such a warranty. ' 18 Therefore, the method of "passing up liability" 
would be inapplicable. Here, the court will discuss whether such a warranty is legally 
binding. The court will go through the above mentioned dilemma to find out whether 
such a warranty can furnish a legal ground for a collateral contractual relationship 
between the remote seller and the ultimate buyer. 
6.1.4.2 The Applicability of the Method 
The main issue arises in cases of passing the liability, is the level of similarity among 
warranties issued by the sellers in chain contracts. The case law has approached this 
issue by two different methods, i. e. identical warranties and similar warranties. 
According to the first method, the liability cannot pass up chain contracts unless 
warranties, issued by parties in the chain, are the same. This method can be found in 
Dexters v. Hill Crest Oil Co., ' 19 where the defendant had sold dark cottonseed grease to 
the plaintiff who resold the seeds as black cottonseeds which are of a higher quality. The 
plaintiff sued the original seller to recover, as damages, what he paid to the ultimate 
buyer. The Court of Appeal refused to measure the plaintiff's damages by the amount he 
paid to his sub-buyer. In this case, Scrutton U pointed out that 
"... where there has been a chain of sales and sub-sales often present 
complications and difficulties; but one point I have always understood as clear, 
namely, that in order to make a sum recovered for breach of the last contract in 
the chain the measure of damages for a similar breach of a contract higher up in 
the chain, it is essential that the contracts along the chain connecting them 
should be the same. " 120 [Emphasis added]. 
Despite that the statement suggests that warranties should be identical, it is hard to 
believe that Scrutton L3 required warranties to be semantically identical. Where 
warranties vary in words, this may not be, for the purpose of passing the liability up the 
chain, a ground to hold that the warranties are different and as a result the chain is 
broken. The warranty maybe changed semantically in order to be more valuable. 
' 21 
118 See M. W., `Retail Sellers and the Enforcement of Manufacturer Warranties: an Application of the 
Uniform Commercial Code to Consumer Product Distribution Systems' (1986) 32 Wayne L. Rev. 1049, 
1075. 
119 [1926] 1 KB 348. 
120 Dexters v. Hill Crest Oil Co., [1926] 1 KB 348,359. 
121 In British Oil & Cake Co. v. Burstall [1923] 39 TLR 406, the Court found the buyer's modification of 
the original warranty did not show the goods with a better value. In this case the defendant (the original 
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In the famous case of Biggin & Co. Ltd. v. Permanite Ltd., 122 Devlin J. made it clear that 
the test is whether or not the ultimate buyer's loss resulted from the original seller's 
breach of warranty. It seems well settled that the liability towards the ultimate buyer 
may pass up the chain if the ultimate buyer's loss resulted from the original seller's 
breach of warranty. It should be clear that the question of whether or not the variation of 
warranties has an effect on the ultimate buyer's loss, is a question of fact which can be 
decided according to the circumstances of each case. In Biggin 's case, Devlin J. pointed 
out that the impact of changes in warranties depends on whether the loss is physical or 
economical. He said that "any variation that is more than a matter of words is likely to 
be fatal, because there is no way of telling its effect on the market value. In the latter 
case the nature of the physical damage will show whether the variation was material or 
not"123. However, if the original seller's breach was one of the causes of the ultimate 
buyer's loss, although it was not the only reason and/ or there was material changes in 
the warranty, the original seller might be held liable for the loss. If this becomes the 
case, his liability cannot be measured by the direct seller's liability towards the ultimate 
buyer since his breach was not the only cause of the loss. The liability may vary 
depending on whether the original seller's breach was the principal cause of loss or 
not. 124 
But, what would be the case if the loss was caused by a breach of a different warranty 
which the original seller confirmed or consented to impliedly or expressly? Obviously, 
in such a case, the original seller may intervene in the subpurchase contract by inducing 
the subpurchaser to rely on the warranty for purchasing the goods. The court may find 
here a legal base for a collateral contract between the original seller and the ultimate 
seller) had sold copra cake to the plaintiff. The plaintiff resold the copra cake as free from castor. The 
court found that the copra cake cannot be with castor; in this sense, the difference in description was 
immaterial to the description of the quality of the goods. Such kind of addition in the description of the 
quality of the goods cannot show the goods with a better quality. 
122 [1951] 1 KB 422. The case was reversed on another ground: [1951] 2 KB 314. In this case the plaintiff 
purchased from the defendant goods in order to be sold to the Dutch government, as the defendant was 
aware of that. The Dutch government resold some of the goods to contractors who found that the goods 
are with unsatisfactory quality. The Dutch government claimed damages from the plaintiff for 
compensation paid to the contractors and the loss of goods which could not be resold. The plaintiff settled 
the claim out of court and sued the defendant to recover, as damages, what he paid to the Dutch 
government. In this case Devlin J. found that there were some changes in warranties which affected the 
representative value of the goods, i. e. the changes in warranty was not only mere language. He held that in 
such cases the manufacturer's liability cannot be measured by the liability of the direct seller towards the 
ultimate buyer. 
123 Ibid at p. 434. 
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buyer. The original seller's intervention may constitute an offer which meets the 
acceptance of the sub-buyer by the act of purchase. However, what would be the case if 
the original seller did not contact the sub-buyer but agreed with the buyer to sell to the 
sub-buyer on a different warranty? Can liability pass up to the original seller? Where 
such an agreement was part of the contract between the original seller and the buyer, the 
original seller would be bound by the agreement and, hence, liability would pass up to 
him. However, where the original seller agreed after he had sold the goods to the buyer, 
the question would turn to be whether the seller's consent and the buyer's resale 
amounted to a collateral contract. 
The similarity of warranties is not the only restriction on passing the liability up the 
chain. 125 Parties should reasonably contemplate, at the time of making the contract, that 
there will, or probably will, be a chain of contracts following their contract. 126 In other 
words, parties should reasonably contemplate that the goods will, or probably will, be 
resold to a sub-buyer who may resell again and so on. In such cases, the remoteness 
principle127 is one of the main restrictions on passing the liability up the chain. Under 
the remoteness principle, it should be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties that 
the loss is not unlikely to result from the breach. It should be in the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties, at the time of making the contract, that the remote seller's 
breach will not be unlikely to cause a breach of the series contracts and it will not be 
unlikely that the sub-buyers will sue their sellers for such a breach. 128 
At the last point, it should be clear that in some cases beneficiaries other than the sub- 
buyer use the purchased goods. If the goods caused damage to such beneficiaries, they 
might sue the ultimate buyer in tort or in contract. 129 Where such a damage results from 
the seller's breach of warranty, the ultimate buyer may recover from the seller for his 
liability to the third party. Here, damages may include the expenses incurred in 
124 See the causation restriction, infra p. 278. 
125 See chapter seven, infra p. 277. 
126 See A. G. Guest, Benjamin's Sale of Goods, London, 1997, para. 17-076. See also Rostock v. 
Nicholson [1904] 1 KB 725; Pinnock v. Lewis [1923] 1 KB 690; Hardwick Game Farm v. Suffolk 
Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1961] 2 AC 31. 
127 See the remoteness principle, infra p. 284. 
128 See the leading case of Hammond v. Bussey (1888) 20 QB 79. 
129 The claim in tort or contract depends on the legal relationship between the aggrieved party and the 
ultimate buyer. 
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defending the third party's claim. 130 In such a case, the claim of the third party and the 
liability of the ultimate buyer should be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at 
the time of making the contract, as not unlikely to result from the seller's breach of 
warranty. 
However, in order to recover for his liability to third party from his seller, the buyer 
should prove that such a liability was caused by the defective goods. In Lambert and 
another v. Lewis and others13' the ultimate buyer was not successful in his claim against 
his seller to recover the compensation he paid to a third party who was injured by the 
defective goods. The House of Lords stated that although the trailer coupling (the 
subject-matter of the sale contract) was defective, the damage suffered by the third party 
was caused by the ultimate buyer's negligence. The ultimate buyer was negligent in 
using the defective trailer coupling after he discovered its defect. If the damage had been 
caused before the buyer noticed that the trailer coupling was broken, the buyer could 
have recovered from his seller for his liability to the third party. Here, it should be noted 
that the buyer may still be entitled to recover for his liability to third party even though 
such a liability results from the buyer's negligence in not examining the goods. This 
may be the case where the buyer, as between himself and the seller, is not under a duty 
to examine the goods. In the leading case of Mowbray v. Merryweather, 132 the buyers 
were held liable in negligence for injury suffered by their employees due to defective 
goods. The buyer was found negligent due to the fact that he did not examine the goods 
before putting them to use. However, the buyers recovered for their liability from their 
seller on the ground that the injury was caused by the defect of the goods and the buyers, 
as between themselves and the seller, were not under duty to examine the goods. 
6.1.5 Enforceability of Warranty issued by Remote Seller to the Ultimate 
Buyer under English law 
Under current English law, the claim of the ultimate buyer against the remote seller for 
breach of implied warranty of quality may face the defence of lack of privity. However, 
this may not be the case where the remote seller issues an express warranty of quality to 
130 Costs cannot be reasonable if they are incurred on unsuccessful appeal brought by the sub-buyer 
against the third party. However, where the sub-buyer's defense against the third party's claim was 
successful, it is very likely to be held that the costs on such a defence were reasonable. See Harvey 
McGregor, McGregor on Damages, London, 16th ed., 1997, p. 598. 
131 [1982] AC 225. See infra, p. 245. 
132 (1895) 2 QB 640. 
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the ultimate buyer. In fact, such express warranties normally provide that the remote 
seller undertakes to repair or replace the defective goods or refund the price. However, 
the seller may also indicate in an express warranty that the goods are fit for specific 
purpose or are of specific description. For example, the remote seller may advertise a 
printer as being of the capacity of printing 30 pages per minute. It is also possible that 
the remote seller, through advertisement or packaged warranties, guarantees the quality 
of the goods for a specific period of time after the time of purchase by the ultimate 
buyer. Moreover, it is reasonable for a person who watches a television advertisement of 
goods to understand that the goods are free of defects and they are fit for their general 
use. Here, it can be argued that such advertisements amount, at least, to a warranty that 
the goods are defect free and fit for their general use. In other words, such 
advertisements should be treated at least as promises of the remote seller that the goods 
will comply with the implied warranty of quality. As one American court said, "when a 
manufacturer puts a new automobile into the stream of trade and promotes its purchase 
to the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such 
accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. "133 
The main question is whether or not the warranty of the remote seller issued to the 
ultimate buyer is enforceable. 134 Generally, the existence of a contractual relationship 
between seller and buyer is a prerequisite for the buyer's claim under the warranty 
theory. 135 Here, it should be noted that some American States, as illustrated below, 136 
have abolished the requirement of privity in cases of breach of warranties issued by 
remote sellers. 137 Such a contractual relationship is required for enforcing the remote 
seller's warranties under English law and some American jurisdictions. ' 38 The 
133 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A. 2d 69,84; 32 N. J. 358,384 (1960). In this case, the wife of a 
purchaser of an automobile had suffered physical injuries due to the defective quality of the automobile. 
She brought an action in contract against the manufacturer for breach of warranty action. The 
manufacturer was held liable regardless of the requirement of privity. Under Section 2-318 of the UCC, 
implied and express warranties are extended to the wife of the ultimate buyer. 
134 See P. L. Dykas, `Opinion v. Express Warranty: How much Puff can a salesman use, if a salesman can 
use puff to make a sale? ' (1991-92) 28 Idaho L. Rev. 167. 
135 However, under certain circumstances, the sub-buyer may bring an action under the 1999 Act. Supra, 
p. 214. 
136 Infra, 253. 
13' Under Section 2-318 of the UCC, privity is not a restriction for claims under the warranty theory. 
138 The manufacturers' instructions of using the goods constitute part of the goods purchased. Therefore, if 
the buyer uses the goods in accordance with the instructions and, nevertheless, the goods fail to fit for 
their purpose, the buyer may sue his immediate seller for breach of warranty of quality. In such a case, the 
buyer can sue his immediate seller regardless of whether the failure is due to the defective quality of the 
goods or to the wrong instructions. In Wormell v. R. HMAgriculture (East) [1986] 1 WLR 336 a farmer 
purchased herbicide in order to kill wild oats in his crop of winter wheat. He applied the herbicide in 
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contractual relationship between remote seller and ultimate buyer can take one of the 
following three shapes: direct contract, contract through agent and collateral contract 
As for direct contractual relationship, the buyer may be able to purchase the goods 
directly from the manufacturer through, as an example, mail order. Obviously, in such a 
case the buyer will be in a direct contractual relationship with the manufacturer and, 
hence, the issue of third party's claim will not arise. However, beneficiaries, 139 other 
than the direct buyer, are not in a contractual relationship with the manufacturer. 
Therefore, if they suffer damage resulting from the use of the product purchased, privity 
can be a defence to their claim under the warranty theory. Likewise, where the 
circumstances show that the dealer is an agent of the manufacturer, the buyer, who 
purchases from such a dealer, will be in a direct contractual relationship with the 
manufacturer. Plainly, in such a case, lack of privity cannot be a successful defence for 
the buyer's claim. 
As for collateral contracts, the court in some circumstances may find the express 
warranty, issued by a remote seller to the ultimate buyer, sufficient enough to furnish a 
legal basis for collateral contract. Such a finding may be essential to hold the remote 
seller liable in cases where the only available action is in contract. Under English law, 
the enforceability of remote seller's warranties is uncertain due to the little litigation in 
this area. Manufacturers tend to honour their warranties in order to improve their 
commercial reputation. 140 
Circumstances, which furnish legal ground for contractual relationship between the 
buyer and remote seller, cannot be put in an exhaustive list. Contractual relationships 
between buyer and remote seller may be found in cases where the remote seller makes a 
representation about his goods to the ultimate buyer personally or to the public. 141 For 
accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. However, the herbicide had little or no effect on the wild 
oats. It was found that the manufacturer's instructions were misleading as understood by the buyer and a 
reasonable user. Thereupon, the buyer's action against his immediate seller for breach of warranty of 
quality was successful. In this case, the Court made it clear that in a case such as Worm ell the buyer 
purchases the goods with their instructions. 
139 Such as the family members of the buyer. 
140 G. Woodroffe, `Guarantees' in Buying and Selling Law (Special Report), the Chartered Institute of 
Purchasing and Supply, Issue 14, May 1993, p. 5. 
141 In the UCC case of Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 1991 N. C. LEXIS 612; 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 
2d 1184 (1991), the manufacturer made a representation concerning the flooring in its mobile homes to 
the seller in a conference held for the purpose of highlighting the attributes of its products. The 
manufacturer enabled the seller to pass the information along to consumers to induce purchases of the 
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example, a buyer who relies on the dealer's representation for purchasing the goods in 
question through a finance company may sue such a dealer in case of breach of his 
representation. Although the direct contractual relationship in such a case is between the 
buyer and finance company, the dealer's representation and the mere purchase of the 
goods creates a collateral contract between the buyer and the dealer upon which the 
dealer's warranty was held enforceable. 142 As for contractual relationship by means of 
representation to the public, manufacturers and distributors often advertise their goods 
in order to induce the ultimate buyers, mainly consumers, to buy their goods from 
retailers. Where the advertisement shows that the goods are of special quality or states 
an assurance of quality, it may furnish grounds for holding that there is a contractual 
relationship between the ultimate buyer and the manufacturer or distributor. 143 
The significant issue here is whether the doctrine of consideration can be satisfied by a 
mere warranty issued to the ultimate buyer by a remote seller. The doctrine of 
consideration may be satisfied where the parties have reciprocal obligations under the 
contract. 144 Therefore, if the ultimate buyer has nothing to do as a reciprocal action to 
the manufacturer's warranty, the contract may not be made. Here it can be noted that the 
purchase of the advertised product from a retailer can be beneficial for the manufacturer 
inasmuch as it increases the sale of his products by an indirect way. 145 In Shanklin Pier 
Ltd. v. betel Products Ltd., 146 the manufacturer assured the plaintiff that a certain kind 
of paint would last for at least seven years if it was applied to the pier of the plaintiff. 
Relying on this assurance, the plaintiff instructed its contractors to purchase the paint 
and use it. The paint lasted for a considerably shorter period. The Court allowed the 
plaintiff damages for the manufacturer's breach of his express warranty. In this case, the 
manufacturer's assurance and the plaintiff's purchase amounted to a unilateral contract. 
Thereupon, the manufacturer was liable for his failure to perform his promise, i. e. the 
life of the paint. This case can be an ideal example of unilateral contract where the 
homes. In this case, the court allowed a claim brought by a consumer against the manufacturer for breach 
of warranty of quality. 
142 This was the case in Yeoman Credit, Ltd. v. Odgers [1962] 1 All ER 789. See also Andrews v. 
Hopkinson, [1957] 1 QB 229; Brown v. Sheen and Richmond Car Sales, Ltd., [1950] 1 All ER 1102. 
143 D. B. Nelson, `Is Privity Still Required in a Breach of Express Warranty Cause of Action for Personal 
Injury Damages? ' (1991) 43 Baylor L. Rev. 520,563. 
144 See Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract, London, 3rd ed., 1997, p. 56. 
145 See G. Woodroffe, supra n. 140 at p. 5. See also the American case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 161 A. 2d 69,78 (N. J. 1960). 
146 [1951] 2 KB 854. 
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consideration doctrine is satisfied by an exchange of an act for a promise. 147 In 
Shanklin 's case the mere purchase of the paint, in reliance on the manufacturer's 
assurance, was a reciprocal act for the buyer's promise of the quality of the paint. 
In certain cases, the mere use of the product may be sufficient enough to constitute an 
acceptance of the remote seller's promise and, hence, establish a contractual relationship 
between the remote seller and the ultimate buyer. In the famous case of Carlill v. 
Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 149 the Court found a collateral contract between the 
manufacturer and the ultimate buyer. In this case, the defendant advertised its product, 
i. e. smoke ball, as preventive against influenza. The defendant made it clear that he 
would pay £100 for anyone who used the smoke ball and still caught flu. The Court held 
that there was a contractual relationship. The requirement of consideration was satisfied 
by the exchange of "the act of use of smoke ball" for the manufacturer's promise. Here, 
suppose that the ultimate buyer did not use the Smoke ball; however, she passed it to 
somebody else, her relative as an example. Could such a relative sue the manufacturer in 
a contract action if he used the smoke ball under the instructions and, nevertheless, 
caught influenza? Relying on the judgment of Bowen LJ, one may answer this question 
in the positive. Bowen LJ pointed out that the effect of the manufacturer's promise, 
which it was intended to have, was to make the people use the product as distinct from 
the purchase of it. So, the promise and the use of the product, created a contract which is 
separate from the purchase contract. 
The intent to create contractual relation is another requirement for making a collateral 
contract. Professor Beale suggests, for the purpose of making a collateral contract, that 
"there must be a specific statement to the customer in relation to a particular transaction 
which the customer is then thinking of entering. "149 In general, where the ultimate buyer 
purchases the goods in reliance on an express warranty of quality, issued to him by the 
remote seller, do the remote seller and the ultimate buyer intend to create a legal 
relationship? The answer is in the affirmative. The remote seller issues such a warranty 
147 Hugh Collins, supra n. 144 at p. 59. 
148 (1893) 1 QB 256. This case was followed in Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust Co of Canada (CI) 
Ltd and Others [1986] AC 207. In this case, the defendants invited two parties to submit sealed offers or 
confidential telexes for a parcel of shares and they stated in the invitation that `we bind ourselves to accept 
the highest offer". It was held that this constituted an offer which was accepted by the highest bid. The act 
of bidding was the consideration for the promise to accept the highest offer. Clearly, in this case, there 
were two contracts, i. e. the contract of sale of the shares and the collateral contract, which was formulated 
by the promise to accept the highest offer and the act of bidding. 
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in order to promote his purchase and, thus, should expect the ultimate buyer to rely on 
such a warranty in purchasing the warranted goods. The buyer enters into the sale 
contract in reliance on the presumption that the goods will conform to the remote 
seller's warranty. This issue was well dealt with by the House of Lords in Esso 
Petroleum Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise. 150 In this case, Esso devised a 
sales promotions scheme under which garage owners offered a free "World Cup Coin" 
with every four gallons of petrol. In dealing with the issue of whether there was a 
collateral contract, Lord Simon said that "I am... not prepared to accept that the 
promotion material put out by Esso was not envisaged by them as creating legal 
relations between the garage proprietors who adopted it and the motorists who yielded 
to its blandishments. "I 5' The test, regarding the requirement of intention to make legal 
relation, is whether the reasonable man in the position of the buyer would understand 
that the statement of the remote seller imports an intention to create legal relation with 
the buyer. 152 Obviously, the test is concerned with the apparent intention of the remote 
seller. 153 Therefore, where the apparent intention of the remote seller is to make a legal 
relationship, the remote seller cannot deny the existence of a collateral contract with the 
ultimate buyer by proving that it was not intended to make such a contractual 
relationship. 
The main issue here is whether the ultimate buyer's reliance on the remote seller's 
warranty is necessary to furnish grounds for a collateral contract. Here, it should be 
noted that the buyer's awareness of the remote seller's warranty is definitely required for 
149 Hugh Beale, supra n. 75 at p. 151. 
150 [1976] 1 All ER 117. 
151 Ibid at p. 121. 
152 Bowerman and Another v. Association of British Travel Agents Ltd., The Times, 24 November 1995. 
The case involve a contract of a school skiing trip made with an operator which was a member of the 
Association of British Travel Agents Ltd (ABTA). The operator became insolvent. However, the 
customers were protected by the ABTA protection scheme. The ABTA reimbursed the cost of the trip but 
insisted on deducting £10 per head which represented the holiday insurance premium paid on behalf of 
each participant in the tour. The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to recover all the cost of the trip 
under the ABTA protection scheme. The question in that case was whether there was a collateral contract 
between the plaintiffs and the ABTA. The statement issued by the ABTA to the customers was that 
"Where holidays or other travel arrangements have not yet commenced at the time of failure, ABTA 
arranges for you to be reimbursed the money you have paid in respect of your holiday arrangements". The 
Court of Appeal by a majority held that there was such a contract. Lord Waite, said that "[m]y own view is 
that the notice [statement of ABTA] - notwithstanding the bewildering miscellany it contains of 
information, promise, disclaimer and reassurance - would be understood by the ordinary member of the 
public as importing an intention to create legal relations with customers of ABTA members. " See also 
K. W. Wedderburn, `Collateral Contracts' [1959] CLJ 58,77. 
153 Gerard McMeel, `Contractual Intention: The Smoke Ball Strikes Back' (1997) 113 LQR 47,49. 
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creating a collateral contract. 154 The issue of reliance was dealt with in the case of Wells 
(Merstham), Ltd. v. Buckland Sand and Silica Co., Ltd. 155 In this case, where the 
original seller breached his express warranty issued to the sub-buyer, the Court held 
such a warranty enforceable on the ground that there had been a collateral contract 
created between the sub-buyer and the original seller. The Court stated that "[a]s 
between A (a potential seller of goods) and B (a potential buyer), two ingredients, and 
two only, are in my judgment required in order to bring about a collateral contract 
containing a warranty: (1) a promise or assertion by A as to the nature, quality or 
quantity of the goods which B may reasonably regard as being made animo contrahendi, 
and (2) acquisition by B of the goods in reliance on that promise or assertion. "156 This 
statement makes it clear that, under English law, reliance on remote seller's warranty is 
required for the purpose of creating a collateral contract by which the remote seller's 
warranty becomes enforceable. However, it should be noted that although English law 
requires reliance on the seller's warranty, the court need not look into the buyer's mind 
to see whether he relied on the seller's warranty. 157 
One here could argue that the requirement of reliance is unfair, especially in cases of 
manufacturers' advertisements. In such cases, it is immaterial from the point of view of 
the manufacturer whether the ultimate buyer relied on his warranty for purchasing the 
goods or not. The manufacturers' warranties are advertised to the public for the purpose 
of promoting the demand for the manufacturers' products. Therefore, where the buyers 
are aware of such advertisements, it should not matter whether they relied in fact on 
such advertisements for purchasing the advertised goods. This seems quite fair in 
154 In Esso Petroleum Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1976] 1 All ER 117 Lord Simon, at 
pp. 122-3, said that "[o]f course not every motorist will notice the placard, but nor will every potential 
offeree of many offers be necessarily conscious that they have been made. However, the motorist who 
does notice the placard, and in reliance thereon drives in and orders the petrol, is in law doing two things 
at the same time. First, he is accepting the offer of a coin if he buys four gallons of petrol. He is himself 
offering to buy four gallons to petrol: this offer is accepted by the filling of his tank. " 
iss [1965] 2 QB 170. 
156 Wells (Merstham), Ltd. v. Buckland Sand and Silica Co., Ltd., [1965] 2 QB 170,180. In this case, the 
plaintiffs who were chrysanthemum growers, asked the defendants whether their sand had the low oxide 
content necessary for propagating cutting. The defendants answered that it did. In reliance on that, the 
plaintiffs bought some of the defendant's sand from a third party. When the sand turned out to have a high 
oxide content, the defendants were held liable in contract. 
157 In Oscar Chess, Ltd. v. Williams, [1957] 1 All ER 325, Lord Denning, at p. 328, pointed out that "[i]t is 
sometimes supposed that the tribunal must look into the minds of the parties to see what they themselves 
intended. That is a mistake... The question whether a warranty was intended depends on the conduct of the 
parties, on their words and behaviour, rather than on their thoughts. If an 
intelligent bystander would 
reasonably infer that a warranty was intended, that will suffice. And this, when the 
facts are not in dispute, 
is a question of law. " 
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unilateral contracts where the buyer reciprocates to the remote seller's warranty by 
purchasing the goods in question. 
In fact, the requirement of reliance seems not to be strictly applied. This is best 
illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lambert and another v. Lewis and 
others. 158 The case involved a car accident in which the plaintiffs, a mother and her son, 
were injured and the son and the father were killed. Their car was hit by a trailer which 
had become detached from an on-coming car owned by a farmer. The unhitching of the 
trailer had resulted from the failure of the coupling connecting the trailer to the farmer's 
car, the design of the coupling being defective. The plaintiffs brought an action in 
negligence against the farmer, the driver of the farmer's car, the dealers who had 
supplied and fitted the coupling to the farmer's car, and the manufacturers of the 
coupling. The farmer brought third party proceedings against the dealers, and the dealers 
in turn brought fourth party proceedings against the manufacturer. The manufacturer and 
the farmer were held liable for the resulting damage. The Court of Appeal held the 
dealers liable to the farmer for his liability to the plaintiffs. 159 As the Court held so, it 
carried on to discuss the dealers' claim against the manufacturer, which is our concern 
in this case. In this case, the dealers did not buy the trailer coupling from the 
manufacturer. However, due to the fact that they were unable to identify the distributor 
who sold them the trailer coupling, they brought a claim against the manufacturer for 
inter alia breach of warranty. 
In this case, the dealers relied on the decision in the aforementioned cases of Carlill and 
Shanklin to argue that the manufacturer was liable for breach of collateral contract. 
However, the Court of Appeal approved the trial judge's finding that the manufacturer's 
statement regarding the quality of the goods in question was not intended to be binding. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeal rejected the dealers' submission that the manufacturer 
was in breach of collateral contract. The Court stated that it is not enough, in order to 
hold the manufacturer contractually liable, to prove that the manufacturer's statement 
induced the buyer to purchase the products. The statement should be a promise which is 
intended to be binding. However, the question should be whether it was reasonable for 
158 [1980] 1 All ER 978. The decision was reversed on different ground: [1982] AC 225. 
159 The decision of the Court of Appeal regarding the liability of the dealers was reversed by the House of 
Lords on the ground that the damage was caused by the farmer's negligence 
in continuing to use the trailer 
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the buyer to rely on the manufacturer's statement in purchasing the products. If the 
answer is in the positive, the manufacturer should be held liable for the defective 
products. Where it is reasonable to rely on the manufacturer's statements regarding the 
quality of the goods, the manufacturer, it is submitted, should be liable for the defective 
quality of goods regardless of whether or not he intended his statements to be legally 
binding. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Lambert accepted the submission that "not much is 
needed to conclude that when a warranty of suitability for a particular purpose is 
expressed or implied in a contract of sale, that warranty has been relied on by the 
purchaser .,, 
160 Therefore, where the buyer is aware of the manufacturer's warranty 
concerning the quality of the goods, the reliance on the warranty may be inferred from 
the act of his purchase of the goods. 
The issue of the enforceability of remote seller's warranty becomes more complicated in 
cases of packaged warranties. A manufacturer's warranty may be enclosed with the 
goods in the same package. 161 Therefore, the buyer might not know that such a warranty 
exists until he purchases the goods. If this becomes the case, the buyer may find it hard 
to show that the purchase is a reciprocal action for the remote seller's warranty. Hence, 
it is difficult to find a legal base for a contractual relationship between the manufacturer 
and such a buyer. However, one may argue that due to the rapid development in the 
commercial field, nowadays consumers expect electrical appliances to be warranted for 
a specific time by the manufacturers. 162 Ultimate buyers are likely to ask retailers about 
such warranties before they purchase the goods. '63 In this sense, one can point out that 
the existence of a contractual relationship, between the ultimate buyer and remote seller, 
based on such a packaged warranty is not impossible. In certain cases, the reliance of the 
ultimate buyer on packaged warranty seems quite clear. For example, ultimate buyers 
coupling after he had discovered the defect. Thereupon, there was no point for the House of Lords to deal 
with the dealers' claim against the manufacturer. 
160 Lambert and another v. Lewis and others [ 1980] 1 All ER 978,1001. 
161 M. G. Bridge, The Sale of Goods, Oxford, 1997, p. 375. 
162 See D. F. Clifford, `Express Warranty Liability of Remote Sellers: One Purchase, Two Relationships' 
(1997) 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 413,433. 
163 In case of warranty of repair, where some electrical machines have no warranty coverage of a repair, 
consumers may believe that the manufacturer has little confidence in the product's quality. This may lead 
to unsuccessful marketing of the manufacturer's products. W. C. Whitford, Comment on a Theory of the 
Consumer Product Warranty, (1982) 91 Yale L. J. 1371,1373. See also G. L. Priest, `A Theory of the 
Consumer Product Warranty' (1981) 90 Yale L. J. 1297. 
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who are used to finding packaged warranties with certain kind of goods, may rely on 
such warranties for further purchases of the same kind of goods. This might be the case 
of goods that are bought by businessmen in order to be manufactured. In such cases, one 
can note that a contractual relationship between remote seller and ultimate buyer is 
likely. 
Furthermore, manufacturers may invite the ultimate buyer to fill and return a warranty 
card attached to the packaged warranty. By doing so, the consideration doctrine may be 
satisfied, especially in cases where the postage has to be paid164 or such a card is used by 
the manufacturer for statistical purposes which may be quite helpful in improving his 
business. The return of such a card may be sufficient to be considered as a reciprocal 
action for the manufacturer's warranty. '65 This can make a sufficient legal basis for a 
unilateral contract. In cases of warranties that stipulate for notification of acceptance, 
Professor Atiyah sees that such a notification is not necessary to hold the warranty 
enforceable. 166 This might be a sensible opinion in cases where such packaged 
warranties had been advertised to the public or the buyer had reason to presume that 
such warranties accompany the goods. Here, the action of purchase can be reciprocal to 
the manufacturer's warranty and, consequently, the buyer does not need to fill and return 
the card of notification. However, where the buyer was not aware of such a packaged 
warranty by the time of purchase, it seems hard to see how the consideration 
requirement can be satisfied without filling such a notification card. 
To sum up, the remote seller's express warranty can be enforceable if it furnishes a 
ground for collateral contract. Leaving the enforceability of such warranties to be 
decided according to the circumstances of each case seems to create uncertainty in 
English law. It is submitted that such warranties should be made legally binding by 
legislation. The remote seller should be held liable for his false statements regarding the 
quality of his products regardless of whether such a warranty amounts to a collateral 
contract. Professor Beale states that "[i]t hardly lies in the mouth of a manufacturer to 
say that information given out to boost sales of its products is unimportant. "167 As 
previously mentioned, the retailer should not be held liable for false statements made by 
164 G. Woodroffe, supra n. 140 at p. 6. 
165 M. P. Furmston, supra n. 71 at p. 3.52. 
166 P. S. Atiyah, supra n. 67 at p. 249. 
167 Hugh Beale, supra n. 75 at p. 152. 
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the producer. 168 In fact, as Professor Beale suggests, 169 the producer should be held 
liable for his own breach. As discussed below, under the revised Article two of the 
UCC, the remote seller is responsible for his public statement regarding the quality of 
the goods in question. 
In consumer cases, a warranty as to reimburse the price paid or to replace, repair or 
handle consumer goods in any way if the goods appeared defective, is enforceable under 
the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees, as discussed above. ' 70 In commercial cases, where the ultimate buyer is 
aware of such a warranty at the time of purchasing the goods, one may strongly argue 
that such a warranty amounts to a collateral contract. As Chris Willet suggests that in 
cases of normal `repair or replace' guarantee, the manufacturer will find it difficult to 
argue against the common sense presumption that the buyer relied on such a guarantee 
and, as a result, this will overcome any problem of consideration. 171 
6.1.6 The Position in American Law 
The enforceability of warranties, issued by the remote seller to the ultimate buyer, seems 
to vary among the various jurisdictions of the United States. This could be due to the 
gap in law left by the UCC as discussed in the next section. The variations among the 
several jurisdictions have created uncertainty in the law. The recent draft of the revised 
Article 2 of the UCC is intended to reduce such uncertainty by stating provisions to deal 
with cases where the ultimate buyer seeks to enforce the remote seller's warranty. 
6.1.6.1 Enforceability of Warranty issued by Remote Seller to the 
Ultimate Buyer under the UCC 
Section 2-313(1)(a) of the UCC defines express warranties as "part of the basis of the 
bargain". 172 An express warranty issued by a remote seller to the ultimate buyer is not 
part of the contract of sale between the ultimate buyer and his direct seller. 173 By 
applying Section 2-313(1-a), the UCC cannot deal with such warranties. 
168 Supra, p. 230. 
169 Hugh Beale, supra n. 75 at p. 153. 
170 Supra, p. 231. 
171 Chris Willet, "The Quality of Goods and the Rights of Consumers" (1993) 44 NILQ 218,228. 
172 Section 2-313 (1) states "Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: (a) Any affirmation of 
fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. " 
173 Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 1982 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 16765; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 391 (1982). 
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Consequently, the issue of whether an express warranty, issued by a remote seller to the 
ultimate buyer, is legally binding has been left to be decided by the case law. Comment 
two to Section 2-313 makes it clear that the scope of this Section is limited to warranties 
made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale. Expressly, the comment 
provides that "the warranty sections of this Article [Article two of the UCC] are not 
designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized 
that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct parties to 
such a contract". The common law can definitely hold that a warranty issued by a 
remote seller to the ultimate buyer is enforceable in cases where such a warranty can 
furnish a contractual relationship. ' 74 
The draft of revised Article two of the UCC, 175 henceforth the Draft, considers some of 
the mentioned issues regarding express warranty. Section 2-313B of the Draft deals with 
the warranty made by the remote seller in a medium for communication to the public. 176 
The Section makes the enforceability of such warranty subject to the condition that the 
remote buyer, i. e. the buyer who is not in a contractual relationship with the seller, 
enters into a transaction of purchase with knowledge of and with the expectation that the 
goods will conform to the warranty. The question here is whether the Section, when the 
Draft comes into force, will create changes in the current law regarding the 
enforceability of such warranties. In fact, where the ultimate buyer relies on the 
manufacturer's warranty for purchasing the goods, such a buyer may argue that by the 
action of purchase he entered into two contracts, i. e. the sale contract and the collateral 
contract with the remote seller who issued the warranty. Therefore, under the American 
common law, such a buyer can bring a contract action against the remote seller. 
Consequently, one can point out that Section 2-313B(b) of the Draft states the current 
position in the American common law. Probably, the significance of the Section is to 
avoid any variation among the several jurisdictions of the USA. 
174 See C. R. Reitz, `Manufacturer's Warranties of Consumer Goods, (1997) 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 357,361. 
175 The draft of March 2000. 
176 Section 2-313B(b) states "If a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods, 
or provides a description that relates to the goods, or makes a remedial promise, in a medium for 
communication to the public, such as advertising, and the remote purchaser enters into a transaction of 
purchase with knowledge of and with the expectation that the goods will conform to the affirmation of 
fact, promise, or description, or that the seller will perform the remedial promise, the seller has an 
obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform to the affirmation of fact, promise or 
description unless a reasonable person in the position of the remote purchaser would not believe that the 
affirmation of fact, promise or description created an obligation.... " [Emphasis added]. 
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Under the Draft, the requirement of reliance seems to be abolished in cases of warranties 
created by records packaged with or accompanying the goods. Section 2-313A(b) of the 
Draft provides that 
"If a seller makes an affirmation of fact or promise that relates to the goods, or 
provides a description that relates to the goods, or makes a remedial promise, in 
a record packaged with or accompanying the goods, and the seller reasonably 
expects the record to be, and the record is, furnished to the remote purchaser, 
the seller has an obligation to the remote purchaser that the goods will conform 
to the affirmation of fact, promise or description unless a reasonable person in 
the position of the remote purchaser would not believe that the affirmation of 
fact, promise or description created an obligation" [Emphasis added]. 
Clearly, Section 2-313A(b) of the Draft makes the enforceability of the packaged 
warranty subject to the condition that the remote seller reasonably expects such a 
warranty to be, and the warranty is, furnished to the buyer. However, the purpose of the 
condition that the manufacturer reasonably expects that his warranty will be furnished to 
the ultimate buyer is unclear. If the warranty is accompanying or packaged with the 
goods, it will definitely be furnished to the ultimate buyer by delivering the goods to 
him. It seems difficult to envisage cases where it is not reasonable for the remote seller 
to expect the packaged warranty to be furnished to the ultimate buyer. Furthermore, the 
Section does not mention the time at which the warranty should be furnished to the 
ultimate buyer. Since the Section does not require the buyer's reliance on the warranty 
to purchase the goods, it seems that the warranty should be enforceable regardless of 
whether it was furnished to the buyer at the time of purchase or the time of delivery. 
However, as the Section clearly states, the warranty will not be enforceable if a 
reasonable person in the position of the remote purchaser would not believe that such a 
warranty creates an obligation. 
The Draft does not deal with the liability of the remote seller for breach of implied 
warranty. Therefore, where the ultimate buyer suffers a loss resulting from breach of 
implied warranty of quality, the issue of whether the ultimate buyer can sue the remote 
seller for breach of warranty has been left to be decided under the common law. As will 
be seen, there seems to be a variation among the several American jurisdictions 
regarding this issue. Under the jurisdictions, which have abolished the requirement of 
privity, such a claim is permissible. However, this may not be the case of other 
jurisdictions which apply the requirement of privity. 
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In both cases of warranty, communicated to the public or packaged with the goods, the 
Draft states provisions for the quantification of damages where the claim is brought by 
the ultimate buyer. The provisions are, to some extent, similar to those concerned with 
the quantification of damages where the claim is brought by the direct buyer. The 
measure of damages here is prima facie the difference between the value of the goods as 
warranted and their actual value as received. 177 Furthermore, where consequential loss 
results from the remote seller's breach, the aggrieved party, i. e. the ultimate buyer or 
one of other beneficiaries, can recover for such loss under Section 2-715 which is 
concerned with the recoverability of such losses. However, the aggrieved party, here, 
cannot recover for his loss of profit resulting from the remote seller's breach of his 
express warranty. 178 Disallowing the ultimate buyer damages for his lost profit, resulting 
from an express warranty issued by a remote seller, seems to be hardly understandable. 
The most significant loss in cases of businessman buyer is likely to be his loss of profit. 
Disallowing the buyer to recover for his lost profit will obviously undercompensate him. 
The purpose of such a provision is unclear. 
6.1.6.2 Enforceability of Warranty issued by Remote Seller to the 
Ultimate Buyer under the American Common Law 
As previously mentioned, the UCC does not apply to the enforceability of warranty 
issued by the remote seller to the ultimate buyer. Therefore, the issue is left to be 
decided under the common law. Under most of the jurisdictions of the United States, the 
enforceability of the express warranty, issued by the remote seller to the ultimate buyer, 
is beyond question as discussed below. 179 Under the jurisdictions which apply the 
requirement of privity, the ultimate buyer may need to show that he has entered into a 
contractual relationship with the remote seller by purchasing the warranted goods. 
Where the buyer purchases goods from an agent of the manufacturer, the ultimate buyer 
177 Comment 8 to Section 2-313A of the Draft provides "As a rule, a remote purchaser may recover 
monetary damages measured in the same manner as in the case of an aggrieved buyer under Section 2- 
714, including incidental and consequential damages to the extent they would be available to an aggrieved 
buyer. In the case of an obligation that is not a remedial promise, the measure of damages would normally 
be the difference between the value of the goods if they had conformed to the seller's statements and their 
actual value... " 
178 Section 2-313A(d-2) of the Draft states "Subject to a modification or limitation of remedy, a seller in 
breach is liable for incidental or consequential damages under Section 2-715 but the seller is not liable for 
lost profits. " 
179 Infra, p. 252. 
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will be in a direct contractual relationship with the remote seller as discussed above-' 80 
For example in Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. James W. Laird, 181 where the plaintiff 
purchased a model 760 combine, manufactured by Massey-Ferguson, from Boyd, the 
Court found that Boyd was acting as an agent for the manufacturer. In this case the 
Court held the manufacturer contractually liable for his breach of express warranty of 
quality. 
Furthermore, the buyer may seek to prove that the remote seller's warranty has furnished 
a legal ground for a collateral contract. As previously argued, the buyer may purchase 
the goods in reliance on the remote seller's warranty. If this becomes the case, the 
ultimate buyer may argue that he is in a collateral contractual relationship with the 
remote seller. For such a purpose, the reliance on the remote seller's warranty for 
purchasing the goods seems to be required. For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 192 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held the manufacturer 
liable for breach of his advertised warranty of the goods' quality. In this case, the Court 
reached its decision after the consumer had shown evidence that she had been aware of 
the advertisement before the time she purchased the goods. In this sense, the buyer's 
knowledge of the remote seller's representation and the expectation that the advertised 
goods will be in conformity with it, seem to be prerequisites for holding the remote 
seller liable for breach of a contractual relationship with the ultimate buyer. "If the 
manufacturer's representations were made in such a way that the natural tendency was 
to induce the sub-purchaser to rely upon them, one could spell out the promise or offer 
of the manufacturer to be bound. Then if the sub-purchaser accepted this offer and did 
the acts requested by the manufacturer it would seem proper to hold the manufacturer 
liable directly to the sub-purchaser upon the unilateral contract that was thereby 
created. "183 
Controversially, 194 some writers suggest that under the American law the principle of 
consideration does not require reliance. 185 However, some UCC cases have stated that 
180 Supra, p. 239. 
181 1983 Ala. LEXIS 4413; 36 UCC Rep. Serv. 437 (1983). 
182 893 F. 2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990). 
183 L. R. Jeanblanc, `Manufacturer's Liability to Persons other than their Immediate Vendees' 24 Va. L. 
Rev. 134,149. 
184 See W. K. Lewis, supra n. 6 at pp. 688-691, where the writer deals with different opinions of several 
writers, such as White, Summers, Nordstrum and Murray. The writer reaches the conclusion that reliance 
is not required. 
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enforceable express warranties require reliance. '86 The American court in such cases 
based its decision on the requirement of the UCC that express warranty should be "part 
of the basis of the bargain". 187 However, as previously discussed, the UCC does not 
apply to warranties issued to remote buyers and the issue has been left to be dealt with 
by the case law. The case law requires the purchase to be a reciprocal action for the 
seller's warranty. Here, does the mere purchase indicate that the buyer relies on the 
seller's warranty for purchasing the goods? The point is illustrated in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts as follows: 
"A offers to buy a book owned by B and to pay B $10 in exchange therefor. B 
accepts the offer and delivers the book to A. The transfer and delivery of the 
book constitute a performance and are consideration for A's promise.... This is 
so even though A at the time he makes his offer secretly intends to pay B $10 
whether or not he gets the book, or even though B at the time he accepts secretly 
intends not to collect the $10"188 
Therefore, under the American law, the mere purchase of the goods, as a reciprocal 
action for the seller's warranty, may be sufficient enough to create a collateral contract. 
Professor Whitman proposes that courts indulge in a rebuttable presumption that 
reliance on warranty exists unless proven otherwise. 189 
6.1.6.3 The Requirement of Privity among the Several States of the USA 
There seems to be no coherent attitude among the American jurisdictions towards the 
application of privity. The applicability of the privity requirement varies depending on 
whether the ultimate buyer sues for breach of express or implied warranty. Also, the 
applicability of privity varies depending on the kind of loss suffered. Whereas some 
185 See M. J. Duchemin, `Whether Reliance on the Warranty is Required in a Common Law Action for 
Breach of an Express Warranty? ' (1999) 82 Marq. L. Rev. 689. The writer here discusses non-UCC cases 
where the requirement of reliance varies among the several jurisdictions in the USA. See also R. E. 
Speidel, `Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More into the Void' 
(1987) 67 B. U. L. Rev. 9,14; S. Kwestel, Freedom from Reliance: a Contract Approach to Express 
Warranty, (1992) 26 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 959,986. See also Panto v. Moore Business Forms Inc., 547 A. 2d 
260 (N. H. 1988) where it was held that promise is enforceable even though the promise did not in fact 
induce promisee's performance. 
186 See Royal Typewriter Co., Inc., v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F. 2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983); Alpert 
v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986). 
187 See Section 2-313(1)(a) of the UCC. 
188 Section 71, illustration 1. 
189 Whitman, `Reliance as an Element in Product Misrepresentation Suits: A Reconsideration' (1982) 35 
Southwestern Law Journal 741,747. 
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States have abolished the requirement of privity in all kinds of loss resulting from 
breach of warranty, 190 some other States still require privity in cases of economic loss. 
As regards cases of physical loss, the prevailing view191 among the American 
jurisdictions seems to be that privity cannot be a defence in cases of physical loss. 192 
This applies equally to all physical losses193 resulting from breach of express or implied 
warranty. 194 This is presumably because privity cannot apply where the aggrieved party 
sues the remote seller in tort. Therefore, it does not make sense to let the seller escape 
liability in contract where he could be liable in tort. 
As for economic loss, the requirement of privity depends on whether the warranty is 
express or implied. 195 In most cases, where economic loss results from breach of express 
190 The States of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia have abolished the requirement of 
privity in cases of breach of warranty. See R. C. Ausness, `Replacing Strict Liability with a Contract-Based 
Products Liability Regime' (1998) 71 Temp. L. Rev. 171, n. 136. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P. 2d 897 (1962) where the Supreme Court of California pointed out 
that in order to impose liability on the manufacturer for the consumer's loss, the consumer need not show 
that an express warranty has been created as defined by California statute. In this case, the husband of the 
buyer brought a successful action in tort for defective power tool which was given to him as a present. 
19' See W. K. Lewis, supra n. 6 at n. 49; D. G. Epstein, `Personal Injuries from Defective Products-Some 
"Dots and Dashes"' (1967) 9 Ariz. L. Rev. 163,171; A. Devience, Jr., `the Developing Line between 
Warranty and Tort Liability under the Uniform Commercial Code: Does 2-318 Make a difference? ' 
(1990) 2 DePaul Bus. L. J. 295,307. See the leading case of Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newson, 382 F. 2d 
395 (10th Cir. 1967) where the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that "[ijn 
general, privity is not essential where an implied warranty is imposed by law on the basis of public 
policy. " See also Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 467 A. 2d 811 (Pa. 1983) where the court rejected the 
defence of privity in cases of personal injury. However, see Chance v. Richards Mfg. Co., 499 F. Supp. 
102 (D. Wash. 1980) where the court held that privity required even in cases of personal injury. 
192 For example, it has been enacted in the Tennessee Public Act ch. 670 that "[i]n all causes of action for 
personal injury or property damage brought on account of negligence, strict liability or breach of 
warranty, including actions brought under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, privity shall 
not be a requirement to maintain said action. " See also J. H. Holman, `Breach of Implied Warranty in 
Personal Injury Actions' (1981) 12 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1002. 
193 As for the abolishment of the requirement of privity in cases of property damage, see R. C. Ausness, 
supra n. 190 at p. 196. 
194 The requirement of privity in cases of defective food has long been abolished in all the jurisdictions of 
the USA. In Jacob E. Decker and Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S. W. 2d 828 (1942), where the plaintiffs 
suffered physical injury resulting from poisonous food, the Supreme Court of Texas held that in such a 
case warranty is not imposed by law as a matter of public policy. See W. H. E. Jaeger, `How Strict is the 
Manufacturer's Liability? Recent Developments' (1964-65) 48 Marq. L. Rev. 293,299. The same applies 
in cases of defective medicine. In Allen v. G. D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989), where 
patient received defective medicine, the Court held that the patient could sue the manufacturer 
notwithstanding lack of vertical privity. In cases of cigarettes, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held, in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 295 F. 2d at 297-299 (1961), that where 
the foreseeable use of products is dangerous to human life unless certain precautions are taken, the 
manufacturer is under a duty to warn the user of such consequences and to advise proper precautions. 
195 See R. E. Speidel, supra n. 11 at p. 319. In some cases, the court held that privity is not required in cases 
of breach of warranty whether express or implied. See Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equip. Co., 
407 Pa. Super. 378; 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 86 (1991). 
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warranty issued to the ultimate buyer, privity has not been required. 196 This may be 
certain in cases where the buyer proves his reliance on the express warranty for 
purchasing the goods in question. 197 For example, the State of New York' 98 has 
abolished the requirement of privity in both cases of physical injury and economic loss 
resulting from breach of express warranty. 199 In the UCC case of Randy Knitwear, Inc., 
20° v. American Cyanamid Company, the defendant was a manufacturer of chemical 
resins, marketed under the registered trade-mark "Cyana", which are used by textile 
manufacturers and finishers to process fabrics in order to prevent them from shrinking. 
The manufacturers of textile were licensed or otherwise authorized by the defendant to 
treat their goods with "Cyana" label and with the guarantee that they were "Cyana" 
finished. The defendant represented and guaranteed that "Cyana" finished fabrics would 
not shrink or lose their shape when washed. The presentation took the form of written 
statements expressed in advertisements appearing in trade journals, direct mail pieces to 
clothing manufacturers and also in labels or garment tags furnished by the defendant. In 
this case, the plaintiff purchased the fabrics in reliance on such a presentation. The 
Court held that the privity doctrine is not a requirement in such a case. The Court 
pointed out that where advertisements induce consumers to purchase the goods 
advertised, the privity doctrine cannot be a defence. In this case, the Court did not 
discuss whether or not there was a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant although the facts of the case seem sufficient enough to furnish a ground for 
collateral contract. This case can be a strong example on the new formulation of the 
American law regarding the rules of contract law. 
196 See D. I. Wallach, The Law of Sales under the Uniform Commercial Code, Boston, 1981, Cumulative 
Supplement 1991, p. 76. 
197 This can be most likely in cases where the manufacturer provides samples to the seller since such 
samples may induce the buyer to buy the goods. See, for example, the decision of Texas Civil Appeal 
Court in Indust-Ri-Chem Laboratory, Inc. v. Par-Park Co., 602 S. W. 2d 282 (1980). 
198 See N. Deutsch, `Seller's Liability to Remote Purchasers and Nonpurchasers for Physical and 
Economic Loss in Breach of Warranty Actions in New York: An Analysis of the Privity Defense and the 
Views of Professor Speidel and the Article 2 Study Group' (1989) 54 Alb. L. Rev. 35; J. P. Zammit, 
`Manufacturer's Responsibility for Economic Loss Damages in Products Liability Cases: What Result in 
New York? ' (1974) 20 New York Law Forum, 81. 
199 The same has been applied in Vermont in the case of Mainline Tractor & Equip., Inc. v. Nutrite Corp. 
937 F. Supp. 1095 (1996); Washington in the case of Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wash. 2d 704; 
Tennessee in the case of Walker v. Decora, Inc. 471 S. W. 2d 778 (1971); New Jersey in the case of Spring 
Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N. J. 555,489 A. 2d 660 (1985); Delaware in the case of 
Autrey v. Chemitrust Indus. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085 (D. C. Del. 1973). 
200 1962 N. Y. LEXIS 1363; 181 N. E. 2d 399 (1962). The case was discussed in Law Commission, Implied 
Terms in Contracts for the Supply of Goods, Law Com No 95, para. 126. 
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However, in cases of economic loss resulting from breach of implied warranty, the 
applicability of privity widely varies from State to another. Whereas some States still 
retain the requirement of privity in such cases, 201 others have gone forward to abolish 
such a requirement. 202 In the States, which retain the requirement of privity, the ultimate 
buyer who suffers economic loss due to the remote seller's breach of implied warranty 
of quality would be left without a remedy. This is due to the application of the 
"economic loss rule" in the USA. Under such a rule, the aggrieved party cannot sue in 
tort for purely economic loss. It is submitted that such an attitude creates a gap in the 
law which needs intervention by the legislature in such States. Under English law, it was 
argued above that there seems to be an authority to allow the buyer to recover from the 
seller for the economic loss suffered by the sub-buyer as a result of the original seller's 
breach of warranty. The recovered damages must be held by the buyer for the sub- 
buyer. 203 Such an authority is not available under those jurisdictions which do not allow 
the sub-buyer to recover from the original seller for economic loss caused by the 
original seller's breach of warranty of quality. 
In some cases, damages were allowed for the diminution in value of the goods and 
refused for the consequential losses suffered by the ultimate buyer. For example, in 
Beyond the Garden Gate, Inc. v. Northstar Freeze-Dry Manufacturing, Inc., 204 where 
the ultimate buyer suffered normal and consequential economic losses, it was held that 
the remote seller is liable for the normal loss, i. e. the diminution in value of the goods 
purchased. In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa applied the privity defence in respect 
to consequential economic losses. The Court stated that "even if relevant policies justify 
allowing non-privity consumers to recover for direct economic loss, there can be no 
justification in the usual case for allowing non-privity consumer buyers to recover for 
201 See Szajua v. General Motors Corp., 503 N. E. 2d 760 (I11.1986); Hadar v. Concordia Yacht Builders, 
Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1082 (S. D. N. Y. 1995); Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P. 2d 
887 (Kan. 1984); Necktas v. General Motors Corp. 357 Mass. 546; 259 N. E. 2d 234 (1970); Baughn v. 
Honda Motor Co., 727 P. 2d 655 (Wash. 1986); Lamb v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 392 S. E. 2d 307 (Ga. 
App. 1990). 
202 See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc, 548 P. 2d 279 (Ala. 1976); Israel Phoenix Assur. Co. v. SMS 
Sutton, Inc., 787 F. Supp 102 (W. D. Pa. 1992); Hubbard v. General Motors Corp. 1996 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 
6974 (1996); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N. Y. 2d 248; 28 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 15 (1995); Crest 
Container Corp. v. R. H. Bishop Co., 111 111. App. 3d 1068 (1982); Mt. Holly Ski Area v. United States 
Elec. Motors, 666 F. Supp. 115 (E. D. Mich. 1987). Some American courts have gone too far to decide that 
implied warranty is, by its nature, a contractual agreement and is collateral to the sales contract, such as 
the decision of the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals in Darr Equip. Co. v. Owens, 408 S. W. 2d 566,569 
(1966). 
203 Infra, 263. 
204 526 N. W. 2d 305(1995). 
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consequential economic losses they sustain. , 205 The Court based its opinion on the 
ground that it is hard for remote sellers to predict the purposes for which the goods will 
be used. However, this result can be reached by the application of the normal 
restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. Under such principles, the seller 
cannot be liable for unforeseeable losses nor can he be liable for losses resulting from 
unforeseeable use of the goods. In view of this, the Court misdirected itself by deciding 
the applicability of privity on the kind of economic loss suffered. 
6.1.7 Enforceability of Warranty issued by Remote Seller to the Ultimate 
Buyer under the CISG 
The issue of third party's claim seems not within the scope of the CISG. The scope of 
the Convention does not go beyond parties to international sale contracts. 206 Article 1(1) 
of the CISG states that the Convention applies to "contracts of sale of goods between 
parties whose places of business are in different States... ". Article 4 makes it clear that 
the Convention "governs only the formation of the contract and the rights and 
obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract... ". Moreover, 
Article 35(1) provides that "the seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, 
quality and description required by the contract and which are contained or packaged 
in the manner required by the contract... ". It is quite plain that the Convention applies 
the privity doctrine by restricting its application to claims brought by one of the parties 
to the contract. So where a Canadian merchant sells goods to a French buyer who resells 
to an Egyptian buyer, a contract action for breach of warranty of quality brought by the 
Egyptian buyer against the Canadian will face the defence of lack of privity. 
However, where the manufacturer participates in the contract of sale between the dealer 
and the ultimate buyer, this may, as Professor Honnold suggests, 
207 amount to a 
collateral contract between the manufacturer and the ultimate buyer. As discussed 
above, 208 the manufacturer may advertise his goods in order to promote their purchase. 
So where such an advertisement indicates a warranty of the quality of the goods, the 
buyer may rely on the advertisement when purchasing the goods. This situation may 
205 Beyond the Garden Gate, Inc. v. Northstar Freeze-Dry Manufacturing, Inc., 526 N. W. 2d 305, p. 309 
(1995). 
206 R. E. Speidel, `The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' (1995) 16 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 165,179. 
207 J. O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 
Deventer, 2nd ed., 1991, pp. 112-114. 
208 Supra, p. 238. 
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amount to a unilateral contract between the manufacturer and the ultimate buyer. 
However, the fact that there is a unilateral contract might not be enough to allow the 
ultimate buyer to bring a suit against the manufacturer under the CISG. Article 4 
restricts the application of the Convention to disputes arise between the buyer and the 
seller in relation to the contract made under the Convention. The participation of 
manufacturer in the ultimate sale contract may not make him the seller. However, this 
cannot be considered as an impassable barrier where the manufacturer participates 
substantially in the ultimate sale contract, such as the case where the manufacturer 
personally contacts the ultimate buyer and persuades him to buy his products from the 
dealer. 209 In such cases, it is submitted that the Convention should be applicable, 
especially where the immediate seller has suffered financial failure or has disappeared 
from the market. 
In normal circumstances, consumers may find it difficult to sue manufacturers who are 
based in another country. It is easier for them to sue their direct seller or the 
manufacturer's representative or branch that is based in their country. 210 This might be 
the reason that the Department of Trade and Industry proposed in 1992 that "the retailer 
should be jointly and severally liable with the manufacturer for the manufacturer's 
"21 1 guarantee to a consumer. 
6.2 Seller's Liability for Losses Suffered by a Beneficiary other than the 
Ultimate Buyer 
This title is concerned with horizontal privity. Horizontal privity is a term used to 
describe the relationship between the retailer and a person who has used or consumed 
the goods, other than the buyer. The issue here is whether the retailer's warranty of 
quality extends to beneficiaries other than the buyer. In other words, can the lack of 
privity be a defence in a claim brought by such beneficiaries, other than the buyer, 
against the retailer? 
Where a beneficiary sues a remote seller for breach of warranty issued to the ultimate 
buyer, the court needs to discuss two points, i. e., whether the remote seller's warranty is 
209 J. O. Honnold, supra n. 207 at p. 114. 
210 EC's Green Paper on "Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services", COM (93) 509, 
p. 87. See Stephen Weatherill, `Consumer Guarantees' (1994) 
110 LQR 545. 
211 DTI, February 1992. 
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enforceable (vertical privity) and whether such a warranty extends to the beneficiary 
(horizontal privity). Some writers use the expression of "Diagonal privity" to describe 
the relationship between the remote seller and beneficiaries other than the ultimate 
buyer. 212 
6.2.1 The Position in English Law: Does the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 make a difference? 
Under English law, warranty does not extend to people other than the person to which it 
is addressed. As previously discussed, beneficiaries other than the buyer will not be 
allowed to bring an action under the purchase contract unless the action falls under the 
1999 Act. 213 However, it has been submitted that the court should go beyond the 1999 
Act to relax the rigour of the privity doctrine in cases of string contracts. The impact of 
this proposition is to allow the seller's warranty to extend to the sub-buyer where the 
subsale was in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. The 
same should be submitted in cases of beneficiaries other than the ultimate buyer. Where 
it was in the contemplation of the parties, at the time of making the contract, that the 
goods would be used by someone other than the buyer, the third party beneficiary should 
be entitled to sue the seller under the contract for breach of warranty of quality. 214 Such 
a claim is allowed in other areas of contract law. For example, beneficiaries of contract, 
made between a customer and an organizer or a retailer for a package holiday, have 
2 contractual rights although they are not parties to the contract. 1 s 
As previously mentioned, 216 the Law Commission Report, Privity of Contract: 
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, 217 makes it clear that the 1999 Act may 
provide help in cases of horizontal privity. 218 The Law Commission Report provides an 
212 The term of "diagonal privity" has been invented by Professor Ezer. See Ezer, `the Impact of the 
Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties' (1961) 8 UCLA L. Rev. 281. 
213 Supra, p. 213. 
214 Unfortunately, The EC's Green Paper on "Guarantees for Consumer Goods and After-Sales Services", 
COM (93) 509 has not discussed the extension of warranties. It dealt only with manufacturer's warranties 
by suggesting that the manufacturer's liability for the consumer's consequential losses, resulting from the 
manufacturer's breach of warranty, is to be left for the Member States without attempting harmonization. 
Here, the issue of extended warranty should not have been ignored specially in cases where the loss is 
economic. 
215 Package Travel, Package holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992. See J. Beatson, Anson's Law 
of Contract, Oxford, 27th ed., 1998, p. 422. 
216 supra, p. 215. 
217 Law Com. No. 242. 
218 Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Corn. No. 242, 
para. 7.54. 
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example of the buyer who makes it clear to the seller that he is purchasing the goods in 
order to give them to his friend as a gift. If the buyer asks the seller to deliver the goods 
to his friend, who is identified by name, the third party (the friend) may sue the seller 
under Subsection 1(1-b) of the 1999 Act. 219 However, Subsection 1(1-b) of the 1999 Act 
may not apply where the third party is not expressly identified (Subsection 1(3)) or if, on 
proper construction of the contract, the seller can argue that he did not intend to confer a 
legal right on the third party (Subsection 1(2)). 
The requirement of express identification of the third party seems to be unfair in certain 
cases of consumer sale. For example, suppose that a man entered a female clothes shop 
and bought a coat for his mother. If the buyer did not mention to the seller that the coat 
is for his mother, the mother would not be able to sue the seller under the 1999 Act for 
the defective coat since Section 1(2) of the Act requires express identification. Although 
in such a case it is reasonable for the seller to expect that the female coat is for a third 
party due to the nature of the goods and the buyer, the 1999 Act will not allow the third 
party's action since the third party is not expressly identified. Indeed, the Law 
Commission Report makes it clear that the 1999 Act allows the third party's action 
"where there is express identification by name, description or class. It follows that... 
third party rights cannot be conferred on someone who is impliedly in mind. "220 
However, there should be special treatment for the case where the nature of the goods 
indicate that the goods are bought for a third party beneficiary. It was previously stated 
that it seems possible to argue that the court may go beyond the boundary of the 1999 
Act if it decides, as the Law Commission suggests, 221 that the 1999 Act does not go far 
enough. 222 This may be the case where the court finds out that the 1999 Act does not 
offer consumers enough protection. It is submitted that where the nature of the goods 
indicates that they are bought for a third party beneficiary, such a beneficiary should be 
entitled to bring a contract action against the seller if the goods appeared defective. In 
other words, it is submitted that the seller's warranty should extend to third party 
beneficiary where it was reasonable for the seller at the time of making the contract to 
contemplate that the proprietary interest in the goods will be transferred to such a 
219 See the example provided by the Law Commission, Privity of Contract: 
Contracts for the Benefit of 
Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, para. 7.41, on the application of Section 1(1-b) of the 1999 Act to sale 
of goods cases where the goods are bought for a third party. 
220 Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, 
para. 8.1. 
221 Ibid, para. 5.10. 
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beneficiary. The seller should honour his warranty regardless of whether the goods have 
been used by his direct buyer or other expected beneficiaries. 223 If this submission is 
ever accepted, two points should be taken into account. Firstly, in order to avoid 
subjecting the seller to double liability for the same loss, the buyer should not be 
allowed to sue the seller for losses suffered by the third party. Indeed, the seller should 
not be liable to the buyer and the third party for the same loss. Secondly, the seller 
should be allowed to defend the third party's action as if such an action had been 
brought by the buyer. 
Here, it is worth noting that the requirement of identifying the third party, for the 
purpose of applying the 1999 Act, seems not to be found under the American 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The intended third party beneficiary can bring a 
contract action against the promisor. Section 302(1) defines the third party beneficiary 
as follows: "[u]nless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of 
a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the 
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and... the 
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of 
the promised performance. " Although Section 302(1) does not require the third party to 
be identified by name, the contemplation of the parties that the benefit of the contract 
will be conferred on a third party seems not enough to allow the third party to bring a 
contract action against the original promisor. 224 The Section requires the parties to 
intend that the third party will have contractual rights under the contract. 225 Therefore, 
under Section 302(1) the contemplation of the parties, at the time of making the 
contract, that the goods will be resold seems not enough to allow the sub-buyer to sue 
the original seller under the contract. However, the privity requirement has been 
abolished in cases of remote seller's liability under some jurisdictions of the USA. As 
previously discussed, under certain jurisdictions, the ultimate buyer may sue the remote 
seller for breach of warranty of quality regardless of the fact that there is no contractual 
222 Supra, p. 217. 
223 Under this submission, the warranty should be derivative: that is to say that the existence, scope and 
validity of this warranty can be determined in reliance on the terms of the contract. Unlike derivative 
warranty, collateral contract made between the ultimate buyer and a remote seller does not depend in its 
existence, scope or validity on the terms of the contract concluded between the ultimate buyer and his 
direct seller. See R. A. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, 3rd ed., 1995, p. 313. 
224 H. G. Prince, `Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule under Section 302 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts' (1984) 25 B. C. L. Rev. 919,969. 
225 See American Financial Corp. v. Computer Services Corp., 1983 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 18792; 558 F. 
Supp. 1182 (1983). 
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relationship between the remote seller and such a buyer. 226 Furthermore, the following 
section will explain that beneficiaries other than the buyer may sue the seller for breach 
of warranty under Section 2-318 of the UCC. 
Where the 1999 Act does not go far enough to protect consumers, the court should bring 
about justice by considering the Law Commission Report227 in order to go beyond the 
boundary of the 1999 Act to allow the third party beneficiary to bring a contract action 
against the seller. It can also be argued that the court should allow the buyer to recover 
damages for the loss suffered by such a beneficiary. In fact, the latter alternative was one 
of the options considered by the Law Commission for a law reform. However, the Law 
Commission rejected this option for the reason that "the promisee may be either 
unwilling or unable to enforce a contract made for a third party. "228 Nevertheless, such 
an exception to the doctrine of privity has not been abolished by the 1999 Act. 
Subsection 7(1) provides that the 1999 Act "does not affect any right or remedy that 
exists or is available apart from the Act. " In fact, the Law Commission Report makes it 
clear that the 1999 Act is not intended to cast any doubt on the development in the 
common law rules which allow the promisee to recover damages on behalf of the third 
party. This is significant in cases where the third party is unable to bring a claim under 
the 1999 Act. The Law Commission Report provides 
"[i]ndeed it is important to emphasise that, while our proposed reform will give 
some third parties the right to enforce contracts, there will remain many 
contracts where a third party stands to benefit and yet will not have a right of 
enforceability. Our proposed statute carves out a general and wide-ranging 
exception to the third party rule but it leaves that rule intact for cases not covered 
by the statute. On the facts of (Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v. Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85) itself, there would be no question of the third 
party having a right of enforcement under our proposed reform.... The 
recognition in that case that the promisee could have recovered damages based 
on the third party's loss will be as important after the implementation of our 
proposed reform as it is under the present law...... 
229 
The development in the common law regarding the recovery of damages for losses 
suffered by third party seems to be in areas other than sale of goods. However, as 
discussed below, there is nothing to prevent such an exception to apply to sale of goods 
226 Supra, p. 251. 
227 Supra, p. 217. 
228 Law Commission, Privity of Contract 
para. 5.4. 
229 Ibid, para. 5.16. 
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, 
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cases where the buyer purchases the goods for a third party who cannot sue the seller or 
the buyer for the defective goods. 
The general rule under English law is that the plaintiff cannot recover damages for 
losses suffered by a third party. 230 However, in Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd., 231 
where the plaintiff and his family suffered mental distress due to a breach of package 
holiday contract, Lord Denning MR decided that in such a case the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover damages for his loss and the loss suffered by his family. In Woodar Investment 
Development Ltd. v. Wimpey Construction Co. Ltd., 232 the House of Lords rejected the 
general view of Lord Denning MR that the plaintiff may recover damages for losses 
suffered by a third party. However, Lord Wilberforce stated that although the general 
view of English law is to disallow the party to recover damages for losses suffered by a 
third party, certain cases call for special treatment. In this case, Lord Wilberforce said 
"I am not prepared to dissent from the actual decision in that case [Jackson's 
case]. It may be supported either as a broad decision on the measure of damages 
(per James L. J. ) or possibly as an example of a type of contract- examples of 
which are persons contracting for family holidays, ordering meals in restaurants 
for a party, hiring a taxi for a group - calling for special treatment. , 
233 
In certain cases the buyer may be entitled to recover damages for losses suffered by a 
third party. In woodar, Lord Wilberforce did not go beyond stating examples of cases 
where the plaintiff may recover damages for losses suffered by a third party. His 
Lordship did not state a general guideline that can be relied on to decide whether a case 
falls under the category of cases where the plaintiff can recover for losses suffered by a 
third party. However, one may argue that there is another line of cases in English law 
which may be relied on to argue that the buyer should be entitled, in principle, to 
recover for losses suffered by a third party beneficiary. 
234 The damages recovered 
should be held by the buyer for the third party who suffered the loss. 
235 
230 This rule was stated by the House of Lords in Woodar Investment Development 
Ltd. v. Wimpey 
Construction Co. Ltd. [1980] 1 WLR 277. 
231 [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
232 [1980] 1 WLR 277. 
233 Ibid, p. 283. 
234 This issue is beyond the scope of the 1999 Act. 
235 In general, where a person recovers damages for losses suffered 
by a third party, such damages must be 
held for that other person. See A. G. Guest, supra 17 at para. 19-063 citing 
Albacruz (Cargo Owners) v. 
Albazero (Owners) (The Albazero) [1977] AC 774,842. 
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Exceptionally, the promisee may recover for losses suffered by a third party. This 
exception to the general rule of privity was recognized by the English Court as early as 
1839 in Dunlop v. Lambert. 236 In this case, where the goods were damaged, the shipper 
was allowed to bring an action in contract against the shipowner although the shipper 
had no proprietary interest in the goods at the time when the goods were damaged. The 
rule of Dunlop was well explained in Albacruz (Cargo Owners) v. Albazero (Owners) 
(The Albazero). 237 In this case, Lord Diplock said 
"[t]he only way in which I find it possible to rationalise the rule in Dunlop v 
Lambert so that it may fit into the pattern of the English law is to treat it as an 
application of the principle... that in a commercial contract concerning goods 
where it is in the contemplation of the parties that the proprietary interests in 
the goods may be transferred from one owner to another after the contract has 
been entered into and before the breach which causes loss or damage to the 
goods, an original party to the contract, if such be the intention of them both, is 
to be treated in law as having entered into the contract for the benefit of all 
persons who have or may acquire an interest in the goods before they are lost or 
damaged, and is entitled to recover by way of damages for breach of contract 
the actual loss sustained by those for whose benefit the contract is entered 
into. , 238 [Emphasis added]. 
It seems clear, from the words of Lord Diplock, that the party to a contract may bring a 
contract action against the other party for losses suffered by a third party beneficiary 
where it was in the contemplation of both parties that the proprietary interest in the 
goods will be transferred to the third party. At first sight, one may conclude that such an 
exception may apply to sale of goods cases. However, a close look to the dictum of Lord 
Diplock shows that sale of goods cases may not fit here. Lord Diplock requires, for such 
an exception to apply, that the proprietary interest in the goods passes to the third party 
after making the contract and before the breach. In St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. 
239 240 Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd., the rule of Dunlop was applied to aconstruction contract. 
236 [1839] 6C1&F600; 7ER824. 
237 [1977] AC 774. 
Zag Albacruz (Cargo Owners) v. Albazero (Owners) (The Albazero) [1977] AC 774,847. Cited in St. 
Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. [1994] 1 AC 85. 
239 [ 1994] 1 AC 85. In this case, the House of Lords dealt with two appeals, i. e. Linden Gardens Trust Ltd. 
v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd. and others and St. Martin's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert 
McAlpine Ltd., which had similar issues. This chapter is concerned with the second appeal. 
240 In St. Martin's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd., [1994] 1 AC 85, a building 
contractor (Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. ) contracted with the first plaintiff 
(St. Martin's Property 
Corporation) to develop a site owned by the first plaintiff under a contract which prohibited assignment 
without the written consent of the contractor. The first plaintiff assigned the 
benefit of the contract to the 
second plaintiff (St. Martin's Property Investments) without seeking the consent of the contractor. 
The 
construction appeared defective and the plaintiffs sued the contractors 
for the cost of cure. The House of 
Lords held that the assignment was ineffective since it was prohibited without the contractor's consent 
which was neither sought nor given. This holding was fatal to the second plaintiff's claim. 
However, the 
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However, in St. Martin 's Property the contractors breached their contract after the 
plaintiff had parted with its interest in the property. 241 In cases of sale of goods, the 
seller could be held in breach of warranty if the goods were defective at the time of 
delivery regardless of whether the defect was discovered at the time of delivery or at a 
later time. In this sense, the proprietary interest in the goods may pass to the third party 
beneficiary after the breach. 
It is clear now that the application of the Dunlop rule is subject to the condition that the 
proprietary interest in the goods passes to the third party by the time of breach. The 
purpose of this condition is obviously that the promisee will suffer no loss resulting 
from the breach and, thus, he will not be entitled to recover more than nominal damages. 
Therefore, as an exception to the general rule that the party can recover only for his loss, 
the promisee should be allowed to recover for the loss suffered by a third party who has 
no cause of action against the promisor. However, in St. Martin 's Property, the House 
of Lords did not discuss such a condition and was more concerned with the fact that the 
third party had no cause of action to recover for the loss caused by the promisor's 
breach. 242 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned purpose of such a condition, i. e. the condition of 
passing the proprietary interest in the goods by the time of breach, can be available in 
cases of sale of goods. It is true that the seller will be in breach of warranty as soon as he 
delivers defective goods. However, in certain cases the defect of the goods cannot be 
discovered until the goods are put to their use by the third party beneficiary. Here, the 
loss will be suffered by the third party who may have no cause of action against the 
seller. The question here is whether the buyer can recover damages from the seller for 
the loss suffered by the third party beneficiary. In view of the decision in St. Martin 's 
Property and the rule of Dunlop, the question can be answered in the affirmative in 
House of Lords held that the first plaintiff was entitled to damages for losses suffered by the second 
plaintiff. 
241 In St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd., [1994] 1 AC 85 Lord Griffiths, at 
p. 96, approached the issue differently. Lord Griffiths allowed the first plaintiff for the loss suffered by the 
assignee on the ground that the first plaintiff was liable for the assignee to cure the defects resulting from 
the breach of the defendant. 
242 In St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. [1994] 1 AC 85, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson, at p. 115, restricted the application of the rule of Dunlop to cases where the third party does not 
have a cause of action against the promisor. Therefore, the rule of Dunlop may not apply to goods 
consigned under a bill of lading since the property of the goods and the cause of action 
for damage pass to 
the consignee. 
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cases where it was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties, at the time of making 
the contract, that the proprietary interest in the goods would be transferred to a third 
party beneficiary. Where it was in the contemplation of the parties, at the time of 
making the contract, that the proprietary interest in the goods will be transferred to a 
third party, it is submitted that the rule of Dunlop should apply to allow the buyer to 
claim damages from the seller for the losses suffered by the third party as a result of the 
breach. Indeed, as Professor Beale questions "why should it matter whether the transfer 
is contemplated as taking place before or after the breach - or indeed , whether there 
is 
any transfer at all? "243 Anyhow, if the buyer recovers damages for losses suffered by a 
third party, the recovered damages must be held by the buyer for the third party. 244 
Here, it should be noted that the buyer should not be entitled to bring such a claim 
where the third party has a cause of action against the seller or the buyer himself. In St. 
Martin 's Property, Lord Browne-Wilkinson pointed out that "[t]he [promisee] will not 
be entitled to recover damages for loss suffered by others who can themselves sue for 
such loss. ý9245 Therefore, where the third party can bring a contract action against the 
seller under the 1999 Act for breach of warranty of quality, the buyer may not be entitled 
to claim damages from the seller for the losses suffered by the third party due to breach 
of warranty of quality. 246 In the Report on which the 1999 Act is based, the Law 
Commission states that "[w]e... do not think that there is a risk of double liability where 
the promisee recovers the third party's loss under one of the exceptions to the standard 
rule that the promisee is entitled to damages for its own loss only. Our understanding of 
the relevant law is that, in that situation, the third party could not subsequently recover 
substantial damages from the promisor under our proposal. "247 In this sense, it seems 
difficult to understand how Section 5(a) of the 1999 Act applies in such a case. Under 
this Section, the court shall reduce the third party's damages "to such extent as it thinks 
appropriate to take account of the sum recovered by the promisee"248 for the loss 
243 Hugh Beale, "Privity of Contract: Judicial and Legislative Reform", (1995) 9 JCL 103,107. 
244 A. G. Guest, supra n. 17 at para. 19-063 citing Albacruz (Cargo Owners) v. Albazero (Owners) (The 
Albazero) [1977] AC 774,842. 
245 St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. [1994] 1 AC 85,115. See also G. H. 
Treitel, `Damages in Respect of a Third Party's Loss' (1998) 114 LQR 527,528. 
246 Andrew Burrows, `Reforming Privity of Contract: Law Commission Report No. 242' [1996] LMCLQ 
467,479. 
247 Law Commission, Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242, 
para. 11.17. 
248 Section 5(l) of the 1999 Act states "Where under section 1a term of a contract is enforceable by a 
third party, and the promisee has recovered from the promisor a sum 
in respect of- (a) the third party's 
loss in respect of the term, or (b) the expense to the promisee of making good to the third party the default 
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suffered by the third party. Clearly, the Section presumes that the promisee may have a 
contract action against the promisor for losses suffered by a third party in cases where 
the third party can bring an action against the promisor under the 1999 Act. It seems that 
such a presumption is in direct contradiction with the aforementioned words of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson which disallow the promisee to sue the promisor for losses suffered 
by a third party in cases where the third party has a cause of action. However, Section 5 
of the 1999 Act provides help in cases where the buyer recovers damages from the seller 
for expenses incurred in curing the defective goods transferred to the third party or 
compensation paid to the third party. In such cases, the court shall reduce the third 
party's damages, recovered from the original seller, by the amount awarded to the 
buyer. 249 
To sum up, the 1999 Act may apply to relax the rigour of horizontal privity. However, 
due to the requirement of express identification, the 1999 Act may not apply in most 
cases where the goods are bought for a third party beneficiary. Nevertheless, where the 
circumstances of the case, such as the nature of the goods, make it reasonable for the 
seller to know that the goods are bought for a third party beneficiary, the court, it is 
submitted, should go beyond the scope of the 1999 Act to allow the third party's claim 
even though such a party was not expressly identified at the time of making the contract. 
The Law Commission Report on which the 1999 Act is based makes it clear that the 
court may offer consumers better protection in cases where it decides that the 1999 Act 
does not go far enough. Furthermore, it was argued that there is nothing to prevent the 
court allowing the buyer to recover damages for the loss suffered by the third party's 
beneficiary who can bring an action against neither the buyer nor the seller. Such 
exception to the doctrine of privity has not been abolished by the 1999 Act. 
In addition, a beneficiary other than the ultimate buyer may not be entitled to bring a 
contract action against the remote seller. However, as previously argued, the privity 
doctrine should be relaxed in order to prevent the remote seller escaping liability for 
defective goods. Where a husband buys goods for his wife, the wife should be able to 
sue the manufacturer if the goods appear defective. It was submitted above that the 
of the promisor, then, in any proceedings brought in reliance on that section 
by the third party, the court or 
arbitral tribunal shall reduce any award to the third party to such extent as 
it thinks appropriate to take 
account of the sum recovered by the promisee. " 
249 Ibid. 
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ultimate buyer should have a direct action against the remote seller for defective goods. 
If this submission is ever accepted, there will be no reason why a beneficiary other than 
the ultimate buyer cannot bring such an action against the manufacturer. Suppose, for 
example, that a father has bought goods for his daughter. If the father has a cause of 
action against the manufacturer, he will not be able to recover more than nominal 
damages since he did not suffer loss. Therefore, the daughter should be able to bring an 
action against the manufacturer. Chris Willet points out that "the central rationale for the 
reform is that it is reasonable for consumers to expect that those who make goods will 
be responsible for their quality. This would not seem to alter by virtue of the fact that 
the consumer is not original purchaser. 99250 It is submitted that third party beneficiary 
should be entitled to bring an action against the remote seller for losses resulting from 
the defective quality of goods. 
6.2.2 Extended Warranty under the UCC 
Section 2-318 of the UCC extends warranties to beneficiaries, other than the buyer. 25' 
The Section includes three alternatives of extension. The alternatives vary in respect of 
the definition of beneficiaries and the kinds of loss suffered. It has been left to the States 
to choose one of these alternatives. 252 It is worth noting that the Section is not intended 
to restrict the extension of warranty under the American case law. 253 In fact, many 
courts have extended warranties to more than those specified by the adopted alternatives 
of Section 2-318.254 
The alternatives provided by Section 2-318 have to be examined in order to identify the 
beneficiaries who can benefit from the Section. The Section provides 
250 Chris Willett, "The Quality of Goods and the Rights of Consumers" (1993) 44 NILQ 218,226. 
251 The non-UCC rules regarding third party beneficiary should continue to apply as long as they are not 
displaced by Section 2-318. So if the seller and the buyer intended to give the benefits of the warranty to a 
subsequent transferee, the latter has the rights created by such a warranty. See TD Crandall, MJ Herbert 
and L. Lawrence, supra n. 70 at p. 7: 75. 
252 Originally, Section 2-318 of the UCC did not provide alternative. In 1966 the Permanent Editorial 
Board (PEB) of the UCC amended the Section by adding two alternatives. The original 2-318 
has been 
kept as alternative A. 
253 Comment 3 to Section 2-318 provides that "[t]he first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries 
within its provisions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. 
Beyond this, the section in this 
form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the 
developing case law on whether the seller's 
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons 
in the distributive chain. " 
254 See J. E. Murray, Jr., `Products Liability v. Warranty Claims: Untangling the Web' (1983) 3 J. L. & 
Com. 269,276; W. D. Hawkland, Hawkland UCC Series §2-318-Article 2,1988, p. 2.789. 
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"Alternative A255 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person 
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it 
is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the 
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not 
exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
Alternative B256 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person 
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods 
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not 
exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
Alternative C257 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may 
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the 
operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to 
whom the warranty extends. " [Emphasis added] 
The alternatives 258 are mostly concerned with personal injury259 suffered by natural 
beneficiaries 260 as a result of breach of warranty. The purpose of such alternatives is 
probably to equalize the positions of the ultimate buyer and other beneficiaries. Where 
the ultimate buyer suffers personal injury due to the breach of warranty, he can claim 
damages in a contract action from his direct seller. 261 By extending the seller's warranty 
to other beneficiaries, they will have the same legal position of the buyer regarding 
breach of warranty express or implied. 
255 Alternative A has been adopted by the following states: New Mexico, Kentucky, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Arizona, Indiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Alaska, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. 
256 Alternative B has been adopted by the following states: Alabama, Colorado, New York, Delaware, 
Kansas, South Carolina, Vermont and the Territory of the Virgin Islands. 
257 Alternative C has been adopted by the following states: Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Utah 
and Wyoming. 
258 Texas has not adopted any of the alternatives. It left the matter of privity to be decided under the case 
law. In Texas, the requirement of privity in cases of physical losses has been abolished. See here J. S. 
Allee, Product Liability, New York, 1995, p. 5.8. Illinois, has not adopted either of the alternatives but 
retains its original codification of Section 2-318 which became alternative A after 1966. 
259 See Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 349 Pa. Super. 147; 42 UCC Rep. Serv. 851 (1986). 
260 See General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630; 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1193 
(1971). 
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Under alternative C, beneficiaries who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or 
be affected by the goods, can claim for losses, whether economic or physical, suffered 
by the breach of the extended warranty. 262 Unfortunately, alternative C was adopted by 
few States. 263 The reason why the other alternatives extend warranty to cover only 
personal injury is not clear. Perhaps the drafters of the UCC expected that some states 
would be in favour of keeping the requirement of privity in cases of economic loss. 
In fact, the words of Alternative C allow the beneficiary to bring an action in contract 
against the seller for any economic or physical loss suffered. 264 Therefore, such a 
beneficiary may sue the seller for damages for the diminution of value resulting from 
breach of warranty of quality. He may also sue him for consequential loss of profit. 
Suppose that a person hires a profit-making machine from the buyer. Suppose further 
that the hirer suffered loss of profit due to the defective quality of the machine. Under 
Alternative C, the hirer may sue the seller for his loss of profit, if it was expected at the 
time of purchasing the machine that the hirer would use it. 
The main issue here is whether the Section 2-318 affects vertical privity. In other words, 
can implied or express warranty, issued to a direct buyer, extend to a sub-buyer? 
Suppose that (W) issued an express warranty to his direct buyer (X) who resold the 
goods to (Y). If (Y) suffered loss due to the breach of such express warranty, could he 
claim that W's warranty was extended to him under Section 2-318? Obviously, 
alternative A does not allow the ultimate buyer to bring such a suit since it extends the 
warranty, whether implied or express, only to natural persons who are in the family or 
household of the buyer or who is a guest in his home. The ultimate buyer is not one of 
these beneficiaries. Under alternatives B&C, W's warranty may extend to (Y) and 
other beneficiaries if they were reasonably expected to use, consume or be affected by 
the goods. 265 For example, in Dalton v. Stanley Solar & Stove, Inc., 
266 it was held that 
261 See J. W. Wade, Tort Liability for Products causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the UCC (1983) 48 
Mo. L. Rev. 1,7. 
262 C. R. Reitz, supra n. 174 at p-369- 
263 Ibid at n. 42. 
264 See W. L. Stallworth, `An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in 
Jurisdictions that have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternatives B& C)' (1993) 
27 Akron L. Rev. 197. 
265 W. L. Stallworth, `An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions 
that have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternative A)' (1993) 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 
1215,1233. In Alabama, the UCC was enacted with some modifications regarding the extension of 
warranties. Under these modifications, the Alabama's 
law extends manufacturers' warranties to the 
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no privity was required under alternative C for suit by an ultimate consumer against the 
manufacturer of a wood stove. 
The draft of revised Article 2 of the UCC267 does not add much to this Section. Section 
2-318 of the Draft differs from the current 2-318 in that it makes it clear that express 
warranty issued by the remote seller to the ultimate buyer can extend to other 
beneficiaries as provided under the Alternatives of Section 2-318. The change in the 
Section is due to the new provisions of 2-313A which deals with warranties 
accompanying or packaged with the goods and 2-313B which deals with warranties 
communicated to the public as explained above. 268 When the Draft comes into force, the 
enforceability of such warranties will become beyond question. 
6.2.3 Extended warranty under the CISG 
The CISG does not deal with the issue of the extension of warranty to beneficiaries 
other than the buyer. Extension of warranty, under domestic laws, is normally intended 
to protect beneficiaries who are in a relationship with the consumer, such as the case of 
the American UCC. The CISG does not apply where the goods are purchased for 
ultimate consumers who might reasonably be expected to use or be affected by their goods. See Atkins v. 
American Motors Corp. 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976). 
266 629 A. 2d 794 (N. H. 1993). 
267 The draft of March 2000. Section 2-318 of the Draft states 
(a) In this section: (1) "Immediate buyer" means a buyer that has a contract with the seller. (2) "Remote 
purchaser" means a person that buys or leases from an immediate buyer or other person in the normal 
chain of distribution. 
Alternative A to Subsection (b) 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied to an immediate buyer, a seller's remedial promise to an 
immediate buyer, or a seller's obligation under Section 2-313A or Section 2-313B to a remote purchaser 
extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home 
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
Alternative B to Subsection (b) 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied to an immediate buyer, a seller's remedial promise to an 
immediate buyer, or a seller's obligation under Section 2-313A or Section 2-313B to a remote purchaser 
extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the 
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the 
operation of this section. 
Alternative C to Subsection (b) 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied to an immediate buyer, a seller's remedial promise to an 
immediate buyer, or a seller's obligation under Section 2-313A or Section 2-313B to a remote purchaser 
extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or 
be affected by the goods and 
who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or 
limit the operation of this section 
with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends. 
" 
268 Supra, p. 249. 
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personal, family or household use. 269 It seems that it was the intention of the drafters to 
exclude consumer sales from the scope of the Convention due to the wide variations, in 
this field, among the several countries. 
The CISG does not apply to claims brought by third parties. However, as previously 
mentioned, the participation of the seller in the ultimate purchase contract may furnish a 
ground for a collateral relationship between such a seller and the ultimate buyer. 270 
Furthermore, as the CISG does not foreclose claims arising under domestic laws in areas 
out of its scope, extended warranty may apply under the applicable domestic law. 271 For 
example, suppose an American consumer bought goods from an American distributor 
who purchased such goods from a French manufacturer. Suppose further that the 
American consumer suffered physical losses due to the use of such goods. In such an 
example, subject to the applicability of the American law under the private international 
law, the American consumer may sue the French seller under Section 2-318 of the UCC. 
Anyhow, this situation seldom happens since the ultimate buyer normally sues the direct 
seller who can bring his seller to defend the ultimate buyer's action. 
Conclusions 
Under current English law, the ultimate buyer cannot bring a contract action against the 
remote seller. However, in cases of string contracts, liability may pass from a seller to 
another until it reaches the original seller. If this becomes the case, one may wonder why 
the ultimate buyer cannot bring a direct contract action against the remote seller. In fact, 
the method of `passing up the liability' may be inapplicable where the chain is broken. 
This can be the case where a party in the chain has disappeared or become insolvent or 
where a party in the chain shelters behind disclaimer clauses. In cases such as Lambert 
and another v. Lewis and others, 272 the chain may be practically broken since the 
commercial buyer cannot identify his immediate seller of the goods. In this sense, 
manufacturers may escape liability and ultimate buyers may be left without remedy. 
Even where the ultimate buyer recovers damages from the retailer, the retailer may not 
always be able to pass the liability up the chain so that it reaches the manufacturer. It 
269 Article 2 of the CISG states "This Convention does not apply to sales: (a) of goods bought for 
personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, 
neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were bought for any such use... " 
270 Supra, p. 257. 
271 R. E. Speidel, supra n. 206 at p. 185. 
272 [1982] AC 225. 
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seems unfair to hold the retailer liable for losses caused by defective manufacturing and 
at the same allow the manufacturer to escape liability for such a defect. 
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 is unlikely to provide help in cases of 
string contracts. It is true that in theory the 1999 Act will apply to sale of goods cases if 
the parties to the sale contract agree expressly to confer a legal right on the sub-buyer; in 
practice, such express agreement can hardly be found. The Law Commission Report on 
which the 1999 Act is based makes it clear that in the absence of such an express 
agreement the 1999 Act does not apply even though the contract is intended to confer a 
benefit on the sub-buyer who is expressly identified. Therefore, although the 1999 Act 
seems to provide help in cases of horizontal privity, it is unlikely to apply to cases of 
string contracts. 
However, it was argued that the 1999 Act does not go far enough to protect the ultimate 
buyer, especially in cases where such a buyer cannot sue his immediate seller for 
practical reasons such as the disappearance or the insolvency of the seller. In fact, the 
Law Commission makes it clear that the court may go farther than the 1999 Act where it 
decides that the Act does not go far enough to protect the third party. Indeed, some legal 
writers, such as Adams and Brownsword, argue that the 1999 Act does not go far 
enough to relax the privity requirement in cases of string contracts. Therefore, the court, 
it is submitted, should allow the ultimate buyer to bring a direct contract action against 
the remote seller for foreseeable losses resulting from defective goods, especially in 
cases where the retailer has disappeared or become insolvent. If this submission is 
accepted, the remote seller should be able to rely on the terms of his contract with his 
immediate buyer. In tort, this was decided by Robert Goff LJ in Muirhead v. Industrial 
Tank Specialities Ltd. and Others. 273 However, the remote seller should not be able to 
exclude his liability for defective goods where the plaintiff is consumer. Moreover, 
Professor Beale argues that the manufacturer should be required to repair or replace the 
defective goods or refund the price to the ultimate buyer. However, the reasoning of 
Professor Beale may not apply to all cases. Therefore, the remote seller should be liable 
for all foreseeable losses suffered by the ultimate buyer. Of course, the recovery of 
damages is always subject to the normal restrictions, i. e. causation, remoteness, certainty 
and mitigation. 
273 [1986] 1 QB 507. 
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Under the current text of the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer 
Goods and Associated Guarantees, consumers cannot sue producers in contract for 
losses caused by the defective quality of goods. However, the Directive will be reviewed 
in relation to the producer's liability. By making the producers directly liable for 
defective goods, they will have an adequate incentive to produce their goods carefully. 
The Directive does not provide for the remedy of damages for defective quality. It is 
submitted that the consumer should be offered the choice to sue under the EC Directive 
or the SGA so that he can recover for his consequential losses caused by the defective 
goods. 
The EC Directive provides for the enforceability of producers' guarantee to reimburse 
the price paid or to replace, repair or handle consumer goods in any way. However, the 
Directive does not provide for the producer's liability for breach of his public statement 
regarding the quality of his products. Under the Directive, such statements are 
considered in assessing the liability of the retailer. Although this may provide better 
protection to consumers, it seems to be unfair for retailers especially in cases where the 
producer makes such statements after the time that the retailer purchases the goods or 
where it was not reasonable for the retailer to be aware of such statements at the time he 
purchases the goods from the producer or distributor. Hopefully, the Directive after its 
review will provide that the producer is bound by his statement. 
Where the producer's or any remote seller's public statement induces the ultimate buyer 
to purchase certain goods, there may be a collateral contract. The ultimate buyer's 
purchase may be interpreted as a reciprocal action to the remote seller's warranty. 
However, such a contractual relationship is hard to be found in cases of warranty 
accompanying or packaged with the goods. In such cases, it is likely that the buyer will 
not become aware of the warranty until he purchases the goods. Nowadays, 
manufacturers make intensive use of advertisements to induce ultimate buyers to 
purchase their products. In such a case, it is highly unrealistic to limit purchaser's 
protection to warranties made directly to him under the retail contract. Certainly, the 
policy of protecting ultimate buyers in cases of such warranty outweighs reliance on the 
requirement of privity. 
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As regards horizontal privity, it seems that such privity has been relaxed by the 1999 
Act. The Law Commission Report on which the 1999 Act is based makes it clear that 
where the goods are bought for a third party who is expressly identified, the third party 
beneficiary can sue the seller in contract unless the parties did not intend to confer a 
legal right on the third party. However, it was argued that the requirement of express 
identification seems to be unfair in certain cases. This can be the case where the 
circumstances indicate that the goods are bought for a third party. The requirement of 
express identification does not exist under American law. Under Section 302(1) of the 
American Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the parties do not need to expressly 
identify the third party nor do they need to include in the contract an express term of 
their intention. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the third party beneficiary should be entitled to sue the 
retailer or the remote seller for losses caused by the defective quality of goods where it 
was reasonable for the seller to know at the time of making the contract that the goods 
were bought for a third party. Furthermore, it was argued that the decision of the House 
of Lords in St. Martin 's Property Corporation v. Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd. 274 should be 
interpreted to allow the buyer to claim damages for losses suffered by the third party 
beneficiary who can bring an action against neither the buyer nor the seller. 
In comparing current English law with American law, one may note that American law 
provides more protection to the ultimate buyer and other beneficiaries. Unlike English 
law, in all the American jurisdictions, privity is not required in cases of physical loss 
even where the aggrieved party brings an action in contract. Therefore, the ultimate 
buyer is entitled to bring an action in contract against the remote seller for physical loss 
caused by breach of warranty of quality. Where the ultimate buyer suffers purely 
economic loss, the applicability of privity varies among the several States of the USA. 
In certain states, the ultimate buyer can bring an action in contract against the remote 
seller for the diminution in value of the goods supplied. As regards remote seller's 
express warranties and public statements, the draft of the revised Article 2 of the UCC 
provides two new sections, 2-313A and 2-313B, which make the remote seller's 
warranty enforceable. The new sections do not require the buyer's reliance on the 
warranty for purchasing the goods in cases of warranty accompanying or packaged with 
274 [1994] 1 AC 85. 
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the goods. However, such reliance is still required in cases of warranty made through 
advertising. Nevertheless, English law will soon provide better protection for 
consumers. Provisions for the enforceability of certain producer's guarantees can be 
found in the EC Directive mentioned above. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the 
Directive will be reviewed regarding producer's liability for defective goods. However, 
the Directive applies to consumer cases only. 
In addition, Section 2-318 of the UCC extends warranties to third parties beneficiaries. 
Section 2-318 provides three alternatives for the extension of warranty. Only the third 
alternative allows the claim of such beneficiaries for economic loss. This seems to offer 
perfect protection to third party beneficiary. Such extension cannot be found under 
English law. However, the 1999 Act may apply in certain cases to allow third party 
beneficiary to sue the seller for defective goods. 
At the last point, one should not fail to mention that the CISG seems to be inapplicable 
to third party's claim. Even where there is a collateral contract between the seller and 
the third party, the CISG may not apply since its application is limited to the original 
sale contract. In fact, this seems to be a fundamental gap in the Convention. The third 
party's claim will be decided under the applicable law. Furthermore, the validity of the 
exclusion clauses will be decided under the applicable law since the Convention is not 
concerned with the validity of the contract terms. In this sense, the validity of a term 
controlling third party's claim against the seller will be decided under the applicable 
domestic law. As the chain of contracts in international sales may include parties from 
different legal systems, this will leave the seller in an insecure position. A provision 
regulating third party's claim could have avoided such insecurity. 
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Chapter Seven 
Defences to Warranty Actions 
Introduction 
Chapter one of this thesis mentioned that the principle of Robinson v. Harman' should 
be applied in conjunction with other principles concerned with the remedy of damages. 
Such principles can be raised by the seller in order to defend the buyer's action for 
damages. If the seller is successful in defending the buyer's action by raising such 
principles, the buyer's damages may be reduced or disallowed. One of these defences is 
uncertainty as to the fact and amount of loss which may be a strong defence in cases of 
loss of profit as discussed in chapter four. The seller may also be able to prove that the 
loss has not resulted from the breach of warranty of quality or that could have 
reasonably been avoided or that it is too remote. Furthermore, under both the UCC and 
the CISG, the buyer is required to notify the seller of non-conformity of goods within a 
reasonable time after the discovery of the breach. Therefore, the buyer's action may fail 
due to the absence of notification. Such a defence is not available under English law in 
cases where the buyer's claim is for damages. Therefore, one may need to find out 
whether such a notification is important in cases where the buyer brings an action for 
damages for breach of warranty of quality. The seller may also rely on the doctrine of 
privity to defend the sub-buyer's contractual action against him, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Most of the seller's defences have been taken into consideration in 
dealing with issues raised in the previous chapters. Therefore, the examination of such 
defences in this research seems to be unavoidable. 
There seem to be differences between the SGA, the UCC and the CISG in applying the 
restrictions mentioned. A comparison between the SGA, the UCC and the CISG may 
show the adequate way of applying such restrictions. Here, it should be noted that the 
purpose of this chapter is not to deal with the general application of these defences in 
contract law. The examination of the application of such restrictions will be mostly 
concerned with cases of breach of warranty of quality. 
1 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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A number of difficulties may face the application of these principles to cases of breach 
of warranty of quality. For example, there seems to be no coherent attitude, under the 
several legal systems, towards the applicability of the causation restriction to reduce the 
amount of damages claimed. Such a variation in the application of the causation 
restriction might influence the applicability of the restriction under the CISG. This 
might also be the case of the defence of lack of notification under the UCC and the 
CISG. The time and content of such a notification varies among the several legal 
systems. 
There are also a number of slight differences between the SGA, the UCC and the CISG 
regarding the application of the mitigation and remoteness principles. This chapter will 
make a comparison between the SGA, the UCC and the CISG in order to deal with such 
differences. In applying such principles in cases of breach of warranty of quality, certain 
issues need to be dealt with. For example, is the buyer required, under the mitigation 
principle, to stop using defective goods after he becomes aware of the defect? Does the 
mitigation principle require the buyer to accept the seller's offer to repair or replace 
defective goods or restore the contract price and take the goods back? Furthermore, 
under the remoteness principle, some points are approached differently under English 
law, the UCC and the CISG. Such laws seem to disagree on whether the test of 
remoteness is objective or subjective neither do they agree on whether the principle 
applies to the kind or the amount of loss. 
7.1 Causation 
Under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG, the restriction of causation, as one of the 
restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages, requires a sufficient causal link 
between the seller's breach and the buyer's loss. It seems essential for the buyer to show 
such a causal link even in cases where the loss was or should have been in the 
reasonable contemplation of the seller at the time of making the contract. For example, 
in the UCC case of Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 
2 where the buyer presented 
an ample evidence that the loss was reasonably foreseeable at the time of making the 
contract, the Court held that the loss was not totally caused by the breach of warranty of 
quality and, hence, the recovery was denied regardless of whether the loss was 
2 1982 U. S. App. LEXIS 22121; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 174 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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foreseeable. However, where the intervening event was expected by the parties at the 
time of making the contract, the seller may not be excused from liability on the ground 
that such an event cooperated with his breach to bring about the loss. 3 
7.1.1 Aspects of the Restriction under the SGA and the UCC 
The restriction of causation seems to have similar application under both English and 
American law in most cases. However, English and American law seem to disagree on 
whether contributory negligence can reduce damages in cases of defective goods, as 
discussed under the following section. In general, actions that may break the causal link, 
in cases of breach of warranty of quality, seem difficult to be put in an exhaustive list. 
Deciding whether or not the loss is caused by the breach, is a matter of fact which 
depends on the circumstances of each case. 4 In certain cases, the application of the 
principle is straightforward. For example, the buyer will not be entitled to recover the 
compensation paid to sub-buyers for losses not caused by the seller's breach. 5 In other 
cases, the application of the principle needs special care, such as the case of misuse of 
products. Here, the general rule is that the buyer is not entitled to damages for losses 
caused by his misuse of the goods purchased. 6 However, where the court finds that the 
misuse did not contribute significantly to the loss resulting from the breach of warranty 
of quality, the seller may be held liable for the whole loss. 7 
More significant, regarding the application of the causation restriction, is the case where 
the loss results from the use of defective goods without pre-examination. In this respect, 
comment 5 to Section 2-715 of the UCC provides that where the loss results from "the 
3 R. R. Anderson, `Incidental and Consequential Damages' (1987) 7 J. L. & Com. 327,371; A. G. Guest, 
Benjamin's Sale of Goods, London, 5th ed., 1997, para. 16-046. 
¢ See the UCC case of Chatfield v. Sherman-Williams Co., 1978 Minn. LEXIS 1323; 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 
285 (1978). 
H. L. A. Hart and T. Honor&, Causation in the Law, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1985,311. The buyer will not be 
entitled to recover, as damages, expenses which are attributable to the his fault or which may be incurred 
whether the seller breached his warranty or not. See here the UCC case of Barnard v. Compugraphic 
Corp., 37 UCC Rep. Serv. 141 (1983) where the Court held that the buyer was not entitled to recover, as 
damages, the interest paid for financing the purchase price of a typewriter since such interests would have 
been paid whether the seller breached his warranty or not. See also Cundy v. International Trencher 
Service, Inc., 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 1278 (1984). 
6 See the UCC cases of Wenner v. Gulf Oil Corp. 1978 Minn. LEXIS 1361; 23 UCC Rep. Serv. 603 
(1978), Elanco Prods. Co. v. Akin Tunnell, 1971 Tex. App. LEXIS 2300; 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 30 (1971). 
See the UCC cases of Mann v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1983 U. S. App. LEXIS 29643; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 
1147 (8th Cir. 1983). See also Southern Illinois Stone Co. v. Universal Engineering Corp. 1979 U. S. 
App. LEXIS 23612; 38 UCC Rep. Serv. 858 (8th Cir. 1979) where the Court held that the misuse of a 
rock crushing equipment, by setting off small dynamite charges 
in the mouth of the crusher to clear rock 
jams, does not bar the recovery as long as the principal cause of the buyer's loss is the improper design. 
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use of goods without discovery of the defect causing the damage, the question of 
"proximate" cause turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods 
without such inspection as would have revealed the defects. If it was reasonable for him 
to do so, or if he did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the injury would not 
proximately result from the breach of warranty. " The comment states that the causal link 
may not be established where the loss results from the use of goods which appeared 
defective before using them. In fact, the buyer, in continuing to use the defective goods 
after the discovery of the defect, will increase his loss which he could reasonably have 
avoided or mitigated by repairing the defective goods or simply by stopping using them. 
Therefore, the mitigation principle can be an appropriate reason for the buyer's 
disallowance of damages for losses resulting from continuing to use defective goods. 8 
Under both the SGA and the UCC, the examination of goods is a right of the buyer and 
not a duty. 9 However, in certain cases, e. g. where it is unreasonable for the buyer to use 
the goods without inspection, the causal link between the breach and the loss may be 
broken by the buyer's negligence to investigate the goods. However, in normal 
circumstances, the buyer is entitled to sue the seller for losses due to defective goods 
regardless of whether the defect could have been discovered by a reasonable 
examination. The case of Beoco Ltd v. Alfa Laval Co. Ltd., 10 seems to be helpful here. 
In this case, the seller, who was the first defendant, installed a heat exchanger at the 
plaintiff company's premises. The heat exchanger appeared defective and the plaintiff 
employed the second defendant to repair it. The repair was defective. Without first 
carrying out any inspection of the repair, which would have revealed the defect of the 
repair, the plaintiff put the heat exchanger back into use. The heat exchanger exploded 
8 The comment has misled the court in many cases. See for example Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & 
Television Co., Inc., 1970 Md. LEXIS 755; 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 656 (1970) where it was held that a 
purchaser who uses obviously defective goods cannot recover for consequential losses since his conduct is 
the intervening cause of the loss. It is submitted that mitigation would be a more appropriate principle for 
the decision. See also Bemidji Sales Barn, Inc. v. Chatfield, 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 1137 (1977). 
9 Section 34 of the SGA states "Unless otherwise agreed when the seller tenders delivery of goods to the 
buyer, he is bound on request to afford the buyer a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract and, in the case of a contract for 
sale by sample, of comparing the bulk with the sample. " 
Section 2-513(1) of the UCC provides "... where goods are tendered or delivered or identified to the 
contract for sale, the buyer has a right before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable 
place and time and in any reasonable manner... ". In some UCC cases the court 
held that examination is not 
a duty. See the UCC case of Taylor & Gaskin v. Chris-Craft Industries, 1984 U. 
S. App. LEXIS 23612; 38 
UCC Rep. Serv. 858 (6th Cir. 1984) where the Court held that the buyer's failure to undertake corrosion 
tests was not blameworthy and cannot be a successful defence for a 
buyer's action of warranty of quality. 
See also the UCC case of Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle Laboratories, Inc., 
1981 U. S. App. LEXIS 16698; 32 
UCC Rep. Serv. 474 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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and caused damage to the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff sued the seller for the cost of 
repair of the defective heat exchange and loss of profit resulting from the loss of 
production while the repair was being effected. Furthermore, the plaintiff sought to 
recover for loss of profit on lost production during the time which would have been 
taken to make good the defective repair had the exchanger not been put back into 
service and exploded. The Court of Appeal awarded the plaintiff damages for the cost of 
repair and loss of profit for the period of time within which the exchanger was being 
repaired. However, it refused to allow the plaintiff further damages on the ground that 
any further repair required had been subsumed in the more extensive repairs required as 
the result of the explosion. The Court held that the explosion had been the result of the 
plaintiff's own negligence of not inspecting the exchanger before putting it into service. 
Some commentators" have submitted that the decision in Beoco can be reached under 
the principle of mitigation. This is due to the fact that it was reasonable for the buyer to 
mitigate his loss by examining the repair of the machine before putting it to use. The 
loss, therefore, was reasonably avoidable. In fact, one may find that the restrictions of 
causation, mitigation and remoteness may overlap in a case such as Beoco. However, 
this does not seem to affect the actual decision of the court. One here may suggest that 
the decision in Beoco could also have been reached under the remoteness principle. 12 it 
is quite understandable that it should have been in the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties, at the time of making the contract, that the machine would be repaired or 
replaced if it appeared defective. But, it might not be reasonable for the parties to 
contemplate that the substitute goods or the repair would be defective. If this becomes 
the case, the buyer may not be entitled to recover for losses resulting from defective 
replacement or repair since such losses are remote. A supportive opinion can be found 
in the UCC case of Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 
13 where the buyer had 
purchased substitute goods in order to replace the defective contracted goods. The 
substitute goods appeared defective and, as a result of their use, the buyer suffered 
consequential losses. In this case, the Court absolved the original seller of liability for 
the consequential losses, resulting from the use of the defective substitute, on the ground 
10 [1995] QB 137. 
'° A. G. Guest, Chitty on Contracts, London, Vol. 1,28th ed., 1999, para. 27-029; A. G. Guest, supra n. 3 at 
para. 16-046, n. 66. 
12 Infra, p. 284. 
13 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 434 (1976). 
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that it was not reasonable for the buyer to foresee, at the time of making the contract, 
that the replacement goods would be defective. 
7.1.2 Causation under Article 74 of the CISG 
Article 74 of the CISG allows damages for losses resulting from breach of contract. 
Naturally, the causation restriction applies, under the Convention, to disallow the buyer 
to recover for losses which are not causally connected with the breach of the seller's 
warranty of quality. Under the Convention, the application of the causation restriction is 
not as easy as it seems. Due to the difference in the application of the causation 
restriction among the various legal systems, as explained below, the application of the 
causation restriction under the Convention may be influenced by domestic laws and, as a 
result, varies among the different countries. 
Under English law, the loss would be causally linked to the breach if it would not have 
occurred but for the breach. 14 Where there are multiple causes of the loss, the court has 
to find out whether the breach was sufficient to cause the loss. Therefore, the buyer may 
be entitled to damages where the breach of warranty of quality is one of two causes 
which are of equal efficacy and combined to bring about the loss. 15 The Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (henceforth the CNA) permits apportionment of 
loss by the reduction of the buyer's damages where he "suffers damages as the result 
partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person. , 
16 Here, it should be 
noted that the CNA applies only to cases where the defendant is liable in tort or where 
he is co-extensively liable in tort and contract. 17 The CNA seems to have no application 
to cases where the broken contractual duty is strict. 
18 It should be clear that the seller's 
liability under the SGA for defective goods is strict. 
19 
14 J. Swanton and B. McDonald, Common Law: Proof of Causation in Claims for Negligence and Breach 
of Contract, (1999) 73 Austl. L. J. 23. 
15 See Heskell v. Continental Express Ltd. [1950] All ER 1033,1048. 
16 Section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. 
17 See here Law Commission, Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract, Law Com. No. 219. See 
also Anderson, `Contributory Negligence in Contract-Again' 
[1987] LMCLQ 10; Burrows, 
`Contributory Negligence in Contract: Ammunition for the Law Commission' (1993) 109 LQR 175. 
18 Barclays Bank v. Fairclough Building Ltd. [1995] 1 All ER 289. See Michael Furmston, Cheshire, 
Fifoot & Furmston 's Law of Contract, London, 1996, p. 634. 
19 See Michael Furmston (ed. ), The Law of Contract, London, 1999, p. 1279. 
282 
A comparison between English law and American law may show that the latter is more 
favourable for the seller since it allows damages to be reduced under the defence of 
contributory negligence for losses resulting from defective goods. Indeed, under 
American law, comparative negligence can be a defence to warranty action. 20 Under the 
defence of comparative negligence, liability is to be apportioned between the seller and 
the buyer according to their respective percentages of causation. 21 In other words, under 
such a defence, the court apportions loss among various causes in order to charge the 
seller for that percentage of the loss attributable to his respective wrong. 
It is submitted that contributory negligence should be considered to reduce the buyer's 
damages for losses resulting from defective quality of goods. If the buyer's action is not 
enough to break the causal link, there seems to be no reason why should not such an 
action be considered to reduce the buyer's damages. Therefore, the position in American 
law regarding this point is better than the position in English law. Under English law, 
the buyer's damages for defective goods cannot be reduced by an amount, in proportion 
to the degree to which his fault contributed to the loss. 22 Therefore, in this case, the 
seller may be totally liable for losses resulting from his breach of warranty of quality if 
such a breach is sufficient enough to bring about the loss. On the other hand, if such a 
breach is not sufficient enough to cause the loss, the seller may be held not liable. 
However, this does not seem the case under French law. Under French law, the 
causation restriction can be applied to reduce damages in all kinds of case. 23 Suppose 
hypothetically that the buyer suffered loss of production of a machine due to its 
breakdown. Suppose further, that the breakdown was caused partly by the buyer's 
improper use of the machine and partly by a defect in its quality. In this case, if the 
buyer claimed damages for his loss of production, the causation restriction would likely 
apply in England and France differently. The causation restriction in England would not 
affect the amount of damages. Under both French and English law, if the sole cause of 
20 See the UCC case of Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co. U. S. App. LEXIS 28852; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 
1494 (6th Cir. 1983). 
21 See the UCC case of Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 1978 Tex. LEXIS 390; 24 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 555 (1978), Commented by K. Angelini, `Product Liability-Implied Warranty-Recovery of 
Consequential Damages in Breach of Implied Warranty Action Disallowed to Extent Buyer's Negligence 
was Concurring Proximate Cause' (1979) 10 St. Mary's L. 
J. 675. This was also enacted in some State 
Statutes such as the case of New York and Texas. See also Peterson v. 
Bendix Home Systems, Inc., 33 
UCC Rep. Serv. 876 (1982); 5-Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Monier & Co., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 820 (1973). 
22 G. H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account, Oxford, 1988, pp. 171,190-1. 
23 Ibid at pp. 190-1; see also at p. 172, of the same book, for the 
intervention of an extraneous event for 
which neither party was responsible. 
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the loss of production was the seller's breach of warranty, the causation restriction 
would be satisfied and vice versa. However, under French law, the amount of 
recoverable damages may be reduced by the percentage of the buyer's contribution to 
the loss by misusing the machine. Under English law, the question is whether the 
seller's breach is sufficient enough to cause the loss. If the answer is in the affirmative, 
the buyer's contribution to the loss by misusing the goods will not be taken into account. 
In view of the above discussion, where the CISG is the applicable law, parties to an 
international sale contract should not expect the causation restriction to be applied 
similarly among the various countries. Although the court may take into account the 
international character of the Convention, it is likely to be influenced by the domestic 
law of the country where it is based. In light of the above discussion, parties are advised 
to agree expressly on whether or not the contributory negligence can be taken into 
account for the purpose of quantifying damages. 
7.2 Remoteness 
Hadley v. Baxendale, 24 described by Gilmore as "a fixed star in the jurisprudential 
firmament", 25 has formulated the principle of remoteness in the common law. 26 The 
principle of remoteness was provided in Hadley as follows: 
"where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the 
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such a breach of 
contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising 
naturally, i. e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of 
contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the 
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable 
result of the breach of it. Now if special circumstances under which the contract 
was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants and 
thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a 
contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of 
injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these 
special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if 
these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the 
contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his 
contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great 
24 [1854] 9 Exch. 341. 
25 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract, 1974,83. For the significance of Hadley v. Baxendale and the 
reasons of formulation of its rule, see R. Danzig, `Hadley v. 
Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of 
the Law' (1975) 4 . J. Legal 
Stud. 249. 
26 The rule of Hadley has roots in the Civil legal system; on this point see 
Franco Ferrari, `Comparative 
Ruminations on the Foreseeability of Damages in Contract Law' (1993) 53 La. L. Rev. 1257. 
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multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach 
of contract. , 27 
Although Hadley was a carriage of goods case where the breach was of a late delivery, 
its rule seems to be applicable to all kinds of contract. The principle of remoteness is 
intended to limit the seller's (the breaching party's) liability to those losses which were 
in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. To 
attain such a purpose, the rule of Hadley has been designed to prevent recovery for 
losses which flow from circumstances peculiar to the aggrieved party (the buyer) and 
not known to the party in breach at the time of making the contract. 28 
A significant advantage of the limitation stated in Hadley is the reduction of 
subsidization of loss. If the seller were liable for all the losses resulting from breach of 
warranty, his insurance premium would be higher. As a result, the price of the goods 
would increase due to the increase in the costs. Diamond and Foss argue that where 
sellers are unable to distinguish high risk buyers from others, as it is often the case, they 
may increase the price of their goods in order to compel the buying public to cross- 
subsidize the buyers' losses. 29 In other words, the sellers will force the buying public to 
pay higher prices in order to compensate the aggrieved buyers for their losses. However, 
since the remoteness principle limits the seller's liability to losses which result in the 
normal course of circumstances or in special circumstances known to the seller at the 
time of making the contract, it reduces the subsidization by the buying public. This is 
understandable from the fact that the sellers will not be liable for losses caused by their 
breach under special circumstances not known to them at the time of making the 
contract. Also, the original seller may not hesitate to issue a warranty to the ultimate 
buyers since he knows that he will not be liable for losses where the use of the goods 
could not reasonably have been contemplated at the time of making the contract. 
Hadley, in applying the test of the reasonableness to the contemplation of the parties, 
distinguishes between contracts made under normal circumstances and those made 
under special circumstances. As for the former, the buyer does not need to prove that the 
seller was aware of such circumstances at the time of making the contract. The 
27 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch. 341,354-355. 
28 H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., [1978] 1 QB 791,796. 
29 T. A. Diamond and H. Foss, `Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. 
Baxendale' (1994) 63 Fordham L. Rev. 665,684. 
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remoteness principle would be satisfied if a reasonable man in the position of the seller 
would have contemplated the loss. However, in cases where the loss results under 
special circumstances, the buyer needs to prove that the seller was aware of such 
circumstances at the time of making the contract. 
Legal writers disagree on the number of rules provided by Hadley. While the 
aforementioned statement of Hadley can be seen as one rule, some writers see it as two 
or three rules. 30 Those who favour the proposition of three rules, classify the losses into 
three categories, i. e., loss arising naturally, loss which can be contemplated by a 
reasonable man under normal circumstances and, finally, loss which arises in special 
circumstances. 31 In fact, the losses which arise naturally, must be contemplated at the 
time of making the contract. 
As for the opinion favouring the proposition of two rules, legal writers may also 
disagree on the way of dividing the statement of Hadley into two rules. Some writers put 
the first rule to deal with those losses which can be in the reasonable contemplation of 
the parties and the second rule to deal with losses resulting under special circumstances 
peculiar to the aggrieved party. Some other writers put the first rule to deal with losses 
that can arise in the ordinary course of events and the second rule to deal with losses 
which are in the reasonable contemplation of the parties under normal or special 
circumstances. 32 Under the latter way of classification, the issue of remoteness cannot 
be discussed in cases where the loss arises in the ordinary course of events. 
Unlike the UCC, the SGA adopts the first way of dividing the statement of Hadley into 
two rules. Section 53(2) of the SGA is a statutory formulation of the first rule which 
deals with the reasonable contemplation in cases of normal circumstances. 
33 However, 
the Section is not intended to oust the second rule, which deals with cases of special 
circumstances. 34 The recovery in such cases can be held under Section 54 of the SGA. 
In fact, the UCC applies the second way of classification by denying the applicability of 
30 p 
. 
S. James, `Measure of Damages in Contract and Tort-Law and Fact' (1950) 13 MLR 36,39. 
31 See J. Douglas Drushal, `Uniform Commercial Code-§§ 2-714 & 2-715-Consequential Damages 
Award- R. I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp., 232 Pa. Super. 242,336 A. 2d 397 (1975)', 
[1976] 976] 37 Ohio St. L. J. 153,156. See also R. R. Anderson, supra n. 3 at p. 352. 
Michael Furmston (ed), The Law of Contract, London, 1999, p. 1286; A. G. Murphey, `Consequential 
Damages in Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Legacy of Hadley' (1989) 23 Geo. 
Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 415,431. 
33 See Section 53(2) of the SGA, supra p. 50. 
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remoteness to the recoverability of damages for normal loss, which is the diminution in 
value of the goods in cases of breach of warranty, and restricting its application to the 
recoverability for consequential losses, e. g. loss of profit. 35 
In comparing the SGA with the UCC regarding this matter, one need not state which 
one deals better with the classification of the rule of Hadley. This is due to the fact that 
normal loss is naturally in the reasonable contemplation of the parties. Therefore, the 
recovery, in such cases, is unlikely to be denied by the application of the remoteness 
principle. In view of that, the classification of Hadley rule turns to be theoretical since it 
does not affect the recoverability of damages in practice. The UCC does not apply the 
remoteness principle to the recoverability of damages for normal loss. 36 This is not 
expressly stated in either the SGA or the CISG. Nevertheless, the remoteness principle 
seems to be unable to negate the recoverability for normal loss. Whereas consequential 
losses are likely to be remote in certain cases, normal loss cannot be remote since it 
should be, by its nature, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of 
making the contract. Therefore, it can be noted that normal loss is not subject, by its 
nature, to the restriction of remoteness. 37 A clear illustration of this can be obtained 
from a hypothetical example given by Prof. Treitel; "... a seller who has contracted to 
deliver an ounce of gold for its market price of (say) £230 instead delivers an ounce of 
some alloy of base metals resembling gold in appearance but worth only £5. Can there 
be any doubt that the buyer in such a case has suffered a loss of £225 simply because he 
has received an object worth that amount less than the object which the seller had 
contracted to supply? It is this rule which is contained in section 53(3). "38 Personally, I 
cannot envisage a case in which the normal loss can be too remote. Clearly, the 
application of the remoteness principle to the recoverability of damages for normal loss 
may increase the buyer's burden of proof 
Provisions dealing with the remoteness principle, can also be found in the UCC and the 
CISG. Section 2-715(2) states that 
"Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss 
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at 
34 H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., [1978] 1 QB 791,807. 
35 See Sections 2-714, supra pp. 51,53. 
36 R. E. B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 1975 U. S. App. LEXIS 12294; 525 F. 2d 749 (10th Cir. 1975). 
37 G. H. Treitel, `Damages for Breach of Warranty of Quality' (1997) 113 LQR 189,190. 
38 Ibid, p. 190. 
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the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be 
prevented by cover or otherwise... " [Emphasis added]. 
Article 74 of the CISG provides that 
"... damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or 
ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light 
of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a 
possible consequence of the breach of contract. " [Emphasis added]. 
The following will focus on the differences in the application of the remoteness 
principle under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG in order to find which one deals best 
with the principle of remoteness. It is intended to find out whether or not such 
differences make a difference in the recoverability of damages. 
7.2.1 Subjective or Objective Test 
Unlike the UCC and Hadley, Article 74 of the CISG adopts subjective and objective 
tests of foreseeability. Under the CISG, the buyer may be liable for losses which he 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of making the contract. 39 Although the 
language of the contemplation principle, under Section 2-715 of the UCC, is different 
from the language of Hadley, comment 2 to Section 2-715 of the UCC makes it clear 
that the Section follows the rule of contemplation stated in Hadley. 44 The rule of 
Hadley, indisputably, applies the objective test of contemplation. It makes the seller 
liable for losses which are reasonably in the party's contemplation at the time of making 
the contract. Even in cases of special circumstances, the seller will be liable for losses, 
which could reasonably be contemplated by the parties, resulting from the seller's 
breach under such special circumstances. 
A comparison between the SGA and the UCC on the one hand and the CISG on the 
other hand may show that the application of the subjective test under the latter is 
inadequate. Under the subjective test, the buyer is required to prove the seller's actual 
contemplation. This seems to be quite difficult. The buyer may be able to prove that the 
39 j 
. 
S. Sutton, `Measuring Damages under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods' (1989) 50 Ohio St. L. J. 737,743. 
40 Comment 2 to Section 2-715 of the UCC provides that "... the older rule at common law which made the 
seller liable for all consequential damages of which 
he had "reason to know" in advance [Hadley rule] is 
followed... " See also Linstrand v. Silvercrest Industries, 31 UCC Rep. Serv. 978 (1981), where the Court 
made it clear that the principle of foreseeability under 
the UCC is concerned with the test whether the 
losses were reasonably foreseeable, not whether they were actually 
foreseen. 
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seller was aware of the special circumstances of the buyer at the time of making the 
contract and, thus, he should have contemplated the loss. If this becomes the case, the 
objective test will apply in order to hold that the loss should have been in the reasonable 
contemplation of the seller. In view of that, there seems to be no need for the application 
of the subjective test under the Convention. 
7.2.2 Whose Contemplation? 
The issue here is whether the remoteness principle requires the loss to be in the 
contemplation of the party in breach or both parties' contemplation. Plainly, the literal 
reading of the statement of Hadley indicates that the principle requires the loss to be in 
both parties' contemplation. This is absolutely not the case under both the CISG and the 
UCC where the remoteness principle requires the loss to be in the contemplation of the 
party in breach. In practice, such a difference is unlikely to lead to a difference in the 
recoverability of damages. 41 To my knowledge, there have been no cases where the 
recovery was denied on the ground that the loss was not in the contemplation of the 
aggrieved party. Furthermore, In Cory v. Thames Iron Works Company, 42 the Court 
rejected the argument that damages can only be for losses which both parties 
43 contemplated at the time of making the contract. 
On this point, Corbin says that the "question always turns on whether the defendant had 
reason to foresee the injury. No doubt the plaintiff nearly always knows his own 
business and circumstances better than the defendant.... Therefore, when courts say that 
both must have had reason to foresee the injury, the meaning is that the defendant must 
have had reason to foresee. , 44 Thereupon, under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG, the 
application of the remoteness principle to cases of defective goods is mainly concerned 
with the reasonable contemplation of the seller. 
a' A. G. Murphey, supra n. 32 at p. 435. 
42 [186813QB 181. 
43 Ibid at p. 188. 
44 A. L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract Law, 
West Publishing Co., Vol. 5,1964, p. 83. 
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7.2.3 Contemplation of What? 
It seems well settled under the SGA and the UCC that the contemplation is of the kind 
of loss and not of the extent. 45 Under Article 74 of the CISG, the recoverable damages 
must not exceed "the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen". 
The words of Article 74 make it hard to tell whether the required foreseeability is of the 
kind of loss or of the amount of loss. This may cause a variation in the application of the 
Article among the different countries. For example, if the Convention is applied in 
England or America, the foreseeability requirement may be applied to the kind of loss 
and not to its amount. However, this may not be the case, for example, in France. The 
French view, which requires the foreseeability of the amount of loss, might influence the 
French court in applying Article 74 of the Convention. 46 
As for the degree of contemplation or foreseeability, the point was discussed by 
distinguished members of the House of Lords in the Heron 11.47 Their Lordships 
provided many expressions describing the degree of contemplation. Damages can be 
recovered for loss which is in the reasonable contemplation of the parties as not unlikely 
to result, 48 as liable to result or at least it was not unlikely to result49 or there is real 
danger50 that the loss will result from the breach of contract. In fact it is hard to state an 
interpretation for each expression. A great deal remains for the court to apply these 
brilliant expressions. 
In comparison, one may note that the SGA and the UCC are similar in applying the 
principle of remoteness. However, the application of the remoteness principle under the 
Convention may be influenced by domestic laws. If the Convention is applied in France, 
for example, the remoteness principle may be applied to the amount as well as the kind 
as As regards the SGA, see Parson Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. [1978] 1 QB 791,813; see also 
Christopher Hill Ltd. v. Ashington Piggeries Ltd., [1969] 3 All ER 1496. As for the UCC, see Barnard v. 
Compugraphic Corp., 37 UCC Rep. Serv. 141 (1983). 
46 G. H. Treitel, supra n. 22 at p. 154. 
47 Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350. 
48 Ibid at p. 383. Lord Reid used "the words `not unlikely' as denoting a 
degree of probability considerably 
less than an even chance but nevertheless not very unusual and easily 
foreseeable. " Lord Reid, in this 
case, cited the case of R. & H. Hall Ltd. v. W. H. Pim 
(Junior) & Co. Ltd., [1928] 33 Com. Cas. 324, 
decided by the House of Lords. In this case, Lord Shaw, at p. 333, stated that "[t]he main 
business fact is 
that [the parties] are thinking of the contract being performed and not of 
its being not performed. But with 
regard to the latter if their contract shows that there were 
instances or stages which made ensuing losses or 
damage a not unlikely result of the breach of the contract, then all such results must 
be reckoned to be 
within not only the scope of the contract, but the contemplation of 
the parties as to its breach. " 
49 Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (Heron II), ibid at p. 406- 
50 Ibid at pp. 414-415. 
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of loss. The application of the principle of remoteness to the amount of loss may not be 
easy in most cases. Here, one may question whether it is possible for the parties to 
foresee the amount of the loss at the time of making the contract. This may be possible 
in cases of expenses incurred in hiring a substitute while the goods are being repaired. 
However, it seems too difficult to prove the seller's contemplation as to the amount of 
loss of profit or the severity of physical damage resulting from the defective quality of 
goods. The purpose of the principle of remoteness is to protect the seller against the 
buyer's claims for unusual losses which cannot be in his reasonable contemplation at the 
time of making the contract as not unlikely to result from the breach. Therefore, there 
seems to be no point to apply such a principle to the extent of the loss where the kind of 
loss is not too remote. 
7.2.4 Contemplation or Foreseeability? Probability or Possibility? 
The terms "contemplation" and "foreseeability" were first used in the Louisiana Civil 
Code. An interesting analysis by Professor Murphey makes it clear that the terms were, 
most likely, used interchangeably. 51 In the case of Hadley, the Court used only the term 
"contemplation". It is unclear whether the Court in Hadley used the term contemplation 
to mean foreseeability or it intended to impose a stricter limitation on the recovery of 
damages in contract. The term foreseeability was used in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) 
Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd., 52 to deny the recovery for loss of profit under special 
contracts which were not made known to the seller at the time of making the contract. 
The use of foreseeability in this case was criticized in Heron II53 by the majority of the 
House of Lords. In this case, Lord Reid pointed out that while the term "foreseeability" 
can be used in tort, the term "contemplation" can be used only in contract to impose a 
stricter limitation on the recovery of damages. 
54 This attitude was criticized by Lord 
Denning, M. R. in Parson Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. 55 Referring to Lord Denning, the 
distinction between what was foreseeable by the parties and what was in the 
contemplation of the parties seems to be a semantic exercise. In his opinion, in cases of 
physical losses, the principle of remoteness should apply in tort and contract similarly. It 
51 A. G. Murphey, supra n. 32 at p. 436. 
52 [1949] 2 KB 528,539. 
53KOUfOS V, C. Czarnikow Ltd. (Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350. 
sa [bid at p. 385. 
55 [1978] 1 QB 791. Supra p. 165. 
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has been submitted56 that the difference in actions should by no means lead to a 
difference in the outcomes. 
Although the UCC applies the standard of "had reason to know" and does not adopt any 
of the terms "contemplation or foreseeability", comment 2 to Section 2-715 of the UCC 
makes it clear that the Section follows the rule of Hadley. However, the American 
courts, which seem to agree on the distinction drawn between foreseeability and 
contemplation, apply the term "foreseeable" to the cases of contract. By doing so, the 
American courts relaxes the rigour of the remoteness principle in order to increase the 
possibility of recovery for consequential losses. 57 
Clearly, Article 74 of the CISG adopts the term "foreseeability" which might make the 
chance of recovery under the Convention more than under the SGA. Article 74 allows 
damages for "the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the 
time of making the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew 
or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach. " In fact, the use of the 
word possible in the wording of Article 74 may also liberalize the application of the 
remoteness principle. Some legal writers, such as Ziegel, 58 consider the mere word 
"possible" a very broad word. Ziegel suggests here that the words of Article 74 should 
be interpreted narrowly in order to prevent the injured party being saddled with 
extravagant damage claims. However, the use of the clause "in the light of the facts", as 
Farnsworth suggests, 59 might be seen as a limitation to the broad meaning of the word 
"possible". 
, Hadley used the word "probable" which has a narrower meaning than the meaning of 
the word possible. 60 The expression "serious possibility", which was used in Victoria 
Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd., 
6' to describe the degree of 
56 Supra p. 1 65. 
57 A. G. Murphey, supra n. 32 at p. 439. 
58 JS Ziegel, International Sales (Conference at Pankers School), Some Common Law Perspective, New 
York, 1984, Ch. 9, p. 39. 
s9 Farnsworth, `Damages and Specific Relief (1979) 27 Am. J.. 
Comp. L. 247,253. 
60 In R. & H. Hall Ltd. v. W. H. Pim (Junior) & Co. Ltd., 
[1928] 33 Com. Cas. 324, Lord Viscount 
Dunedin pointed out, at p. 329, that "I do not think that 
`probability'... means that the chances are all in 
favour of the event happening. To make a thing probable, 
it is enough, in my view, that there is an even 
chance of its happening. " 
61 [1949] 2 KB 528,540. 
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contemplation, was rejected by the House of Lords in Heron IL 62 Section 2-715 of the 
UCC has different words, i. e. "had reason to know", which do not include either 
"possible" or "probable". The terms "foreseeability" and "probable" can be found in 
Section 351 of the American Restatement (Second) of Contracts 1979 which states that 
"Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to 
foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made. " While the word 
"foresee" provides a flexible application of the remoteness principle, the word 
"probable" limits such a flexibility. Farnsworth, in comparing the test of remoteness 
under the CISG, the UCC and the Restatement, stated that although "the use [in Article 
74 of the CISG] of "possible consequence" may seem at first to cast a wider net than the 
Restatement's "probable result, " the preceding clause ("in the light of the facts... ") cuts 
this back at least to the scope of the [UCC] language". 63 
In comparing Hadley with the UCC and the CISG regarding the terminology used in 
stating the remoteness principle, one should look first at the purpose of the remoteness 
principle. As mentioned above, the purpose of such a principle is to protect the seller. 
Therefore, the principle provides an exception to the general rule that the party should 
be liable for all losses caused by his breach. The scope of such an exception, as reducing 
or disallowing the recoverable damages under the principle of Robinson v. Harman, 64 
should not be wider than the scope provided by Hadley. As the remoteness principle was 
formulated under the common law by Hadley, the scope of such a principle should not 
be widened by using broad terminology such as foreseeability and possibility. 
Thereupon, it can be noted that English should be the leading law in applying the 
principle of remoteness. However, the use of such terminology under the CISG may be 
justified by the fact that the convention is a compromise between the several legal 
systems. 
7.2.5 Communication of Special Circumstances 
Logically, the seller needs to be aware, at the time of making the contract, of the special 
circumstances under which the loss is caused 
in order to be held liable. 65 Special 
62 [ 19691 1 AC 350,390. 
63 Farnsworth, supra n. 59 at p. 253. 
64 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
65 See Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd., [1949] 2 K. B. 528 where the buyer 
was not allowed damages 
for his loss of profits which the seller was not aware of at the time of making the 
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circumstances vary from case to another depending on many factors, such as the kind of 
the relationship between the parties, the nature of the buyer and the nature of goods. 
Where the parties have been in a long business relation and, thus, aware of the business 
position of each other, the seller should be aware of the abnormal purpose of purchasing 
the goods. Therefore, where the seller is aware that the goods have been purchased in 
order to be manufactured, he should know that his breach will cause loss of profit to the 
buyer. 66 However, it may be a kind of special circumstance if the buyer loses profit 
under special contracts. If this becomes the case, the seller should be informed of such 
special contracts, at the time of making the original contract, in order to be held liable. 67 
Likewise, where the nature of the goods indicate their use, e. g. profit making goods, 68 
the seller cannot deny his liability on the ground that he was not aware of the future use 
of the goods. 69 Nevertheless, the buyer is advised to notify the seller of the intended use 
of the purchased goods, especially in cases where such goods can be put to several uses 
or are intended to be put to an uncommon use. 70 
7.2.5.1 The Time of Communication 
Under the rule of Hadley, the UCC and the CISG, the buyer needs to communicate his 
special circumstances to the seller at or before the time of making the contract. In this 
sense, if the buyer notifies the seller of the special circumstances after the time of 
contract. See also the UCC case of City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 31 UCC Rep. Serv. 1375 (2n Cir. 
1981). 
66 For example, in the UCC case of Lewis v. Mobile Oil Corp., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 625 (8th Cir. 1971), 
where the seller was aware, at the time of making the contract, that goods were purchased in order to be 
used in manufacturing process, the court found it reasonable to assume that the seller knew or should have 
known that the defective goods will cause disruption of production and, as a natural consequence, the 
buyer will suffer loss of profit. 
67 Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd., [1949] 2 KB 528. 
68 For the quantification of damages for breach of warranty of quality of profit-making goods, see chapter 
four, supra p. 129. 
69 M. A. Eisenberg, `the Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale' (1992) 80 Cal. L. Rev. 563,589. However, one 
can find some UCC cases where the court has misdirected itself when it held that the circumstances of the 
buyer were special. For example, in Keystone Diesel Engine Co. v. Irwin, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 184 (1963), 
the Court considered the commercial use of a tractor is a kind of special circumstances which had not been 
communicated to the seller at the time of making the contract. As a result, the Court refused to allow 
damages for the loss of use of the tractor which resulted from the purchased defective engine. In fact, it 
would have been more reasonable for the court to assume that a seller who 
is aware that the diesel ingine 
is purchased in order be be used in a tactor, should 
know that the seller will suffer loss of profit if the 
engine delivered appeared defective. See also R. I. Lampus 
Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp., 22 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 1172 (1977). Discussed in R. R. Anderson, supra n. 3 at pp. 356-357. 
70 In case of warranty of fitness for specific purpose, the 
buyer might find it difficult to prove the existence 
of such a warranty if he did not inform the seller of the specific purpose of 
the goods at the time of making 
the contract. 
294 
making the contract, the seller will be liable only for losses which result in the normal 
course of circumstances. In other words, the seller's awareness of such special 
circumstances after the time of making the contract will not be taken into account for 
measuring his liability. 
The time of communicating special circumstances is intended to protect the party in 
breach. The seller who becomes aware of the buyer's special circumstances at the time 
of making the contract, may refuse to enter into such a transaction. Alternatively, the 
seller may take some protective measures by raising the price of the goods or 
contractually limiting his liability for specific losses or by taking special precautions to 
assure the conformity of the goods with the contract. 7' It is clear that if the seller 
becomes aware of special circumstances after the time of making the contract, he may 
lose the chance of taking protective measures and this will unfairly increase his liability. 
Here, it should be clear that this does not apply to information which are available to 
both parties, such as information concerning market condition. Such information may 
not be considered as special circumstances since they do not concern the buyer only. 72 
7.2.5.2 The Source of Knowledge of Special Circumstances 
Unlike Hadley, neither the CISG nor the UCC provides a special source of the seller's 
knowledge of special circumstances. Under the UCC, the buyer's special circumstances 
will not prevent or reduce his recovery if the seller "had reason to know" such special 
circumstances at the time of making the contract. 
73 Likewise, under the CISG, such 
circumstances will not be an obstacle to the recovery if the seller "knew or ought to have 
known" them at the time of making the contract. 
74 The CISG does not provide a 
definition for the expression of "'ought to have known". Here, it is worth mentioning 
that Article 13 of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 1964 (henceforth 
ULIS) defines such an expression as that which "should have been known to a 
reasonable person in the situation". Clearly, under such a standard, the seller may not 
be 
7' H. L. MacQueen, `Remoteness and Breach of Contract' [1996] Jur. Rev. 295,298. However, see T. A. 
Diamond and H. Foss, supra n. 29 at p. 694, where the authors argue 
that although the principle of Hadley 
v. Baxendale is efficiency enhancing on the 
basis of the stratification of pricing and precaution, such 
efficiency is likely to be reduced by costs of communicating and utilizing 
the relevant information. 
72 T. A. Diamond and H. Foss, supra n. 29 at p. 695. 
73 This was held in many UCC cases such as 
Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R. J. Dick, Inc., 28 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 1371 (3rd Cir. 1980); United California Bank v. 
Eastern Mountain Sports, Inc., 34 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 806 (1982). 
74 Article 74 of the CISG. 
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required to search for information concerning the circumstances of the buyer. However, 
Honnold seems to have a strict interpretation of the expression. He has made an 
interesting comparison between two expressions used in the Convention, i. e., "ought to 
have known" and "could not have been unaware". In his opinion, "the facts one `ought 
to have known' include those facts that would be disclosed by an investigation or 
inquiry that the party should make. But an obligation based on facts of which one `could 
not have been unaware' does not impose a duty to investigate -- these are the facts that 
are before the eyes of one who can see. "75 Anyhow, one finds it hard to accept that the 
seller is obligated to investigate under the standard of "ought to have known" since this 
will put the seller in an insecure and burdensome situation. This is why the buyer is 
advised to communicate to the seller his circumstances which might be special. 
The literal reading of the aforementioned statement of Hadley indicates that the buyer 
needs to communicate his special circumstances to the seller at the time of making the 
contract. However, it is unlikely that the court will deny the liability of the seller, who 
was aware of such special circumstances at the time of making the contract, on the 
ground that the special circumstances were not communicated to him by the buyer. In 
fact, the full reading of the aforementioned statement of Hadley may support this 
conclusion. The last sentence of the statement limits the seller's liability to those losses, 
which can arise in normal circumstances, if special circumstances were wholly unknown 
to the seller at the time of making the contract. The statement was plainly concerned 
with the breaching party's lack of knowledge of such special circumstances and not with 
the failure of the aggrieved party to communicate such special circumstances. This 
indicates that the source of the seller's knowledge of the special circumstances is of no 
significance in cases where such a knowledge is proved or not denied. Furthermore, in 
Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd., 76 the Court made it clear 
that what is reasonable and so "foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by 
the parties or, at all events, by the party who later commits the breach. , 
77 Furthermore, 
in Heron I178 the House of Lords was concerned with the contemplation of the breaching 
79 
party in light of "the information available to [him] when the contract was made". 
75 J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, Boston, 
2nd ed., 1991, p. 308. 
76 [1949] 2 KB 528. 
77 Ibid at p. 539. 
78 Koufos V. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350. 
79 Ibid at p. 385 
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7.2.5.3 The "Tacit Agreement" Rule 
The issue here is whether the seller is required to agree on his liability for losses 
resulting under special circumstances. Although Hadley makes it clear that the 
remoteness principle requires the loss to be in the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties, one can find cases where the court required the breaching party to agree, 
expressly or impliedly, on his liability for losses resulting under special circumstances. 80 
The mere reading of the rule of Hadley regarding cases of special circumstances can 
show two points: first, the rule requires the reasonable contemplation, and not the 
assent, of the party in breach; second, the rule applies an objective test by requiring the 
loss to be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties in light of the special 
circumstances they are aware of. 81 In view of that, if it was reasonable for the party in 
breach to contemplate the loss at the time of making the contract in light of the special 
circumstances he was aware of, he might be held liable regardless of whether he 
contemplated the loss in fact or not. 82 Consequently, it can be noted that the requirement 
of the assent of the breaching party to his liability for losses under special circumstances 
is based on a misinterpretation of the rule of Hadley. 
Under American law, the requirement of the seller's assent has been abandoned. Such a 
requirement is called the "tacit agreement" rule. The rule applies to the liability for all 
kinds of consequential loss regardless of whether they result under normal or special 
circumstances. Under such a test, the buyer should believe that the seller has accepted 
the liability for consequential loss. However, the seller's acceptance or rejection of such 
a liability is tacit. That is to say that the circumstances of the contract formation had to 
show that the seller agreed, expressly or impliedly 
(tacitly), to be liable for 
consequential losses resulting from his breach. 
83 In this sense, the buyer should have a 
reason to believe that the seller accepts the 
liability for consequential loss. The "tacit 
agreement" rule was rejected expressly 
by the UCC by adopting the standard of "had 
80 In the case of British Columbia Saw-Mill 
C. Ltd. v. Nettleship, (1868) 3 C. P. 499, which was decided 
fourteen years after the case of Hadley, the 
Court stated, at p. 506, that the party in breach is liable for the 
loss which he "could have foreseen and reasonably expected 
and to which he has assented expressly or 
impliedly by entering into the contract. 
" 
81 J. J. Gow, `A Comment in the Rule in Hadley v. 
Baxendale' (1954) 27 Austl. L. J., 666,667. 
82 However, see J. F. Wilson and C. J. Slade, `A 
Re-examination of Remoteness' (1952) 15 MLR 459,460. 
83 J. D. Drushal, `Uniform Commercial Code- 
Sections 2-714 & 2-715- Consequential Damages Award- 
RI Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Products 
Corp., 232 Pa. Super. 242,336 A. 2d 397 (1975), [1976] 37 
Ohio St. L. J. 153,157. 
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reason to know". Comment 2 to Section 2-715 of the UCC states expressly that the 
"tacit agreement" test for the recovery of damages is rejected. Similarly, under the 
CISG, Article 74 speaks about the foreseeability of the loss. In other words, the 
acceptance of the party in breach of his liability for losses is clearly not required under 
the standard of remoteness adopted in Article 74 of the Convention. 
The "tacit agreement" test seems to be in contradiction with the rule of Hadley. The 
buyer should not be required to prove that the seller agreed expressly or impliedly that 
he will bear the loss resulting under special circumstances. Although such an agreement 
may be understood from the decision of the seller to contract with the buyer, one may 
note that the rule of Hadley cannot be interpreted to require the buyer's express or 
implied agreement. 
7.3 Mitigation 
Under the mitigation principle, the buyer is not entitled to recover for losses he has 
avoided or ought to have avoided. 94 The principle also goes further to reduce the buyer's 
damages by an amount equivalent to what he has gained or ought to have gained85 as a 
result of the breach. 86 In certain cases of breach of warranty of quality, the buyer may 
save expenses he would have incurred had the goods been in conformity with the 
contract. Here, damages may be reduced by the amount of the saved expenses and the 
profit that could reasonably be obtained by investing such expenses. 87 On the other 
hand, the principle of mitigation may increase the buyer's damages by allowing him the 
expenses he has incurred in his reasonable attempts to mitigate the loss regardless of 
whether such attempts were successful or not. 
88 
84 See the UCC case of Carnation Co. v. Olivet Egg Ranch, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d. 1531 (1986), where the 
buyer could not recover for his loss of goodwill which he could reasonably have avoided. See also 
International Petroleum Services, Inc. v. S&N Well Service, Inc., 1982 Kan. LEXIS 200; 33 UCC Rep. 
Serv. 217 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Fairley, 1981 Miss. LEXIS 2000; 32 UCC Rep. Serv. 440 (1981); 
Melotz v. Scheckla Mont. 1990 LEXIS 370; 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 
9 (1990). 
85 This does not include what the buyer receives under financial precautions taken 
before injury against 
the eventuality of injury, such as insurance, pension, or the 
like. See Harvey McGregor, McGregor on 
Damages, London, 16th ed., 1997,220. However, in the UCC case of Jackson v. Glasgaw 1980 Okla. 
Civ. App. LEXIS 133; 30 UCC Rep. Serv. 482 (1980), the Court took into account the money received 
under an insurance policy to reduce the amount of recoverable 
damages. It is submitted that the Court 
misdirected itself in this case. 
86 See British Westinghouse Electric Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Rys. [ 1912] AC 673. 
87 See chapter four at p. 137. See also G. H. Treitel, supra n. 
22 at p. 185. 
88 See the CISG case of Delchi Carrier , 
SpA v. Rotorex Corp., <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
940909u1. html> discussed in E. C. Schneider, `Consequential Damages 
in the International Sale of Goods: 
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The principle applies under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG. In British Westinghouse 
Co. v. Underground Ry., 89 it was made clear that the buyer cannot recover for losses 
which could have been avoided by taking reasonable steps. 90 Section 2-715(2) of the 
UCC makes it clear that the buyer can recover only for consequential losses "which 
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise... ". Likewise, Article 77 of the 
CISG states 
"A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, 
resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach 
may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should 
have been mitigated. " 
Here, it should be noted that the principle has similar application under the SGA, the 
UCC and the CISG. Therefore, unless otherwise is stated, the methods of mitigation 
discussed below apply similarly under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG. However, there 
are still some differences between English law and the UCC regarding the application of 
the remoteness principle. For example, unlike English law and the CISG, the UCC 
applies the principle of mitigation to the recoverability for consequential losses only. In 
other words, where the buyer's claim is for damages for the diminution in value, the 
seller cannot raise the defence of mitigation. However, damages should be awarded for 
the actual loss suffered by the buyer. By allowing the buyer damages for more than his 
actual loss, the buyer will be put in a better position than he would have been in if the 
goods had been delivered as warranted. Section 2-714 of the UCC allows damages for 
the losses suffered by the buyer. Therefore, it is submitted that the mitigation principle 
should apply to all cases regardless of the type of loss caused by the seller's breach. In 
fact, although the UCC seems to apply the mitigation principle to cases of consequential 
loss only, American courts may go beyond the UCC to apply the principle to all cases, 
such as the case of Robertson Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Tile Co., 
91 discussed Below. 
Analysis of Two decisions' (1995) 16 U. Pa. J. Int'l 
Bus. L. 615. See also J. E. Murray, Murray on 
Contracts, 3rd ed., p-702- 
89 [1912] AC 673,689. 
9' It should be clear that the mitigation is not a 
duty owed to the party in breach. However, the buyer will 
not be entitled to recover for losses which could reasonably 
be avoided. See here Sotiros Shipping Inc. v. 
Sameiet Solholt (The Solholt) [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 603,608. 
91 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 119. 
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7.3.1 Reasonable Steps of Mitigation 
Under the mitigation principle, the buyer is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate 
his loss. Deciding whether certain steps are reasonable or not, is a matter of fact which 
depends on the circumstances of each case. In general, the standard of conduct of 
mitigation is not too high since the seller is a wrongdoer. 92 The buyer is not "under any 
obligation to do anything other than in the ordinary course of business". 93 Furthermore, 
where the buyer has acted reasonably to mitigate his loss, damages would unlikely be 
reduced on the ground that the buyer could have taken better steps to mitigate his loss. 94 
Under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG, the buyer is not required to undertake undue 
risk or burden in its effort to mitigate. 95 In this sense, the buyer is not required to take 
impractical steps which are beyond his financial means96 or which requires expenditure 
disproportionate to the loss sought to be avoided. 97 Also the buyer does not need, for the 
purpose of mitigation, to perform sub-sale contracts by delivering non-conforming 
goods if that would involve damaging his own commercial reputation. 98 
7.3.2 Methods of Mitigation 
Where the buyer has mitigated his loss, damages should be awarded under the principle 
of Robinson v. Harman99 since by allowing the buyer damages for the avoided loss, he 
will be placed in a better position than he would have been in if the goods had been free 
from defects. However, where the buyer has failed to mitigate his loss, which could 
92 A. G. Guest, supra n. 11 at para. 27-088. 
93 In Dunkirk Colliery Co. v. Lever, (1878) 9 Ch. D. 20, James LJ, at p. 25, pointed out that "[t]he person 
who has broken the contract is not to be exposed to additional cost by reason of the plaintiffs not 
doing 
what they ought to have done as reasonable men, and the plaintiff not being under any obligation to 
do 
anything otherwise than in the ordinary course of business. " 
94 In Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow [1932] AC 452, Lord Macmillan pointed out, at p. 506, that "[t]he 
law is satisfied if the party placed in a difficult situation by reason of the 
breach of a duty owed to him has 
acted reasonably in the adoption of remedial measures and 
he will not be held disentitled to recover the 
cost of such measures merely because the party in 
breach can suggest that other measures less burdensome 
to him might have been taken. " 
95 J. J. White and R. S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 
4th ed., 1995, p. 382. 
96 See the UCC case of Nyquist v. Randall 1987 U. S. App. LEXIS 
7774; 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1823 (11th 
Cir. 1987). 
97 See Kirby v. Chrysler Corp. 1982 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 
16377; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 497 (1982), where the 
Court made it clear that the concept of mitigation 
does not require a buyer to purchase additional 
equipment from the seller to correct the 
defects of the original goods nor to solicit dissatisfied customers 
of the buyer where there was no reason to 
believe that either course of action would have been successful 
to reduce the buyer's loss. See also Barnard v. 
Compugraphic Corp. 1983 Wash. App. LEXIS 2655; 37 
UCC Rep. Serv. 141 (1983); Gerwin v. Southeastern California 
Association of Seventh Day Adventist, 
1971 Cal. App. LEXIS 988; 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 643 (1971). 
98 James Finlay & Co. Ltd. v. N. V. Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappij 
[ 1928] 2 KB 604. 
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have been avoided by taking reasonable steps, damages recovered under the principle of 
Robinson should be reduced by an amount equivalent to the avoidable loss. 
Methods of mitigation widely vary depending on the nature of goods and buyers. For 
example, an experienced buyer is expected to take better steps to mitigate his loss than a 
normal consumer. Here, two main ways of mitigation of loss, resulting from breach of 
warranty of quality, need to be examined. The buyer may mitigate his loss by stopping 
using the defective goods; the buyer may also mitigate his loss by accepting the seller's 
offer to repair or restore the contract price and take the goods back. 
7.3.2.1 Mitigation by Stopping using Defective Goods 
The buyer may not be entitled to damages for losses he has suffered by continuing to use 
defective goods after he knew or ought to have known of the defect. '°° Likewise, the 
buyer should not resell the goods, as free of defects, after he knew or ought to have 
known that they were defective. 1 °' However, he may resell the defective goods at a 
cheaper price' 02 if by doing so, he can mitigate his loss. 103 Where the buyer knew of the 
defect after he had resold the goods, he should pass his knowledge of the defect to the 
subpurchasers. The failure of the buyer to pass such a knowledge may affect the 
recoverability of damages for his liability to the subpurchasers. In this case, indemnity 
paid to subpurchasers for losses resulting from the use of defective goods after the buyer 
became aware of the defect, is likely to be excluded from the original seller's liability. 104 
99 (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
ioo See Lambert v. Lewis [1982] AC 225. See also the UCC cases of KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics 
Corp. 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 50, in which the Court did not allow the buyer damages for losses resulting 
from the use of defective television which was patently defective; Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. v. 
Metal-Prep of Houston, Inc. 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 708 (8th Cir. 1990) in which the buyer was not 
allowed damages for his financial loss resulting from the use of patently 
defective infrared oven; R. I. 
Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 996; Fla-Hapag-Lloyd, A.. G. v. 
Marine Indem. Ins. Co. 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 462 (1991). 
101 Biggin v. Permanite [195 1] 1 KB 422; the case was reversed on 
different point [195112 KB 314. 
102 See the UCC case of Larry Goad & Co. v. Lordstown Rubber Co., 1983 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 18217; 36 
UCC Rep. Serv. 167 (1983). 
103 In cases of perishable goods or goods which 
decline speedily in value, the buyer should make 
reasonable efforts to resell the goods or try to stop 
the diminution in value as the case may be. See the 
CISG case of ICC Arbitration Case No. 7331 of 
1994, <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/94733111. 
hnml>. In case of productive goods, the buyer might mitigate 
his loss by leasing substitute goods while the 
defective goods are in the process of repair. See the UCC case of Cancun Adventure Tours, Inc. v. 
Underwater Designer Co., 1988 U. S. App. LEXIS 16367; 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1035 (4th Cir. 1988). 
104 A . 
G. Guest, supra n. 3 at p. 592. 
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Here, one may consider the decision in Parson Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. 105 In this 
case, the buyers should have mitigated their loss by stopping using the mouldy nuts. The 
Court of Appeal did not discuss this point. In fact, the act of feeding the pigs the mouldy 
nuts should have been considered as an intervening act which could have broken the 
chain of causation. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal did not discuss the restrictions of 
causation and mitigation in this case. 106 
However, the mitigation principle does not always require the buyer to stop using the 
defective goods. One can envisage some cases where the buyer may be justified in 
continuing to use the defective goods. Where the seller expressly assures the buyer that 
the goods are not defective, the seller's defence that the buyer failed to mitigate by 
continuing to use the allegedly defective goods may not be successful. 107 The buyer 
under the mitigation principle is required to cooperate with the seller in order to 
minimize his loss. So, if the seller induced the buyer to use the goods by assuring him 
that the goods are not defective, the seller should be responsible for all the losses caused 
by the proper use of the defective goods. 
In certain cases, the mitigation principle goes further to require the buyer to mitigate his 
loss by continuing to use the defective goods. 108 For example, in the UCC case of 
Prutch v. Ford Motor Co. 109 the Court made it clear that the purchaser's decision to use 
defective equipment in their attempt to produce at least part of normal crop at all was 
required by their duty to lessen, rather than increase, their losses. Thus, the seller could 
105 [1978] 1 QB 791. The facts of this case are mentioned in chapter five, supra p. 165. 
106 Sir Robin Cooke has observed that Lord Denning did discuss causation in one version of the reports of 
his judgment. Sir Robin Cooke says: "In the fuller version of [Lord Denning's] judgment in Lloyd's 
Reports [1977 Lloyd's Rep. 522,525] there is a passage in which his Lordship discusses causation and 
mentions that when the act of third parties intervene the likelihood of the consequences is very relevant. In 
editing his judgment for the Weekly Law Reports and the All England Reports, he has evidently condensed 
this passage. Perhaps we may infer that Lord Denning decided that it was better not to embark on such a 
vexed topic. Yet there can be no doubt that there was intervening human action in the Parsons case, in the 
deliberate feeding of the mouldy nuts to the pigs, albeit by the plaintiffs themselves. " Sir Robin Cooke, 
`Remoteness of Damages and Judicial Discretion' [ 1978] CLJ 288,296. 
107 See the UCC cases of Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. J. J. Blazer Constr. Co., 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 906 
(1977) where the buyer insisted that there is no breach of warranty, the court 
held that the buyer was 
justified to continue to use the goods in question. See also Delta Motors, 
Inc. v. Childs (Miss) 101 So 2d 
527 (Miss 1958). 
108 This might be the case where the defective goods are 
less productive than they were warranted under 
the contract. In such a case, where the substitute 
is not available or the cost of obtaining the substitute 
would increase the seller's liability to be more than 
if the buyer continued to use the goods, the buyer may 
be required, under the mitigation principle, to continue 
to use the goods unless special circumstances 
indicate otherwise. The quantification of the buyer's loss of profit in cases of 
deficient production is dealt 
with in chapter four, supra p. 130. 
109 29 UCC Rep. Serv. 1507. 
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not avoid his liability by claiming that the purchasers failed to mitigate by continuing to 
use the defective equipment. Similarly, in the UCC case of Burrus v. Itek Corp., 11 ° the 
Court held that the buyer was justified in continuing to use a defective press in an effort 
to maintain his business since the seller refused to provide a replacement and, thus, the 
buyer had no choice in the matter. 
7.3.2.2 Mitigation by Accepting the Seller's Offer to remedy his Breach 
Where the opportunity of mitigation of loss comes through the seller's offer to repair or 
otherwise, the buyer's refusal of the offer may result in a reduction of his damages. In 
other words, the buyer's damages maybe reduced by the amount of the loss which could 
have been mitigated had the buyer accepted the offer. 
A) Offer to Repair or Replace 
The buyer may be required to accept the seller's offer to cure the breach in order to 
mitigate his loss. This can be understood from the decision in Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders. " 
In this case, the seller agreed to sell a quantity of silk to the plaintiffs. After some delays 
in payment, the seller refused to make further deliveries except for cash. The plaintiffs 
accepted this repudiation of the contract. The market price had risen considerably. The 
plaintiffs sought to recover the difference between the contract price and the market 
price. The Court of Appeal made it clear that the plaintiffs should have mitigated their 
loss by accepting the seller's offer, i. e. delivery of goods for cash. 
Here, the application of the reasonableness test is of a vital significance. Where it is 
unreasonable for the buyer to accept the seller's offer to cure, the mitigation principle 
may not be a successful defence against the buyer's claim for breach of warranty of 
quality. 112 For example, in the UCC case of Stair v. Gaylord, 
113 where the buyer refused 
110 21 UCC Rep. Serv. 1009. 
1" [1919] 2 KB 581. The case involves the buyers' claim for non-delivery. However, it is submitted that 
the same conclusion can be reached in cases of breach of warranty of quality. 
See also Sotiros Shipping 
Inc. v. Sameiet Solholt (The Solholt), [1983] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 603 where the seller failed to deliver the 
purchased ship on the contractual date of delivery, the 
Court found that it was reasonable for the buyer to 
mitigate his loss by accepting her late delivery. 
112 The mitigation principle does not require the 
buyer to accept defective goods. For example, in Rogers 
and another v. Parish (Scarborough) Ltd. and 
Others, [1987] QB 933 the buyer purchased a Range Rover 
car from a dealer. The car appeared defective and 
the dealer replaced it. The new car appeared defective. 
The buyer had the benefit of a manufacturers' guarantee which provided, that 
for 12 months after delivery, 
parts requiring replacement or repair 
because of a manufacturing or material defect would be replaced or 
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replacement for a defective hose in an irrigation system because of delay in delivery of 
the replacement, it was held that the buyer was entitled to damages with regard to the 
defective goods accepted. Similarly, in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. MAHO Machine Tool 
Corp 114 the seller offered to replace the defective goods. The offer was subject to the 
transportation of the defective goods from Singapore to Germany' 15 at the buyer's 
expense. The buyer did not have enough money to pay for the carriage. The Court held 
that, in light of the facts of the case, the buyer was not required to accept the seller's 
offer in order to mitigate his loss. 
As regards the CISG, the words of Article 77 are broad enough to cover all the 
reasonable methods of mitigation. Where offers to repair are normally reasonable in 
domestic sales, the case might be different in the international sales. A seller to an 
international sale of goods contract may require a long time to repair the defect. The 
process of repair may involve the transportation of the defective goods to the 
manufacturer. If this appears to be unreasonable in the circumstances, the buyer may not 
be required to accept such an offer in order to comply with the mitigation principle. 
B) Offer to restore the contract price and take the goods back 
Where it is reasonable for the buyer to accept the seller's offer to restore the contract 
price and take the goods back, he may be required to accept such an offer in order to 
comply with the mitigation principle. This was the case in Houndsditch Warehouse Co. 
v. Waltex, 116 where the seller offered to restore the price and take the goods back. It was 
held that the buyer should have accepted the offer to mitigate his loss. 
An important issue may arise in relation to Section 2-715 of the UCC. The Section, as 
aforementioned, seems to apply the principle of mitigation to the recoverability 
for 
consequential losses only. So, can the buyer claim that 
he is not required to accept the 
buyer's offer to repair the defective goods on the grounds that the mitigation principle 
repaired free of charge. The car was subjected 
to a number of inspections during the months following its 
delivery and also to unsuccessful attempts to put 
it right. Eventually, the buyer lost patience and rejected 
the car after he had driven it for about 
5,500 miles. The Court of Appeal held that the buyer was entitled 
to reject the defective car. 
113 1983 Kan. LEXIS 255; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 1485 
(1983). See also Joc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated 
Edison Company of New York, Inc., 1980 N. Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 2894 (1980). 
114 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 28861; 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 
2d 369 (1991). 
115 In this case, the defective goods were supposed to 
be sent to Germany in order to be rebuilt there. 
116 [1944] KB 579. 
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does not apply to the recoverability for normal loss? The answer to this question can be 
found in Robertson Mfg. Co. v. Jefferson Tile CO ., 
117 where the buyer refused the 
seller's offer to cure the defect of the goods, it was held that the buyer was not entitled 
to the additional expenses of installing the defective goods since such expenses could 
have been avoided by the seller's offer. In view of this judgement, one may point out 
that the mitigation principle applies under the UCC to all kinds of loss. 
7.4 Notice of breach 
The condition of notification is commonly applicable under the UCC and the CISG. 
Under this condition, the buyer cannot claim any remedy for breach of warranty of 
quality' 18 unless he notifies the seller of the breach. ' 19 Such a rigorous consequence may 
be relaxed by means stated under the CISG which can be applied in special 
circumstances stated below. 
Under the SGA, the seller's defence of lack of proper notification is not available in 
cases where the buyer claims damages for non-conformity of goods. The requirement of 
notification, under the SGA, is restricted only to cases where the buyer chooses to reject 
the goods. In this case, the buyer is required to intimate to the seller that he has rejected 
the goods within a reasonable time after the goods were actually handed over to him. 12° 
The reasonable time here should be enough to let the buyer have a reasonable 
opportunity to examine the goods. '21 As the subject matter of this work is concerned 
with the remedy of damages, the following work will be mostly concerned with the 
notice requirement under the CISG and the UCC. 
117 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 119. 
"$ Cases concerning non-conformity, other than defective quality, may 
be examined in this work since the 
requirement of notification applies similarly to all 
kinds of non-conformity of goods. 
19 The requirement of notification is not a legal obligation which can 
be a ground for a seller's claim of 
damages in cases where such an obligation is not fulfilled. 
Neither Article 39 of the Convention nor 
Section 2-607(3) of the UCC provides that the buyer is legally obligated to give a notice of non- 
conformity. The buyer will lose his right to rely on any remedy 
for breach of contract if he does not notify 
the seller. 
"ZO Section 35(4) states "The buyer is... deemed to have accepted the goods when after the lapse of a 
reasonable time he retains the goods without 
intimating to the seller that he has rejected them. " 
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Section 2-607(3) of the UCC states 
"Where a tender has been accepted... the buyer must within a reasonable time 
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of 
breach or be barred from any remedy... " 
Article 39(l) of the CISG states 
"(1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he 
does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity 
within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered 
it. 
" 
In comparing English law with the UCC and the CISG, it is worth noting that the notice 
of breach may be of great significance to the seller even in cases where the buyer's 
claim is only for damages. In fact, the notice requirement is in the interest of the seller 
since it gives the seller an earlier opportunity to prepare his evidence and defences 
against the buyer. The seller may also have recourse to his supplier as soon as he 
becomes aware of the defect of the goods. Besides, the seller may also have the chance 
to examine the goods in order to make his own decision about the nature of non- 
conformity. '22 Therefore, it is desirable to adopt the requirement of notification in 
English law. 
It is submitted that the requirement of notification, as stated under the UCC and the 
CISG, should be adopted under English law provided that the period of notification is 
wide enough to give the buyer a chance to notify the seller of the non-conformity of 
goods. The period of notification should be decided under the circumstances of each 
case. This work will show that some legal systems require the buyer to notify the seller 
of the non-conformity of goods within a short period after the discovery of the non- 
conformity. Under such legal systems, the short period of notification was 
decided, in 
certain cases, to be one or two days. It does not seem 
fair that the buyer will lose his 
121 Section 35(5) of the SGA states "The questions that are material 
in determining for the purposes of 
subsection (4) above whether a reasonable time 
has elapsed include whether the buyer has had a 
reasonable opportunity of examining the goods... 
" 
122 See JJ. Phillips, `Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: 
Should there be a 
Difference? ' (1971) 47 Ind. L. J. 457,466. Comment 4 to Article 
37 of the Comments on the 1978 Draft of 
the International Sale of Goods Convention [Article 
39 of the CISG] provides that "The purpose of the 
notice is to inform the seller what 
he must do to remedy the lack of conformity, to give him the basis on 
which to conduct his own examination of 
the goods, and in general to gather evidence for use in any 
dispute with the buyer over the alleged lack of conformity... 
". In case of remedies, other than damages, 
such a notice can be in the interest of 
both parties. For example, where the buyer asks for cure of defect or 
replacement of goods, the notice will make such a 
cure swifter which is in the interest of the buyer. By 
giving a notice specifying the nature of 
the defect, the seller will have a better chance to cure the defects. 
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right, if he does not notify the seller of the non-conformity within a reasonable time. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the notice requirement should apply in cases where the 
buyer claims damages provided that such a period is wide enough to give the buyer the 
chance to make such a notification. 
7.4.1 Who is Required to Notify? 
Explicitly, Section 2-607(3) of the UCC and Article 39 of the CISG provide that the 
buyer is the person who is required to notify the seller of the breach. However, the 
requirement of notification would likely be fulfilled if one of the buyer's employees 
notified the seller of the non-conformity. In fact, the question about the source of 
notification is not significant where the actual awareness of the seller is proved or not 
questioned. The question may become considerably more important where the seller 
denies his receipt of notification. In this case, the buyer needs to prove that he has given 
the notice by using the appropriate means. 123 Section 1-201(26) of the UCC makes it 
clear that the buyer can notify the seller "by taking such steps as may be reasonably 
required to inform the [seller] in ordinary course whether or not such [a seller] comes to 
know of it... ". Article 27 of the CISG states a similar way of notification. 124 
Nevertheless, the buyer cannot rely on his own presumption that a third party has 
notified the seller. If this becomes the case, the buyer may be required to show evidence 
that the seller was actually notified. 
However, does this apply to a third party's claim? This question possibly arises under 
the UCC since Section 2-318 extends the seller's implied or express warranties to 
beneficiaries, other than the direct buyer. Such an extension of warranty does not exist 
123 In cases of termination of contract, Section 2-309 of the UCC requires, 
for the termination of contract 
by one party, a reasonable notification be received by the other party. 
Section 2-309(3) provides 
"Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires that 
reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement 
dispensing with notification is 
invalid if its operation would be unconscionable. " As for the definition of 
"receive" Section 1-201(26) of 
the UCC states that "... A person "receives" a notice or notification when 
(a) it comes to his hand or his 
attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at the place of 
business through which the contract was made or at any 
other place held out by him as the place for receipt of such communications. 
" In this sense, where the 
buyer chooses to reject the goods and terminate the contract, 
he has to notify the seller of the termination 
and to make sure that the seller received the notification. 
124 Article 27 of the CISG states that "... if any notice, request or other communication 
is given or made by 
a party in accordance with this part and 
by means appropriate in the circumstances, a delay or error in the 
transmission of the communication or its failure to arrive 
does not deprive that party of the right to rely on 
the communication. " 
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under either the CISG or the SGA. 125 It should be plain that Section 2-607(3) of the 
UCC is only concerned with the duty of the buyer to issue such a notice within a 
reasonable time after acceptance. Unfortunately, the official comment to this Section 
does not give a clear-cut answer to this issue. Comment 5 states that "... a beneficiary 
does not fall within the reason of the present section in regard to discovery of defects 
and the giving of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing 
to do with acceptance. However, the reason of this section does extend to requiring the 
beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred... but even a beneficiary can 
be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had time to become 
aware of the legal situation". In this sense, a great deal is left to the court to decide 
whether the beneficiary acted in a good faith or not. Here, the seller should prove that 
the beneficiary has acted in bad faith by not giving him a proper notification of the non- 
conformity of goods. 
Although comment 5 to Section 2-607(3) states that the third party's claim may be 
unsuccessful where he fails to give proper notification, American courts do not take a 
consistent approach towards the applicability of such a comment. In Western Equipment 
Co. v. Shedridan Iron Works, '26 the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated that where the 
sub-buyer sues the manufacturer for breach of warranty and privity doctrine does not 
arise, 127 the sub-buyer has to furnish a notice under Section 2-607(3) of the UCC. This 
is one of the leading cases128 where the court applied Section 2-607(3) in order to 
require the third party to notify the seller of the breach. However, this does not seem a 
settled law. For example, in Taylor v. American Honda Motor CO ., 
129 where a third 
party beneficiary claimed damages for personal injury resulting from the manufacturer's 
breach of warranty of quality, the Court held that Section 2-607(3) applies only where 
the plaintiff is the buyer. 
'30 In this case, the Court denied the application of comment 5 
to Section 2-607(3) on the ground that the comment seems to be in direct contrast with 
the unambiguous language of the Section. The Court based its decision on the ground 
125 Supra, p. 258. 
126 1980 Wyo. LEXIS 230. 
127 See Section 2-3 18 of the UCC. 
128 See also Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 
1976 Alas. LEXIS 377; 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 1 (1976); 
Branden v. Gerbie, 1978 Ill. App. LEXIS 2916; 
24 UCC Rep. Serv. 152 (1978). 
129 (1982) U. S. Dist. LEXIS 16765; 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 391. See also Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 1965 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 179; 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 147 (1965); Frericks v. General Motors Corp. (No. 2), 1976 
Md. LEXIS 632; 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 371 (1976); Clemco Industries v. Johnson, 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 
1979). 
13° Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 1982 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 16765. 
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that comments to the provisions of the UCC are not statutory thus the court has a 
discretion to decide their applicability. A similar conclusion was reached by the 
Supreme Court of Colorado in Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore System, Inc., 131 where the 
ultimate buyers sued the manufacturer for losses resulting from its breach of warranty of 
quality. The ultimate buyers did not notify the manufacturer of the breach. The Court 
stated clearly that, unless special circumstances indicate otherwise, the third party is not 
required to notify the manufacturer of the breach under Section 2-607(3) of the UCC. 132 
Logically, the spirit of Section 2-607(3) and the purpose of notification imply that the 
third party should notify the seller of the breach once he becomes aware of the legal 
situation of notification 133 or once he knows that such a notification is significant to the 
seller although this is not expressly provided by Section 2-607(3). Requiring a stricter 
standard of such a notification, may deprive a good faith consumer of a remedy; this will 
be contrary to the purpose of the law. '34 On the other hand, requiring a more flexible 
standard may offer a bad faith plaintiff more than he is fairly entitled to. 
7.4.2 The Content of the Notice 
Neither Section 2-607(3) of the UCC nor Article 39 of the CISG requires a specific form 
of notification. The buyer may notify the seller orally or in writing depending on the 
circumstances of each case. 135 Means of communication such as normal post, fax, telex 
and electronic mail, may suffice. 136 However, the buyer should notify the seller by the 
appropriate means. Here, the buyer is advised to use the means which make the proof of 
notification easier. '37 For example, notifying the seller via telephone may face the 
131 1991 Colo. LEXIS 415; 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 977 (1991). See also Church of Nativity of our Lord v. 
WatPro, Inc., 1992 Minn. LEXIS 278; 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 1017 (1992); Vescio v. Chrysler Corp. 23 
UCC Rep. Serv. 659 (Pa. C. P. 1977); Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Cannon, Md. LEXIS 221; 34 
UCC Rep. Serv. 1564 (It was held that the buyer's action against a remote manufacturer is not barred by 
the buyer's failure to notify the manufacturer of the breach since Section 2-607(3) requires the buyer to 
notify his direct seller). 
132 Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore System, Inc., 1991 Colo. 
LEXIS 415. 
133 Comment 5 to Section 2-607. 
134 See the decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore System, Inc., 
1991 Colo. LEXIS 415. 
135 F. Ferrari, Recent Developments: CISG: Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial 
Application and Scholarly Writing' (1995) 15 J. 
L. & Com. 1,112; available at <http: //cisgw3. law. 
pace. edu/cisg/biblio/2ferrari. html>. 
136 p. Schlechtriem, Commentary on the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods, [Translated 
by G. Thomas], Oxford, 1998, p. 313- 
131 See Arrondissementsrechtsbank `s-Gravenhage (Smits BV v. Jean 
Quetard) of 7 June 1995 
(Netherland) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/950607nl. 
htrrA>. 
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problem of proof in cases where the seller denies his receipt of the notice. In one CISG 
case, the buyer was required to provide a record of the date of the telephone call and the 
name of the person who answered the call. 138 
The content of the notice, under the UCC, "need merely be sufficient to let the seller 
know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched". 139 In this sense, the 
notice may be sufficient enough if it makes it clear that the goods are not in conformity 
with the contract without specifying the nature of non-conformity. 140 The requirement of 
more specific notification can be found under Article 39 of the CISG. Comment 4 to 
Article 37 of the 1978 draft of the CISG (currently Article 39) provides that the notice 
"must specify the nature of the lack of conformity. " In this sense, contrary to the UCC, 
the notice that does not specify the nature of the lack of conformity will not meet the 
requirement of notification under Article 39 of the CISG. Such a strict standard meets 
the need of the international sale. A seller to a domestic sale contract, who is notified of 
the non-conformity, will presumably be able to examine the goods in question and find 
out the nature of the lack of conformity whereas a seller to an international sale contract 
may find it hard to reach the goods in question in order to investigate their non- 
conformity. It should be clear that the seller needs to be aware of the nature of non- 
conformity in order to prepare his evidence and defences or to have recourse to his 
supplier as the case may be. 
Implied notification may be accepted by the flexible standard of notification under 
Section 2-607(3) of the UCC. Where the buyer makes the seller aware of the breach by 
acts other than formal notification, the notice requirement under Section 2-607(3) may 
be satisfied. 141 This cannot be the case under the CISG; implied notification is unlikely 
to be accepted for the purpose of Article 39 of the Convention since the Article makes it 
clear that the notice must specify the nature of the lack of conformity. 
138 In Amtsgericht Kehl of 6 October 1995 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/951006gl. 
html>, the buyer gave two notices of the non-conformity of the goods received. The 
first notice was given 
over the phone immediately after he discovered the 
defect whereas the second was given later via a fax. 
The Court did not accept the alleged first notice since there was no proof of the notification. 
See also 
Landgericht Frankfurt of 13 July 1994 (Germany), <htttp: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/940713gl. html>. 
139 Comment 4 to Section 2-607 of the UCC. 
140 However, the buyer may be required to specify the quantity of the 
defective goods. See here Michigan 
Sugar Co. v. Jebavy Sorenson Orchard Co. 66 Mich. App. 
642 (1976). 
141 See Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, U. S. App. LEXIS 5958; 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 110 (8th Cir. 1964) 
where the court made it clear that certain acts other 
than formal written notice may be accepted for the 
purpose of Section 2-607(3). 
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Indisputably, the sufficiency of the information, notified to the seller, concerning the 
nature of non-conformity, can always be decided depending on the circumstances of 
each case. For example, a buyer who is expert in the type of goods in question may be 
required to notify the seller of detailed explanation of the lack of conformity; on the 
other hand, an innocent consumer may not be required to give a notice specifying 
precisely the lack of conformity. An inexperienced commercial buyer may not have to 
notify the seller of all the precise details of the non-conformity. 142 Furthermore, in 
deciding the sufficiency of information notified to the seller, the court may take into 
account the practice established between the parties and well-known usage. This can be 
of great significance in international sales where parties to an international sale are 
bound by well-known usage. In view of this, it can be noted that the notice may be 
sufficient enough even if it omits some details of the lack of conformity which are 
reasonably supposed to be known to the seller. 143 However, the buyer cannot ignore 
material information regarding the lack of conformity on his own presumption that they 
are known to the seller. 144 
In cases of multiple aspects of non-conformity, should the buyer notify the seller of the 
nature of each aspect? Comment 4 to Section 2-607 of the UCC makes it clear that 
"(t)here is no reason to require that the notification... must include a clear statement of 
all the objections that will be relied on by the buyer ...... 
145 However, in the case of 
142 F. Ferrari, supra n. 135 at p. 112. 
143 Article 9 of the Convention states "(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed 
and by any practices which they have established between themselves. (2) The parties are considered, 
unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of 
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned. " See, 
however, Landgericht Bochum of 24 January 1996 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
960124g1. html> where the buyer notified the seller that the truffles delivered were "soft". The buyer 
alleged that most professional truffle-vendors would know that softness implies a probable worm- 
infestation. The Court concluded that the notice did not specify the nature of non-conformity regardless of 
whether or not it was known to the seller that softness 
implies a probable worm-infestation. The case is 
cited in Camilla Baasch Anderson, Reasonable Time 
in Article 39(1) of the CISG - Is Article 39(1) Truly 
a Uniform Provision? Pace Essay Submission, 
Sep. 1998, note 127, <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/ 
cisg/biblio/anderson. html>. 
144 See Landgericht Murburg of 12 December 1995 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/ 
95 1212g l . 
html> where the buyer notified the seller of the breach 
but he did not quote the serial number of 
the goods in question and their date of delivery. 
The Court held that the notice is not sufficient on the 
ground that the seller is not required to 
look for such information in order to find out the certain defective 
machine. The case is discussed in A. 
Veneziano, Non Conformity of Goods in International Sales: A 
Survey of Current Caselaw on CISG, (1997) 36 Revue 
De Droit Des Affaires Internationales 39,52. 
145 Under Section 2-605 of the UCC, where the buyer rejects the goods and terminates the contract, he 
may be required to notify the seller of all of 
his objections that he will rely on. Section 2-605(1) of the 
UCC states "The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular 
defect which is 
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instalment contracts, both the UCC146 and the CISG, 147 require the buyer to give a notice 
of the non-conformity of each instalment. As for the CISG, the buyer should notify the 
seller of the nature of each aspect in order to meet the purpose of Article 39(1). 148 If the 
buyer gives a proper notice of part of these aspects, he may be allowed to rely on this 
part only for claiming damages from the seller. For example, in the CISG case of 
Landgericht Bielefeld, 149 the Court allowed the buyer to rely on one defect of the goods; 
i. e. unclean bacon, properly communicated to the seller and disallowed him to rely on 
another defect, i. e. unsatisfactorily smoked bacon, not specifically communicated to the 
seller. 
7.4.3 The Time of Notification 
Section 2-607(3) of the UCC and Article 39 of the CISG make it clear that, unless a 
contrary agreement indicates otherwise, the buyer will lose his right to rely on any 
remedy unless he notifies the buyer of the nature of non-conformity within a "reasonable 
time" after he has discovered or ought to have discovered the non-conformity. Article 39 
of the CISG provides a cutoff period where the buyer cannot rely on any remedy after its 
expiration. However, where the buyer does not notify the seller within the right period 
under Article 39 of the Convention, the buyer may be able to rely on the remedy of 
damages in special circumstances discussed below. '50 
ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from relying on the unstated defect to justify 
rejection or to establish breach (a) where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably; or (b) between 
merchants when the seller has after rejection made a request in writing for a full and final written 
statement of all defects on which the buyer proposes to rely. " 
146 Section 2-612 of the UCC make it clear that the buyer can bring an action for the non-conformity of 
one instalment. In this sense, the buyer has to notify the seller of the non-conformity of each 
instalment in 
question. 
147 P Schlechtriem, supra n. 136 at p. 313. 
148 C. B. Anderson, supra n. 143 text accompanying note 48. 
149 18 January 1991 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/910118gl. htn-d>. See also Landgericht 
Landhut of 5 April 1995 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/950405gl. 
html> where the buyer 
purchased sport clothes which suffered three 
kinds of defects, i. e. colour, shrinkage and wrong quantity, 
the court rejected the buyer's claim for all the 
defects since he did not notify the seller of the nature of all 
the defects. Quoted from C. B. Anderson, supra n. 
143 text accompanying nn. 129,174. 
150 Infra, p. 320. 
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7.4.3.1 The "Reasonable Time" of Notification 
The period of notification commences at the time when the buyer discovers or ought to 
discover the non-conformity. 15 1 As for the former, the period of notification commences 
at the time when the buyer becomes aware of the non-conformity in fact. Therefore, 
where the buyer discovers the non-conformity by the time of handing over the goods, 
the period of notification commences at the time of discovery. 152 Similarly, where the 
transport document reveals that goods were externally defective when they were handed 
over to the carrier, the period of notification commences at the time of receiving such a 
document since at that time the buyer becomes actually aware of the lack of 
conformity. 153 
The period of notification commences also at the time when the buyer ought to discover 
the non-conformity regardless of whether the buyer was actually aware of non- 
conformity or not. In this sense, where a reasonable examinations 54 can reveal the nature 
of non-conformity, the period of notification starts at the time of the proper examination 
or at the time when the buyer was supposed to examine the goods. So, when the buyer 
does not examine the goods, the reasonable period of notification starts at the end of the 
period of examination. ' 55 This applies only to defects which can be revealed by a 
151 The Secretary Commentary does not provide a definition for the "reasonable time" stated under Article 
37(1) (former draft of Article 39(1)) nor does it provide a guideline for determining such a "reasonable 
time". Likewise, Section 2-607 of the UCC provides no guideline for measuring the "reasonable time" of 
notification. Apparently, the drafters were inclined to state a flexible expression which can be interpreted 
according to the circumstances of each case. See Economy Forms Corp. v. Kandy Corp. 511 F. 2d 1400 
(5th Cir. 1975). For cases of untimely notices under the UCC see the follows. Pace v. Sagebrush Sales 
Co. 560 P. 2d 789 (Ariz. 1977); Branden v. Gerbie 1978 Ill. App. LEXIS 2916; 24 UCC Rep. Serv. 152 
(1978). 
152 Enderlein and D. Maskow, International Sales Law: United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods: Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 
New York, 1992, p. 160. 
153 P. Schlechtriem, supra n. 136 at p. 307- 
154 The examination should be done within a reasonable time in accordance with Article 38 of the CISG 
and Section 2-513(1) of the UCC. As for the period of examination, Article 38 of the CISG states "(1) The 
buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, within as short a period as is practicable in 
the circumstances. (2) If the contract involves carriage of goods, examination may be deferred until after 
the goods have arrived at their destination. (3) If the goods are redirected in transit or redispatched by the 
buyer without a reasonable opportunity for examination by him and at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract the seller knew or ought to have known of the possibility of such redirection or redispatched, 
examination may be deferred until after the goods have arrived at the new destination. " 
155 As for the measurement of the period of examination, Article 38 of the CISG states several situations 
where the commencement of the period of examination varies 
from one to another. Part one of the Article 
deals with contracts which do not involve carriage of goods. 
In this case, the period of examination 
commences at the time when the goods are handed over to the 
buyer. Where the seller delivers the goods 
before the stipulated time of delivery, i. e. premature delivery, the time of examination commences at the 
stipulated time of delivery unless it has been agreed on such an early 
delivery. See P. Schlechtriern, supra 
n. 136 at p. 306. Furthermore, in special circumstances, 
the buyer may not be able to examine the goods 
due to some impediments such as a general strike or technical operating instructions have not arrived. If 
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reasonable examination. 156 However, in cases of latent defects, which cannot be 
revealed by a reasonable examination, the period starts at the time when the buyer 
becomes, or ought to be, aware of the defect. '57 Where the reasonable use of goods can 
reveal their defect, the buyer should notify the seller within a reasonable time after 
putting the goods to use. In such a case, the reasonable time of notification commences 
at the time when the buyer has an opportunity to discover the non-conformity of 
goods. 159 
this becomes the case, the period of examination commences at the time when the buyer has a reasonable 
opportunity to examine the goods. Acceptable impediments, for this purpose, should be objective; in other 
words, personal impediments related to the buyer or one of his employees are unlikely accepted. In cases 
where the contract of sale involves carriage of goods, part two of Article 38 makes it clear that the period 
of notification commences at the time when the goods arrive to their destination. Here, it should be noted 
that parties to an international sale, which involves carriage of goods, should include in their contract the 
destination of the transportation. Destination under CIF and FOB contract is the port of destination 
whereas under other contracts it is the place of the business of the buyer or his sub-buyer where the goods 
are dispatched directly to him. Part three of the Article postpones the examination of the goods to their 
new destination where they are redirected or redispatched by the buyer. Here it is irrelevant whether the 
buyer or his sub-buyer redirected or redispatched the goods in question. Such a postponement of 
examination is subject to two conditions, i. e. the redirection or redispatch of the goods was known or 
ought to have been known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of contract and the buyer had no 
reasonable opportunity to examine the goods. As for the former, it is clear that where the seller was not 
aware or ought to have been aware, at the time of making the contract, of the resale of goods which 
involve redispatch or redirection, the examination cannot be postponed to the time of their arrival to their 
new destination. This may not be the case where the buyer cannot examine the goods due to an 
impossibility of handing over the goods at the original destination. In this case, the examination may be 
postponed until after they arrive at a new destination regardless of whether the seller was aware or ought 
to have been aware of such a redirection. As for the latter, the question of whether or not the buyer had a 
reasonable opportunity to examine the goods depends on the nature of the goods and on how long the 
buyer had the goods before they were redispatched. For example, where the examination of the goods 
makes them unsuitable for a subsequent carriage, the buyer will not be considered as having a reasonable 
opportunity of examination. See C. M. Bianca, in Bianca and Bonell, Commentary on the International 
Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, Milan, 1987, pp. 302,300. 
156 See S. M. Wilson and Co. v. Reeves Red-E-Mix Concrete, Inc. 350 N. E. 2d 321 (III. App. 1976). As 
regards the period of examination under the UCC, Section 2-513 of the UCC provides that "Unless 
otherwise agreed... where goods are tendered or delivered or identified to the contract for sale, the 
buyer 
has a right before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place and time and 
in any 
reasonable manner. When the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to the 
buyer, the 
inspection may be after their arrival. " Unlike the CISG, the Section 
does not deal specifically with the 
time of examination in cases where the goods are redirected or redispatched. 
The Section leaves a great 
deal to the court to decide what time and place of examination can 
be reasonable. Comment 3 to the 
Section provides that "the reasonableness will 
be determined by trade usage, past practices between the 
parties and the other circumstances of the case. 
" 
157 C. M. Bianca, in Bianca and Bonell, supra n. 155 at p. 298. See the UCC case of Murray v. Kleen Leen, 
Inc. 41111. App. 3d. 436 (1976). 
158 In Landgericht Düsseldorf of 23 June 1994, decided in Germany, <http: 
//cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
940623g1. htrnl> where the period of examination of two 
low power engines purchased in order to be used 
in the manufacture of hydraulic presses and welding machines, 
the period was two long and as a result the 
Court found that the buyer did not notify the seller in a reasonable time. 
In this case, the buyer was not 
granted any remedy. This case is 
discussed in A. Veneziano, supra n. 144 at p. 50. 
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The period of notification can be affected by several factors. 159 Discernibility of defects 
is one of the main factors which affect the period of examination and, as a result, affect 
the beginning of the period of notification. The discernability of non-conformity 
depends mostly on the nature of goods; for example, where the goods are technological 
machinery, the period of examination will presumably be longer than in the case where 
the goods are consumable such as fruit and vegetables. The fact that the goods are 
perishable or durable can be an important factor for determining the reasonable period 
of examination. The examination period in cases of perishable goods is probably shorter 
than in cases of durable goods. 160 This can be understandable on the ground that the 
situation of perishable goods worsens rapidly and, thus, the seller needs to know their 
defect as early as possible in order to mitigate, if it is possible, their deterioration. 161 
Furthermore, the discernability of defects depends also on the nature of the parties. A 
buyer who is not expert in the goods, may not be expected to discover the defect of the 
goods in a short period; the same would apply to the buyer who neither has nor has 
available the technical facilities and expertise. 162 
7.4.3.2 The Influence of Domestic Laws 
The court , 
in applying Article 39 of the Convention, has to take into account the 
international aspect of the Convention in accordance to Article 7(1). 163 However, in 
practice, the application of Article 39 is highly influenced by domestic laws. The 
159 The choice of claim may have a considerable impact in determining the "reasonable time" of 
notification. The period of notification, in cases where the buyer asks for repair or replacement or where 
he rejects the goods and avoid the contract, is likely to be longer than where the buyer retains the goods 
subject to his claim of damages. In cases where the buyer rejects the goods, it is probably in the seller's 
interest to be notified of the breach swiftly in order to be prepared to deal with the goods in question and 
not only with the buyer's claim. The seller will need in this case to market the rejected goods in order to 
find a substitute buyer. In cases where the buyer asks for repair, it is in the seller's interest to cure the 
goods before their situation becomes worse and, of course, it is in the buyer's interest to have a swift 
repair of the goods in question. As the subject matter of this work is the remedy of damages, factors are 
examined insofar as its effect on the period of notification where damages is the only remedy claimed, i. e. 
where the buyer retains the goods and claim damages. 
160 Similarly, in cases of seasonal goods, where the buyer wants to avoid the contract, it will be in the 
reasonable interest of the seller to be notified of the breach in order to market the goods in question before 
their season passes and as a result their price drops sharply. 
161 If the buyer can reasonably stop the deterioration of the goods in question, he will be required to do so 
under the mitigation principle. 
162 Comment 3 to Article 38 of the CISG provides that "... a party would not be expected to discover a 
lack of conformity of the goods if he neither 
had nor had available the necessary technical facilities and 
expertise, even though other buyers 
in a different situation might be expected to discover such a lack of 
conformity. " UN Doc. AICONF. 9715 
Secretariat Commentary to Article 36 of the 1978 draft of the CISG 
(currently Article 38 of the CISG). 
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influence of domestic laws on the notice requirement under the CISG can be noticed in 
two aspects, i. e. the content of the proper notice and the determination of the 
"reasonable time" of notification. 
The interesting survey of Anderson on the practice of the European courts in relation to 
Article 39 of the CISG shows that the application of Article 39 is highly influenced by 
domestic laws. ' 64 As for the influence on the content of notification, the German courts, 
as an example, require the notice to provide precise details of the nature of non- 
conformity. This is probably due to the influence of the notice requirement under the 
Germanic legal system. For example, in Landgericht München, 165 where a German 
buyer claimed damages from an Italian seller who delivered defective fashion goods, the 
Court rejected the buyer's claim reasoning that of the lack of proper notice in 
accordance with Article 39(1) of the CISG. In this case, the buyer notified the seller of 
poor workmanship and improper fitting of the goods. The court held that such a notice 
did not specify the nature of non-conformity for the purpose of Article 39(l) since the 
purpose of the notice requirement under this Article is to clarify the nature of complaint. 
The American UCC, as another example, has a flexible standard concerning the 
requirement of notification as explained above. '66 Here, it would not be surprising if the 
American courts were influenced by such a flexible standard in the application of 
Article 39 of the CISG. 
As regards the influence on the period of notification, the practice of courts across the 
European continent shows that there is no coherent attitude towards measuring the 
period of notification under Article 39 of the CISG. This is due to the influence of the 
different periods of notification among the several domestic laws. Whereas the German 
domestic law'67 requires the notification to be within a short period, the French Civil 
Code' 68 allows such a notification to be with a brief delay. Furthermore, some other 
163 Article 7(1) of the CISG states "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith in international trade. " 
164 C. B. Anderson, supra n. 143. 
165 3 July 1989 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/890703g1. htrnl>. 
166 The notification of poor workmanship and improper 
fitting of the goods is likely to meet the purpose of 
Section 2-607(3) of the UCC. See Larry A. DiMatteo, `the CISG and the 
Presumption of Enforceability: 
Unintended Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings' 
(1997) 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 111,163- 
164. 
167 See Article 377 of the German HGB (German Sales Law). 
169 See Article 1648 of the French Civil Code. Cases decided in France show that the period of 
notification is approximately one month. 
See, for example, Cour d'Appel de Grenoble of 13 September 
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domestic laws require such a notification to be imrnediately169 or within a specific 
period 170 after the discovery of non-conformity. Here, one cannot ignore the American 
flexibility in applying the reasonableness test to the period of notification, especially in 
consumer contracts. 
' 71 
The measurement of the period of notification may also vary from a case to another in 
the one country where the "rule of precedent" does not exist; this can be found under the 
civil legal system. The interesting survey of Anderson172 shows that although the 
German Supreme Court173 made it clear that a period of one month after the discovery 
of non-conformity is reasonable due to different international legal traditions, many 
subsequent cases were decided differently. 174 
1995 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/950913fl. html> where a notice given one month after delivery 
was considered timely. 
169 See Article 370(3) of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations. Probably, due to the influence of the 
Swiss domestic law, a notice given four weeks after delivery was considered untimely under Article 39(1) 
of the CISG; see here Handelsgericht Züricht of 26 April 1995 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
950426s 1. html>. 
170 See Article 1495 of the Italian Civil Code where the periof of notification is limited to eight days after 
the discovery of non-conformity. 
171 Comment 4 to Section 2-607 of the UCC states "The time of notification is to be determined by 
applying commercial standards to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notification from a retail 
consumer is to be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of 
requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of 
his remedy. " See G and D Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Long Island Butter and Egg Co., 306 N. Y. S. 2d (App. 
Div. 1969); Leeper v. Banks 487 S. W. 2d 58 (Ky. 1972); Metro Inv. Corp. v. Portland Road Lumber Yard, 
Inc. 501 P. 2d 312 (Ore 1972); United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. North Am.. Steel Corp. 335 Sso. 2d 18 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Tarter v. Monark Boat Co. 430 F. Supp. 1290 (E. D. Mo. 1977). 
172 C. B. Anderson, supra n. 143. 
173 See The German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichthof) of 8 March 1995 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/ 
cases/950308g3. html>. See the following German cases decided prior to the mentioned decision of the 
Supreme Court. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf of 8 January 1993 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
930108gl. html> (notice given 7 days after the examination was considered untimely); Amtsgericht 
Riedlingen of 21 October 1994 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/941021gl. html> (notice given 21 
days 
after delivery was considered untimely; Landgericht Frankfurt am 
Main of 9 December 1992 
<http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/921209gl. html> (notice given 19 days after delivery was considered 
untimely); Landgericht Aachen of 3 April 1990 <http: 
//cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/900403gl. html> 
(notice given 1 day after delivery was considered timely); 
Landgericht Bielefeld of 18 January 1991 
<http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/910118gl. html> (notice given 3 
days after discovery of non-conformity 
was considered timely); Landgericht Berlin of 
16 September 1992 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
920916g1. html> (notice given two months after delivery was considered untimely); Landgericht Berlin of 
30 September 1992 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 920930gl. html> (notice given three and a half 
months after delivery was considered untimely); 
Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken of 13 January 1993 
<http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/930113gl. html> 
(notice given two months after delivery was 
considered untimely); Landesgericht 
Düsseldorf of 23 June 1994 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. 
edulcases/940623gl. html> (notice given 
two months after delivery was considered untimely). For more 
cases decided before the mentioned 
decision of the Supreme Court, see M. Karollus, `Judicial 
Interpretation and Application of the CISG 
in Germany 1988-1994' (1995) Cornell Review of the 
Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods 51; available at <http: //cisgw3. law. 
pace. edu/cisg/biblio/karollus. 
html>. 
174 See the following German cases where the period of notification was 
less than one month: Landgericht 
Landhut of 5 April 1995 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/950405gl. 
html>; Landgericht Heidelberg of 
2 October 1996 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/961002gl. 
html>. However, see the following German 
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The court, in applying the CISG, should always examine relevant international cases 
decided in other countries in order to avoid disparities in the case law of the CISG 
signator countries. 175 The uniformity in application can best be done by examining cases 
decided by International Arbitral Tribunals since such decisions are less influenced by 
domestic laws. Cases decided by the ICC International Court of Arbitration show that 
the period of notification is one month unless special circumstances indicate 
otherwise. 
176 
Due to the lack of a consistent approach towards the measurement of the period of 
notification, it is submitted that the month period, provided by the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration, should be considered as a guideline to be applied in normal 
circumstances. Even in special circumstances, e. g. easily discernible defect, the 
guideline can be the starting point for deciding the reasonableness of longer or shorter 
period of notification. 
7.4.3.3 The Cutoff Period of Notification: Article 39(2) of the CISG 
Article 39(2) of the CISG states 
"In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the 
goods if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of 
two years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the 
buyer, unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of 
guarantee. " 
As the "reasonable time" of notification starts to run at the time when the buyer 
discovers or ought to discover the defect, the seller's liability, without Article 39(2) or 
cases which considered the month period of notification provided by the Supreme Court: 
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart of 21 August 1995 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/950821gl. html>; 
Amtsgericht Augsburg of 29 January 1996 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/960129g1. html>. 
175 See C. Witz, The Interpretive Challange to Uniformity, Paris, 1995, reviewed by V. G. Curran, (1995) 
15 J L. & Com. 175,198. 
176 See the following cases decided by the International Arbitral Tribunal. ICC Arbitration Case No. 7331 
of 1994 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/94733111. 
htrnl> (notice given one month after delivery was 
considered timely); ICC Arbitration 
Case No. 5713 of 1989 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. eduj 
cases/895713i1. html> (notice given eight 
days after the publication of an expert report was considered 
timely). See also Hungary 5 December 1995 Budapest Arbitration 
Proceeding Vb94131 <http: //cisgw3. 
law. pace. edu/cases/951205hl. html> (notice given thirty two 
days after delivery was considered untimely). 
Cited in C. B. Anderson, supra n. 143. 
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limitation period under domestic laws, could be open ended. 177 Clearly, Article 39(2) 
denies the buyer's reliance on any remedy unless he gives a notice to the seller 
specifying the nature of non-conformity within two years from the time of handing over 
the goods. Two main issues may arise out of the application of Article 39(2), i. e. where 
the period of guarantee is longer or shorter than two years and where the limitation 
period of claims, under the applicable law, is longer or shorter than two years. 
The issue of the period of guarantee can be decided in relation to the kind of rights that 
the guarantee deals with. Guarantees may be designed to replace the buyer's rights under 
the Convention or to add rights in addition to those provided by the Convention. As for 
the former, the cutoff period will be the period of guarantee regardless of whether it is 
longer or shorter than two years since this will be a kind of derogation of Article 39(2) 
of the Convention. As regards the latter kind of guarantee, determining the cutoff period 
depends on the cause of the buyer's loss. While the period of guarantee applies where 
the loss results from its breach, the two years period under Article 39(2) of the 
Convention applies where the loss results from breach of implied warranty provided by 
the Convention. 178 It should be noted that the period of guarantee, in the absence of a 
contrary agreement, has no effect on the application of Article 39(1): that is to say that 
the buyer cannot wait till the end of the period of guarantee if the "reasonable time" of 
notification, under Article 39(l) of the CISG, expires before that. 179 
The buyer's claim for the seller's breach may be limited by a specific period of time 
stated in domestic law or the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International 
Sale of Goods (henceforth "the Limitation Convention") as the case may be. The 
Limitation Convention makes such a period four years from the time when the goods are 
actually handed over to the buyer; 
18° the UCC, as an example on domestic laws, 181 
177 R. Hyland, Commentary on ICC Arbitration Case No-5713 of 1989, available at <http: //cisgw3. law. 
pace. edu/cases/895713ii. html>, text accompanying note 35. 
178 F. Enderlein and D. Maskow, supra n. 152 at p. 162. 
179 P Schlechtriem, supra n. 136 at p. 317. 
180 See Article 8 of the Limitation Convention. 
'g' As for the period of limitation under English law, Section 
5 of the Limitation Act 1980 provides "An 
action founded on simple contracts shall not 
be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on 
which the cause of action accrued. " However, under 
Section 11 the period of limitation in case of actions 
based on personal injuries, is three years from 
"the date on which the cause of action accrued; or ... the 
date of knowledge (if later) of the person 
injured. " Although the CISG does not apply to claims based on 
personal injuries, the buyer may be able to sue under 
the CISG to recover indemnity paid or payable to a 
sub-buyer for personal injury resulting 
from the seller's breach of warranty of quality. Therefore, the 
buyer would not be able to recover for his liability to the sub-buyer 
if he was found liable two years after 
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makes such a period four years from the time when the tender of delivery is made. ' 82 In 
view of that, where the goods appear defective after more than two years, the buyer's 
claim, under the CISG, may not be successful although it may be allowed under the 
applicable domestic law or the Limitation Convention. Similarly, where the buyer is 
found liable to a sub-buyer, who found the goods defective after more than two years 
from the time when the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, the buyer's claim 
against the seller for his liability to such a sub-buyer may not be successful due to the 
expiration of the two year cutoff period under Article 39(2) of the CISG. 183 On the other 
hand, where the buyer's claim is limited by a period of time less than two years under 
the applicable domestic law, e. g. the Italian law, 184 the buyer's claim will be disallowed 
although it is within the cutoff period under Article 39(2) of the CISG. In light of such 
an inconsistency between the cutoff period of notification under the CISG and the 
limitation period of claims, whether under the applicable domestic law or the Limitation 
Convention, parties are strongly advised to agree on a limitation period at the time of 
making the contract. 
7.4.4 Means of Relaxation of the Notice Requirement 
As Article 39 states a rigorous consequence of the buyer's failure to give notice, Articles 
40 and 44 of the Convention take a lenient approach by denying the applicability of 
Article 39 in certain situations, i. e., derogation of the requirement of notification, 
reasonable excuse for the lack of proper notification and, finally, the seller's awareness 
of non-conformity. 
7.4.4.1 Derogation of the Requirement of Notification 
Article 6 of the Convention185 allows the parties to derogate from or vary the effect of 
Article 39 by agreeing on a different time frame of notification. 
' 86 Similarly, Section 1- 
the goods were actually handed over to 
him. For further information about the limitation period under 
English law see J. F. Josling, Periods of Limitation, 
London, 7th ed., 1989; A. McGee, Limitation Periods, 
1990. 
182 See Section 2-725 of the UCC. See 0. Gonzalez, `Remedies under the 
U. N. Convention for the 
International Sale of Goods' (1984) 2 Int'l Tax 
& Bus. Law. 79,90. 
183 F. Ferrari, supra n. 135 at p. 111. 
184 Article 1495(3) of the Civil Code of Italy 
limits the buyer's claim to one year from the time when the 
goods are handed over. 
185 Article 6 of the CISG states "The parties may exclude the application of 
this Convention or, subject to 
Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of 
its provisions. 
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204 of the UCC allows the parties to agree on a fixed period of time of notification. 187 
Furthermore, parties may agree to exclude the application of a notice requirement and, 
as a result, waive the seller's defence of the lack of proper notification. '88 Such a 
derogation or exclusion should be made by an agreement between the parties according 
to Article 6 of the Convention and, thus, cannot be understood by the conduct of one 
party. However, the application of Article 39 can also be denied by a trade usage under 
Article 9(2)189 of the Convention unless an express term in the contract indicates 
otherwise. ' 90 Under Article 9(2) of the Convention, trade usage may apply to the 
contract. 
It is worth adding that the seller may lose his right to rely on the lack of proper 
notification if he informs the buyer that the notice of non-conformity is sufficient for the 
purpose of Article 39. Furthermore, the seller will be stopped from relying on the lack of 
proper notification if he gives the buyer reason to believe that he considered the claim 
justified despite the improper notification. 191 It should be clear that the buyer's own 
impression that the seller has accepted the notice will not be enough for denying the 
seller his right to raise the defence of the lack of proper notification under Article 39 of 
the Convention. For example, where the seller asks for more information about the 
nature of non-conformity or about the complaint of a sub-purchaser, the buyer will not 
186 Agreed time frames were approved by the German courts in many cases such as Oberlandesgericht 
München of 11 March 1998 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/98031lgl. html> (time frame was two 
weeks); Landgericht Baden-Baden of 14 August 1991 <http: cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/910814gl. html> 
(time frame was 30 days); Landgericht Hannover of 1 December 1993 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/ 
cases/931201 g l. html>. Cited in C. B. Anderson, supra n. 143 at section 1.3.1. 
187 See Smart v. Tidwell Industries, Inc. 668 S. W. 2d 605 (Mo. App. 1984). 
188 The effectiveness of such an agreement, under the CISG, is goverened by the applicable domestic law 
since Article 4(a) excludes the applicability of the Convention to "the validity of the contract... ". Clauses 
specify a time frame for the notification are likely to be reasonable, and as a result valid, if the non- 
conformity is discoverable within the time-frame. This conclusion can be found in the ICC Arbitration 
Case No. 7331 of 1994 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/947331i1. htn-d> where the time frame of month 
was upheld on the ground that the defect of the goods was readily ascertained. As for the UCC, such an 
agreement is governed by Section 2-302 which renders any clause 
invalid where the court finds it 
unconscionable. See here Vandenberg and Sons, N. 
V. v. Sister, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. (1964). 
189 Article 9(2) of the CISG. Supra, n. 143. 
190 A. Veneziano, supra n. 144 at p. 53. See also S. Bainbridge, `Trade Usage in International Sales of 
Goods: An Analysis of 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions' (1984) 24 Va, J. Int'l L. 619; available at 
<http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/biblio/bainbridge. html> section 
II. C. 2. 
See Austria 15 June 1994 Vienna Arbitration Proceeding SCH-4318 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edui 
cases/940615a4. ht hl>. There are no available cases on 
this point under the UCC; however, the same 
conclusion would apply since the seller, who 
indicated to the buyer that the notice is sufficient, will act in 
a bad faith if he raises the defence of the 
lack of proper notice. 
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lose his right to raise the defence of lack of proper notification. This also applies to 
cases where the seller tries to settle the dispute by negotiation. ' 92 
7.4.4.2 Reasonable Excuse for the Lack of Proper Notification 
In accordance to Article 44 of the convention, the buyer can reduce the price or claim 
damages where he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice. 
Such a provision cannot be found under the UCC. However, where an inexperienced or 
consumer buyer has an excuse for his delay in giving notice, the American court, in 
determining the reasonable time of notification, may take the excuse into account. 
Article 44 of the CISG states 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 39 and paragraph (1) 
of Article 43, the buyer may reduce the price in accordance with Article 50 or 
claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable excuse for his 
failure to give the required notice" 
Plainly, Article 44 is concerned with the buyer's failure to give notice within the time 
limit of notification stated under Article 39(2): that is to say that the buyer may 
reasonably be excused for his failure to give a proper notice if he brings the claim for 
damages within two years from the time of handing over the goods to the buyer. 
The historical draft of this Article shows that the Article was merely a compromise 
between the view of delegates from developing and developed countries. The former 
considered the obligation of notification under Article 39 unfair, due to the 
technological gap between developing and industrialized countries. The lack of 
specialist knowledge of technical goods and the unfamiliarity of some domestic legal 
systems with the requirement of such a notice are the main reasons for the existence of 
this Article. 
'93 
Certain cases, whereby the buyer can be excused for not giving the required notice, can 
hardly be put in an exhaustive list. These cases are likely to be concerned with the type 
of the buyer. This is because this Article 
is based on equitable consideration of less 
192 See Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf of 12 March 1993 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
930312g1. html> Cited in A. Veneziano, supra n. 144 at p. 56. 
193 J Lookofsky, `Cross-References and Editorial Analysis-Article 44' available at <http: //cisgw3. law. 
pace. edu/cisg/text/cross/cross-44. 
html>. See also P. Schlechtriem, supra n. 136 at p. 349. 
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sophisticated buyers who do not have long experience in trade or who run small 
businesses especially in developing countries. This has been acknowledged by a CISG 
case decided by Oberlandesgericht München, 194 where the Court made it clear that the 
buyer, who was a large company, cannot be excused for its failure to give the required 
notice. Here, the inexperienced buyer can be excused on, at least, two grounds, i. e. he 
may need a longer time for examining the goods and/or he may not be able to give a 
notice specifying the nature of non-conformity. Nonetheless, an experienced buyer may 
also have a chance to be excused in cases where the delay of notification is too short. 
Here the buyer would be in a better position if the notice was not of a considerable 
significance to the seller. ' 95 However, the court will be anxious to excuse such a buyer 
since the history of the draft of Article 44 makes it clear that the Article is concerned 
196 with unsophisticated buyers whose businesses are based in developing countries. 
The excused buyer under Article 44 may be entitled to recover for diminution in value 
of the goods sold and for any consequential loss, except loss of profit, resulting from the 
seller's breach of warranty. Expressly, the Article denies the recoverability for loss of 
profit even in cases where such a recovery meets the restrictions imposed on the remedy 
of damages. Such a denial is probably due to the historical draft of the Article. As 
previously mentioned, the Article is intended to be in favour of buyers from developing 
countries who may find the required notification troublesome. However, drafters were 
reluctant to allow the buyer to recover for loss of profit since such an loss will 
unpredictably increase the liability of the seller who is originally excused from liability 
due to the lack of proper notification. 
7.4.4.3 The Seller's Actual Awareness of the Defect 
Article 40 of the CISG states 
"The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of articles 38 and 39 if the 
lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew or could not have been 
unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer"' 
97 
194 8 February 1995 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/950208g1. htrnl>. Cited in A. 
Veneziano, supra n. 144 at p. 54. 
195 P. Schlechtriem, supra n. 136 at p. 351. 
196 See Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken of 13 January 1993 (Germany) <httpJ/cisgw3. law. pace. edu/ 
cases/930113g1. html>, where the buyer's excuse 
that the he found difficulties in examining the goods was 
not satisfactory. Cited in A. Veneziano, supra n. 
144 at n. 66. 
197 For the application of Article 40 of the CISG see Landdericht 
Trier of 12 October 1995 (Germany) 
<http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/951012gl. htnll> 
(where a German buyer did not give a proper notice in 
accordance to Article 39 of the CISG, the court 
held that he did lose his rights against the Italian wine 
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Logically, where the seller is aware of the non-conformity of goods, whether under the 
UCC198 or the CISG, it seems senseless to require the buyer to give notice of such a 
non-conformity. ' 99 However, in the UCC case of Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 200 where the buyer did not give a proper notice of the breach which is 
known to the seller, the Court decided that "it is not enough under section 2-607 that a 
seller has knowledge of the facts constituting a nonconforming tender; the Court added 
that the seller must be informed that the buyer considers him to be in breach of the 
contract. "2°1 The Court based its decision on the ground that the seller might have been 
able to settle the dispute had he become aware of the buyer's view concerning the 
breach. In fact, the purpose of the notice is to make the seller aware of the breach and 
not to make him aware of the buyer's claim. 202 Raising the defence that there could be a 
settlement if the seller was aware of the buyer's opinion about the breach, does not seem 
enough to deny the buyer his rights claimed. 
Article 40 goes further to deny the seller's reliance on the lack of notification where he 
could not have been unaware of facts that the non-conformity relates to. For example, a 
manufacturer, or one of his employees, 203 is expected to know about defects which can 
be discovered by a superficial check or standard test. 204 A dealer, who has been notified 
of the non-conformity of goods that he has sold from a large lot, should be aware that 
the rest of the items, sold from the same lot, are defective. 205 Some commentators go 
further to suggest that the seller should reasonably investigate the goods for the purpose 
of Article 40.206 In fact, Article 40 can only be interpreted insofar as facts of which the 
seller was aware or could not have been unaware: that is to say that "an obligation based 
seller since the latter could not have been unaware of the unmerchantable wine sold. ). See also 
Arrondissementsrechtbank Roermond (Fallini Stefano & Co. S. N. C. v. Foodik BV) (Netherland) of 19 
December 1991 (Netherland) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/911219nl. html>; ICC Arbitration Case 
No. 5713 of 1989 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/895713il. html>. 
198 A similar provision to Article 40 of the CISG cannot be found under the UCC. 
199 See Oberlandesgericht Köln of 21 May 1996 (Germany) <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/ 
96052 1gl . 
html> where the seller sold a second hand car with false specification that he was aware of, the 
court allowed the buyer damages for his liability to 
his subuyer of the car in question. 
200 532 F . 2d 957 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
20! Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F. 2d 957 at p. 973 (5th Cir. 1976). 
202 See comment 4 to Section 2-607 of the 
UCC. 
203 The awareness of the non-conformity 
by persons employed to perform the contract in question may be 
attributable to the seller. See V. 
G. Curran, `Cross-References and Editorial Analysis (Article 40)' 
available at <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cisg/text/cross/cross-40. 
html>. 
204 p Schlechtriem, supra n. 136 at p. 322. 
205 V. G. Curran, supra n. 203. 
206 Ibid at n. 14. 
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on facts of which one `could not have been unaware' does not impose a duty to 
investigate -- these are facts that are before the eyes of one who can see. , 207 However, 
the seller must not ignore clues as to the non-conformity. 208 
The main issue concerning the application of Article 40, seems to be the determination 
of facts relating to non-conformity. In the leading case of Beijing Light Automobile Co., 
Ltd v. Connell Limited Partnership, 209 where the Chinese buyer failed to give proper 
notice of the non-conformity of a press, purchased from an American seller, within the 
guarantee period, the tribunal found that the seller could not rely on the lack of proper 
notification since he was aware of the risk of non-conformity. In this view, the 
awareness of the seller of facts related to the risk of non-conformity may be sufficient to 
make the seller's defence of the lack of proper notification of non-conformity 
unsuccessful. 21° 
Nonetheless, Article 40 makes its effect subject to the lack of disclosure of the facts to 
which non-conformity relates. The main question here is that where the seller discloses 
such facts, is the buyer required to notify him of the non-conformity? The answer to this 
question depends on whether the buyer discloses the non-conformity or facts related to 
the risk of non-conformity. In case of the former, the buyer is not required to give a 
notice since the seller is already aware of the defect whereas the buyer still needs to 
notify the seller in case of the latter. 211 
Another issue here is concerned with the time of the seller's awareness of non- 
conformity. Article 40 does not provide a time frame. Such a time should be within the 
"reasonable time" of notification. 212 After this period, the buyer will not have the chance 
to notify the seller of the non-conformity. Consequently, the seller's awareness of the 
non-conformity through other means becomes irrelevant. 
207 J. O. Honnold, supra n. 75 at p. 308. 
2Ö8 See Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award of 5 June 1998 (Being Light Autmobile 
Co., Ltd v. Connell Limited Partnership) <http: 
//cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/980605s5. html>. 
209 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award of 5 June 
1998 <http: //cisgw3. law. pace. edul 
cases/980605 s5. html>. 
2'o Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award of 5 June 
1998 (Beijing Light Autmobile Co., 
Ltd v. Connell Limited Partnership) <http: 
//cisgw3. law. pace. edu/cases/980605s5. html>, section 6.3(b). 
211 p. Schlechtriem, supra n. 136 at p. 323. 
212 Ibid at p. 323. 
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Conclusions 
There seem to be some differences in applying the restrictions imposed on the recovery 
of damages under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG. One of the main differences 
between English and American law is concerned with the application of contributory 
negligence. The so-called comparative negligence under American law may be relied on 
to reduce the buyer's damages where part of the loss results from the buyer's 
intervening action. In English law, the defence of contributory negligence cannot be 
relied on in cases of broken `strict contractual duty'. The Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945 does not apply to cases of strict contractual duty. It is clear that 
the CNA does not apply to cases of defective goods as the seller's liability for breach of 
warranty of quality is strict. One here may note that where part of the loss results from 
the buyer's intervening action, it seems unclear why damages cannot be reduced. It 
seems that American law deals better with this point. It is submitted that liability for 
losses resulting from defective goods should be apportioned between the seller and the 
buyer according to their respective percentages of causation. In fact, this point may be of 
great significance for the application of the restriction of causation under the CISG. The 
application of such a restriction may be influenced by the domestic law of the country 
where the Convention is applied. For example, under French law, liability for all types 
of loss can be apportioned between the seller and the buyer according to their respective 
percentages of causation. This seems one of the gaps in the Convention which may lead 
to a difference in its application among the various legal systems. 
As regards the remoteness principle, there seems to be no difference in its application 
under English law and the UCC. However, the CISG does not expressly state whether 
the principle applies as to the kind or the amount of loss. While Hadley and the UCC 
require the contemplation to be of the kind of loss, the wording of Article 74 of the 
CISG is wide enough to require the contemplation to be of the kind as well as the 
amount of loss. Therefore, the contemplation of the amount might be required under the 
Convention in cases where it is applied in countries which apply such a requirement 
under their domestic laws. In addition, the words of 
Article 74 are unclear in respect to 
whether the Article applies the subjective or the objective test of contemplation. 
The 
words are broad enough to include 
both tests. This is different from Hadley and the 
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UCC where the objective test applies. The objective test applies to hold the seller liable 
for losses which were in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of 
making the contract. On the other hand, the subjective test applies to hold the seller 
liable for losses which were in the actual contemplation of the parties at the time of 
making the contract. It is unclear how the buyer can prove the actual contemplation of 
the seller. Here, it is submitted that the subjective test of remoteness, which is applied 
under the Convention, seems to be impractical. 
English law, the UCC and the CISG seem to have, to some extent, similar application of 
the principle of mitigation. It is true that the UCC applies the principle to cases of 
consequential loss only. However, it was argued that under the American common law 
the principle is applicable to all cases of defective goods regardless of the type of loss 
caused by the breach. This chapter dealt with a number of ways of mitigation that should 
apply under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG similarly. Under the mitigation principle, 
the buyer may be required to stop using defective goods. However, this may not be the 
case where the continuity of using defective goods mitigates the buyer's loss. Generally, 
the buyer is not required to take unreasonable steps to mitigate his loss. Therefore, the 
buyer may not be required to accept the seller's offer to repair or replace defective goods 
where such a repair is delayed or cannot be helpful. Neither is the buyer required to 
accept the seller's offer to restore the contract price and take the goods back where such 
an offer is unreasonable to him. 
Finally, the SGA, unlike the UCC and the CISG, does not apply the requirement of 
notification in cases where the buyer claims damages for losses resulting from defective 
goods. However, it has been seen how such a requirement is necessary especially in 
cases where the seller could settle the dispute outside the court or remedy the non- 
conformity of goods but for the lack of such a notification. The requirement of 
notification, it is submitted, should apply under English law. However, the period of 
notification should be wide enough to give the 
buyer the chance to determine the nature 
of non-conformity and seek legal advice. It 
has been seen how the period of notification 
is short in some countries, such as Germany, and relatively 
long in others, such as the 
USA. 
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The use of the term "reasonable time" under the Convention allows the influence of 
domestic laws. To avoid such an influence, two points are submitted: firstly, the parties 
may include in their contract express clauses which specify the period of notification. 
Secondly, the courts should examine cases decided under different legal systems in 
order to minimize the influence of domestic laws. Here, decisions decided by the ICC 
International Court of Arbitration are best to be examined in the light of the fact that 
they are less influenced by domestic laws. Any way, the requirement of notification may 
not apply in certain cases, such as the case where the seller is actually aware of the 
nature of defective quality. Under Article 44 of the Convention, the buyer may be 
excused from giving proper notice in certain cases. The Article has been designed to 
protect buyers from developing countries who may find it hard to comply with the 




At this last part, it is intended to provide general conclusions for the underlying 
argument of whether the law strikes the right balance in applying the principle of 
Robinson v. Harman' and whether such a principle is undermined by applying, or 
misapplying, other principles concerned with the remedy of damages. After stating the 
general conclusion, which is comprised of two parts, one needs to show how such 
conclusions have been reached, whether under English or American law, in reliance on 
the points raised in this thesis. 
Firstly, English law, in allowing damages for breach of warranty of quality, has, to some 
extent, succeeded in striking the right balance by achieving the objective of damages, as 
stated in Robinson, and at the same time ensuring that the buyer is not overcompensated. 
However, English law needs to pay more attention to certain points in order to avoid 
overcompensating the buyer. Suggestions and formulas are submitted below in order to 
ensure that the balance is always achieved in cases of defective goods. Although the 
same objective of damages can be found under American law, American courts, it is 
submitted, have failed to achieve the right balance, as illustrated below. 
Secondly, the application of the principle of Robinson, it is submitted, is undermined 
due to the application, or misapplication, of certain principles concerned with the 
recoverability of damages. This has lead to undercompensation of the buyer by 
disallowing him to recover damages for certain types of loss. By this way, English law, 
it is submitted, fails to achieve the objective of damages by improper application of 
other principles of law. American law seems to 
face similar problems. 
As regards the second part of the conclusion, the most obvious areas where the 
application of the principle of Robinson 
is undermined are non-pecuniary losses and loss 
of profit. Under both English and 
American law, the buyer is not entitled to recover 
more than his lost expectations even 
though his reliance expenses are more than his 
' (1848) 1 Exch 850,855. Supra, p. 1. 
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expectations. This can be understood from the rule that the aggrieved party should not 
be put in a better financial position than the position he would have been in if the 
contract had been performed properly. In this sense, the buyer should not be entitled to 
recover both his lost expectations and wasted reliance expenses since reliance expenses 
normally comprise part of the expectations. Therefore, the buyer should not be allowed 
his lost gross earnings and wasted reliance expenses. However, this should not apply 
where the buyer seeks recovery of his wasted capital expenses and lost net profit. Gross 
earnings are normally comprised of net profit and capital expenses. It can be noted that 
reliance expenses are part of the buyer's expectations unless the buyer has made a bad 
bargain, i. e. where the expectations are less than the capital expenses. Indeed, the buyer 
will not obtain double recovery by allowing him his lost net profit and wasted capital 
expenses. The application of the rule, i. e. the buyer is not entitled to recover for both 
lost expectations and wasted reliance expenses, should be confined to cases where the 
buyer claims his lost gross earnings and wasted capital expenses. English law should 
pay more attention to this point. The obvious example, where the court failed to achieve 
the objective of damages due to its failure to distinguish between gross earnings and net 
2 profit, is the case of Cullinane v. British "Rema" Manufacturing Co. Ltd. In this case, 
the buyer was not permitted to claim both his wasted capital expenses and lost net profit 
caused by defective profit-making machinery. It is submitted that the misapplication of 
the principle that the buyer is not entitled to recover both his lost expectations and 
wasted reliance expenses has undermined the application of the principle of Robinson 
by failing to place the buyer in the same position as if the goods had been free from 
defects. 
The wrong reliance on the distinction between reliance expenses and expectations may 
undermine the objective of damages. This can be the case of wasted pre-contract 
expenses under American law. Under American 
law, damages for wasted pre-contract 
expenses are still unrecoverable. American courts 
justify such an attitude on the grounds 
that pre-contract expenses are not part of reliance expenses. 
However, the classification 
of reliance and expectations, 
it is submitted, should not prevent the recovery for losses 
resulting from a breach of contract. 
Moreover, pre-contract expenses can be part of the 
buyer's expectations where the buyer makes a good 
bargain since the buyer, in such a 
case, makes enough profit to recover 
his pre-contract expenses. If wasted pre-contract 
2 [1954] 1 QB 292. 
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expenses can be recovered as part of the buyer's damages for lost expectations, there 
should be no point in disallowing their recovery where they are claimed independently. 
Therefore, contrary to Ogus, damages for wasted pre-contract expenses should be 
allowed under the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. Ignoring 
such a loss will result in undermining the objective of damages where the only loss of 
the buyer is the wasted pre-contract expenses. Under English law and the CISG, such 
damages are generally recoverable. Indeed, under the CISG, damages can be recovered 
for all foreseeable losses resulting from the breach. In comparing English law with 
American law and the CISG, one may note that English law and the CISG deal better 
with cases where the buyer seeks recovery of his wasted pre-contract expenses. 
The application of the principle of Robinson is also undermined in the area of non- 
pecuniary loss due to the application of the "general non-recoverability rule" in cases of 
certain types of non-pecuniary damage, such as disappointment and mental distress. In 
fact, money award may not remedy the buyer's feelings injury. However, damages are 
the only available remedy for such a damage. Damages should be awarded in order to 
compensate the buyer for such a damage. If the goods had been free from defects, the 
buyer would not have suffered such a damage. Therefore, the principle of Robinson 
should apply in order to place the buyer, so far as money can do it, in the same position 
he would have been in had the goods been free from defects. Although English law 
allows damages for physical inconvenience under the normal restrictions, it seems to 
confine the recovery of damages for mental distress and other intangible losses to 
certain cases. Damages for such losses can be recovered in cases where the contract is 
intended to provide mainly pleasurable amenity and freedom from distress or where 
mental distress is consequent on personal injury or physical inconvenience caused by the 
breach of contract. However, one here may argue that the objective of damages cannot 
be achieved without compensating the buyer for such types of damage under the normal 
restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. The "general non-recoverability rule" 
under English law should be abolished. If 
damages for physical inconvenience can be 
generally awarded, one may question why 
damages for mental distress cannot be 
generally awarded. The emotional status should 
be treated as part of the body. Indeed, in 
, 
it can be noted that view of the recent decision of the 
House of Lords in Malik V. BCC. 3 
English law seems to be moving towards abolishing the "general non-recoverability 
3 [1998] AC 20. 
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rule" in cases of intangible losses. Nevertheless, as the law stands at present, the 
application of the "general non-recoverability rule" undermines the application of the 
principle of Robinson. 
Nevertheless, English courts seem to be less unsuccessful than American courts in 
achieving the objective of damages in cases of non-pecuniary losses due to the 
application of the "general non-recoverability rule" to both cases of physical 
inconvenience and mental distress. English law seems to deal better than American law 
with cases of physical inconvenience. Whilst damages for physical inconvenience are 
generally recoverable under English law, American law allows such damages only 
where the physical inconvenience is severe. The American approach is in contradiction 
with the purpose of damages under Section 2-714 of the UCC. Under this Section, 
damages should be allowed for the losses caused by breach of warranty taking into 
account the normal restrictions imposed on the recovery of damages. 
However, under American law, the objective of damages is less undermined in cases of 
mental distress. American law has gone a step forward in cases where the buyer claims 
damages for mental distress or other intangible losses. Although both English and 
American law apply the "general non-recoverability rule", the latter has gone a step 
forward to consider the severity of mental distress in deciding the recoverability of 
damages. American law applies the same exceptions that can be found under English 
law. In addition, under the American Restatement (Second) of Contracts damages for 
mental distress can be allowed where the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional 
disturbance was a particularly likely result. Nevertheless, although American law seems 
to deal better with cases of mental distress, neither English law nor American law has 
gone far enough to provide for the general recoverability of damages for intangible 
losses. Comparing with the CISG does not provide help in this area. The recoverability 
of damages for non-pecuniary losses seems to be beyond the scope of its application. 
Comment 3 to Article 74 makes it clear that the purpose of damages is to compensate 
the aggrieved party for his financial loss. This may be understandable on the ground that 
intangible losses are analogous to bodily injury for which damages cannot be recovered. 
Article 5 of the Convention excludes liability for personal 
injury and death from the 
scope of the Convention. Arguably, the recoverability of 
damages for the buyer's 
liability to his sub-buyer, who suffered personal injury, 
is most likely beyond the scope 
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of the Convention. This seems to be a suitable regime in the international trade field 
since such a liability widely varies among the several legal systems. 
Another area, where the objective of damages is undermined under American law, is 
loss of profit of new business. The "new business rule" applies under American law in 
order to disallow damages for loss of new business profit. However, such a rule should 
be regarded as a rule of evidence and not of law. Where loss of profit is proved, 
damages should be allowed under the normal restrictions. Whilst the uncertainty as to 
the fact of loss of profit is fatal, it is not as to the amount of loss of profit. English law 
does not face such a problem. It can be noted that English law deals better with the 
remedy of damages in cases of loss of profit of new business. 
Turning back to the first part of the general conclusion, i. e. English law strikes the right 
balance in achieving the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, and ensuring that 
the buyer is not overcompensated. In order to keep such a balance, three points should 
be considered. Firstly, the court, in applying the principle of Robinson, should look at 
the potential end-result of a proper performance of the contract. Secondly, the court 
should consider the actual position that the buyer is placed in due to the breach of 
warranty of quality. Thirdly, in order to avoid overcompensating or undercompensating 
the buyer, the court should consider the buyer's actual loss resulting from breach of 
warranty of quality. In fact, the UCC and the CISG allow damages for the losses 
resulting from the breach. However, the buyer under all of the SGA, the UCC and the 
CISG should not be allowed for more than his actual loss. In determining the actual loss, 
one has to consider the profit derived from the breach. 
The first point can justify why the prima facie measure should consider the value at the 
time of acceptance and not the time of delivery. The end-result of proper performance of 
the contract is to deliver conforming goods which can continue 
being conforming in 
performing their potential use. It 
is unlikely for the buyer to discover the defect in the 
goods until he receives them. Therefore, 
it is more logical, in applying the prima facie 
measure, to consider the value of the goods at 
the time of acceptance. In fact, the prima 
facie measure under the SGA considers the value of the goods at the time of 
delivery 
while under the UCC the goods are valued at 
the time of acceptance. Nevertheless, this 
may not create any difference 
in the application of the prima facie measure under 
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English and American law since the goods are normally valued at the time when the 
buyer has a reasonable chance to discover the defect of the goods. Therefore, where the 
buyer has passed the goods to a sub-buyer without examining them and the seller was 
aware or should have been aware, of the subsale, goods should be valued at the time of 
discovery of the defect by the sub-buyer. Similarly, where the seller caused a delay in 
the resale of the defective goods, the goods will be valued at the time of resale. 
A significant example on the first point, i. e. the potential end-result of proper 
performance of the contract, is the case of profit-making goods. In such cases, damages 
should not be quantified under the prima facie measure. In applying the principle of 
Robinson in cases where the buyer uses the goods for their commercial life, the court 
should look at the potential gross earnings that the buyer could have gained but for the 
breach. In order to consider the potential end-result of proper performance of the 
contract, the court has to consider also the potential profit that could have been gained 
by investing the potential annual earnings for the commercial period of the goods. In 
such a case, the buyer is entitled to recover the difference between the potential net 
profit and the actual net profit that the buyer gained by using the goods as delivered. In 
addition, the buyer may be entitled to damages for the loss of chance of investing the 
annual earnings for the period of the commercial life of the goods. Net profit can be 
quantified under the following formula: 
[(the total earnings of the goods during their commercial life + the residual 
value of the goods at the end of their commercial life) less the contract price of 
the plant and any further expenses incurred in reliance on the contract] 
In order to strike the right balance by achieving the objective of damages, as stated 
in 
Robinson, and ensuring that the buyer is not overcompensated, the second point 
mentioned above, i. e. the actual position that the 
buyer is placed in as a result of the 
breach, should be considered, especially in cases where the 
buyer suffers loss of 
production. In fact, the actual position that the 
buyer is placed in may indicate the 
buyer's actual loss. In cases of profit-making goods, the 
buyer should not be entitled to 
recover for both the diminution 
in value of the goods supplied and loss of production 
since by doing so, the buyer will 
be overcompensated. Damages should be allowed for 
the actual loss of the buyer, i. e. loss of production. 
However, the buyer should not be 
entitled to recover such damages where 
he has repaired or replaced the goods. In such a 
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case, the buyer's actual loss is the diminution in value or cost of repair. In such a case, 
the application of the principle of Robinson may overcompensate the buyer. The buyer 
should be entitled to recover damages for his actual loss only. The same result can be 
reached by applying the mitigation principle, which applies to disallow damages for 
losses that have been, or could have been, avoided. Therefore, where the buyer stopped 
using the defective goods in order to mitigate his loss, he may be entitled to recover the 
loss of net profit during the period of using the goods plus his loss of gross earnings for 
the remaining period of the commercial life of the goods after subtracting the running 
expenses which would have been incurred if the goods had operated as warranted. In 
such a case, the buyer's damages under the principle of Robinson should be reduced in 
order to allow the buyer damages for his actual loss and, as a result, ensure that he is not 
overcompensated. 
As regards the third point mentioned above, i. e. the actual loss resulting from breach of 
warranty of quality, the court, in applying the principle of Robinson, may avoid 
overcompensating the buyer by reducing his damages by the amount gained from the 
breach. For example, the court may reduce the buyer's damages by the amount gained 
by using superior substitute goods. Where the buyer gains from the breach by obtaining 
a substitute of superior capacity, the extra profit gained should be deducted from his 
damages in order to allow him the same economic end-result of delivering conforming 
goods. In such cases, the following formula is submitted to be considered for the 
quantification of damages: 
([cost of replacement + extra expenses incurred in using defective goods] - [the 
salvage value of the defective goods + extra profit derived from the superiority 
of the substituted goods]). 
In addition, in determining the buyer's actual loss 
in cases where the defective goods 
cause delay in the operation of a business, the court should take 
into account the profit 
gained by investing the capital during the period of 
delay. In allowing the buyer 
damages under the principle of Robinson, the 
buyer's damages should be reduced by the 
amount gained by freeing the capital 
during the period of delay. Based on the analysis of 
Williamson, the following formula may apply. 
{[(total expected percentage on return on capital - the percentage on actual 
return) x (capital investment)] x number of years of recovery period. 
} 
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A similar conclusion should be reached where the substituted goods are of a longer 
commercial life than the remainder of the potential commercial life of the replaced 
goods. In such cases, the buyer will have the chance to invest the price of a new machine 
between the time of expiry of the supposed commercial life of the replaced machine and 
the end of the commercial life of the substituted machine. Profits derived from investing 
the price for such a period should be deducted from the buyer's damages. However, the 
court may not be convinced that the buyer will use the substituted goods for all their 
commercial life; in such a case, the court may disregard the commercial life of the 
substituted goods for the purpose of calculation of damages as in the case of Bacon v. 
Cooper (Metals) Ltd. 4 Nevertheless, the court, it is submitted, should pay more attention 
to the commercial life of substitute goods in order to avoid overcompensating the buyer. 
On the other hand, considering the buyer's actual loss may increase the buyer's 
damages. In general, the principle of Robinson applies objectively unless special 
circumstances indicate otherwise. Therefore, the buyer in normal circumstances 
recovers damages for the diminution in the objective value of goods. The objective 
value can be measured by the market value or the contract price, as explained in this 
research. However, the subjective value of the proper performance of the contract may 
be more than the objective value. In order to allow damages for the buyer's actual loss, 
the subjective value of the goods should be considered as long as such a value was, or 
should have been, in the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. 
Therefore, in principle, loss of `consumer surplus' is recoverable as long as the buyer 
cannot avoid such a loss by obtaining substitute goods or curing the defect. This should 
apply similarly under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG although the CISG does not 
expressly state the prima facie measure of damages. However, where the value of the 
goods fluctuates, the prima facie measure may apply under the CISG in order to allow 
the buyer damages for the diminution in the objective or subjective value of the goods. 
In fact, the subjective valuation may be in favour of the seller where he can prove that 
the defective goods are of more value in the eye of the buyer than their objective value. 
Therefore, ignoring the subjective value may overcompensate or undercompensate the 
buyer and, as a result, the required balance 
in awarding damages under the principle of 
Robinson may be affected. 
4 [1982] 1 All ER 397. 
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In fact, the actual loss of the buyer may be considered in order to allow the buyer more 
damages than the damages he is entitled to recover under the principle of Robinson. 
This can be the case where the repair or replacement increases the value of the goods. 
Of course, this does not happen in cases of profit-making goods since the buyer's 
damages should be reduced by the amount of profit derived from the improvement of 
the goods. In certain cases, such as secondhand goods, the repair may improve the 
quality of goods. If substitute goods are not available, repair becomes the only way to 
deal with the defect of the goods. In such a case, it can be argued that the actual loss of 
the buyer is the cost of repair even though such a cost exceeds the diminution in value. 
However, the buyer may not be expected to cure the defective goods where the cost of 
cure is very disproportionate to the difference in value. In such a case, it seems unfair to 
allow the buyer damages calculated on the basis of the cost of cure. Therefore, as 
decided by the House of Lords in Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. and another 
v. Forsyth, 5 the buyer should not be entitled to recover the cost of cure where it is 
unreasonable to cure the defective performance. At any case, the buyer should not be 
entitled to more than the cost of cure since such a cost represents his actual loss. 
However, this does not apply where the cure makes the goods of less quality than the 
contractual quality. In such a case, the buyer's actual loss is the cost of cure plus the 
difference between the cost of cure and the value of the goods that they would have had 
if they had been in confonnity with the contract. 
The principles of betterment and reasonableness are necessary to avoid 
overcompensating or undercompensating the buyer under the principle of Robinson. In 
addition, in order to measure the buyer's actual loss, subsale contracts should be 
considered in assessing the buyer's damages provided that the subsale was in the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of making the contract. English law 
has recently developed in the right direction by considering subsale contracts in 
quantifying the buyer's damages for breach of warranty of quality. Goods may be 
purchased in order to be used as 
ingredients for producing other products. If the 
products are discovered defective 
by sub-buyers, the buyer's damages will be quantified 
on the basis of his liability to his sub-buyer provided 
that the seller was aware, or should 
have been aware, at the time of making the contract, of the fact that the goods will be 
5 [1996] 1 AC 344. 
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manufactured. This is due to the fact that the buyer's actual loss is his liability to sub- 
buyers. This is the current position of English law, as stated in Bence Graphics 
International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd. 6 Of course, the buyer's damages will be quantified 
differently if the goods are discovered defective before manufacturing them or the 
products are discovered defective before selling them. In the former case, the buyer will 
be entitled to recover damages for the diminution in value of the goods whilst in the 
latter case he will be entitled to damages for the diminution in value of the products. In 
such cases, if the buyer cannot obtain a substitute, he may also be entitled to recover for 
his liability to sub-buyers. 
It can be pointed out that the decision in Bence confirms that the buyer should not be 
entitled to recover more than his actual loss. Moreover, one may argue that the objective 
of damages, as stated in Robinson, can be achieved by allowing the buyer damages for 
his liability to sub-buyers. In applying the principle of Robinson, one should look at the 
potential economic end-result of the proper performance of the contract. If the goods 
had been delivered as warranted, the buyer would have manufactured them and 
successfully delivered the products to sub-buyers. Damages should be awarded in order 
to put the buyer in such a position unless the buyer discovers the defect before 
manufacturing the goods or selling the products. Here, the buyer may be able to mitigate 
his loss by not manufacturing the goods or by not selling the products. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the award in a case such as Bence can be made in reliance on the 
principle of Robinson. A similar conclusion should be reached in cases where the buyer 
purchases goods for resale. If the buyer successfully performed resale contracts, he 
should be entitled to no more than nominal damages since he suffered no actual loss. 
Thereupon, contrary to Treitel, it is submitted that the case of Slater v. Hoyle & Smith 
Ltd? was wrongly decided. 
To sum up, the buyer should not be allowed 
damages for more than his actual loss. The 
court, in applying the principle of 
Robinson, should consider the end-result of proper 
performance of the contract. 
In other words, the court should consider the potential 
outcome of using the goods if they 
had been in conformity with the contract provided 
that the seller was aware, or should 
have been aware, at the time of making the contract 
6 [1997] 1 All ER 979. 
7[ 1920] 2 KB 11. 
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of the potential use of the goods. For example, the direct result of proper performance, 
i. e. delivery of conforming goods, should be ignored where the seller was aware, or 
should have been aware, at the time of making the contract that the goods were bought 
to be used in profit-making business. By this way, the court can strike the right balance 
by achieving the objective of damages, as stated in Robinson, and at the same time 
ensuring that the buyer is not overcompensated. 
Although damages should be quantified under the SGA, the UCC and the CISG 
similarly, American courts seem to be less successful than English courts in allowing 
the buyer damages for his actual loss. There should be a distinction between the 
negative results of the breach and the actual loss resulting from the breach. For 
example, in cases where the goods are bought in order to be manufactured, breach of 
warranty of quality may cause a diminution in value of the goods supplied, a diminution 
in value of the products manufactured and a buyer's liability to sub-buyers. However, 
these negative results should not be considered as actual losses resulting from breach of 
warranty of quality. The buyer's actual loss depends on the stage when the defect is 
discovered as discussed above. In fact, in a number of UCC cases, such as the famous 
case of Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 8 the buyer was allowed damages for the 
diminution in value of the seeds or herbicides and the diminution in value of the crops. 
The buyer's actual loss is the diminution in value of the crops since the seeds and 
herbicides are usually used in any case to produce the crops. Under the CISG, damages 
should be allowed for the buyer's actual loss caused by the seller's breach. Due to the 
relatively small number of cases decided under the CISG in the area of damages for 
defective goods, it does not seem possible to compare the practice of quantifying 
damages under the Convention with the practice of English and American courts in this 
area. However, the problems that exist in English and American law regarding the 
quantification of damages may be avoided under the Convention by considering the 
aforementioned methods of assessment of damages. 
In general, where the buyer's loss is 
less than what the buyer has gained by not 
performing the contract properly, the seller may gain 
from his breach by allowing the 
buyer damages calculated on the basis of his actual loss. On the other hand, by allowing 
the buyer restitutionary damages, i. e. damages calculated on the basis of the seller's gain 
1 1982 S. D. LEXIS 262; 33 UCC Rep. Serv. 588 (1982). 
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from the breach, the buyer will be overcompensated. The same result may be reached 
where the buyer is allowed price reduction as stated under the CISG. The amount of 
price reduction is not quantified on the basis of the buyer's loss. Under English law, 
consumers will be able to claim price reduction under certain restrictions after the 
implementation of the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods 
and Associated Guarantees. In order to avoid overcompensating the buyer or allowing 
the seller to gain from his breach, it is submitted that there should be a legislative 
intervention in order to apportion the windfall between the parties. 
Clearly, before quantifying the buyer's damages, the court discusses whether the 
damages claimed are recoverable and, in many cases, whether the buyer has a cause of 
action. The principle of Robinson is concerned with the recoverability and quantification 
of damages since it aims at placing the innocent party, so far as money can do it, in the 
same situation as if the contract had been properly performed. However, damages 
recoverable under the principle of Robinson can be reduced or denied by the application 
of other principles developed by the common law, such as remoteness and mitigation. 
English courts should pay more attention to the restriction of causation in allowing 
damages for `loss of the right to reject'. The buyer should not be entitled to recover 
under the principle of Robinson for losses resulting from the buyer's acceptance of the 
goods and not from his loss of the right to reject documents. In general, there seem to be 
no material differences in the application of these principles under English law, the 
UCC and the CISG. However, the remoteness principle does not apply under the UCC 
to cases of physical loss. In such cases, damages can be recovered as long as the loss is 
proximately caused by the defective goods. This seems to leave the seller in an insecure 
position since he may be held liable for remote losses resulting under special 
circumstances. As a result, this may increase the costs since the insurance will be higher. 
It is submitted that the remoteness principle should restrict the recovery of damages for 
all types of loss. This is the position under English 
law and the CISG. 
By allowing the buyer damages for 
his loss, the restriction of mitigation can be satisfied. 
Where the buyer has mitigated his loss, damages recoverable under the principle of 
Robinson should be reduced in order to avoid compensating the 
buyer for the avoided 
loss, i. e. in order to avoid overcompensating the 
buyer. In fact, by allowing the buyer 
damages for his actual loss, the buyer will not be entitled to recover for his avoided loss. 
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Therefore, this function of the mitigation principle is already taken into account by 
allowing the buyer damages for his actual loss. However, the application of the principle 
of mitigation is still significant since it reduces the buyer's damages under the principle 
of Robinson by disallowing him damages for losses which could reasonably have been 
avoided. 
The main difference between English law and the UCC is the defence of lack of privity. 
Due to this defence, the buyer may be left uncompensated and the remote seller may 
escape liability for losses caused by the defective quality of goods. Under the current 
English law, the ultimate buyer seems to have no action in contract against the producer 
of the goods. Where the retailer has disappeared or become insolvant, the buyer may be 
left uncompensated for his loss. The Law Commission Report, on which the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 is based, makes it clear that the Act does not provide 
much help in cases of chain contracts. However, the Law Commission Report makes it 
clear that the 1999 Act may offer the third party beneficiary, who was expressly 
identified at the time of making the contract, the right to sue the retailer for defective 
goods. The requirement of express identification, it is submitted, leads to unfair results 
in certain cases. The third party beneficiary should have an action against the retailer 
where the circumstances of the case reasonably indicate that the goods are bought for a 
third party. Furthermore, the ultimate buyer should be entitle to recover damages from 
the remote seller where such a seller was aware, or should have been aware, of the fact 
that the goods will be resold to the ultimate buyer. English courts should go beyond the 
1999 Act, at least in cases where the chain of contract is broken, in order to prevent the 
manufacturer escaping liability and at the same time ensure that the ultimate buyer is not 
left uncompensated. 
In comparison, American law is more 
flexible in applying the defence of lack of privity. 
In fact, under several American jurisdictions, such a 
defence does not apply to cases 
where the ultimate buyer sues the manufacturer 
for losses resulting from defective 
goods. Under the UCC, retailer's 
implied or express warranty may extend to third party 
beneficiary. Under the draft of revised Article 2 of the UCC, the manufacturer's express 
warranty addressed to the ultimate 
buyers or end-users is legally enforceable. English 
law seems to deal with such a 
defence differently. The enforceability of express 
warranties issued by the remote seller 
to the ultimate buyer is open to debate. Although 
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the prevailing view is that such warranties are legally binding, the issue is still 
controversial. Such warranties are normally binding where they furnish a ground for a 
collateral contract. Under the EC Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer 
Goods and Associated Guarantees, certain guarantees issued by the producer to 
consumers are legally binding. Currently, American law seems to deal better with the 
liability of remote seller and the liability of the retailer to third party beneficiary. 
However, the position in English law is likely to change in the near future. The EC 
directive will be reviewed with respects to the producer's liability. Unfortunately, if a 
provision for the producer's liability is added under the EC Directive, it will be confined 
to consumer cases and, most likely, will not provide for the remedy of damages. English 
law should go farther than that by relaxing the requirement of privity where the third 
party beneficiary sues a retailer or the ultimate buyer or end-user sues the remote seller. 
Finally, it can be noted that the buyer's actual loss should always be the starting point 
in determining the buyer's compensatory damages for breach of warranty of quality. 
Not all the negative results of the breach should be considered in quantifying the 
buyer's damages. In applying the principle of Robinson, the court should consider the 
economic end-result of proper performance and the actual position that the buyer is 
placed in due to the defective performance. In order to avoid undermining the principle 
of Robinson, the court should award damages for all the actual loss caused by the 
defective quality of goods, taking into account the normal restrictions imposed on the 
recovery of damages. By applying the methods of quantification submitted above, the 
issue of overcompensation or undercompensation will be extremely unlikely to arise. 
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